CHINA,  JAPAN  AND  KOREA 


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in  2015 


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B.  T.  Prideaux ] 


[. Frontispiece 


DAWN  ON  THE  CHIENTANG  RIVER,  CHEKIANG. 

“The  moving  homes  of  men  whose  lives  are  as  the  lives  of  their 
forefathers.*’ 


CHINA 

JAPAN  AND  KOREA 


BY 

J.  O.  P.  BLAND 


ILLUSTRATED 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER’S  SONS 


1921 


Printed  in  Great  Britain 


The  very  idea  of  the  power  and  the  right  of  the 
people  to  establish  government  presupposes  the  duty 
of  every  individual  to  obey  the  established  govern- 
ment. All  obstructions  to  the  execution  of  the  laws, 
all  combinations  and  associations,  under  whatever 
plausible  character,  with  the  real  design  to  direct, 
control,  counteract  or  awe  the  regular  deliberation 
and  action  of  the  constituted  authorities,  are 
destructive  of  this  fundamental  principle,  and  of 
fatal  tendency.  They  serve  to  organise  faction,  to 
give  it  an  artificial  and  extraordinary  force ; to  put, 
in  the  place  of  the  delegated  will  of  the  nation,  the 
will  of  a party,  often  a small  but  artful  and  enter- 
prising minority  of  the  community.  . . . However 
combinations  or  associations  of  the  above  description 
may  now  and  then  answer  popular  ends,  they  are 
likely,  in  the  course  of  time  and  things,  to  become 
potent  engines,  by  which  cunning,  ambitious  and 
unprincipled  men  will  be  enabled  to  subvert  the 
power  of  the  people  and  to  usurp  for  themselves 
the  reins  of  government,  destroying  afterward  the 
very  engines  which  have  lifted  them  to  unjust 
dominion. — From  Washington’s  Farewell  Address. 


CONTENTS 


PART  I 

A POLITICAL  SURVEY 

CHAP.  PAGE 

I.  INTRODUCTORY  ......  I 

II.  YUAN  SHIH-K’AI,  1912-16  .....  29 

III.  CHINA  JOINS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR  ...  52 

IV.  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY  .....  68 

V.  CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  ....  89 

VI.  china:  the  problem  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  . -113 

vii.  japan:  her  vital  problem  ....  135 

VIII.  japan’s  policy  in  CHINA  . . . . -156 

IX.  THE  JAPAN  OF  TO-DAY  . . . . . 1 76 

X.  THE  INDEPENDENCE  MOVEMENT  IN  KOREA  . . 1 92 

PART  II 

STUDIES  AND  IMPRESSIONS 

XI.  ON  A JAPANESE  PACIFIC  LINER  ....  209 

XII.  MODERN  TOKYO  ......  220 

XIII.  AT  A JAPANESE  THEATRE  .....  230 

XIV.  A DAY  IN  SEOUL  ......  240 

XV.  SHANGHAI  .......  245 

XVI.  NORTHWARD  THROUGH  SHANTUNG  . . . 267 

XVII.  PEKING  IN  1920  ......  278 

XVIII.  AN  EMPEROR  IN  WAITING  .....  295 

XIX.  THREE  PALACES  ......  309 

323 

vii 


INDEX 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


} • 


To  fact  page 
Frontispiece 


I' 


DAWN  ON  THE  CHIENTANG  RIVER 
WISDOM  IN  THE  ROUGH 
VERY  BUSY 

CHINA  .*  THE  ETERNAL  PROBLEM 
BREADWINNERS  . 

A CHINESE  GARDEN 
A BUDDHIST  PRIEST 
ASCENDING  THE  RAPIDS,  HWEI  RIVER 
A FISHERMAN  ON  THE  WHANGPOO 

UNMARRIED  GIRLS  OF  THE  MIDDLE  CLASS,  SHANGHAI 
SUNSET  ON  THE  HWEI  RIVER  .... 

A VILLAGE  ON  THE  CHIENTANG  RIVER  . 

A WAYSIDE  SHRINE  ...... 

“SHE  DWELT  AMONG  THE  UNTRODDEN  WAYS  ”1 
HOMEWARD  AT  EVENING  ) 

THINGS  ANCIENT  AND  MODERN  .... 

“THOSE  THAT  DIG  AND  WEAVE,  THAT  PLANT  AND  BUILD” 
“ JUST  A SONG  AT  TWILIGHT  ” 

SCENE  IN  THE  THEATRE  QUARTER,  KYOTO 1 
THE  PALACE  MOAT,  TOKYO  f 

FUJIYAMA  THE  PEERLESS 
A JUNK  ON  THE  WHANGPOO 
BOAT  TRAFFIC,  SOOCHOW  CREEK,  SHANGHAI 
THE  RICE  HARVEST,  JAPAN  'l 
PRIMITIVE  TRANSPORT,  Japan/ 

A KOREAN  FAMILY  IN  WINTER  COSTUME  j 
CORNER  OF  THE  AUDIENCE  HALL,  SEOUL J 


20 

26 

3° 

38 

56 

66 

82 

90 

100 

108 

116 

126 

132 

144 

160 

175 

185 

200 


ix 


X 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


ON  BOARD  A JAPANESE  LINER  t WRESTLING 

THE  MOATED  WALLS  OF  CHIYODA  PALACE,  TOKYof 

UTAYEMON  AND  FUKUSUKfi  . 

THEATRE  STREET  IN  KYOTO  . 

IN  THE  OLD  PALACE  ENCLOSURE,  SEOUL.  ] 

KOREAN  GIRLS  AT  A JAPANESE  SCHOOL,  SEOUl/ 

A QUAINT  LITTLE  MONSTER,  SHANGHAI 
MODES  AND  FASHIONS,  SHANGHAI 
YOUNG  CHINA  : MARRIAGE  UP  TO  DATE] 

A LADY  OF  FASHION,  SHANGHAI 
MILITARISM  IN  THE  MAKING 
THE  FEMALE  OF  THE  SPECIES 
GENERAL  MA  LIANG’S  TROOPS  AT  DRILL  | 

ANCESTOR  WORSHIP  j 

CAMELS  RESTING,  PEKING 

A CAMEL  TRAIN  FROM  THE  WESTERN  HILLS,  PEKING 
MILLET  IN  OCTOBER 
ON  THE  FROZEN  PEIHO,  TIENTSIN 
THE  NORTHERN  RAILWAY  APPROACH  TO  PEKING  | 
UNDER  THE  WALLS  OF  PEKING 
A LLAMA  RITUAL,  PEKING  j 

IN  THE  MANCHU  QUARTER,  PEKINGj 
ENTRANCE  TO  A TAJEITS  RESIDENCE,  PEKING] 

IN  THE  ONCE-FORBIDDEN  CITY.  PEKING 


To  /ace  page 
. 212 

• 230 

. 236 

. 240 

. 248 

• 258 

. 264 

. 272 

282 

290 

• 3°° 

. 306 

• 312 


PART  I 

A POLITICAL  SURVEY 


CHAPTER  I 


INTRODUCTORY 

In  a book  published  at  the  end  of  1912,1  the  year  of 
the  abdication  of  the  Manchu  dynasty  and  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Chinese  Republic,  I endeavoured  to  trace 
the  causes,  and  to  predict  some  of  the  results,  of  that 
upheaval.  Before  proceeding  to  discuss  the  history  of 
the  eight  years  which  have  elapsed  since  that  book  was 
written,  I propose  to  revert  briefly  to  some  of  the  views 
which  it  expressed  and  to  some  of  the  opinions  which  it 
evoked,  in  China  and  abroad.  Eight  years  are  all  too 
brief  a space  of  time  in  the  life  of  a nation  to  afford  any 
conclusive  evidence  as  to  the  direction  of  its  political 
evolution ; nevertheless,  the  course  of  events  since  1912, 
and  the  actual  position  of  affairs  at  Peking  and  in  the 
provinces  afford,  I think,  good  ground  for  certain  useful 
conclusions  in  regard  to  questions  upon  which  opinion  has 
widely  differed,  and  still  differs,  in  England  and  America. 

Of  these,  the  most  important  is,  firstly,  the  general 
question  of  the  fitness  of  the  Chinese  people  for  self- 
government  ; and,  secondly,  the  question  of  Young  China’s 
aspirations  and  achievements  in  the  organisation  and 
working  of  representative  institutions. 

I do  not  propose  to  recapitulate  here  the  causes  of  the 
Chinese  revolution  of  1911-12;  the  truth  is  now  generally 
recognised,  I believe,  that  these  causes  w’ere  funda- 
mentally economic  rather  than  political,  and  that,  until 
the  social  system  of  the  Chinese  people  shall  have  been 
modified  by  process  of  education,  the  acute  pressure  of 
population  upon  means  of  subsistence,  which  results 

1 Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in  China, 

B 


2 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


from  that  system,  must  continue  to  be  an  ever-recurring 
source  of  unrest  and  strife.  It  is  also  generally  recognised 
that  under  these  conditions,  no  matter  what  names  and 
shapes  authority  may  assume,  the  Chinese  can  never 
hope  to  be  quietly  and  orderly  governed,  unless  and 
until  the  Central  Government  is  strong  enough  to  keep 
in  check,  by  force,  the  ever-latent  elements  of  disorder. 
All  over  the  world,  and  most  noticeably  since  the  War, 
men  are  being  led  to  perceive  that  the  increasing  pressure 
of  population  upon  the  food  resources  of  the  planet, 
constitutes  civilisation’s  gravest  problem  and  the  para- 
mount cause  of  world  unrest.  In  China,  the  social 
fabric  is,  comparatively  speaking,  so  simple,  that  the 
connection  between  cause  and  effect  is  swift  and  un- 
mistakable when  pestilence  or  famine  decimate  whole 
provinces.  A few  observers  there  are  who,  while  ad- 
mitting the  severity  of  the  economic  pressure  which  has 
made  Chinese  history  for  centuries  a series  of  cataclysms, 
still  profess  to  believe  that  it  may  be  relieved  by  ex- 
pedients, such  as  emigration,  the  scientific  development 
of  mines,  or  the  improvement  of  agriculture.  But, 
generally  speaking,  the  truth  appears  to  be  realised  that, 
even  if  it  were  possible  to  obtain  temporary  allevia- 
tion by  any  or  all  of  these  means,  the  fundamental  problem 
would  still  remain  unsolved,  the  application  of  the  law 
of  population  being  merely  deferred,  and  its  results 
aggravated,  by  such  expedients,  unless  accompanied  by 
a reduction  of  the  birth-rate. 

The  views  which  I ventured  to  put  forward  in  1912 
concerning  the  permanent  causes  of  unrest,  and  incident- 
ally of  the  revolution,  in  China,  naturally  appealed  with 
greater  force  to  Europeans  there  resident  than  to  ob- 
servers and  students  of  Chinese  affairs  at  a distance. 
Many  of  the  latter,  unfortunately,  are  by  temperament 
or  vocation  disposed  to  believe  in  the  efficacy  of  political 
formulae  or  religious  beliefs  to  relieve  society  of  the 
penalties  of  its  collective  ignorance  or  collective  folly, 
and  attach  small  importance  to  economics.  For  a certain 


INTRODUCTORY 


3 


very  prevalent  class  of  rhapsodists  and  idealists,  the 
experience  of  a thousand  yesterdays  is  always  as  nought 
compared  with  to-morrow’s  vision  of  the  Promised 
Land.  Show  them,  by  weight  of  indisputable  evidence 
gathered  from  trustworthy  sources,  that  in  the  East  no 
magic  virtue  of  regeneration  proceeds  from  the  blessed 
words  “ Democracy  ” and  “ Republic,”  prove  to  them 
that  the  so-called  Parliamentarians  have  reduced  the 
political  status  of  China  to  the  level  of  San  Domingo, 
they  will  denounce  you  as  a reactionary,  urge  you  to 
have  more  faith,  and  proceed  to  proclaim  with  increased 
fervour  the  application  of  their  infallible  panaceas. 

Writing  in  1912,  while  the  Republic  was  still  in  the 
making,  I observed  that  no  stable  form  of  government 
could  possibly  be  evolved  from  the  materials  at  Young 
China’s  disposal.  The  reasons  for  this  belief  were  given, 
as  follows  : — 

“ Remembering  the  ancestry  and  genesis  of  Young 
China,  being  personally  acquainted  with  many  of  its 
leading  spirits,  having  followed  its  operations  and  activities 
in  every  province  from  the  beginning  of  the  present 
revolution,  I am  compelled  to  the  conviction  that  salva- 
tion from  this  quarter  is  impossible,  not  only  because 
Young  China  itself  is  unregenerate  and  undisciplined, 
but  because  its  ideals  and  projects  of  government  involve 
the  creation  of  a new  social  and  political  structure  utterly 
unsuited  to  the  character  and  traditions  of  the  race; 
because  it  is  contrary  to  all  experience  that  a people  cut 
off  from  its  deep-rooted  beliefs  and  habits  of  life  should 
develop  and  retain  a vigorous  national  consciousness.” 

Another  passage  summarised  the  actual  position  created 
by  the  collapse  of  the  Manchu  Government’s  authority, 
as  follows  : — 

“ The  army,  uncontrolled  and  uncontrollable,  has 
already  repudiated  Young  China;  the  horde  of  hungry 
politicians  remains  absorbed  in  futile  arguments  and 
sordid  intrigues;  the  Government  is  without  prestige, 
policy  or  power ; three  parties  in  the  State,  alike 


4 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


forgetful  of  their  country’s  urgent  needs,  struggle  for  place 
and  pelf;  the  Cabinet  is  distracted  by  the  advice  of 
amateur  politicians  at  the  capital  and  the  threats  and 
protests  of  the  provinces.” 

These  opinions  were  naturally  denounced  with  great 
vehemence  by  Young  China  in  the  vernacular  Press,  and 
challenged  by  more  than  one  vocational  optimist  amongst 
the  foreign  advisers  of  the  Chinese  Government.  They 
were  also  freely  criticised  by  certain  writers,  notably  in 
America,  who  had  discovered,  in  Sun  Yat-sen  and  his 
ready-made  Republic,  Heaven-sent  proof  of  the  saving 
grace  of  democratic  principles.  The  Daily  News,  for 
example,  quoted  with  approval  the  opinion  of  a well- 
known  Oriental  scholar,  who,  writing  from  Peking  in 
November  1912,  said  : — 

“ The  influence  of  men  like  Sun  Yat-sen  and  Huang 
Hsing  has  tended  to  effect  a rapprochement  between  the 
Nationalists  and  President  Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  to  the  great 
improvement  of  the  situation.  The  position  here  has 
improved  to  an  extraordinary  extent.” 

A month  later  the  Christian  Science  Monitor  of  Boston, 
U.S.A.,  severely  criticising  my  views,  gave  a glowing 
account  of  the  preparations  which  it  seriously  believed 
were  then  a-foot  in  China  for  “ the  elections  for  the  first 
National  Parliament.”  Its  picture  of  political  activities 
under  the  Republic  is  worth  reproducing,  not  only  because 
of  its  earnest  absurdity,  but  because,  in  spite  of  all  that  has 
since  happened,  the  same  sort  of  nonsense  is  still  being 
written  by  the  incurable  theorists  who  insist  that  the 
East  is  bound  to  derive  moral  and  material  benefits  from 
adopting  the  political  institutions  of  the  West. 

Wrote  the  Editor  of  the  Monitor  : — 

“ Sharply  contrasted  with  the  pessimistic  predictions 
of  Mr.  Bland,  whilom  representative  of  the  London  Times 
in  Peking,  now  giving  a series  of  lectures  at  the  Lowell 
Institute  in  Boston,  are  the  hopeful  comments  of  the 
Chinese  Press  and  public  men  on  the  course  of  events 


INTRODUCTORY 


5 


during  the  first  year  of  the  Republic.  . . . Unless  our 
sources  of  information  are  much  distorted,  the  twelve- 
month  has  disclosed  both  Sun  Yat-sen  and  Yuan  Shih- 
k’ai  as  large  enough  to  subordinate  themselves  and  their 
ambitions  to  performing  genuine  national  duties,  one 
as  a peripatetic  teacher  of  racial  unity  throughout  the 
provinces,  and  the  other  as  provisional  President,  hand- 
ling diverse  domestic  and  international  problems  with 
sagacity  and  patience.  No  mere  novices  or  doctrinaires 
are  in  power  at  Peking,  as  Mr.  Bland  would  have  the 
American  public  believe.  . . . Evidently  they  err  who 
think  the  Chinese  ill-adapted  to  deal  with  principles 
and  methods  of  government.  The  papers  of  State  issued 
at  Peking  to-day  not  only  lack  most  of  the  former  ornate- 
ness of  phrasing  and  absurdity  of  excuse  for  official  lapses 
which  often  used  to  make  the  Imperial  Decrees  as  ludicrous 
as  they  were  cruel ; these  papers  are  now  straightforward, 
logical,  and  impressive  in  their  vital  dealings  with  concrete 
needs  of  the  people.” 

Many  visions  of  the  new  Chinese  Arcadia  were  vouch- 
safed at  this  period.  Here  is  one  proclaimed  by  Mr.  Hua 
Chuen-mei,  Secretary  of  the  China  Society  of  America, 
in  an  article  published  by  the  New  York  Tribune  in 
January  1913  : — 

“ Since  the  establishment  of  the  Republic,  all  the 
officials  of  the  country  have  been  fulfilling  their  adminis- 
trative and  judicial  functions,  and  commerce  and  in- 
dustry have  been  resumed  with  added  eagerness  and 
enterprise.  Every  branch  of  civil  life  has  been,  or  is 
being,  reconstituted  or  modified  to  accord  with  the  new 
national  spirit.  The  people  as  a whole  are  content  and 
pleased  with  the  Government  they  have  ordained,  because 
even  in  the  short  space  of  a twelvemonth,  that  Govern- 
ment has  demonstrated  its  honesty,  its  efficiency,  and  its 
loyalty  to  the  national  ideals.  . . . 

“ In  the  fall  of  1911,  when  the  revolutionary  armies 
in  the  Yangtsze  Valley  raised  the  standard  of  republicanism 
as  against  monarchism,  China  had  found  herself.  The 
enthusiasm  for  popular  sovereignty  spread  like  wild 
prairie  fire.  The  eighteen  mutually  jealous  provinces 
under  the  Manchu  regime  now  ceased  to  be  divided. 


6 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


The  movement  for  a series  of  independent  States  was 
promptly  thrown  overboard,  and  the  people  of  all  China 
eagerly  and  without  coercion  fell  into  line,  first  to  oust  the 
Manchu,  then  to  establish  representative  Government. . . . 

“ . . . The  people  of  China  had  spoken  loud  and  un- 
mistakably in  favour  of  the  democratic  principle  of 
Government.  Besides,  the  form  of  republicanism,  long 
ago  communicated  by  American  merchants  and  mission- 
aries and  by  the  Chinese  students  educated  in  American 
institutions  of  learning,  had  already  universally  infected 
the  people,  and  as  the  years  passed,  the  symptoms  of  a 
wider  consciousness  of  popular  rights  developed  into  a 
veritable  contagious  disease  for  national  freedom  and 
enfranchisement.” 

I have  quoted  the  above,  not  only  because  of  its 
melancholy  retrospective  interest,  but  because  it  is  typical 
of  the  windy  ullage  with  which  the  Young  China  of 
Western  learning  still  regales  its  admirers  abroad ; typical 
of  the  kind  of  bread  which  returns  to  us,  after  many 
days,  cast  by  the  hand  of  error  upon  the  waters  of 
delusion.1 

It  is  only  fair  to  say  that  public  opinion  abroad  during 
the  first  years  of  the  Republic  was  powerfully  influenced 
by  the  consistently  optimistic  views  of  the  late  Dr. 
Morrison,  the  famous  Times  correspondent,  who  became 
an  adviser  to  the  Chinese  Government  in  1912.  Dr. 
Morrison’s  sympathies  were  instinctively  with  the  foreign- 
educated  section  of  Young  China,  and  in  spite  of  many 
disillusions,  he  clung  to  his  genial  belief  that  it  w'ould 
eventually  produce  leaders  imbued  with  disinterested 
patriotism  and  constructive  statesmanship.  His  in- 
domitable optimism  and  loyalty  to  those  wThom  he  served, 
led  him  to  turn  a tolerant,  not  to  say  a blind  eye,  to  the 
seamy  side  of  Chinese  politics,  and  to  emphasise  their 
bright  spots.  Thus  in  the  winter  of  1912,  his  views  on 

1 Dr.  Wellington  Koo,  lately  Chinese  Minister  at  Washington, 
put  it  even  more  artistically,  when  he  said,  “ In  reconstructing 
her  government  on  the  principle  of  sovereignty  vested  in  the 
people  as  a body,  China  has  thrown  autocracy  overboard  and  is 
putting  her  house  in  order  under  the  aegis  of  democracy.” 


INTRODUCTORY 


7 


the  situation,  published  as  an  interview  in  the  Pall  Mall 
Gazette,  and  circulated  broadcast,  were  of  a nature  to 
encourage  confidence  in  the  future,  if  only  because  of 
the  worthy  doctor’s  world-wide  reputation.  As  the 
Spectator  observed : — 

“ Dr.  Morrison’s  vision  of  China  is  radiant.  Trade 
has  reached  a record;  the  soldiers  who  used  to  prey 
upon  the  country  when  dismissed  penniless  from  the 
army,  now  receive  their  pay  and  become  quiet  and  use- 
ful citizens;  no  one  desires  the  return  of  the  Manchus, 
because  every  one  knows  the  difference  between  gross 
rapacity  and  a sincere  attempt  to  govern  decently ; daily 
newspapers  and  cheaper  telegrams  carry  enlightenment 
throughout  the  land,  the  Christian,  calendar  has  been 
officially  adopted,  and  Sunday  is  recognised  as  a day  of 
rest;  and  oil,  by  the  genial  light  of  which  newspapers 
can  be  read  in  the  long,  dark  evenings,  has  brought  a 
moral  illumination  into  the  lives  of  the  people,  since  they 
are  no  longer  driven  to  the  solacing  distraction  of  opium.” 

It  is  also  necessary  to  remember,  in  judging  these 
opinions  retrospectively,  that  political  economy  is  a 
dreary  science ; that  there  is  no  delusion  so  prevalent  as 
belief  in  the  miracle  of  a nation  re-born  and  structurally 
changed  by  means  of  a revolution;  and  that  the  en- 
thusiasms born  of  that  belief  are  always  keen  and  con- 
tagious. He  who,  moved  by  the  emotion  of  such  enthusi- 
asm, discerns  the  splendid  dawn  of  a new  era,  may  be 
absolved  if  his  vision  is  surcharged  with  couleur  de  rose. 
But  when  the  dream-castles  of  that  dawn  have  vanished 
in  the  clear  light  of  day,  a heavy  responsibility  rests  with 
those  who,  either  as  zealots  or  as  optimists  de  metier, 
continue  to  proclaim  their  solid  virtues. 

During  the  first  two  years  of  the  Republic,  the  British 
Press  as  a whole  shared  the  prevalent  enthusiasm  for  the 
new  era,  to  the  extent  that  it  was  generally  prepared  to 
suspend  its  verdict  as  to  the  merits  and  capacity  of 
Young  China,  and  to  judge  the  tree  by  its  fruits.  As  a 
reviewer  in  the  Spectator  put  it  (December  7,  1912)  : — 


8 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


“ If  it  were  safe  to  surrender  oneself  entirely  to  the 
voice  of  authority  in  judging  of  Chinese  affairs  to-day, 
we  should  be  guided  unhesitatingly  by  Mr.  Bland.  But 
just  now  authority  speaks  with  a divided  voice.  There 
is  Dr.  Morrison,  for  instance,  who  is  as  confident  about 
the  future  of  China  as  Mr.  Bland  is  doubtful.  Professor 
Reinsch  1 also  inclines  to  the  side  of  the  optimists.” 

At  the  same  time,  the  English  Press,  better  informed 
concerning  foreign  affairs  than  the  majority  of  American 
papers,  was  never  greatly  impressed  by  the  eloquence 
of  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen,  and  by  many  it  was  felt  that  a grave 
responsibility  was  incurred  by  those  missionaries  and 
other  well-meaning  enthusiasts  who  had  advised  and 
encouraged  Young  China  to  believe,  or  at  least  to  pro- 
claim, that  the  solution  of  their  country’s  dangers 
and  difficulties  was  to  be  found  in  the  adoption  of  a 
Republican  form  of  Government.  Thus,  speaking  of 
Sun  Yat-sen,  the  Observer  said  (December  8,  1912)  : — 

“ To  the  support  which  the  outer  world  gave  to  this 
unpractical  theoriser,  are  due  the  facts  that  the  Chinese 
Republic  stands  upon  a base  of  sand,  that  the  moderate 
men  are  looking  forward  to  the  re-establishment  of  a 
monarchy,  the  army  to  a military  despotism  or  extended 
anarchy,  the  provinces  to  autonomy,  and  the  robber 
Powers  around  China  to  spoliation  on  a scale  even  bigger 
than  has  hitherto  been  possible.  Young  China’s  friends 
have  served  the  honest  members  of  the  party  badly,  by 
persuading  Europe  and  America  to  accept  as  genuine 
the  elaborate  sham  which  has  been  erected,  by  talking 
of  the  solidity  of  the  Republic  and  the  acquiescence  of 
the  people.” 

In  a special  review  of  “ Recent  Events  and  Present 
Policies  in  China,”  published  in  the  Nineteenth  Century 
for  May  1913,  Earl  Cromer  observed  : — 

" We  English  are  largely  responsible  for  creating  the 
frame  of  mind  which  is  even  now  luring  Young  Turks, 

1 Formerly  American  Minister  at  Peking;  now  financial 
adviser  to  the  Chinese  Government  in  New  York. 


INTRODUCTORY 


9 


Chinamen,  and  other  Easterns  into  the  political  wilder- 
ness by  the  display  of  false  signals.  We  have,  indeed, 
our  Blands  in  China,  our  Milners  in  Egypt,  our  Miss 
Durhams  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  and  our  Miss  Bells 
in  Mesopotamia,  who  wander  far  a-field,  gleaning  valuable 
facts  and  laying  before  their  countrymen  conclusions 
based  on  acquired  knowledge  and  wide  experience.  But 
their  efforts  are  only  partially  successful.  They  are  often 
shivered  on  the  solid  rock  of  preconceived  prejudice  and 
genuine  but  ill-informed  sentimentalism.  A large  section 
of  the  English  public  are,  in  fact,  singularly  wanting  in 
political  imagination.  Although  they  would  not,  in  so 
many  words,  admit  the  truth  of  the  statement,  they 
none  the  less  act  and  speak  as  if  sound  national  develop- 
ment in  whatsoever  quarter  of  the  world,  must  of  neces- 
sity proceed  along  their  own  conventional,  insular,  and 
time-honoured  lines,  and  along  those  lines  alone.” 

A little  later  Earl  Cromer  wrote  to  me : — 

“ I am  very  glad  you  liked  my  paper  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  ; it  represents  my  sincere  convictions.  Although 
I do  not  possess  any  local  knowledge  of  Chinese 
affairs,  I have  very  little  doubt  that  your  forecast 
will  turn  out  to  be  correct,  only,  as  not  infrequently 
happens  with  prophets,  you  will  very  likely  have  to 
wait  some  while  before  your  prophecies  are  fulfilled.  As 
a rule,  people  who  see  clearly  into  a general  situation 
are  rather  apt  to  under-rate  the  time  required  for  political 
evolution.  The  locus  classicus  on  this  subject  is  the 
case  of  De  Tocqueville,  who,  in  the  very  early  days,  cast 
an  extraordinarily  accurate  horoscope  of  the  course  which 
would  be  run  by  the  Second  Empire,  but  it  took  seventeen 
years  before  events  proved  how  correct  he  had  been.” 

When  Earl  Cromer  wrote  of  the  “ genuine  but  ill- 
informed  sentimentalism  ” which  had  led  certain  classes 
of  Englishmen  to  sow  seeds  of  unrest  amongst  Oriental 
peoples,  he  was  judging  from  the  results  of  his  own 
experience  and  observation  in  the  Near  East.  In  China, 
our  faddists,  fanatics,  and  intellectual  Bolsheviks  have, 
no  doubt,  done  their  bit,  but  on  the  whole  the  influences 
which  have  created  the  most  mischief,  by  breeding  a 
spirit  of  indiscipline  and  sedition  among  the  younger 


10 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


generation  of  literati,  and  by  encouraging  political  alarms 
and  excursions  in  the  name  of  democracy,  have  been 
more  American  than  English.  It  is  worthy  of  note  in 
this  connection  that,  now  that  the  chickens  of  this  par- 
ticular error  are  coming  home  to  roost,  it  is  from  the 
same  intellectual  sources  that  emanate  the  latest  warn- 
ings of  the  Yellow  Peril,  the  American  Vision  of  Pan- 
Asia,  “ welded  into  a common  solidarity  of  feeling  against 
the  Dominant  White  Man,”  of  the  white  race  swamped 
in  “ the  rising  tide  of  colour,”  and  civilisation  wiped  out 
“ by  the  imperious  urge  of  the  coloured  world  towards 
racial  expansion ! ” 1 Thus,  at  the  present  moment, 
while  one  group  of  well-meaning  enthusiasts  is  fervently 
advocating  the  abolition  of  the  foreigner’s  extra-territorial 
rights  in  China,  as  a matter  of  abstract  justice,  another 
group  of  equally  sympathetic  advisers  sees  no  remedy 
for  the  existing  chaos  but  the  application  of  strict  foreign 
supervision,  not  only  to  China’s  finances,  but  to  her 
internal  political  machinery  ! 2 

I would  ask  the  reader  to  believe  that,  in  thus  referring 
to  the  part  played  by  foreign  sympathisers  and  advisers 
during  the  period  immediately  following  the  Revolution, 
I have  no  wish  to  flourish  the  prophet’s  mantle,  or  to 
drag  coat-tails  of  complacency.  My  purpose  in  traversing 
this  old  ground  is  two-fold.  Firstly,  to  emphasise  the 
fact  that  those  who  have  encouraged  the  Western-learning 
“ Intellectuals  ” of  Young  China  to  apply  their  ill- 
digested  text-book  theories  to  the  business  of  govern- 
ment, have  incurred  serious  responsibility  and  wrought 
much  mischief.  (It  must,  I think,  be  admitted  that  if 
the  disastrous  experiments  of  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  and  his 
followers  had  not  been  supported  by  Europeans  on  the 
spot,  and  by  the  sympathy  of  public  opinion  abroad, 
their  career  would  have  been  brief,  Yuan  Shih-k’ai 

1 Vide  The  Rising  Tide  of  Colour,  by  Lothrop  Stoddard. 
Scribners. 

2 Vide  Modern  Constitutional  Development  in  China,  by  Harold 
M.  Vinacke.  Princetown  University  Press. 


INTRODUCTORY 


11 


would  have  succeeded  in  restoring  something  like  law 
and  order,  and  the  present  chaos  of  strife  and  corruption 
would  have  been  to  a great  extent  averted.)  Secondly, 
I desire  to  show  that,  notwithstanding  the  parlous  results 
achieved  by  Young  China’s  politicians  in  the  name  of 
Democracy,  there  is  still  a tendency,  in  certain  quarters 
(especially  where  “ moral  uplift  ” is  combined  with  a 
shrewd  business  instinct),  to  apply  the  old  coideur  de  rose 
and  to  create  a very  misleading  impression  abroad  as  to 
the  actual  condition  of  affairs  in  the  Far  East,  thus 
encouraging  the  self-constituted  rulers  of  China  in  the 
belief  that  responsible  opinion  in  America  and  Europe 
sympathises  with  their  theories,  and  sanctions  their 
practices,  of  government. 

I have  spoken  of  the  optimist  de  mitier.  I know  of  no 
more  striking  example  of  the  pernicious  nonsense  with 
which  Young  China  has  been  fed  and  misled,  than  “ the 
semi-official  statement  of  China’s  case  to  the  world,” 
published  by  Mr.  Putnam  Weale  in  1918,  under  the 
title  The  Fight  for  the  Republic  in  China.  When  this 
book  was  written,  the  northern  Military  Party,  subsi- 
dised by  Japan,  had  just  succeeded  in  defeating  General 
Chang  Hsiin’s  attempt  to  restore  the  Monarchy  and  his 
own  fortunes,  and  in  the  collapse  of  this  farcical  coup 
d’ttat,  Mr.  Weale  found  welcome  proof  of  the  devotion 
of  the  Anfu  faction  to  the  principles  of  enlightened 
Liberalism.  Once  again,  whilst  lawlessness  stalked  red- 
handed  through  the  plundered  land,  and  proofs  multiplied 
on  every  hand  that  the  so-called  democracy  had  become 
more  flagrantly  venal  than  ever  before,  he  descried  the 
dawn  of  a new  era,  in  which  the  world  would  “ welcome 
China  to  the  family  of  nations,  not  only  on  terms  of 
equality,  but  as  a representative  of  Liberalism  and  a 
subscriber  to  all  those  sanctions  on  which  the  civilisation 
of  peace  rests.”  He  predicted  that  “ within  a limited 
period,  Parliamentary  Government  would  be  more  suc- 
cessful in  China  than  in  some  European  countries,”  and 
“ something  very  similar  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  theory  of 


12  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Government  impregnably  entrenched  in  Peking.”  In 
his  opinion,  “ the  marvellous  revolution  of  1911  had 
given  back  to  this  ancient  race  its  old  position  of  leader 
of  ideas  on  the  shores  of  the  Yellow  Sea.”  Finally,  he 
expressed  the  confident  belief,  “ based  on  a knowledge 
of  all  the  facts,”  that  China  would  shortly  achieve  “ a 
united  Government  and  a cessation  of  internecine  strife.” 
The  whole  tenour  of  his  writing  was  such  as  to  encourage 
the  world  at  large  to  see  in  the  sordid  strife  of  politicians 
like  Tuan  Chi-jui,  Chang  Hsiin,  Sun  Yat-sen,  and  Tang 
Shao-yi,  a conflict  of  high  principles,  from  which  an 
enlightened  democracy  was  emerging,  with  healing  in  its 
wings.  “ The  new  China,”  he  declared,  “ is  a matter 
of  life  and  death  to  the  people,  and  the  first  business  of 
the  foreigner  is  to  uphold  the  new  beliefs.”  For  those 
who  fill  highly-paid  posts  as  advisers  under  the  Chinese 
Government,  this  may  be  so,  but  for  the  majority  of 
foreigners  in  the  East,  the  “ new  beliefs,”  as  manifested 
by  the  mandarins  and  military  chieftains  of  the  new 
dispensation,  are  an  alien  and  parasitic  growth,  which 
threatens  to  paralyse  the  ancient  and  venerable  tree  of 
Chinese  civilisation. 

Mr.  Weale’s  book  was  written  before  the  world  had 
witnessed  Russia’s  appalling  demonstration  of  the  truth 
that  when  a nation  unfitted  for  representative  govern- 
ment is  cast  into  the  melting-pot  of  “ red  ” revolution, 
an  unprofitable  scum  rises  to  the  top,  and  that  the  conse- 
quences for  the  man  in  the  street  are  very  different  from 
those  predicted  by  the  Intellectual  harbingers  of  the 
millennium.  The  world  has  witnessed  the  disillusion  of 
the  honest  dreamers  who  believed  that  the  Russian 
nation  and  its  government  would  be  purged  of  evil  by 
the  abolition  of  the  autocracy;  if  China’s  affairs  were 
not  beyond  its  normal  ken,  it  would  know  that  here  also, 
as  in  Russia,  the  patriotic  Intellectuals  have  been  put 
to  silence  and  shame  by  the  professional  agitator  and 
the  place-seeker.  Almost  before  Mr.  Weale’s  book  was 
published,  the  course  of  events  at  Peking  had  revealed 


INTRODUCTORY 


13 


something  of  the  real  nature  of  the  “ civilisation  of 
peace  ” to  be  expected  from  the  contending  political 
factions,  for  General  Chang  Hsiin  had  been  whitewashed 
(for  value  received)  and  orders  had  been  issued  by  the 
President  for  the  arrest  of  Sun  Yat-sen  and  other 
Cantonese  malcontents. 

The  present  brief  study  of  the  actual  condition  of 
affairs  in  the  Far  East  is  based  generally  on  observation 
of  the  conditions  existing  early  in  1920.  At  the  time 
of  my  visit  to  Peking,  in  February,  the  storm  was 
brewing,  which  eventually  led  to  the  overthrow  of 
Marshall  Tuan  Chi-jui,  “ Little  Hsii,”  and  the  Japanese- 
subsidised  “ Anfu  ” clique  by  General  Wu  Pei-fu  and 
the  Chihli  faction,  to  a heavy  bill  of  costs  by  the  military 
commanders,  and  a redistribution  of  the  spoils  of  office. 
As  usual,  professional  and  amateur  apologists  for  the 
“ world  made  safe  for  democracy,”  vied  with  each  other 
in  proclaiming  that  the  defeat  of  Tuan  and  his  friends 
assuredly  meant  the  end  of  false  dawns,  and  that  General 
Wu  Pei-fu,  with  his  National  Convention,  would  in- 
augurate the  long-expected  new  era.  Well,  Tuan  bowed 
in  due  course  to  the  superior  forces  brought  to  bear 
against  him  and  went  his  dignified  way  into  lucrative 
retirement ; the  National  Convention  was  speedily  forgot- 
ten in  the  turmoil  of  new  intrigues  amongst  the  victors, 
and  to-day  the  Directors  of  the  Southern  Parliament  still 
refuse  to  be  persuaded  to  come  into  the  Northern  fold, 
and  still  accuse  the  Northern  leaders  of  selling  their 
country’s  birthright  for  a mess  of  Japanese  pottage. 

In  the  meantime,  while  the  politicians  fight  for  place 
and  power,  what  of  the  destinies  of  the  common  people, 
in  whose  name  and  for  whose  alleged  benefit  the  con- 
tending factions  appeal  to  the  world  at  large?  The 
sorrows  and  sufferings  to  which  the  “ stupid  people  ” 
have  been  exposed  during  the  past  ten  years  are  very 
seldom  mentioned  by  the  apologists  of  misrule,  and  the 
Chinese  Parliamentarians  are  more  concerned  in  dis- 
cussing the  forms  and  proceedings  of  their  embryo 


14 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Constitution  than  in  relieving  the  miseries  of  provinces 
decimated  by  brigandage  and  famine.  These  things  are 
lightly  dismissed,  or  described  as  the  inevitable  con- 
dition of  a race  inured  to  such  calamities  since  the  begin- 
ning of  time.  The  world  will  never  know  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  sufferings  endured  by  the  common 
people  throughout  China  since  the  passing  of  the  Manchu 
dynasty,  nor  will  any  census  reveal  the  number  of  those 
who  have  “ gone  to  their  graves  like  beds.”  While 
Europe  was  at  war,  the  affairs  of  the  inarticulate  East 
concerned  us  less  than  usual;  and  even  to-day,  when 
millions  are  silently  dying  of  famine  in  North  China,  we 
hear  more  of  Sun  Yat -sen’s  latest  political  manifestoes 
than  of  measures  for  the  prevention  of  these  catas- 
trophes. Your  optimist  de  metier  points  triumphantly  to 
the  fact  that  China’s  foreign  trade  for  the  past  year 
constitutes  a record,  and  from  this  fact  he  proceeds  to 
draw  conclusions  reassuring  for  the  bond-holder  and  com- 
fortable for  the  worthy  people  who  like  to  believe  that 
all  is  for  the  best  in  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds. 

From  the  chapters  of  the  present  work  which  deal 
with  China,  the  reader  may  learn  something  of  the  con- 
dition of  affairs  in  the  summer  of  1920,  and  be  able  to  form 
his  own  opinion  as  to  the  material  and  moral  benefits 
which  the  Chinese  people  have  derived  from  the  attempt 
of  the  revolutionaries  of  1911  to  adapt  to  their  use  and 
for  their  own  advantage  the  political  institutions  of  the 
West.  But  in  order  to  make  the  story  more  complete  in 
detail,  and  to  bring  it  more  fully  up  to  date,  let  me 
supplement  it  with  certain  recent  extracts  from  the 
North  China  Herald. 

Here,  for  example,  are  the  Index  headings  of  Outport 
News,  as  given  in  the  issue  of  November  15,  1920.  (It 
is  to  be  observed  that  most  of  the  Herald's  inland  corre- 
spondents are  missionaries)  : — 

Kuangsi  expelled  from  Canton. 

North  Kiangsu  notes;  the  burden  of  the  soldiers. 


INTRODUCTORY 


15 


Malcontents  of  Changsha. 

Szechuan’s  dramatic  victory. 

Independence  Day  in  Szechuan. 

Celebrating  the  Victory  in  Szechuan. 

Stranded  missionaries  in  Szechuan. 

The  Bandit  Tyrant  of  Pakhoi. 

The  new  Bank  in  Tsinanfu. 

Yangchow  notes  : sacrifice  for  famine  sufferers. 
Skirmish  with  Robbers. 

The  Upper  Yangtsze  revisited. 

Threatened  rising  of  Tibetans. 

Hangchow  notes  : inter-College  Sports. 

By  the  Yellow  River  in  Mongolia. 

Teachers  on  strike  in  Honan. 

Slavery  non-existent  in  Hongkong. 

Soldiers’  requisitions  in  Hunan. 

Unwelcome  visitors  in  Kneichow. 

Mr.  Colvil’s  death  (killed  by  Chinese  troops). 
College  Principal  beaten  by  Students. 

Mr.  Shaw  released. 

Scandalous  state  of  the  River  Han. 

Japanese  Seamen’s  Combine. 

Pirate  raid  near  Soochow. 

Hongkong’s  need  of  wireless. 

The  Great  Famine  in  North  China. 

Motors  in  Anhui. 

New  American  Church  in  Shaohsing. 

China  and  Socialism. 

Piracy  near  Hongkong. 


I venture  to  suggest  that  this  list  presents  a picture  of 
the  actual  conditions  of  affairs  in  China,  of  the  prevailing 
lawlessness  and  brigandage  and  famine,  more  convincing 
than  all  the  visions  of  Utopia  provided  by  Peking’s 
political  pundits. 

Under  the  heading  “ The  Upper  Yangtsze  revisited,” 
occurs  the  following  note  concerning  the  opium  traffic, 
interesting  in  the  light  of  the  many  virtuous  manifestoes 


16 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


that  have  been,  and  are  still  being,  published  on  the 
subject  by  the  Radical  Republican  leaders  : — 

" The  great  increase  of  the  contraband  opium  trade  was 
the  cause  of  frequent  comment  on  the  Upper  Yangtsze.  It 
seems  to  parallel  what  one  hears  of  the  liquor-smuggling 
in  America,  for  I was  told  that  large  numbers  were  being 
attracted  by  the  great  profits,  and  people  of  hitherto 
unimpeachable  reputation  were  engaged  in  the  trade; 
so  that  in  this  way,  as  well  as  by  the  use  of  the  drug, 
numerous  people  were  being  debauched.  . . . Caravans 
of  the  drug  have  been  brought  over  by  the  soldiers  from 
Yunnan  and  Kueichow,  where  the  planting  has  been 
encouraged  and  even  insisted  upon  by  the  officials,  who 
in  some  cases  have  taxed  it  when  planted,  when  in  blossom, 
and  when  the  drug  is  gathered.  The  blame  rests  entirely 
upon  the  south-west  government,  and  it  would  seem  that 
the  leaders,  such  as  Wu  Ting-fang,  Tang  Shao-yi,  Sun 
Yat-sen,  C.  T.  Wang,  and  others,  men  of  integrity,  should 
stop  this  traffic  or  accept  the  responsibility  for  it.”  1 

A similar  report  from  South  Fukien  appeared  in  the 
North  China  Herald  of  November  20,  1920. 

Here  is  another  picture,  supplied  by  a traveller  who 
has  recently  made  a journey  of  some  three  thousand 
miles  through  the  more  remote  regions  of  the  Central 
and  North-Western  provinces  and  Sin  Kiang.  It  con- 
veys some  idea  of  the  kind  of  felicity  which  has  been 
conferred  on  the  common  people  by  the  new  dispensation. 

“ The  country  all  over  is  stamped  with  the  seal  of  war 
and  rapine,  of  the  ravages  and  wholesale  destruction  and 
massacres  caused  by  the  several  Mahomedan  risings; 
ruins  of  whose  villages,  temples,  farms,  and  country 
houses,  are  met  all  the  way  along. 

“ Even  places  such  as  Sian  and  Lanchow  have  lost, 
during  this  strenuous  century  of  national  evolution,  the 
lustre  of  their  prestige  and  glory  of  yore;  rebellion, 
1 I have  dealt  with  some  facts  of  the  opium  trade  elsewhere — 
vide  page  290.  In  this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  find  an 
authority  like  Sir  Charles  Addis  publicly  announcing,  as  late  as 
the  19th  January,  1921,  that  “under  the  Republic  the  Opium 
Trade  has  been  suppressed,  the  degrading  practice  of  footbinding 
abandoned,  examination  by  torture  abolished,  early  marriages 
discountenanced,  a free  Press  created,”  etc.,  etc. 


INTRODUCTORY 


17 


revolutions,  floods,  and  other  calamities  having  delivered 
the  coup  de  grace.  Minor  towns  are  empty  and  pretty 
dead;  evidence  of  their  once  having  enjoyed  greater 
prosperity  is  visible,  but  that  is  about  all  there  is  left  I 
Villages  are  a collection  of  squalid  hovels.” 

The  editor  of  the  North  China  Herald,  always  a sym- 
pathetic recorder  of  events  and  a sincere  friend  of  the 
Chinese  people,  summed  up  the  situation  last  July,  in 
the  following  words  : — 

“ Those  who  have  found  it  a weariness  to  follow  the 
accounts  of  China’s  civil  war  in  our  pages  from  day  to 
day,  and  have  found  them  merely  an  interminable  record 
of  bickering  and  chicanery,  have  our  sympathy;  but 
they  have  nevertheless  missed  an  interesting  page  of 
history  in  the  making,  and  an  instructive  comment  on 
the  failure  of  Democracy  in  this  young  Republic.  The 
present  deplorable  situation  originated  in  the  ineptitude 
of  Parliament  and  in  the  failure  of  the  people’s  representa- 
tives to  think  imperially,  or  indeed  to  think  of  anything 
but  their  personal  profit  and  selfish  aggrandisement. 
China  is  a vast  country  and  ought  to  be  represented  by 
big  men;  unfortunately,  though  she  has  three  Parlia- 
ments, one  in  Peking,  one  in  Canton,  and  a third  which 
proposes  to  transfer  its  activities  to  Chungking,  there  is 
not  to  be  found  in  any  of  them  a man  who  rises  above  the 
level  of  mediocrity,  and  it  is  to  be  feared  there  are  many 
who  fall  beneath  even  this  low  standard.  . . . The 
present  situation  is  that  there  is  fighting  between  the 
Chihli  and  Anhui  forces,  with  the  President  making  futile 
efforts  to  bring  about  peace,  while  Chang  Tso-lin  threatens 
to  march  his  whole  Manchurian  army — 100,000  men  on 
paper — to  crush  whoever  refuses  to  hearken  to  his  offers 
or  commands.  The  nation  looks  on  with  interest.  It 
is  a contest  between  the  militarists,  and,  whoever  suc- 
ceeds, the  ideal  of  government  by  the  people  for  the 
people  will  not  be  advanced  a hairbreadth.  ‘ When  the 
city  gate  is  on  fire  the  fishes  in  the  moat  perish,’  and 
while  armies  struggle,  agriculture  and  industry  are  being 
ruined.  Whoever  triumphs,  the  result  of  the  present 
upheaval  will  doubtless  be  to  keep  the  yoke  of  militarism 
as  firmly  as  ever  on  the  neck  of  the  people  of  China.  As 
Europe  has  learned  to  its  sorrow,  it  is  possible  to  win  the 
c 


18 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


war  and  lose  the  peace,  so  China  is  beginning  to  under- 
stand that  that  blessed  word  democracy  does  not  mean 
peace,  and  that  prosperity  and  order  are  not  necessary 
corollaries  of  a successful  revolution  and  a republican 
form  of  government.  The  fact  is,  the  form  of  govern- 
ment is  of  much  less  importance  than  the  character  of 
the  men  who  administer  it.” 

Since  these  words  were  written,  the  world  (or  that 
small  part  of  it  which  is  interested  in  the  destinies  of 
China)  has  been  confronted  by  the  terrible  spectacle  of 
millions  of  inoffensive,  thrifty  peasants  dying  of  starva- 
tion in  the  famine  region,  quite  close  to  the  centres  of 
Government,  while  all  the  time  the  politicians,  callously 
indifferent  to  their  pitiful  plight,  continue  to  wrangle 
over  the  whited  supulchre  of  a meaningless  Constitution, 
and  the  Tuchuns  make  war,  one  upon  another,  for  the 
right  to  plunder  the  survivors. 

This  brief  review  of  actualities,  based  on  the  evidence 
of  disinterested  and  sympathetic  observers,  brings  us 
back  to  first  principles,  and  to  emphatic  repudiation  of 
the  idea  that  law  and  order,  peace  and  prosperity,  can 
be  attained  in  China,  either  by  the  present  generation  or 
the  next,  through  the  assertion  of  democratic  ideals  or 
the  creation  of  representative  institutions.  The  idea 
springs  from  the  perennial  delusion,  of  those  whose 
business  or  pleasure  it  is  to  apply  their  theories  to  facts 
of  which  they  have  not  sufficient  experience,  that  states 
of  society  can  be  swiftly  re-modelled  by  legislative  enact- 
ments and  systems  of  culture,  and  that  a nation  can  be 
fitted  for  self-government  b}^  the  adoption  of  a code.  In 
the  case  of  the  irresponsible  mandarins  who  have  so 
grievously  mis-ruled  China  since  the  revolution,  it  is 
incontestably  true  that,  in  the  words  of  Mill,  “ the  name 
and  forms  of  popular  representation  have  had  no  effect 
but  to  prevent  despotism  from  attaining  the  stability 
and  security  by  which  alone  its  evils  can  be  mitigated  or 
its  few  advantages  realised.”  Can  it  be  doubted  that,  if 
Yuan  Shih-k’ai  had  been  allowed  to  restore  the  system 


INTRODUCTORY 


19 


of  paternal  despotism  which  the  Chinese  people  (man- 
darins included)  understand  and  respect,  he  would  have 
delivered  them  out  of  the  hands  of  many  of  their  present 
oppressors,  and  given  peace  in  his  time,  even  as  Diaz 
gave  peace  to  Mexico  ? 

Amongst  the  Intellectual  idealists  in  the  United  States 
who  have  lately  studied  the  Chinese  problem,  the  name 
of  Professor  Dewey  carries  great  weight,  and  rightly  so, 
for  his  outlook  combines  a philosophical  and  scholarly 
attitude  with  humanism  of  the  benevolent  type.  He 
differs  from  the  orthodox  idealist  in  so  far  that  he  per- 
ceives the  fundamental  problem  of  China  to  be,  not 
political,  but  economic  and  social.  In  a recently  published 
article,  speaking  of  the  characteristic  callousness  of  the 
Chinese,  he  justly  observes  : — 

“ Where  there  is  a complete  manifestation  of  the 
Malthusian  theory  of  population,  friendliness  develops 
with  great  difficulty  to  the  point  of  active  effort  to  relieve 
suffering;  where  further  increase  in  population  means 
increase  in  severity  of  the  struggle  for  subsistence, 
aggressive  benevolence  is  not  likely  to  assume  large 
proportions.  On  the  contrary,  when  the  cutting  off  of 
thousands  by  plague,  or  flood,  or  famine  means  more 
air  to  breathe  and  more  land  to  cultivate  for  those  who 
remain,  stoic  apathy  is  not  hard  to  attain.” 

Professor  Dewey  might  have  added  that  the  same 
observation  holds  true  when  the  population  is  decimated 
by  battle,  murder,  and  sudden  death;  these,  like  all 
other  calamities,  are  philosophically  accepted  by  the 
survivors.  But  when  he  comes  to  discuss  the  remedy 
for  this  deplorable  condition  of  affairs,  the  Professor  still 
seeks  and  finds  it  in  the  panaceas  of  his  own  class  and 
kindred,  and  advocates  a remedy  the  immediate  result 
of  which,  if  applied,  would  only  be  to  increase  the  density 
of  China’s  population  at  the  expense  of  the  rest  of  the 
world.  If  it  be  true  that  China’s  procreative  reck- 
lessness is  the  fundamental  cause  of  the  pitiful  condition 
under  which  the  masses  struggle  for  existence,  what  can 


20  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


it  profit  them,  or  humanity,  to  stimulate  this  racial 
tendency  by  "an  introduction  of  modem  industrial 
methods  which  will  profoundly  affect  their  environ- 
ment ” ? Is  it  not  self-evident  that  if  " mining,  railways, 
and  manufacturing,  based  upon  China’s  wealth  of  unused 
resources,  give  a new  outlet  for  energies  that  cannot  now 
be  used,”  the  immediate  result  would  be  to  enable  the 
Chinese  to  compete  with  other  nations  in  the  world’s 
food-markets,  and,  while  thus  increasing  their  own 
numbers,  to  aggravate  the  problem  of  existence  in  coun- 
tries which  cannot  possibly  compete  with  low-standard 
Oriental  labour  ? China’s  problem  is  essentially  and 
eternally  a food  problem,  which  until  now  the  nation 
has  solved,  tragically  enough,  within  its  own  borders. 
To  encourage  her  to  solve  it  henceforth  by  industrial 
competition  with  the  white  race,  is  very  typical  of  the 
political  idealism  of  a country  which  nevertheless  protects 
itself  rigorously  against  Asiatic  immigration. 

Idealism  of  this  curiously  illogical  kind  is  by  no  means 
confined  to  those  professors  and  philanthropists  in  the 
United  States  who  have  recently  displayed  interest  in 
China ; the  same  tendency  to  ignore  the  existence  of  all 
unpleasant  facts  which  conflict  with  preconceived  ideas, 
and  to  proclaim  these  ideas  as  facts,  has  been  conspicuous 
in  the  attitude  of  several  of  the  distinguished  business 
men  and  politicians  who  have  recently  visited  China. 
Very  typical  and  instructive,  for  example,  are  the  words 
in  which  Mr.  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  head  of  the  American 
group  of  the  Consortium,  has  borne  testimony  to  the 
political  activities  and  influence  of  American  missionaries 
by  virtue  of  which  China  is  to  cease  to  be  merely  a people 
and  become  a nation.1  Very  significant  also  were  the 
attitude  and  utterances  of  the  large  party  of  Congress- 
men, accompanied  by  their  wives,  sisters,  and  daughters, 
who  visited  China  last  autumn.  The  party,  which 
included  Mr.  John  Burke,  Treasurer  of  the  United  States, 
and  Dr.  Paul  Reinsch,  ex-Minister  to  China,  was  enter- 
1 Vide  infra,  p.  127. 


WISDOM  IN  THE  ROUGH.  VERY  BUSY. 


INTRODUCTORY 


21 


tained  on  its  way  through  Shanghai  at  a banquet  given 
by  the  Pan-Pacific  Association,  at  which  Mr.  Tang 
Shao-yi  (President  of  the  Association)  welcomed  the 
distinguished  guests,  and  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen  held  forth 
for  over  an  hour  in  eloquent  eulogy  of  his  own  political 
activities,  and  applauded  his  persistence  in  continuing 
the  struggle  between  the  South  and  the  North,  “ in  order 
to  save  China  from  Japanese  militarists.”  Dr.  Reinsch 
spoke  for  the  visitors.  The  keynote  of  his  speech  was 
contained  in  his  fervent  declaration  that  “ out  of  all  the 
world,  Dr.  Sun  stood  out  as  the  representative  of  the 
Chinese  ideal,  true  to  her  inner  traditions  and  the  ideals 
Americans  believed  in.  First  of  all,  he  was  a true  and 
great  Chinese  Liberal.”  Furthermore,  he  said  that  it 
was  the  duty  of  the  civilised  world  “ to  sustain  China 
in  her  struggle  for  higher  organisation  of  national  life. 
There  could  not  be  tolerated  any  intrigue,  military  or 
diplomatic,  against  the  integrity  and  sovereignty  of 
China.  Asia,  Africa,  and  Europe  must  look  upon  China 
as  the  mother  of  civilisation.” 

It  would  be  difficult,  I think,  to  quote  a more  striking 
example  of  the  hypnotic  influence  of  catchwords  and 
preconceived  ideas,  and  of  the  force  of  delusions  in  which 
the  wish  is  ever  father  to  the  thought.  Dr.  Reinsch, 
having  had  occasion  to  study  the  Chinese  situation  on 
the  spot  for  several  years,  can  scarcely  plead  ignorance 
of  the  facts  of  Dr.  Sun  Yat -sen’s  career,  of  his  long  and 
intimate  connection  with  “ Japanese  militarists  ” and 
financiers;  of  his  acceptance  of  highly-paid  office  under 
Yuan  Shih-k'ai,  against  whom  he  subsequently  con- 
spired; of  his  incessant  plots  and  intrigues  against  the 
Central  Government,  no  matter  how  constituted;  of  his 
failure,  during  all  these  years,  to  originate  one  single 
measure  of  constructive  reorganisation.  Dr.  Reinsch 
must  be  aware  that,  in  the  opinion  of  foreigners  in  China, 
Dr.  Sun  has  for  some  years  been  regarded  as  a very 
mischievous  agitator,  and  that  even  in  the  Chinese  Press 
he  figures  more  often  as  a laughing-stock  than  as  a 


22 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Liberal.  His  latest  intrigues  with  the  Anfu  clique  and 
Tuan  Chi-jui  (whom  he  formerly  denounced  as  a traitor) 
have  proved  once  more  that  his  ideals  are  scarcely  of  the 
kind  that  most  Americans  believe  in.  But  Dr.  Reinsch 
and  his  friends  prefer  to  shut  their  eyes  to  all  these  things. 
They  remember  only  that  Dr.  Sun  is,  intellectually  speak- 
ing, the  offspring  of  American  ideals,  that  he  has  pro- 
claimed a Republic,  professed  Christianity,  and  preached 
the  pure  doctrine  of  American  democracy.  How,  then, 
can  he  fail  to  be  truly  representative  of  the  ideal  Chinese 
statesman?  Dr.  Sun,  Mr.  Tang  Shao-yi,  Dr.  Wu  Ting- 
fang,  and  other  “ distinguished  leaders  of  the  Constitu- 
tionalist cause,”  have  now  gone  back  to  Canton,  there 
to  re-organise  their  independent  “ Military  Government  ” 
and  to  resume  operations,  through  Kuangsi,  against  the 
Central  Government.  Is  it  exaggerating  the  influence  of 
Dr.  Reinsch  and  his  Congressional  party  to  suggest  that, 
were  it  not  for  their  sympathy  and  support,  Dr.  Sun 
and  his  friends  might  have  hesitated  before  committing 
themselves,  and  condemning  the  country,  to  a further 
period  of  senseless  civil  war? 

While  on  the  subject  of  the  Canton  Parliament  and 
“ the  leaders  of  the  Constitutionalist  cause,”  it  should 
be  observed  that,  apart  from  the  advantages  of  world- 
wide notoriety  to  be  derived  from  the  direction  of  civil 
war,  the  business  of  Constitution-making,  as  practised 
by  the  “ true  and  great  Liberals  ” of  the  Canton  faction, 
is  not  without  its  solid  advantages.  According  to  a 
Chinese  student,  who  investigated  the  record  of  the 
Canton  legislators  on  the  spot,  and  published  the  results 
in  the  North  China  Herald  (June  5,  1920),  the  members 
of  the  “ Old  ” Parliament  at  Canton  (as  distinct  from  the 
“ New  ” Parliament  at  Peking)  received  in  salaries  and 
subsidies  sums  amounting  to  $4,240,000  in  less  than  two 
years.  Of  this  total,  half  a million  dollars  represented 
“ special  contributions  for  the  purpose  of  completing 
the  Constitution  for  the  Republic  of  China.”  The  inves- 
tigator commented  acidly  on  the  fact  that,  despite  this 


INTRODUCTORY 


23 


lavish  expenditure,  the  Constitution  has  not  been  com- 
pleted, that  it  remains,  in  fact,  “ where  it  was  when 
Yuan  Shih-k’ai  decided  that  he  could  govern  the  country 
unassisted.”  He  pointed  out  that,  when  driven  by  their 
Kuangsi  rivals  to  seek  refuge  at  Shanghai,  these  Parlia- 
mentarians “ forthwith  appointed  a Commission  to  study 
ways  and  means  for  raising  funds  to  support  themselves.” 
Finally,  he  asked,  “ what  excuse  has  the  Old  Parliament 
for  living?  ” and  the  answer  which  he  gave  to  this 
question  deserves  the  attention  of  those  who  continue 
to  proclaim  the  disinterested  patriotism  of  the  Cantonese 
faction. 

“ What,”  he  asks,  “ has  the  Old  Parliament  done?  It 
has  done  this  and  this  alone  : it  has  served  as  a con- 
stitutional smoke-screen  for  militarists  of  one  faction  or 
another.  It  has  befogged  the  minds  of  the  Chinese  and 
foreigners  here.  It  has  encouraged  civil  war  for  prin- 
ciples in  which  it  has  no  faith.  It  has  permitted  generals 
to  battle  against  each  other  for  jobs  and  has  levied 
payments  for  its  consent.  It  has  sat  in  Canton,  while 
its  heart  was  in  Shanghai  and  Peking.  It  has  per- 
petuated itself  and  forbidden  the  compromising  of  issues 
between  North  and  South  on  any  basis  other  than  its 
own  longevity.  It  has  supported  its  paymaster  and 
has  forfeited  the  welfare  of  the  land  in  accepting  this 
support. 

“ But  its  crime  consists  not  in  its  corruption,  but  in 
its  effects  upon  the  growing  generation.  Everybody 
knows  and  accepts  the  iniquity  of  Peking  officialdom, 
but  the  country  has  regarded  the  Old  Parliament  as  a 
body  which  stands  between  corruption  and  good  govern- 
ment. And  now  that  too  is  gone.  Nobody  can  be 
trusted.  There  is  no  honour  in  China.  The  country  is 
going  to  boot  and  nobody  cares.  So  the  people  speak 
and  so  the  Old  Parliament’s  activities  have  encouraged 
them  to  speak.” 

(The  “ Old  Parliament,”  be  it  noted,  includes  the  most 
brilliant  lights  of  Liberalism  and  Western  learning  in 
China’s  political  firmament.) 

But,  as  will  be  shown  in  subsequent  chapters,  there  are 


24  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


many  sincere  friends  of  China  who,  while  recognising  the 
moral  failure  of  Young  China’s  present  leaders,  pin  their 
faith  as  firmly  as  ever  to  the  younger  generation  of 
Western-educated  students,  much  in  the  same  spirit  as 
every  English  officer  pinned  his  faith  to  the  men  of  his 
own  regiment  at  the  time  of  the  Indian  Mutiny.  Because 
every  human  being  is,  and  must  always  be,  the  combined 
product  of  his  ancestry  and  environment,  and  for  other 
reasons,  which  will  be  stated  in  their  place,  I find  it  as 
difficult  to  share  this  belief  to-day  as  I did  in  1911.  And 
this  scepticism  is  fortified  just  as  much  by  doubts  as  to 
the  relevance  and  moral  value  of  the  education  which  is 
being  imparted  to  the  present  generation,  as  by  study 
of  the  results  of  that  education  on  its  predecessors. 

Let  me  cite  two  illustrations,  both  provided  in  the 
recent  writings  of  “ Western-learning  ” Intellectuals  of 
the  highest  type.  In  the  first,  Mr.  S.  G.  Cheng,  an  M.A. 
of  Oxford,  describes  “ Modern  China  " from  the  stand- 
point of  his  own  class  and  creed.  Like  many  of  that 
class,  Mr.  Cheng  combines  great  mental  ability  with 
sincere  patriotism,  but  his  book  emphasises  on  almost 
every  page  the  disabilities  produced  by  Western  educa- 
tion on  the  Oriental  mind,  which,  do  what  you  will, 
remains  beneath  the  surface  true  to  type,  contempla- 
tively philosophical  and  instinctively  opposed  to  the 
practical  scientific  attitude  of  Western  materialism.  Mr. 
Cheng  realises  that  continuance  of  the  present  deplorable 
condition  of  affairs  in  China  is  likely  to  end  in  national 
disaster,  and  he  attributes  this  condition  to  the  work  of 
a few  politicians  “ who  are  not  supported  at  all  by  the 
popular  wishes  or  voice.  The  Northern  Militarists  and 
Southern  Constitutionalists,  who  both  claim  to  fight  for 
the  liberty  of  the  people,  alike  ignore  the  feelings  and 
sufferings  of  the  silent  mass.  . . . The  future  of  China 
depends  upon  the  training  of  her  inhabitants  that  will 
enable  them  to  carry  on  their  Government  free  from  any 
exploitation  of  political  adventurers.”  In  other  words, 
the  nature  of  the  people  must  be  changed,  so  as  to  awaken 


INTRODUCTORY 


25 


them  to  an  intelligent  capacity  of  self-government.  This, 
he  thinks,  may  be  achieved  “ by  education  and  increasing 
contact  with  the  West,”  but,  like  most  of  those  who  share 
this  opinion,  he  overlooks  the  important  fact  that  it  is 
chiefly  from  the  “ Western-learning  ” mandarin  class 
that  to-day’s  most  active  groups  of  political  adven- 
turers have  emerged  ! If  this  has  been  the  result  of 
contact  with  the  West  at  the  top,  what  justification  is 
there  for  hoping  for  better  results  from  further  dis- 
turbance of  the  tranquil  mind  of  the  masses? 

Very  significant  are  those  passages  in  Mr.  Cheng's 
book  in  which  he  discusses  the  political  ascendancy  of 
Japan  at  Peking.  He  sums  up  the  situation  frankly  in 
these  words  : “In  pursuance  of  Imperialistic  and  Jin- 
goistic aims,  the  Government  of  Tokyo  has  bribed  certain 
undesirable  elements  in  the  country,  placed  them  in 
power  and  supported  them  with  money  to  cover  their 
administrative  expenses.”  The  blame  for  this  state  of 
affairs  he  ascribes,  not  to  the  undesirable  elements,  who 
are  in  reality  the  chief  offenders,  but  to  Japan.  Herein 
he  speaks  with  the  same  voice  as  his  brilliant  confreres, 
Mr.  Wellington  Koo  and  C.  T.  Wang,  who  represented 
China  at  the  Versailles  Conference.  Like  them,  he 
proposes  several  remedial  measures  and  reforms  to  relieve 
the  situation  thus  created,  such  as  a revision  of  the 
Tariff  and  the  abolition  of  extra-territoriality;  like  them, 
also,  he  remains  strangely  silent  concerning  the  vital 
need  of  integrity  in  the  Public  Service,  and  of  measures 
to  check  the  activities  of  the  “ undesirable  elements  ” 
aforesaid.  It  will  be  time  to  share  Young  China’s  en- 
thusiasm for  political  adventures  when  its  Intellectuals 
have  come  to  recognise  and  denounce  official  corruption 
as  the  chief  cause  of  their  country’s  parlous  plight. 

The  second  illustration  to  which  I refer  was  contained 
in  an  apologia  for  the  “ returned  student,”  written  last 
summer  by  Dr.  M.  T.  Z.  Tyau.1  This  writer  lays  stress 

1 Now  legal  adviser  to  the  Chinese  delegation  to  the  League  of 
Nations  at  Geneva. 


26  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


on  the  achievements  of  the  class  of  students  educated  in 
America  and  England,  by  whose  influence  “ the  country 
has  been  changed  from  an  absolute  despotism  to  a popular 
democracy,  from  an  antiquated  conservatism  to  a modern 
liberalism.”  He  goes  on  to  deplore  the  fact  that,  the 
number  of  returned  students  having  greatly  increased, 
there  are  not  enough  Government  jobs  to  go  round,  so 
that  to-day,  " through  no  fault  of  his  own,  he  is  at  a 
“ discount,  just  as  the  Bank  of  China  and  Bank  of  Com- 
" munications  notes  are  depreciated.  Of  course,  such  a 
" state  of  affairs  is  abnormal  and  can  only  be  temporary, 
“ just  as  the  Chinese  Republic  will  soon  really  come  into 
“ its  own.  But  while  the  unsatisfactory  situation  lasts, 
“ the  position  of  the  returned  student  is  far  from  enviable. 
“ In  the  keen  struggle  for  existence,  diplomas  and  degrees 
“ are  often  forgotten,  and  an  incumbent  (sic)  for  a certain 
“ position  might  as  well  have  stayed  at  home,  instead  of  re- 
“ turning  with  a foreign  academic  or  professional  training. 
“ Consequently,  the  spectacle  is  often  one  of  undignified 
“ incongruities.  This  is  as  it  should  never  be,  and  in- 
“ dubitably  will  be  remedied,  as  soon  as  the  Liberal 
“ elements  come  into  power.”  A franker  exposition  of  the 
economic  basis  of  Chinese  Liberalism  would  be  difficult  to 
discover;  Dr.  Tyau  has  put  his  finger,  nevertheless,  on  the 
spot  from  whence  arises  most  of  the  political  unrest  in 
China.  When  he  proceeds  to  give  a list  of  the  returned 
students  to  whom  is  due  “ the  modernisation  of  China's 
hoary  civilisation,”  he  is  less  convincing.  The  list  begins 
with  Ex-President  Li  Yuan-hung,  includes  our  old  friends, 
Wu  Ting-fang,  Admiral  Sah,  etc.,  and  ends  with  Dr.  Lew 
Yuklin,  formerly  Chinese  Minister  in  London.  The  only 
conclusion  which  a dispassionate  observer  can  draw  from 
it  is,  that  a foreign  education  does  not  necessarily  unfit 
an  intelligent  Chinese  for  a mandarin’s  career. 

To  conclude.  If,  as  I have  said,  the  Chinese  people 
are  at  present  neither  fitted  for  the  exercise  of  self- 
government  nor  anxious  for  it,  if  the  Republic  is  nothing 
but  a name,  and  the  framework  of  Parliamentary  Govern- 


CHINA  : THE  ETERNAL  PROBLEM. 


INTRODUCTORY 


27 


ment  a hollow  mockery,  what  of  the  future?  By  what 
means  can  China  possibly  be  saved  from  complete  dis- 
integration and  her  inoffensive  and  defenceless  people 
from  further  calamities?  This  question  will  be  dealt 
with  in  the  chapter  which  deals  with  the  Problem  of 
Reconstruction.  But  it  may  be  useful  at  the  outset  to 
summarise  certain  conclusions  which  bear  upon  it : — 

1.  The  ills  that  flesh  is  heir  to  in  China,  the  chronic 
destitution,  diseases,  and  discontents  endured  by  vast 
numbers  of  the  population,  are  directly  due  to  the  social 
system  and  religious  beliefs,  which  make  procreative 
recklessness  a duty;  these  are  evils  which  cannot  pos- 
sibly be  removed,  or  even  remedied,  by  any  change  in 
the  form  of  government  or  political  institutions  of  the 
nation. 

2.  While  the  inevitable  development  of  China's  mines, 
railways,  and  other  sources  of  latent  wealth  by  modem 
industrial  methods  is  likely  to  diminish  the  normal 
severity  of  economic  pressure  for  a time,  by  enabling 
her  to  increase  her  food  supply  from  abroad,  the  immediate 
result  will  be  an  increase  of  her  population  up  to  the  new 
limits  of  the  means  of  subsistence ; and  this  increase  can 
only  be  achieved  at  the  cost  of  increased  economic  pres- 
sure in  countries  where  labour  enjoys  a higher  standard 
of  living.  Europe  and  America  will  then  be  compelled 
to  protect  themselves  against  the  products  of  Chinese 
industrialism  in  the  same  way,  and  for  the  same  reason, 
that  they  now  protect  themselves  against  Asiatic  immi- 
gration. 

3.  So  long  as  the  present  Chinese  social  system  endures, 
the  only  means  by  which  the  ever-latent  elements  of 
disorder  can  be  held  in  check  is  a strong  Central  Govern- 
ment, organised  and  administered  upon  principles  which 
the  masses  understand  and  to  which  they  always  have 
been  accustomed  ; that  is  to  say,  principles  of  paternal 
despotism,  applied  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  and 
traditions  of  the  race. 


28  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


4.  Under  existing  conditions,  therefore,  a democratic 
form  of  government,  as  understood  in  Europe  and 
America,  is  impossible  in  China.  To  encourage  the  small 
minority  of  foreign-educated  Intellectuals  who  profess 
to  wish  to  apply  it,  can  only  result  in  making  unrest, 
civil  war,  and  brigandage,  widespread  and  endemic, 
instead  of  local  and  epidemic. 

5.  The  rapidly  increasing  financial  and  administrative 
difficulties  which  now  confront  the  Chinese  Government, 
as  the  result  of  ten  years  of  civil  strife  and  official  cor- 
ruption, can  only  be  overcome,  and  the  nation’s  recupera- 
tive powers  encouraged,  by  concerted  action  of  the 
Powers,  directed,  in  the  first  instance,  to  the  disarmament 
and  disbandment  of  the  rabble  armies,  which  prey  upon 
every  form  of  productive  industry,  and  thereafter  to  the 
moral  and  material  support  of  the  Central  Government, 
howsoever  constituted.  When  no  more  money  is  forth- 
coming for  the  maintenance  of  these  armed  hordes  (and 
that  day  is  close  at  hand)  a crisis  will  occur;  and  to 
escape  from  their  wrath,  the  mandarins  will  probably 
endeavour,  as  usual,  to  divert  unpleasant  attention  from 
themselves  by  the  instigation  of  an  anti-foreign  move- 
ment. When  this  crisis  has  passed,  a period  of  recon- 
struction, with  foreign  supervision  over  China’s  finances, 
must  of  necessity  be  imposed. 


CHAPTER  II 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI  (1912-I916) 

It  will  be  remembered  that,  after  being  recalled  to 
high  office  by  the  panic-stricken  Manchus  in  October 
1911,  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  did  all  in  his  power  to  prevent 
the  overthrow  of  the  dynasty  and  the  introduction  of 
a Republican  form  of  government.1  For  four  months 
he  struggled  manfully  against  hopeless  odds ; but 
weakened  by  internal  intrigues,  and  abandoned  by  the 
foreign  Powers,  to  which  he  had  confidently  looked  for 
moral  and  financial  support,  he  finally  made  a virtue  of 
necessity  and  accepted  the  Presidency  of  the  Republic 
in  March  1912.  It  is  significant  of  the  condition  of 
political  affairs  in  China  that,  only  three  months  before, 
he  had  publicly  declared  that  “ to  be  a party  to  the 
establishment  of  a Republic  would  brand  him  as  a liar 
before  all  the  world.”  But  in  accepting  the  Presidency, 
with  quite  obvious  mental  reservations,  he  merely 
followed  the  opportunist  traditions  of  his  class  and  creed. 
He  realised  that  the  metropolitan  administration  and 
the  mandarinate  of  the  provinces  were  quite  as  thoroughly 
disorganised  and  terrified  as  the  Manchus  themselves  by 
the  swift  development  of  Young  China’s  revolution,  and 
that  the  only  hope  of  preserving  the  country  from  com- 
plete chaos  lay  in  the  re-establishment  of  a strong  central 
authority — no  matter  what  its  name — at  Peking. 

As  it  was  at  the  time  of  the  triumph  of  the  Young 
Turks  in  1908,  so  it  was  when  Young  China  upset  the 
Dragon  Throne  in  1911.  Misled  by  the  tumult  and  the 
shouting  of  students  and  professional  agitators  who 
proclaimed  the  birth  of  a new  era  to  the  cry  of  "liberty, 

1 Vide  Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies,  pp.  152,  et  seq. 

29 


30  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


equality,  and  fraternity,”  many  observers  at  a distance, 
and  some  upon  the  spot,  welcomed  the  establishment 
of  the  Republic  as  a proof  of  the  Chinese  people’s  political 
consciousness  and  fitness  for  representative  government. 
In  the  infectious  enthusiasm  of  the  moment,  the  deep- 
rooted  economic  evils  which  are  the  permanent  cause  of 
social  and  political  unrest  in  China,  were  overlooked; 
the  clamour  of  self-seeking  politicians  was  mistaken  for 
an  outburst  of  patriotic  fervour,  with  the  result  that  the 
permanence  and  constructive  capacity  of  the  new  forces 
were  greatly  exaggerated. 

In  particular,  many  English  and  American  missionaries 
were  vocationally  disposed  to  believe  in  Young  China’s 
intentions  and  ability  to  reclaim  the  people  by  virtue  cf 
Western  learning  and  democratic  institutions.  In  their 
zealous  enthusiasm  at  the  prospect  of  reaping  the  long- 
delayed  harvest  of  their  teachings,  they  were  led  to 
believe  in  the  sudden  awakening  of  the  Chinese  people’s 
political  morality.  Therefore  they  overlooked  not  only 
the  instinctive  conservatism  of  the  inarticulate  masses, 
but  the  self-seeking  ambitions  which  had  produced 
this  ferment — to  say  nothing  of  the  corruption  and 
administrative  incapacity  which,  from  the  outset,  char- 
acterised the  revolutionary  movement.  They  believed, 
in  fact,  in  the  miracle  of  a national  re-birth.  Thus  it 
came  about  that  the  inauguration  of  the  Republic  was 
widely  proclaimed  in  Europe  and  America  as  the  dawn 
of  a new  era  for  China.  For  a year  or  more,  diplomats, 
journalists,  and  missionaries  vied  with  each  other  in 
forecasting  the  nation’s  brilliant  future ; everything  that, 
after  long  centuries  of  education  and  effort,  Europe  had 
evolved  in  the  direction  of  constitutional  government, 
was  to  be  introduced  at  once,  and  with  complete  success, 
in  the  new  Utopia  of  the  Far  East.  All  the  ancient 
foundations  were  to  be  uprooted  with  the  Throne  : Con- 
fucianism, the  cult  of  ancestors,  the  patriarchal  philosophy 
of  the  Sages,  all  were  to  be  replaced,  in  the  twinkling  of 
an  eye,  by  the  latest  thing  in  democratic  institutions, 
with  a Constitution  broad-based  on  the  nation’s  will. 


BREADWINNERS. 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


31 


a government  of  the  people  by  the  people  for  the  people, 
universal  suffrage,  conscription,  and  even  votes  for  women. 

Opinions  of  this  kind,  arising  out  of  one  of  the  most 
persistent  delusions  common  to  humanity,  are  more 
easily  disseminated  than  dissolved.  With  regard  to 
China’s  brief  vision  of  Celestial  Socialism,  there  are 
many  observers  who  persist  in  believing  in  the  mystic 
power  of  political  formulae  to  accomplish  the  impossible 
and  to  change  the  whole  structural  character  of  the 
race.1  Yet  the  history  of  Young  China’s  brief  authority 
has  been  written  with  bloodshed  and  chaos  throughout 
the  land,  in  such  a manner  as  to  shatter  beyond  repair 
the  people’s  faith  in  the  healing  virtue  of  the  blessed 
word  Republic.  Within  a year  of  Sun  Yat-sen’s  declara- 
tion that  the  passing  of  the  monarchy  heralded  “ the 
dawn  of  peace  and  prosperity,  just  laws,  and  honest 
administration,”  the  people’s  instinctive  desire  for  authori- 
tative rulership  had  already  been  clearly  demonstrated. 
Even  at  that  time  Young  China,  absorbed  in  futile 
dissensions  and  sordid  intrigues,  had  manifested  the 
hopelessness  of  its  bright  vision  of  the  millennium,  while 
the  struggle  for  supremacy  between  rival  military  chief- 
tains was  beginning  to  assume  definite  direction.  Eight 
months  after  the  revolution,  the  military  and  police 
authorities  of  the  provinces  had  warned  the  members 
of  the  National  Assembly  “ to  cease  from  thwarting  the 
Government  by  their  senseless  and  selfish  factions.” 
The  phenomena,  which  had  been  regarded  by  many  as 
evidence  of  the  fitness  of  the  Chinese  people  for  self- 
government  under  European  institutions,  had  rapidly 
proved  to  be  superficial  and  transient.  The  reaction  of 
the  literati,  of  the  military  and  the  merchant  classes 
against  Sun  Yat-sen’s  political  adventures,  proved  clearly, 
if  proof  were  needed,  that  the  real  causes  of  unrest  in 
China  remain  economic  in  their  origin,  and  that,  for 

1 Thus,  quite  recently  an  eminent  financier  has  described  the 
establishment  of  the  Republic  as  " an  experiment  in  self-govern- 
ment, unprecedented  in  scale  and  unique  in  its  leap  from  autocracy 
to  democracy  without  passing  through  the  intervening  stage  of 
feudalism,  as  in  Great  Britain  and  Japan  ” 1 


32  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


these,  the  catchwords  of  Republicanism  could  provide 
neither  remedy  nor  relief. 

It  is  not  only  interesting,  but  profitable,  to  look  back 
upon  and  study  the  masterly  statecraft  by  means  of 
which  Yuan  succeeded  in  bringing  something  like  order 
out  of  chaos,  restoring  the  authority  of  the  Central 
Government  in  many  of  the  provinces,  and  repairing  the 
administrative  and  fiscal  machinery,  dislocated  by  the 
revolution.  For  it  may  safely  be  predicted  that,  when- 
ever the  Strong  Man  emerges  who  shall  put  an  end  to 
the  present  suicidal  strife  of  factions,  the  methods  by 
which  he  will  attain  to  and  maintain  his  authority  will 
be  based  on  the  stratagems  and  devices  of  Yuan  Shih-k’ai 
and  of  his  illustrious  predecessor,  Li  Hung-chang.  At 
the  end  of  his  first  year  of  office  in  the  Presidency,  the 
Radicals  of  the  Kuo-Min  tang  party  still  held  the  balance 
of  power  and  Yuan’s  attitude  was  one  of  watchful  waiting. 
He  knew  full  well  that  the  activities  of  Young  China, 
the  hybrid  radicalism  of  Sun  Yat-sen  and  his  fellow 
fanatics,  must  speedily  wear  themselves  out  in  futility 
against  the  irresistible  deadweight  of  national  con- 
servatism. He  could  afford  to  give  them  rope,  to  let 
them  discuss  their  paper  constitutions  and  democratic 
ideals  at  Peking,  while  his  secret  agents  were  busy  in 
the  provinces,  organising  at  strategical  points  the  forces 
with  which,  when  the  time  came,  he  would  be  able  to 
put  an  end  to  any  armed  assaults  that  might  be  organised 
by  the  political  factions.  At  that  date  it  was  impossible, 
by  the  light  of  Yuan’s  record  under  the  Manchu  dynasty, 
to  predict  his  line  of  action  or  to  gauge  the  measure  of 
his  strength  of  purpose  in  a protracted  crisis.  It  had 
already  been  made  manifest,  for  all  who  had  eyes  to  see 
and  ears  to  hear,  that  the  Republic  was  a political 
interregnum,  destined  sooner  or  later  to  be  replaced 
either  by  the  absolute  Monarchy  of  the  Man  of  Destiny, 
or  by  a limited  Monarchy  tempered  by  cautious  experi- 
ments in  Constitutionalism ; but  even  those  who  appre- 
ciated Yuan’s  statesmanship  could  not  assert  with  any 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


33 


degree  of  confidence  that  he  would  display  the  qualities 
necessary  to  attain  even  partial  command  of  a situation 
so  complicated  and  so  dangerous.  It  remained  to  be 
proved  that  he  possessed  the  combination  of  diplomatic 
suppleness  and  ruthless  despotism  which  is  required  for 
the  making  of  a ruler  in  China.  The  velvet  glove  had 
been  in  evidence  on  more  than  one  historic  occasion — 
notably  at  the  crisis  of  the  Old  Buddha’s  coup  d'etat  in 
September  1898 — but  the  iron  hand  had  never  been 
revealed  in  absolute  authority. 

Looking  back  to-day  upon  the  chief  events  of  Yuan’s 
administration  of  the  Presidency  of  the  Republic,  it  is 
interesting  to  observe  how  each  one  marked  a distinct 
and  pre-arranged  advance  in  a resolutely  consistent 
policy,  that  policy  which  Yuan  had  frankly  proclaimed 
from  the  outset  as  the  country’s  only  possible  way  of 
salvation.  Western  observers,  even  when  familiar  with 
the  principles  and  practice  of  Chinese  officialdom,  found 
some  difficulty  in  accounting  for  the  boldness  with  which, 
at  the  first  crisis  of  the  revolution.  Yuan  resisted  the 
abolition  of  the  Monarchy  and  held  his  ground,  almost 
alone,  against  the  forces  of  Young  China  triumphant. 
They  found  it  harder  still  to  explain  how  it  came  to 
pass  that,  having  thus  declared  himself,  a man  of  Yuan’s 
proved  capacity  in  tactics  of  expediency  should  have 
been  elected  to  the  Presidency  by  the  vote  of  Sun  Yat-sen 
and  his  revolutionary  colleagues,  and  that  these  men 
should  apparently  have  believed  in  his  conversion  to 
democratic  principles  of  government.  And  as  they 
gradually  came  to  perceive  in  each  of  his  carefully-timed 
dramatic  coups  the  working  out  to  its  logical  conclusion 
of  his  unswerving  belief  in  despotic  government,  all 
clearly  pointing  to  the  inevitable  restoration  of  auto- 
cracy, it  became  correspondingly  difficult  to  account  for 
the  childlike  confidence  in  him  displayed  by  the  leaders 
of  the  Kuo-Min  tang.  It  is  impossible  to  believe  that 
the  members  of  the  Nanking  Assembly  were  individually 
and  collectively  beguiled  by  Yuan’s  belated  profession 
£> 


34 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


of  faith  in  the  Republic  : their  naivete  in  this  matter 
can  only  be  explained  on  the  assumption  that  the  dele- 
gates were  more  concerned  for  the  furthering  of  their 
private  ambitions  than  for  the  application  of  Republican 
principles,  and  that  they  looked  to  Yuan  to  play  the 
game  of  party  politics,  as  they  conceived  it,  and  with 
due  regard  to  the  part  which  they  had  played  in  putting 
him  at  the  head  of  affairs. 

The  issue  proved  that  they  misjudged  their  man 
and  the  solidity  of  the  classical  orthodoxy  which  he 
had  proclaimed  in  defending  the  Monarchy.  Yuan,  as 
President,  proved  himself  a past-master  in  all  the  arts 
of  mandarin  intrigue  : expert  in  opportunism,  prudent  in 
counsel,  of  many  devices ; a very  Ulysses  for  stratagem, 
unwavering  in  the  execution  of  his  plans.  He  adhered 
boldly  to  the  corrupt  traditions  of  venal  expediency, 
which  have  characterised  the  Government  of  China  for 
centuries,  to  the  nepotism  and  tortuous  methods  of 
Oriental  statecraft ; but  in  all,  and  above  all,  he  fought 
steadily  for  the  maintenance  of  the  unbroken  continuity 
of  time-honoured  traditions,  for  the  preservation  of  the 
philosophy  and  morality  of  the  Confucian  system,  and 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  ancient  social  structure  of 
civilisation,  founded  upon  that  system,  whose  apex  is 
the  Dragon  Throne.  He  acted  from  the  outset  upon 
the  conviction,  which  he  had  frankly  confessed  to  The 
Times  correspondent  at  Peking  on  November  20,  1911, 
that  “ the  institution  of  a Republic  could  only  mean  the 
instability  of  a rampant  democracy,  of  dissension  and 
partition,”  and  that  its  results  would  be  chaos,  " amidst 
which  all  interests  would  suffer  and  for  several  decades 
there  would  be  no  peace  in  the  Empire.”  He  believed, 
with  good  cause,  that  the  politicians  of  Young  China 
were  either  vain  dreamers  or  ambitious  place-seekers, 
and  that  by  no  possibility  could  their  dreams  be  brought 
into  any  direct  relation  with  the  actualities  of  the  life, 
the  deep-rooted  reverences  and  beliefs,  of  the  Chinese 
people.  Upon  this  belief  he  acted  consistently,  even 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


35 


while  yielding  lip-service  to  the  Republican  form  of 
government  and  taking  an  empty  oath  of  allegiance  to 
the  principle  of  representative  institutions. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  recapitulate  here  the  incidents — 
many  of  them  tragically  sordid — of  Yuan’s  successful 
campaign  against  the  “ rampant  democracy  ” of  Young 
China,  or  to  trace  in  their  order  the  stages  by  which  he 
has  slowly  but  surely  restored  the  ancient  edifice  of 
autocracy,  revered  by  the  orthodox  literati  and  accepted 
by  the  Chinese  people  as  the  foundation  of  the  imme- 
morial order  of  things.  Two  incidents,  however,  which 
clearly  indicated  the  President’s  policy  and  the  methods 
by  which  it  was  to  be  fulfilled,  deserve  to  be  remembered. 
The  first  was  the  summary  execution,  by  his  orders,  of 
two  Republican  generals,  accused  of  treasonable  con- 
spiracy at  Wuchang,  in  August  1912 — an  act  of  auto- 
cratic martial  law  administered  d VOrientale,  without 
hesitation  or  formalities.  The  second  was  the  assas- 
sination at  Shanghai,  in  April  1913,  of  Sung  Chiao-jen, 
the  Kuo-Min  tang’s  candidate  for  the  Premiership, 
under  circumstances  which  pointed  clearly  to  the  com- 
plicity, if  not  the  direct  instigation,  of  the  President. 
The  Republican  generals  at  Wuchang  were  dangerous 
because  they  were  capable  of  organising  a military 
revolt ; Sung  Chiao-jen  was  dangerous  because,  at  the 
moment  when  the  National  Assembly  was  about  to 
meet  for  the  first  time,  he  was  the  uncompromising 
advocate  of  Parliamentary,  as  opposed  to  Presidential, 
authority.  In  both  instances  the  dangers  were  swiftly 
and  ruthlessly  removed,  by  measures  of  despotic  bar- 
barity as  cold-blooded  as  those  of  Tzu  Hsi  at  the  height 
of  her  power;  and  in  both  instances  Yuan’s  knowledge 
of  his  countrymen  was  justified  by  the  fact  that  the 
nation  accepted  the  situation  without  indignation,  almost 
with  indifference.  According  to  The  Times  correspon- 
dent, indeed,  the  general  opinion  in  China  in  the  autumn 
of  1912,  instinctively  recognising  the  need  for  some 
effective  authority,  blamed  Yuan  for  being  “ far  too 


36  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


anxious  not  to  transgress  constitutional  limits.”  He 
speedily  rectified  his  shortcomings  in  that  respect.  If 
at  any  time  after  his  inauguration  as  President  he  dis- 
played a conciliatory  attitude  towards  Young  China, 
subsequent  events  proved  that  he  was  merely  drawing 
back  in  order  to  jump  the  more  effectively. 

At  the  outset,  Yuan’s  position  was  rendered  danger- 
ously insecure  for  lack  of  the  sinews  of  war:  until  he 
had  negotiated  a large  foreign  loan,  his  authority  lacked 
not  only  the  prestige  which  recognition  by  the  Powers 
conferred,  but  it  lacked  the  means  of  purchasing  the 
“ loyalty  ” of  military  commanders  like  Chang  Hsiin 
and  providing  his  agents  at  the  provincial  capitals  with 
the  only  argument  which  is  invariably  convincing  in 
China.  Once  placed  in  possession  of  funds,  however, 
and  assured  of  the  sympathy  and  support  of  the  Govern- 
ments which  direct  the  operations  of  the  “ Five  Powers  ” 
group  of  financiers.  Yuan  could  face  with  equanimity  the 
Cantonese  party’s  last  desperate  bid  for  place  and  power. 
“ The  war  to  punish  Yuan  ” (July  1913)  was  a melan- 
choly fiasco,  and  incidentally  a valuable  object-lesson 
in  Chinese  politics,  because  from  beginning  to  end  it 
was  a matter  of  dollars  and  cents.  The  Army  and  Navy 
were  frankly  at  the  service  of  the  highest  bidder,  and  the 
only  cash  bidder  was  Yuan. 

It  was  only  after  the  President’s  easy  victory  over  the 
rabble  forces  of  Sun  Yat-sen  and  Huang  Hsing  that  his 
policy  of  centralisation  revealed  the  hand  of  the  Strong 
Man  and  his  intention  of  restoring  the  principles  and 
practice  of  autocratic  government.  He  had  bided  his 
time — he  had  endured  with  philosophic  calm  the  invasion 
of  the  high  places  of  the  metropolitan  government  by 
hordes  of  turbulent  “ Western -learning  ” students;  he 
had  given  them  rope,  and  they  had  hanged  themselves. 
After  the  collapse  of  the  last  possible  attempt  at  organ- 
ised insurrection,  the  proscription  of  the  Kuo-Min  tang 
was  inevitable.  He  removed  it,  as  Cromwell  removed 
the  Rump  Parliament,  and  no  dog  barked  in  all  the 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


37 


land.  At  his  subsequent  formal  " election  ” to  the 
Presidency  on  October  6,  1913,  he  took  occasion  to 
emphasise  the  fact  that,  for  the  future,  he  proposed  to 
rule  without  interference,  in  accordance  with  ancient 
tradition.  “ Restrictions  have  been  placed  on  my 
authority,”  he  observed,  “ which  have  hampered  me  in 
my  work  of  promoting  the  country’s  best  interests,” 
to  which  was  added  the  significant  reminder  that  “ he 
had  always  preferred  conservative  to  radical  courses.” 
He  proceeded,  therefore,  to  adopt  them,  removing,  one 
by  one,  the  flimsy  props  of  the  Cantonese  jerry-built 
Republicanism  with  the  deliberate  precision  of  a chess- 
player ; and  all  the  while,  as  he  destroyed  the  substance 
of  representative  government,  he  continued  solemnly  to 
pay  his  respects  to  the  memory  of  its  shadow’. 

There  was  nothing  surprising  in  the  fact  that  Yuan 
Shih-k’ai,  having  defeated  the  armed  forces  of  his  political 
opponents,  should  have  put  an  end  to  the  farce  of  Parlia- 
mentary government  at  Peking  by  decreeing  the  dis- 
solution of  the  Kuo-Min  tang.  From  the  Chinese  point 
of  view,  there  was  nothing  remarkable  in  his  action ; 
nor  was  there  anything  contrary  to  Chinese  traditions 
of  statecraft  in  the  “ face-saving  ” expedients  and  ex- 
planations by  which  he  justified  every  subsequent  move 
in  a perfectly-planned  policy.  The  only  really  remark- 
able feature  of  the  situation  lay  in  the  failure  of  many 
European  observers  to  foresee  its  inevitable  conclusion, 
and  in  their  apparently  sincere  belief  that  constitutional 
methods  of  government  w’ere  still  within  the  range  of 
practical  politics  at  Peking.  The  dissolution  of  the 
Kuo-Min  tang  resulted  naturally  in  the  abolition  of  the 
National  Assembly,  and  thereafter,  equally  logically,  in 
the  suppression  of  the  local  self-government  Assemblies 
throughout  the  country.  Parliament  was  replaced  by 
a Political  Council  and  an  “ Administrative  Conference 
for  the  revision  of  the  Constitution.”  The  Administra- 
tive Conference,  a body  of  seventy-one  members,  was 
composed  almost  exclusively  of  men  selected  by  the 


38  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


President  and  by  his  agents,  the  Tutuhs,  in  the  provinces, 
literati  and  officials  of  the  old  regime.  Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s 
first  Presidential  address  to  this  body  left  no  room  for 
further  doubts  as  to  his  policy.  “ The  Republic,”  he 
declared,  “ had  been  in  existence  for  two  years,  and 
during  this  period,  principles  and  laws  have  been  dragged 
in  the  dust,  while  morality,  self-control,  and  righteous- 
ness have  been  swept  into  oblivion  ” — in  other  words, 
his  own  wise  forecast  had  been  completely  fulfilled. 
Thereafter,  adopting  the  traditional  phraseology  of 
Imperial  decrees,  he  proceeded  to  express  his  opinion 
of  “ the  minority  of  turbulent  demagogues,”  who  had 
brought  such  evils  upon  the  State,  the  " specious  rogues  ” 
who  talked  glibly  of  liberty,  equality,  and  patriotism, 
‘‘intent  all  the  while  on  possessing  themselves  of  others’ 
wealth,  with  which  they  flee  overseas,  seeking  shelter 
under  the  aegis  of  the  foreigner.”  Finally,  after  express- 
ing his  belief  in  gradual  reforms  and  his  intention  to 
adopt  a policy  of  practical  reconstruction,  he  declared 
that,  in  his  experience  of  the  art  of  government,  men 
and  money  were  more  useful  than  revolutionary  theories. 

As  regards  money,  he  was  by  no  means  well  sup- 
plied; but  the  men  were  ready  to  his  hand,  and  those 
whom  he  selected  as  Tutuhs,  to  direct  and  express  “ public 
opinion  ” in  the  provinces,  served  him,  on  the  whole, 
faithfully  and  well.  With  the  scrupulous  regard  for 
appearances,  the  careful  whitening  of  sepulchres,  which 
is  the  first  principle  of  government  in  China,  every  step 
which  Yuan  subsequently  took  towards  the  practical 
reconstruction  of  the  old  orthodox  autocracy  and  central- 
isation of  power,  was  taken  ostensibly  in  response  to 
the  unanimous  petition  of  the  Tutuhs.  On  their  repre- 
sentations (thoughtfully  drafted,  to  prevent  possible 
mistakes,  in  the  President’s  Secretariat)  the  Provincial 
Assemblies  were  abolished.  With  their  approval,  and 
that  of  the  Political  Council,  the  Worship  of  Heaven 
was  revived,  with  ceremonies  similar  to  those  observed 
by  the  Manchu  dynasty.  At  their  instance,  the  Pro- 


CHINESE  GARDEN  (AT  SOOCHOW). 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


39 


visional  Constitution  was  suspended  till  a more  con- 
venient season,  and  replaced  by  the  Presidential  system 
of  government.  The  Cabinet  became  little  more  than 
a perfunctory  body  of  well-paid  secretaries,  and  the 
Premier’s  only  duties  were  to  appear  at  diplomatic 
functions  and  to  countersign,  fro  forma,  the  Presidential 
mandates.  The  Conference  for  the  re-drafting  of  the 
Constitution,  which  met  on  March  18,  1914,  afforded  an 
indication  of  its  quality  by  proposing  to  amend  certain 
articles  of  the  Code  so  as  to  confer  on  the  President 
full  power  to  declare  war  and  make  treaties  without 
Parliamentary  sanction.  This  was  a typical  example  of 
collective  “ face-saving  ” — for  all  concerned  were  well 
aware  that,  in  the  absence  of  a successful  revolution, 
there  was  no  likelihood  of  any  Parliament  being  con- 
vened. Had  not  the  Provincial  Assemblies  been  dissolved 
for  “ perversely  usurping  financial  authority  and  ob- 
structing the  business  of  administration  ” ? Per  contra, 
at  this  juncture  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  gave  proof  of  the  begin- 
ning of  a policy  of  reconstruction,  by  instituting  examina- 
tions to  test  the  fitness  of  District  Magistrates  and  other 
local  authorities — a highly  necessary  reform,  which  might 
have  led  to  practical  results  had  Yuan  been  spared  and 
had  it  been  honestly  carried  out  by  competent  examiners. 

So  long  as  Yuan  Shih-k’ai 's  policy  was  confined  to 
political  and  financial  measures,  clearly  directed  towards 
the  re-establishment  of  the  old  order  of  metropolitan 
administration,  public  opinion  accepted  it  placidly 
enough  as  a normal  reaction  against  innovations  that 
ran  counter  to  the  instincts  and  customs  of  the  people. 
The  Press,  still  largely  controlled  by  Young  China  at 
the  Treaty  Ports,  denounced  it  as  unconstitutional,  but 
the  masses,  knowing  nothing  of  constitutions,  were 
evidently  unconcerned  in  the  disputes  of  the  scribes 
and  politicians.  They  were  only  anxious  that  the  blood- 
shed and  brigandage,  which  they  had  come  to  associate 
with  Republican  ideas,  should  cease ; wheresoever  public 
opinion  was  articulate,  it  was  evidently  disposed  to  hope 


40  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


that  Yuan,  the  Strong  Man,  would  succeed  in  restoring 
law  and  order.  The  common  people  were  weary  of  being 
looted  in  the  name  of  liberty.  It  was  only  when  the 
President,  acting  upon  the  “ advice  ” of  the  Administra- 
tive Council,  decided  henceforward  to  perform  the 
Winter  Solstice  sacrifice  at  the  Temple  of  Heaven,  that 
he  became,  in  the  sight  of  the  people,  something  far 
more  important  than  an  administrator  and  a politician. 
By  this  momentous  decision,  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  carried  his 
original  profession  of  political  faith  to  its  logical  con- 
clusion— a conclusion  which  concerned  the  sons  of  Han 
in  their  daily  lives,  because  it  meant  the  restoration  of 
the  social  structure,  the  re-assertion  of  things  which  the 
iconoclasts  of  Young  China  had  threatened  utterly  to 
destroy.  By  this  decision,  as  a Times  correspondent 
in  Peking  justly  observed,  “ the  President  practically 
proclaimed  himself  an  autocratic  ruler,  who  is  responsible 
not  to  the  nation,  but  to  the  Almighty  alone.”  Yet  even 
in  so  doing,  Yuan  was  careful  to  have  it  suggested  by 
his  faithful  Councillors  that  the  Worship  of  Heaven  was 
originally  “ Republican  in  spirit.”  And  all  the  while, 
“ in  the  profound  seclusion  of  the  Palace,”  he  kept  a firm 
grasp  on  the  situation,  gauging  the  force  of  public  opinion 
from  every  quarter,  timing  every  move  in  the  game 
with  the  precision  of  a master-player,  steadily  increasing 
his  hold  over  the  provinces  and  their  revenue-producing 
capacity.  He  knew — none  better — that  the  loyalty  of 
the  majority  of  his  supporters,  and  particularly  of  the 
army,  was  an  fond  a loyalty  of  loaves  and  fishes.  He 
realised  that  his  power  to  rule  the  Empire  must  ever 
depend  on  control  of  ready  money  sufficient  to  secure 
the  removal  or  conversion  of  malcontents  and  to  provide 
for  the  repression  by  force  of  widespread  elements  of 
disorder.  As  for  the  masses  of  the  people,  he  declared 
his  firm  belief  that  they,  like  himself,  were  “ no  lovers 
of  changes  which  run  counter  to  immemorial  custom  ” ; 
for  the  rest,  he  knew  that  they  cared  not  at  all  what 
the  form  or  fashion  of  the  Government  may  be,  so  long 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


41 


as  it  secured  for  them  surcease  of  civil  strife  and  reasonable 
security  for  life  and  property. 

The  Presidential  mandates  issued  by  Yuan  Shih-k’ai 
at  this  period  afforded  striking  proof  of  his  profound 
knowledge  of  his  countrymen  and  of  his  conviction  that 
they  would  welcome  the  restoration  of  the  autocratic 
form  of  government  to  which  they  were  accustomed. 
These  mandates  afford  also  instructive  example  of  the 
curious  admixture  of  patriarchal  philosophy  and  childish 
naivete  which  characterises  the  Chinese  mind  (whether 
Young  or  Old)  whenever  it  attempts  to  graft  new  wood 
of  European  origin  upon  the  venerable  tree  of  native 
statecraft.  The  avowed  purpose  of  the  most  important 
of  these  mandates  was  “ to  lay  the  permanent  founda- 
tions of  the  new  constitution  in  China  ” ; its  immediate 
and  practical  result  was  to  remove  the  last  vestiges  of 
constitutional  procedure.  “ The  most  renowned  scholars 
of  East  and  West,”  it  declared,  “ are  agreed  that,  in 
framing  a fundamental  law,  it  is  essential  to  bear  in 
mind  the  condition  of  the  people.  No  good  can  possibly 
come  of  cutting  one’s  feet  to  fit  a pair  of  shoes.”  So 
the  shoes  were  made  to  fit  the  understandings  of  the 
day,  good  comfortable  shoes,  fashioned  on  the  old  dynastic 
last.  The  Presidential  election  law,  promulgated  in 
December  1914,  conferred  ten  years  of  office  on  the 
President,  who  was  to  be  eligible  for  re-election  by  a 
vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  Administrative  Council.  To 
“ prevent  intrigue  and  strife,”  the  President  was  em- 
powered to  nominate  three  persons,  whose  names  were 
to  be  recorded  and  secreted  upon  a table  of  gold,  one  of 
whom  was  to  succeed  him  in  the  event  of  his  death. 

Another  mandate,  issued  in  response  to  a memorial 
by  the  Censors,  decreed  that  henceforth  “ no  member 
of  any  political  party  shall  be  eligible  for  membership 
of  Parliament.”  The  Censors  based  their  memorial  on 
the  lamentable  fact  that  “ China’s  recently  dissolved 
Parliament  became  a laughing-stock,  because  all  its 
members  belonged  to  political  parties.  Among  them 


42 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


were  to  be  found  men  who  degraded  the  profession  of 
letters,  men  who  indulged  in  windy  rhetoric,  who  em- 
ployed money,  and  even  arms,  to  turn  the  country  upside 
down.  The  parties  used  their  collective  strength  to 
influence  elections  and  usurp  power.”  By  the  re-drafting 
of  the  Constitution,  full  powers  were  conferred  upon  the 
President  to  declare  war  and  make  treaties.  In  his 
hands,  also,  was  placed  supreme  authority  over  the 
finances  and  armed  forces  of  the  country.  Finally,  a 
leaf  was  carefully  selected  from  Great  Britain’s  wait- 
and-see  procedure  of  Parliamentary  reform  by  the 
promise  of  a model  Parliament,  to  consist  of  an  Upper 
and  a Lower  House,  to  be  elected  and  convened  at 
some  convenient  season  in  the  dim  future. 

Thus,  out  of  the  chaos  left  by  the  passing  of  the  Manchus 
and  the  turmoil  of  the  revolution,  Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s  genius 
of  statesmanship,  conforming  strictly  to  the  ancient 
classical  model,  succeeded  in  effectively  restoring  the 
authority  of  the  metropolitan  administration,  with  him- 
self as  its  head,  in  the  undisguised  capacity  of  Dictator. 
Every  stage  in  his  intricate  programme  was  silently  and 
skilfully  carried  out  with  the  polished  smoothness  of  a 
conjuring  performance,  and  the  general  effect  on  the 
audience  was  such  as  to  completely  justify  those  who 
hold  that  the  Chinese  people  are  in  no  sense  fitted,  or 
even  anxious,  for  self-government.  In  other  words,  only 
under  a benevolent  form  of  despotism,  conforming  to 
the  Confucian  traditions  of  government,  can  law  and 
order  be  maintained.  By  his  very  aloofness  and  dignified 
reticence,  by  his  acute  perception  of  the  “ happy  mean  ” 
and  pursuance  of  the  lines  of  least  resistance,  by  his 
masterly  handling  of  semi-independent  military  chiefs 
and  provincial  officials,  Yuan  succeeded  in  establishing 
himself  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  as  the  Man  of  Destiny, 
the  only  ruler  in  sight  who  could  possibly  hold  in  check 
the  ever-present  elements  of  disorder. 

The  divine  right  of  monarchs  in  China  being  in- 
timately bound  up  with  the  sacred  institution  of  ancestor- 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


43 


worship,  it  is  a matter  of  tradition  that  no  new  dynasty 
can  rightfully  claim  the  “ mandate  of  Heaven  ” unless 
it  has  overthrown  its  predecessor  by  force  of  arms.  It 
is  safe  to  say  that  when  Yuan  struggled  to  retain  the 
Manchu  hierarchy  in  its  place,  as  a figure-head  shorn  of 
despotic  authority,  he  did  so  because  he  realised  that 
the  eventual  restoration  of  the  Throne  was  inevitable, 
and  that  grave  dangers  must  confront  the  creation  of  a 
new  Imperial  House.  Those  dangers  were  undoubtedly 
lessened  by  the  insidiously-gradual  assertion  of  Yuan’s 
autocratic  authority,  and  by  the  fact  that  the  people 
(including  the  Manchu  clans)  were  thus  led  to  regard  him 
as  the  head  of  the  State.  Some  of  his  methods  were 
extremely  “ slim,”  and  certain  of  his  swift  reprisals 
were  barbarous,  according  to  Western  ideas,  but  all 
conformed  to  time-honoured  precedents  of  Chinese  rule, 
and  therefore  none  aroused  anything  like  popular 
indignation. 

Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s  subsequent  attempt  to  restore  the 
monarchical  system  of  government  in  his  own  person 
merely  carried  his  openly-avowed  principles  to  their 
most  natural  conclusion.  Neither  by  his  actions  nor  by 
his  utterances  had  he  ever  definitely  abandoned  those 
principles  or  modified  his  profound  distrust  of  “ changes 
which  run  counter  to  immemorial  custom.”  Had  the 
question  of  the  monarchy  been  solved  along  the  lines  of 
classical  tradition,  as  a matter  of  internal  politics,  it 
can  hardly  be  doubted  that  Yuan,  as  Emperor,  would 
have  succeeded  in  establishing  his  effective  authority  to 
the  general  satisfaction  and  benefit  of  the  Chinese  people. 
Apart  from  the  opposition  of  the  Kuo-Min  tang  faction 
led  by  Sun  Yat-sen — nationally  speaking,  not  so  im- 
portant a factor  in  the  situation  as  some  foreign  observers 
were  led  to  believe — everything  pointed  to  the  prob- 
ability that  the  nation,  if  left  to  itself,  would  have  wel- 
comed the  restoration  of  the  Monarchy,  if  only  because 
the  masses  had  come  to  associate  the  Republican  doctrine 
with  bloodshed  and  brigandage.  The  ruling  class,  the 


44  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


mandarin  hierarchy,  were  clearly  in  sympathy  with  the 
restoration  of  the  monarchical  form  of  government. 

But  the  question  was  not  destined  to  be  settled  as  a 
matter  of  internal  politics.  The  plans  of  Yuan  Shih-k’ai 
and  his  supporters  failed  to  realise  the  dangers  of  foreign 
intervention,  and  particularly  the  interest  evoked  in 
Japan  by  any  important  change  in  China’s  affairs.  The 
President’s  methods  and  mandates  during  the  year  pre- 
ceding his  acceptance  of  the  Throne  afforded  striking 
proof  of  his  profound  knowledge  of  his  countrymen, 
but  they  revealed  also  his  inability  to  appreciate  the 
international  situation. 

The  movement  for  the  restoration  of  the  Monarchy, 
organised  by  the  Chou-An-hui  Society,  began  to  assume 
a definite  form  a year  after  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe, 
in  August  1915.  It  failed  conspicuously  to  take  into 
account  the  significance  of  the  demands  which  Japan 
had  addressed  to  China,  in  settlement  of  her  outstanding 
claims,  after  the  expulsion  of  the  Germans  from  Kiao- 
Chao.  These  demands,  submitted  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment in  the  form  of  a Protocol  by  Mr.  Hioki  on  January 
18,  1915,  were  unmistakably  of  a nature  to  emphasise 
the  special  rights  and  material  interests  claimed  by 
Japan  as  the  result  of  her  victories.  As  The  Times 
observed,  “ it  was  obvious  to  everybody,  except,  perhaps, 
to  the  Chinese  statesmen,  that  Japan  would  probably 
make  use  of  her  opportunity  to  obtain  some  definite 
settlement  of  her  many  outstanding  claims  against  her 
neighbour.”  We  need  not  here  recapitulate  these  claims 
or  describe  the  subsequent  negotiations  which  took  place 
at  Peking  between  January  and  May.  It  was  recognised 
in  England  that  certain  of  the  “ contingent  ” and  question- 
able demands  put  forward  (which  were  not  communicated 
to  the  Allied  Powers)  were  inspired  by  the  exigencies  of 
the  internal  political  situation  in  Japan.  The  Okuma 
Government  had  been  defeated  in  the  Chamber  and  a 
General  Election  was  impending,  in  wdiich  the  Government 
had  perforce  to  reckon  with  a strong  popular  demand 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


45 


for  a more  active  “ forward  ” policy  in  China.  After 
four  months  of  tedi©us  negotiations  at  Peking  (in  which 
German  intrigue  played  an  important  role  by  means 
of  a systematic  propaganda  of  falsehood  in  the  Chinese 
Press)  the  Japanese  Government  presented  an  ultimatum 
to  China  (May  6)  in  which  the  “ contingent  ” demands 
above  mentioned  were  withdrawn  and  reserved  for 
future  discussion.  Count  Okuma’s  party  had  won  the 
elections  in  March,  but  popular  feeling  was  still  strongly 
expressed  on  the  subject  of  China,  and  the  Government 
was  being  charged  with  vacillation  and  urged  to  employ 
military  force  to  back  its  demands.  On  April  2,  Count 
Okuma  had  taken  occasion,  through  Reuter’s  corre- 
spondent, to  declare  that  Japan’s  position  and  policy  in 
her  negotiations  with  China  had  been  deliberately  mis- 
represented, especially  in  America,  as  the  result  of  false 
statements  spread  broadcast  by  German  agents. 

The  attitude  of  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  throughout  these 
negotiations  was  friendly  but  evasive;  in  refusing  the 
greater  part  of  the  Japanese  claims,  he  took  his  stand 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  not  possible  for  the  Chinese 
Government  to  concede  any  demands  calculated  to 
impair  China’s  sovereignty  or  the  Treaty  rights  of  other 
Powers,  an  attitude  which  barred  discussion  of  many 
of  the  questions  which  Japan  had  raised.  He  had  also 
stipulated  from  the  outset  that  Kiao-Chao  should  be 
completely  restored  to  China  and  that  China  should  be 
represented  in  the  general  peace  negotiations  after  the 
war.  In  declining  the  finally  modified  demands  of  the 
Japanese  Government  on  May  3,  the  Chinese  Foreign 
Office  expressed  itself  in  a distinctly  unconciliatory 
manner,  revealing  most  inopportunely  the  traditional 
mandarin  arrogance  and  contempt  for  Japan’s  claims 
to  be  treated  as  a great  Power.  In  this  attitude  it  was 
encouraged,  no  doubt,  by  Count  Okuma’s  public  declara- 
tion of  pacific  and  reasonable  intentions.  When  subse- 
quently confronted  with  a forty-eight-hour  ultimatum, 
however,  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  and  his  advisers  made  the 


46 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


usual  virtue  of  necessity  and  promptly  yielded.  By  the 
terms  of  the  settlement  thus  effected,  Japan  regularised 
and  consolidated  her  position  in  Shantung  (in  succession 
to  the  Germans),  in  South  Manchuria,  Eastern  Inner 
Mongolia,  and  on  the  coast  of  Fukhien  province. 

Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s  diplomacy  had  brought  him  thus  far 
fairly  successfully  through  a difficult  situation;  but  his 
usual  astuteness  was  lacking  when  he  failed  to  draw 
from  these  negotiations  the  obvious  conclusion  that,  in 
the  matter  of  his  personal  ambitions  to  found  a new 
dynasty,  he  would  have  to  reckon  seriously  with  the 
Japanese  Government.  He  had  never  been  persona 
grata  in  Japan  since  the  days  when,  as  Li  Hung  Chang’s 
lieutenant  and  Resident  in  Korea,  he  had  opposed 
Japanese  policy  and  supported  that  of  Russia ; he  might 
well  have  foreseen  that  the  Government  at  Tokyo  would 
discourage  any  attempt  on  his  part  to  establish  himself 
upon  the  Throne  of  China.  He  was  certainly  not  without 
warning  on  this  score.  One  of  the  ablest  and  most 
influential  writers  in  China,  the  famous  scholar  Liang 
Ch’i-ch’ao,  who  had  served  as  Minister  of  Justice  in 
Yuan’s  first  Cabinet  during  the  crisis  of  1911,  and  had 
then  strongly  supported  the  maintenance  of  the  Monarchy 
together  with  a constitutional  form  of  government,  re- 
tired from  the  State  Council  in  August  1915,  and  openly 
denounced  the  monarchical  movement  on  broad  principles 
of  national  policy.  In  September  he  published  his  opinions 
on  the  subject  in  a series  of  articles  in  the  Peking  Gazette. 
His  objections  to  Yuan’s  accession  to  the  Throne  were 
based  partly  on  grounds  of  classical  orthodoxy  and  partly 
on  recognition  of  the  certainty  of  Japan’s  intervention. 
Regarding  the  matter  from  the  point  of  view  of  historical 
precedents,  ever  dear  to  the  mind  of  the  literati,  he 
observed  that  public  opinion  would  undoubtedly  support 
the  President’s  accession  to  the  Throne  “ if  he  had  first 
defeated  a foreign  foe  in  a decisive  battle.”  There  being 
no  immediate  prospect  of  this  solution,  he  laid  stress 
on  the  fact  that  “ full  recognition  of  the  Monarchy  was 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


47 


not  likely  to  be  accorded  to  China  by  certain  Powers 
until  after  the  Peace  Conference  of  Europe  has  con- 
cluded its  business.”  Referring  specifically  to  Japan, 
he  observed  that  “ the  country  which  has  the  loudest 
voice  in  our  affairs  is  that  which  lies  close  to  our  elbow,” 
and  predicted  that  “ if  this  country  has  occasion  to 
consider  the  question  of  recognition,  it  will  also  have 
occasion  to  interfere.  Even  a little  child,”  he  con- 
cluded, “ can  foresee  that  Japan  will  not  recognise  the 
new  Government  without  demanding  the  concession  of 
further  privileges,  which  China  dare  not  refuse.”  Yuan 
Shih-k’ai  was  undoubtedly  impressed  by  the  views  of 
this  famous  writer.  He  recognised  their  far-reaching 
influence,  and  made  every  effort  to  enlist  Liang  Ch’i- 
ch’ao’s  support  and  to  persuade  him  to  speak  smooth 
things;  but  in  vain. 

In  October  the  State  Council  made  a show  of  consti- 
tutional procedure  by  referring  the  question  of  the 
Monarchy  to  a vote  of  the  provinces,  or  rather  to  a 
number  of  individuals  selected  by  the  President  and 
his  supporters  to  represent  them.  In  due  course,  on 
October  30,  the  expected  happened.  The  Japanese 
Minister  at  Peking,  accompanied  by  his  British  and 
Russian  colleagues,  called  at  the  Chinese  Foreign  Office 
and  offered  friendly  advice  on  behalf  of  his  Government 
against  the  restoration  of  the  monarchical  system.  He 
pointed  out  that  while  Europe  was  at  war  it  would  be 
dangerous  for  China  to  make  changes  likely  to  create 
internal  dissensions;  for  this  reason  his  Government 
respectfully  advised  the  President  temporarily  to  post- 
pone the  projected  change.  The  Foreign  Minister  re- 
plied that  the  Chinese  Government  had  no  reason  to 
anticipate  serious  opposition  in  the  provinces,  and  that, 
having  referred  the  question  to  the  decision  of  the  people, 
they  must  abide  by  the  issue,  whatever  it  might  be. 
The  issue,  of  which  there  never  was  any  doubt,  was  a 
practically  unanimous  “ vote  ” in  favour  of  Yuan’s 
accession  (November  5).  Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s  attitude  at 


48  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


this  juncture  plainly  intimated  his  conviction  that  the 
danger  of  foreign  intervention  in  China’s  domestic  affairs 
would  not  be  increased  or  diminished  by  any  change  in 
the  form  of  the  Government.  He  believed,  indeed,  that 
the  pre-occupation  of  the  European  Powers  in  the  war 
had  greatly  lessened  the  chance  of  such  intervention, 
and  he  evidently  under-estimated  the  risk  of  serious 
opposition  being  organised  against  him  in  China.  As 
regards  Japan,  he  appears  to  have  thought  that  active 
intervention  from  that  quarter  would  strengthen  his 
hands  and  gain  for  him  the  support  of  patriotic  opinion, 
even  among  the  Young  China  revolutionaries.  In  defer- 
ence to  further  representations  from  the  Japanese  Minister 
and  his  colleagues,  he  directed  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  to  state  that  the  Government  was  in  a position  to 
deal  with  opposition  in  China,  but  that  it  must  depend 
on  the  good  offices  of  foreign  Governments  to  control 
revolutionaries  domiciled  outside  its  jurisdiction — an 
unmistakable  reference  to  the  support  given  in  Japan  to 
Sun  Yat-sen,  Huang  Hsing,  and  other  political  agitators. 
Here,  again,  Yuan’s  courage  was  greater  than  his  wisdom ; 
for  his  experience  during  the  revolution  of  1911  and  on 
many  other  occasions  should  have  reminded  him  that 
revolutions  in  China  are  rather  a matter  of  money  than 
of  political  ideals,  and  that  a handful  of  energetic  men, 
provided  with  sufficient  dollars,  could  get  the  rabble 
army  of  any  province  to  move  in  any  and  every  direc- 
tion. On  November  9 the  Chinese  Government,  while 
adhering  to  its  intentions,  announced  that  no  change  in 
the  system  of  government  would  take  place  before  the 
New  Year. 

On  December  6 came  the  first  mutterings  of  the  storm 
which  eventually  put  an  end  to  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  and  all 
his  ambitions.  A Government  cruiser  lying  off  the 
Arsenal  at  Shanghai  was  seized  by  a party  of  thirty 
revolutionaries,  chiefly  naval  students ; but  the  affair  was 
purely  local,  and  the  subsequent  proceedings  on  both 
sides  savoured  of  opera  bouffe.  Thereupon  the  State 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


49 


Council  memorialised  the  President  to  put  an  end  to 
the  prevalent  uncertainty  and  unrest  by  proclaiming 
himself  Emperor  without  further  delay.  After  the 
customary  face-saving  protestations  of  unworthiness. 
Yuan  Shih-k’ai  complied,  and  on  December  12  the 
Monarchy  was  proclaimed.  The  coronation  ceremony 
was  fixed  for  February  9.  But  it  was  not  to  be. 

Within  a week  after  the  issue  of  the  mandate  announc- 
ing Yuan’s  accession  came  rumours  of  a serious  insur- 
rection brewing  in  the  far-western  province  of  Yunnan, 
organised  and  led  by  Tsai  Ao,  a military  official  educated 
in  Japan,  whom  Yuan  had  appointed  to  the  military 
governorship  of  the  province  after  the  revolution.  On 
December  27  the  revolutionary  leaders  and  gentry  of 
Yunnan  declared  the  independence  of  their  province, 
in  opposition  to  the  Monarchy,  and  Tsai  Ao  dispatched 
a rabble  army,  estimated  at  30,000  men,  against  the 
Imperial  forces  which  had  been  hurriedly  sent  to  Szechuan. 
Despite  initial  successes  gained  by  the  Government,  the 
insurrectionary  movement  spread  rapidly;  it  was  bound 
to  do  so,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  in  nearly  every  province 
there  were  bodies  of  unpaid  and  undisciplined  troops, 
under  generals  of  doubtful  loyalty,  eager  for  oppor- 
tunities of  looting.  By  the  end  of  January  the  provinces 
of  Kueichou  and  Kwangsi  had  renounced  their  allegiance. 
Yuan’s  star  was  now  visibly  declining,  and  his  sup- 
porters, following  the  cautious  custom  of  their  class,  were 
deserting  him.  When  his  right-hand  man,  Feng  Kuo- 
chang,  the  Commander-in-Chief  at  Nanking,  declined  to 
support  him,  and  bodies  of  the  Imperial  troops  began  to 
make  common  cause  with  the  rebels,  his  friends  at  the 
capital  persuaded  him  to  issue  an  official  announcement 
(January  22)  that  the  establishment  of  the  Monarchy 
would  be  indefinitely  postponed.  But  the  step  came 
too  late.  In  China  nothing  fails  like  failure,  and  Yuan, 
as  aspirant  Emperor,  could  never  hope  to  command 
from  the  literati  the  same  kind  of  blind  loyalty  which  the 
best  type  of  classical  Confucianists  displayed  for  the 

E 


50 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Manchu  dynasty,  even  in  its  decline.  By  the  end  of 
March  the  tide  of  ill-fortune  was  running  so  strongly 
against  him  that  his  few  remaining  friends  urged  him  to 
abdicate  the  Presidency  and  retire  into  private  life.  A 
month  later  the  provinces  of  Kuangtung  and  Kiangsi  had 
joined  the  hue  and  cry ; Y uan  wras  denounced  as  a traitor 
and  usurper  by  the  representatives  of  the  same  provinces 
which  had  urged  him  to  ascend  the  Throne  six  months 
before.  The  remnants  of  his  army  were  isolated  and 
helpless  in  far-off  Szechuan,  the  provincial  Treasuries 
had  suspended  all  remittances  to  Peking,  and  his  act  of 
renunciation  had  merely  served  to  intensify  the  vindic- 
tive feelings  and  personal  ambitions  of  his  adversaries. 
His  position  was  clearly  impossible;  even  amidst  his 
own  proteges  of  the  Court  faction  there  were  few  to  do 
reverence  to  the  Strong  Man  who  had  failed.  On  April  22, 
hoping  still  to  retrieve  something  of  the  desperate  situa- 
tion, Yuan  agreed  to  surrender  all  civil  authority  to  the 
Cabinet,  reconstructed  under  the  Premiership  of  Tuan 
Chi-jui,  who  came  to  the  front  at  this  juncture.  Tuan 
had  been  Yuan’s  Minister  of  War  in  1913,  when  he  had 
displayed  much  energy  and  ability  in  defeating  the 
abortive  “ campaign  to  punish  Yuan,”  launched  by  Sun 
Yat-sen  and  his  revolutionary  friends.  Despite  his  con- 
servative and  monarchical  tendencies,  he  was  popular 
with  the  leaders  of  the  southern  faction;  an  able  diplo- 
matist, and  credited  by  his  friends  with  unusual  nimble- 
ness of  opinion  in  politics.  Upon  his  accession  to  the 
Premiership,  his  Cabinet  proceeded  to  placate  the  south- 
ern party  by  announcing  its  intention  of  re-establishing 
Parliamentary  Government  at  an  early  date.  Meanwhile 
the  southern  Kuo-Min  tang  leaders  had  proclaimed 
Li  Yuan-hung,  the  Vice-President  of  the  Republic,  as 
President,  and  had  constituted  themselves  into  a new 
Provisional  Government  at  Canton,  without  reference 
to  Peking.  What  would  have  been  the  ultimate  fate  of 
Yuan  Shih-k’ai  under  these  conditions,  none  can  say; 
he  solved  all  such  problems  by  dying  on  June  5.  The 


YUAN  SHIH-K’AI 


51 


medical  men  who  attended  him  ascribed  his  death  to 
kidney  trouble  and  nervous  prostration;  the  man  in 
the  street  at  Peking  said,  with  equal  truth,  that  he  died 
of  “ eating  bitterness  ” and  loss  of  face.  Officialdom  at 
Peking  appeased  its  conscience,  and  possibly  placated 
the  soul  of  the  departed,  by  a State  funeral  on  a most 
imposing  scale. 

Yuan  Shih-k’ai  having  passed  to  his  rest,  Li  Yuan- 
hung  became  President  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  with 
Tuan  Chi-jui  as  Premier.  The  country,  or  rather  the 
vernacular  Press,  expressed  great  relief  at  the  change 
and  confidence  in  the  early  establishment  of  law  and 
order  under  the  beneficent  direction  of  a constitutional 
Government.  But  if  ever,  when  in  disgrace  with  fortune, 
Yuan  may  have  had  misgivings  as  to  the  wisdom  and 
patriotism  of  his  own  policy,  his  august  shade  had  not 
long  to  wait  by  the  Yellow  Springs  of  Hades  to  see  them 
amply  justified,  and  his  words  fulfilled  concerning  the 
need  for  benevolent  despotism  and  the  evils  of  govern- 
ment under  a “ rampant  democracy.”  The  late  Dictator 
had  not  been  dead  a month  before  it  became  apparent 
at  Peking  that  only  a strong  hand  of  absolute  authority 
could  hope  to  impose  a stable  government  upon  the 
conflicting  policies  and  ambitions  of  the  semi-independent 
military  chieftains  and  amateur  politicians  who  now 
aspired  to  rule  the  country.  Many  experienced  observers 
had  foreseen  that  the  substitution  of  the  Dictator’s  rule 
for  that  of  a number  of  jealous  provincial  governors 
would  mean  chaos,  and  they  were  right. 

With  Yuan  passed  the  last  of  the  super-mandarins  of 
the  old  regime  and  the  last  hope  of  an  early  restoration 
of  stable  government  in  China. 


CHAPTER  III 


CHINA  JOINS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  passing  of  Yuan  left  the  Central  Government’s 
finances  in  a parlous  state  and  the  administration  com- 
pletely disorganised.  A month  before  his  death  the 
Government  banks  at  Peking  had  suspended  specie  pay- 
ments and  the  military  leaders  were  fiercely  clamouring 
for  money.  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  the  new  Cabinet  formed 
at  the  end  of  June,  containing  representatives  of  all 
parties,  hoped  to  restore  the  fiscal  machinery  by  convening 
the  Parliament  of  1913  for  August  1 and  by  other  measures 
calculated  to  conciliate  the  Kuo-Min  tang  leaders.  The 
Cantonese  section,  however,  showed  no  signs  of  willing- 
ness to  co-operate  with  the  new  Government.  On  July  8 
Admiral  Li  Ting-hsin  published  a manifesto  at  Shanghai, 
in  which  he  declared  that  the  Navy  was  determined  to 
prevent  the  domination  of  the  country  by  the  militarists 
and  monarchists  who  still  controlled  the  administration ; 
behind  the  Navy  was  Tang  Shao-yi,  who  had  been  a 
staunch  monarchist  under  the  Manchus  and  one  of  Yuan 
Shih-k’ai’s  ablest  lieutenants  in  the  Chihli  Viceroyalty, 
but  now  a leader  of  Kuangtung  irreconcilables.  Tang 
Shao-yi  and  his  friends  demanded  the  immediate  revival 
of  the  Provisional  Constitution  drawn  up  by  the  Repub- 
lican leaders  at  Nanking  in  1911.  Tuan  Chi-jui  endeav- 
oured to  win  over  this  very  able  but  fractious  official  by 
making  him  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  new 
Cabinet,  but  Tang  declined  the  honour.  The  proceedings 
at  the  reopening  of  Parliament  on  August  1 showed  clearly 
that  the  opposition  of  the  Kuo-Min  tang  to  Peking  had 
not  ended  with  the  Monarchy,  but  that  it  would  continue 

52 


CHINA  JOINS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR  53 


to  be  actively  organised  against  the  so-called  Military 
Party  and  its  leader,  the  Premier,  Tuan  Chi-jui.  The 
Military  Governors,  on  their  side,  who  actually  dominated 
the  situation,  were  willing  to  give  the  Parliamentarians 
an  opportunity  of  justifying  their  political  existence,  but 
they  were  frankly  sceptical  as  to  the  utility  of  an  institu- 
tion which  in  the  past  had  confined  its  constructive  states- 
manship to  voting  £600  a year  to  each  of  its  members. 
From  the  outset  it  was  clear  that  the  life  of  the  resusci- 
tated Parliament  would  depend  upon  the  good  pleasure 
of  the  Military  Governors  and  upon  funds  being  made 
available  for  the  generous  maintenance  of  their  armies. 

For  the  remainder  of  the  year  the  financial  problem 
continued  to  be  serious,  though  somewhat  relieved  by  the 
increasingly  satisfactory  results  of  the  Salt  Gabelle  under 
Sir  Richard  Dane.  In  the  spring  of  1917  the  question  of 
China’s  entering  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  came  to 
be  seriously  considered  by  the  Chinese  Cabinet.  Tuan 
Chi-jui  had  for  some  time  past  been  in  favour  of  this 
course,  because  he  realised  that  it  would  not  only  improve 
China's  political  position,  and  entitle  her  to  a voice  in 
the  ultimate  settlement  of  Far  Eastern  affairs,  but  that 
it  would  greatly  alleviate  the  country’s  financial  situa- 
tion. When,  therefore,  at  the  beginning  of  February, 
the  U.S.  Minister  at  Peking  invited  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment to  follow  the  example  of  the  United  States  by 
formally  protesting  against  the  illegality  and  barbarism 
of  Germany’s  submarine  campaign,  and  by  severing 
diplomatic  relations,  the  seed  fell  upon  ground  well  pre- 
pared. On  February  9 the  Chinese  Government  replied 
to  the  German  Note  announcing  the  unlimited  submarine 
campaign,  by  an  energetic  protest,  and  an  intimation 
that  if  the  protest  were  disregarded  diplomatic  relations 
would  be  broken  off.  But  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  his  friends 
were  not  to  have  their  undisputed  way  in  this  matter. 
As  usual,  the  question  became  rapidly  involved  in  a net- 
work of  internal  politics,  in  which  German  intrigue  played 
no  inconsiderable  part  and  German  money  secured  the 


54 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


support  of  a considerable  faction.  The  result,  as  usual, 
was  a Ministerial  crisis,  in  which  the  President’s  and  the 
Premier’s  views  came  into  sharp  conflict.  Tuan  Chi-jui’s 
supporters,  all  for  immediate  and  energetic  action,  were 
opposed  by  the  President  on  the  ground  that  the  matter 
was  one  for  the  decision  of  Parliament ; their  action  was 
fiercely  attacked  and  their  motives  impugned  by  the 
German-subsidised  Press.  At  the  outset  their  position 
was  somewhat  weakened  by  the  delay  which  took  place 
in  the  severance  of  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Germany,  and  by  the  failure  of  the  Allies  to  convey 
any  collective  intimation  to  China  that  her  intervention 
in  the  war  would  be  welcome.  This  deficiency  was 
remedied,  however,  on  February  28,  when  the  Allied 
Ministers  at  Peking  presented  a memorandum  to  the 
Chinese  Government  expressing  sympathy  with  its  action 
in  regard  to  Germany  and  promising,  in  the  event  of 
diplomatic  relations  being  severed,  to  consider  favourably 
the  suspension  of  the  Boxer  indemnity  payments  and  a 
revision  of  the  Chinese  Customs  tariff.  Germany,  on  Her 
side,  was  spending  money  freely  at  several  military  head- 
quarters, and  had  offered  to  wipe  out  several  outstanding 
financial  claims  against  China,  in  the  hope  of  avoiding  a 
rupture.  Tuan’s  Cabinet,  after  referring  the  matter  to 
the  political  leaders  at  Peking  and  in  the  provinces, 
decided  on  March  2 to  sever  relations  with  Germany  and 
to  instruct  the  provincial  authorities  accordingly.  Presi- 
dent Li  Yuan-hung,  however,  declined  to  sign  these 
instructions,  whereupon  Tuan  Chi-jui  resigned.  But  the 
majority  of  Parliament  and  nearly  all  the  leading  poli- 
ticians were  against  the  President ; Tuan  could  also  count 
upon  the  energetic  support  of  the  Military  Governors. 
After  twenty-four  hours’  reflection  the  President  gave  way, 
whereupon  Tuan  withdrew  his  resignation  and  proceeded 
to  lay  the  facts  of  the  situation  before  a meeting  of 
representatives  of  both  Houses  of  Parliament.  On 
March  11  Parliament  voted  for  the  severance  of  relations 
with  Germany.  They  were  severed  on  the  14th,  and  on 


CHINA  JOINS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR  55 


the  same  date  the  German  ships  at  Shanghai  and  Amoy 
were  seized  by  the  Chinese  authorities. 

So  far  so  good.  But  neither  China  nor  the  Allies  could 
hope  to  derive  advantages  from  the  steps  thus  taken 
commensurate  with  their  importance  unless  and  until 
they  were  carried  to  their  logical  conclusion  by  a declara- 
tion of  war  against  the  Central  Powers.  There  was  never 
any  serious  difference  of  opinion  among  the  various 
political  and  military  factions  at  Peking  as  to  the  advisa- 
bility of  China  throwing  in  her  lot  with  the  Powers 
fighting  against  the  menace  of  Prussian  militarism. 
Differences  of  interests  there  undoubtedly  were,  and 
factional  jealousies  which  became  actually  intensified  by 
the  prospect  of  a Central  Government  at  Peking  relieved 
of  its  most  pressing  financial  burdens;  but  never  any 
vital  differences  of  principles  or  national  policy.  Despite 
the  feverish  activity  of  German  propaganda,  educated 
opinion  throughout  China  had  slowly  but  surely  come  to 
appreciate  the  objects  and  methods  of  German  kaltur  and 
to  regard  them  with  repugnance.  The  Chinese  people  are 
accustomed,  as  the  result  of  the  many  invasions  and 
rebellions  that  have  ravaged  their  country,  to  the  savageries 
of  bandit  warfare,  to  the  looting  of  cities  and  the  slaughter 
of  unoffending  citizens,  but  their  history  contains  no 
record  of  cold-blooded  barbarism  to  equal  Germany’s 
deliberate  policy  of  ruthless  warfare  waged  against 
civilians.  Even  more  than  by  the  sinking  of  neutral 
merchant  ships,  the  literati  were  impressed  by  the 
Germans'  violations  of  international  law  in  Belgium,  by 
their  wholesale  deportation  of  defenceless  Belgians  into 
captivity  and  forced  labour;  and  all  their  humane  and 
religious  instincts  were  particularly  outraged  by  the 
horrible  callousness  displayed  by  the  Germans  in  their 
treatment  of  their  dead. 

The  Chinese  Cabinet’s  war  policy  was,  therefore, 
approved  in  principle  by  Parliament,  and  generally 
endorsed  throughout  the  country,  at  the  end  of  March. 
A conference  of  military  leaders  held  at  Peking  on  April  26 


56 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


voted  for  an  immediate  declaration  of  war ; six  days  later 
the  Cabinet  passed  a unanimous  resolution  to  the  same 
effect.  On  May  io  the  matter  was  brought  up  for  debate 
in  the  Lower  House  of  Parliament.  The  result  showed 
clearly  that,  while  there  was  no  genuine  opposition  to  the 
war,  the  Parliamentarians,  with  the  President  behind 
them,  were  determined  to  treat  the  question  as  an  oppor- 
tunity for  an  attack  upon  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  the  military 
party.  How  far  German  threats  and  bribes  were  factors 
in  this  determination,  remains  necessarily  a matter  for 
conjecture,  but  both  undoubtedly  carried  a certain  amount 
of  weight  with  the  Opposition.  On  May  19  a resolution 
was  adopted  by  Parliament  declaring  that,  while  not 
opposed  to  the  entry  of  China  into  the  war,  the  House 
would  refuse  to  consider  the  question  until  the  Cabinet 
had  been  reconstructed.  In  other  words,  the  situation 
was  to  be  determined,  not  by  the  merits  of  the  national 
policy  proposed,  but  by  gratifying  the  envy  and  jealousy 
of  politicians.  All  parties  recognised  quite  clearly  the 
moral  and  material  advantages  which  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment might  expect  to  gain  by  declaring  war  on  the  Central 
Powers  (the  abolition  of  indemnity  and  loan  interest  pay- 
ments to  Germany  alone  represented  a sum  of  £ 6000  a 
day),  but  the  Opposition,  headed  by  the  Kuo-Min  tang, 
was  not  disposed  to  see  those  advantages  secured  by 
Tuan  Chi-jui  and  the  Military  Governors  without  a 
struggle. 

The  struggle  accordingly  took  place.  It  involved  in 
its  three  months’  course  the  dismissal  of  Parliament  by 
order  of  the  Militarj'  Governors,  the  resignation  of  the 
President,  and,  finally,  an  abortive  restoration  of  the 
Manchu  dynasty  and  a comic-opera  battle  between 
Republican-Monarchists  and  the  Monarchist-Republicans 
around  and  about  the  Forbidden  City.  Following  imme- 
diately upon  Parliament’s  demand  for  a reconstruction 
of  the  Cabinet,  the  President  decided  upon  a new  trial  of 
strength  with  his  masterful  Premier.  He  proceeded  to 
reconstruct  the  Cabinet  by  obtaining  the  resignation  or 


A BUDDHIST  PRIEST  (PROVINCE  OF  CHEKIANG). 


CHINA  JOINS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR  57 


by  the  dismissal  of  all  its  members  except  Tuan  himself. 
But  the  Cabinet,  thus  reduced  to  one,  adhered  firmly  to 
its  position,  and  declined  to  renounce  its  policy ; it  urged 
the  President  to  dissolve  Parliament,  plainly  hinting  that 
the  Military  Governors,  determined  to  secure  the  declara- 
tion of  war,  had  no  intention  of  leaving  Peking  until 
he  had  done  so.  On  May  23  President  Li  (apparently 
supported  by  a section  of  the  Military  Party)  took  his 
courage  in  both  hands  and  dismissed  the  Premier.  Tuan 
announced  his  intention  to  defy  the  mandate,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  confer  with  his  friends  at  Tientsin.  A week 
later  the  Military  Governors  of  several  provinces  north  of 
the  Yangtsze  declared  their  independence  of  the  Central 
Government.  The  attitude  of  Vice-President  Feng  Kuo- 
Chang  at  this  juncture  was,  as  usual,  one  of  benevolent 
neutrality,  and  the  solution  of  the  crisis  seemed  therefore 
to  rest  with  General  Chang  Hsiin,  the  genial  swashbuckler 
of  Shantung,  who  had  made  a name  for  himself  as  a 
military  Vicar  of  Bray  under  the  Manchus  and  during 
the  revolution.  In  the  south,  Sun  Yat-sen,  Tang  Shao-yi, 
and  other  Kuo-Min  tang  leaders  were  loudly  denouncing 
Tuan  and  his  supporters  as  exponents  of  militarism,  and 
calling  on  all  patriots  to  rally  to  the  defence  of  Parliament 
and  the  people’s  liberties.  Their  voice  was  the  voice  of 
Young  China,  but  too  often  there  was  reason  to  believe 
that  the  unseen  hand  was  the  insidious  hand  of  Potsdam’s 
agents  in  partibus. 

The  Military  Governors,  after  accusing  the  President 
and  Parliament  of  trying  to  destroy  the  responsible 
Cabinet  system,  cut  short  further  argument  about  con- 
stitutional principles  by  nominating  a Provisional  Govern- 
ment of  their  own  at  Tientsin,  with  Hsii  Shih-chang  (an 
amiable  septuagenarian,  ex-guardian  of  the  Manchu  heir- 
apparent)  cast  for  the  dummy  role  of  Dictator.  President 
Li's  position  had  now  become  difficult  and  dangerous. 
General  Nieh,  Military  Governor  of  Anhui,  defined  it 
succinctly  by  stating  that  he  would  be  allowed  to  retain 
office  only  on  condition  of  submitting  to  the  Military  Party 


58 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  dissolving  Parliament.  He  added,  with  curious 
frankness,  that  if  General  Chang  Hsiin  went  to  Peking,  it 
would  not  be  to  make  peace  between  President  and 
Premier,  but  to  restore  the  Manchus.  On  June  12, 
Chang  Hsiin  arrived  at  the  capital,  preceded  by  a “ body- 
guard ” of  several  thousand  men.  He  came  ostensibly  as 
mediator,  but  it  was  observed  that  his  troops  proceeded 
to  occupy  the  Fengtai  railway  junction  and  other  strategic 
points.  His  mediation  proved  rapidly  effective  : on  the 
day  after  his  arrival  the  President  dissolved  Parliament  by 
mandate. 

No  sooner  had  Chang  Hsiin  emerged  as  the  central 
figure  on  the  stage  than  there  were  signs  of  trouble  and 
dissension  between  him  and  certain  of  his  colleagues  in 
the  Military  Party.  At  this  juncture,  the  question  of 
declaring  war  against  Germany  was  temporarily  relegated 
by  common  consent  to  the  background  of  practical  politics ; 
public  attention  became  completely  engrossed  in  the  clash 
of  personal  ambitions  at  Peking.  Tuan  Chi-jui  remained 
at  Tientsin  watching  events;  a new  Premier  had  been 
elected  by  Parliament  (Li  Ching-hsi,  a son  of  Li  Hung- 
chang),  but  so  far  he  had  declined  to  assume  office  and 
seemed  rather  disposed  to  support  the  action  of  that 
section  of  the  Military  Party  which  demanded  the  rein- 
statement of  Tuan.  The  leaders  of  the  Kuo-Min  tang 
in  the  dissolved  Parliament  had  made  haste  to  depart  for 
the  South,  where  the  Press  was  proclaiming  an  irreparable 
breach  with  the  North,  and  the  Navy,  manned  chiefly  by 
southerners,  made  no  secret  of  its  intention  to  oppose 
Peking  and  the  Military  Governors. 

This  tangled  situation  was  rendered  still  more  com- 
plicated, and  the  President’s  anti-war  policy  temporarily 
strengthened,  by  a Note  handed  to  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment by  the  American  Minister  at  Peking  on  June  6, 
in  which  the  U.S.  Government  deplored  the  growth 
of  internal  dissensions  in  China  and  intimated  that  the 
restoration  of  national  unity  and  a stable  administration 
was  even  more  important  than  the  declaration  of  war  by 


CHINA  JOINS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR  59 


China  against  Germany.  This  advice  was  morally  justi- 
fied, no  doubt,  by  the  facts  of  the  situation ; nevertheless, 
it  had  several  obviously  weak  points  which  made  it 
politically  unsound.  In  the  first  place,  it  conflicted 
sharply  with  the  advice  tendered  from  Washington  only 
two  months  before ; in  the  second,  it  was  calculated  (as 
a Reuter  message  from  Tokyo  promptly  observed)  to 
accentuate  the  existing  party  strife  at  Peking,  for  the 
reason  that  the  President’s  faction  would  naturally  regard 
it  as  an  intimation  that  the  U.S.  Government  was  opposed 
to  the  policy  of  Premier  Tuan  and  his  adherents.  A 
considerable  section  of  public  opinion  in  Japan  regarded 
this  Note  as  unjustifiable  under  the  circumstances  and 
likely  to  do  more  harm  than  good.  The  fact  that,  since 
his  accession  to  power  as  Premier,  Tuan  Chi-jui’s  policy 
had  been  framed  and  carried  out  in  close  touch  with 
Japan,  was  a factor  in  the  situation  that  could  not  be 
ignored  : it  was,  indeed.  Young  China’s  chief  political 
reason  for  denouncing  him  and  his  military  supporters. 
Everything  justifies  the  assumption  that  Tuan’s  policy 
in  this  matter  was  largely  due  to  his  intelligent  observa- 
tion of  the  causes  that  had  contributed  to  the  downfall 
of  Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  and  to  the  prudent  advice  of  Liang 
Ch’i-ch’ao — to  recognition,  in  fact,  of  Japan’s  predominant 
position  in  the  Far  East  and  of  her  material  interests  in 
China.  Sun  Yat-sen  and  his  friends  of  the  Kuo-Min  tang 
had  frequently  recognised  that  position  and  those  interests, 
when  it  suited  them  to  do  so,  in  the  past,  and  most  notably 
when  they  sought  and  obtained  material  assistance  from 
Japan  in  the  revolution  of  1911.  This,  however,  did  not 
prevent  them  now  from  denouncing  Tuan  Chi-jui  as  a tool 
of  the  Government  at  Tokyo  and  accusing  him  of  having 
made  a secret  agreement  prejudicial  to  China  with  Japan, 
as  the  price  of  her  support  for  the  military-monarchist 
party. 

The  " mediation  ” of  General  Chang  Hsiin,  as  events 
proved,  was  not  intended  to  promote  either  the  policy  of 
the  President  or  that  of  the  Premier.  There  was  German 


60 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


money  behind  him,  no  doubt,  and  had  his  coup  dc  main 
been  successful,  there  would  have  been  little  prospect  of 
China’s  joining  the  Allies ; but  his  immediate  object  was 
the  restoration  of  the  Manchu  dynasty  in  the  form  of  a 
Regency  administered  by  himself  as  Viceroy  of  Chihli. 
During  the  eighteen  days  that  elapsed  between  the  arrival 
of  his  advance  guard  at  the  Temple  of  Heaven  and  his 
proclamation  of  the  restoration  of  the  Dragon  Throne 
(July  i).  General  Chang  Hsiin  continued  to  mediate,  for 
form’s  sake,  with  the  President.  The  result  of  these 
pourparlers  was  that,  by  June  24,  Li  Ching-hsi  had  agreed 
to  assume  the  Premiership  for  three  months,  and  the 
President  had  consented  to  a conservative  re -drafting  of 
the  Constitution,  a considerable  restriction  of  his  own 
powers,  and  the  election  of  a new  Parliament  with  reduced 
membership.  These  things  being  settled,  the  Military 
Governors  of  Honan,  Shantung,  Chihli,  and  Fengtien 
agreed  to  withdraw  their  troops  and  rescind  their  declara- 
tion of  independence.  Things  seemed  to  be  shaping 
towards  an  amicable  settlement  in  accordance  with  the 
wishes  of  the  Military  Party;  but,  as  a matter  of  fact, 
every  inn-keeper  and  muleteer  in  Peking  knew  that  some- 
thing more  important  than  these  face-saving  negotiations 
was  afoot,  and  that  the  Son  of  Heaven,  after  five  years’ 
dignified  detachment  in  the  profound  seclusion  of  his 
palace,  was  about  to  be  brought  back,  and  the  Dragon 
Throne  restored  to  its  ancient  pride  of  place.  There  is  no 
possible  doubt  that  the  restoration  of  the  Manchu  dynasty 
as  a Constitutional  Monarchy  had  been  discussed  and 
approved  by  the  Military  Governors,  including  Tuan 
Chi-jui,  at  their  several  conferences  at  Hsii-chou-fu  in 
1916;  the  failure  of  Chang  Hsiin’s  colleagues  to  support 
him  and  the  restored  Throne  in  July  1917,  was  not  due 
to  any  Republican  sympathies  on  their  part,  but  solely 
to  the  fact  that  Chang  Hsiin,  a blunt,  ambitious  soldier 
and  no  politician,  had  stolen  a march  on  his  associates 
and  could  by  no  means  be  permitted  to  reap  the  fruits 
thereof.  More  than  one  of  the  dignitaries  who  pledged 


CHINA  JOINS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR  61 


themselves  to  support  the  restoration  of  the  Manchus  has 
since  admitted  that  the  plot  broke  down  because  of 
General  Chang’s  insistence  on  being  rewarded  with  the 
Viceroyalty  of  Chihli,  a post  to  which  both  Tuan  Chi-jui 
and  Tsao  Kun  aspired. 

His  Majesty,  the  boy  Hsiian  Tung  and  the  remnants  of 
the  Imperial  Manchu  family,  in  the  tranquil  recesses  of 
the  palace,  had  certainly  no  hand  in  the  plot.  When, 
after  six  days  of  brief  eminence  (more  emphasised  in  the 
European  and  American  Press  than  in  his  own  capital), 
he  returned  once  more  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  stately 
dignities  and  ceremonial  etiquette  of  his  Court  without  a 
kingdom,  the  triumphant  “ Republican  ” generals  pub- 
lished a communication  from  the  Emperor  in  the  Peking 
Gazette,  explaining  that  he,  being  only  a boy,  had  been 
unable  to  prevent  General  Chang  Hsiin  from  issuing  edicts 
in  his  name,  but  that  the  authority  of  the  House  of  Ching 
had  been  wrongfully  invoked  and  abused. 

It  was  on  July  i that,  following  the  precedent 
for  similar  coups  d’etat  established  by  Her  Majesty  the 
Empress  Dowager  Tzu-Hsi,  General  Chang  Hsiin  dragged 
the  reluctant  young  Emperor  from  his  bed  at  three 
o’clock  in  the  morning.  Forthwith  the  city  bedecked 
itself  with  Dragon  flags,  by  order  of  the  police  (the  very 
fact  that  they  were  available  gives  cause  for  reflection), 
and  within  twenty-four  hours  the  old  order  was  peace- 
fully re-established.  It  has  already  been  said  that  Chang 
Hsiin  was  no  politician  : he  now  proved  it  by  a tactless 
assumption  of  supreme  authority,  conferring  the  highest 
honours  in  the  land  indiscriminately  and  without  con- 
sulting the  recipients,  and  by  assuming  that  the  Military 
Governors’  avowed  sympathy  for  the  Monarchy  would 
lead  them  to  support  it  under  his  direction.  Therein  he 
erred,  chiefly  because  (as  The  Times  correspondent  justly 
said)  he  himself  was  an  “ outsider,”  almost  an  accident, 
in  the  Councils  of  the  Peiyang  Military  Party.  Tuan 
Chi-jui  now  emerged  from  his  retirement  at  Tientsin  and 
promptly  put  himself  at  the  head  of  an  army  determined 


62 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


to  vindicate  the  Republic  and  to  “ exterminate  Chang 
Hsun  as  a criminal  and  a robber.”  In  this  object  he  was 
supported  by  the  Vice-President,  Feng  Kuo-chang,  com- 
manding the  Republican  army  of  the  south,  and  by  other 
generals  who,  as  a matter  of  common  knowledge,  had  all 
been  good,  staunch  monarchists  a year  before.  Not  with- 
out justice  was  Chang  Hsun’s  pathetic  plaint  for  mediation 
addressed  to  the  Foreign  Ministers.  When  he  found 
himself  out-numbered  and  cornered,  he  said  that,  in 
restoring  the  Emperor  to  the  Throne,  he  had  acted  in 
complete  good  faith,  hoping  to  put  a stop  to  the  country’s 
internal  dissensions,  and  having  every  reason  to  expect 
support  " from  his  pledged  associates,  with  whom  he  was 
now  forced  to  do  battle.”  His  troops  realised,  just  as 
readily  as  their  leader,  that  there  was  little  advantage  to 
be  gained  by  endeavouring  to  maintain  an  untenable 
position ; the  defence  of  the  Monarchy  was  therefore  half- 
hearted and  desultory.  On  July  12  the  defenders  of  the 
Imperial  City  capitulated,  upon  an  amicable  understand- 
ing that  they  were  to  receive  three  months’  pay,  money 
down.  The  total  casualties,  including  a small  number 
amongst  the  Legation  Guards  and  foreign  civilians, 
amounted  to  twenty-five  killed  and  forty-five  wounded. 
Before  retiring  upon  his  last  position  in  the  Imperial  City, 
Chang  Hsun  had  asked  the  Foreign  Legations  to  mediate, 
and  had  threatened,  if  pushed  to  extremities,  to  publish 
the  minutes  of  one  of  the  conferences  at  Hsuchow-fu,  at 
which,  he  said,  both  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  Feng  Kuo-chang 
had  promised  to  support  the  restoration  of  the  Manchus. 
Chang  Hsun,  after  escaping  to  the  refuge  of  the  Dutch 
Legation,  with  the  help  of  some  of  his  Austrian  friends, 
was  permitted  to  retire  into  private  life  and  left  in  enjo}7- 
ment  of  his  property.1 

1 Since  the  collapse  of  the  Anfu  party  last  summer  he  has  once 
more  emerged,  to  play  a prominent  part  in  Peking  politics,  as 
friend  and  henchman  of  the  great  Chang  Tso-lin,  while  Tuan 
Chi-jui  takes  his  turn  in  prosperous  and  dignified  retirement.  In 
China,  as  in  England,  the  fulminations  of  one  party  politician 
against  another  are  usually  stage  thunder. 


CHINA  JOINS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR  63 


This  semi-farcical  restoration  escapade  proved  in  its 
conclusion  to  be  a blessing  in  disguise,  inasmuch  as  it 
expedited  and  facilitated  the  establishment  of  a strong 
Cabinet  under  Tuan  Chi-jui  (who  now  returned  to  resume 
the  Premiership)  and  practically  ensured  the  declaration 
of  war  by  China  against  Germany.  President  Li  Yuan- 
hung,  who  had  fled  for  refuge  to  the  Japanese  Legation 
on  the  proclamation  of  the  Monarchy,  finally  declined  to 
resume  a post  for  which  he  had  never  displayed  any 
inclination  or  real  fitness,  and  which  Tuan  Chi-jui  triumph- 
ant would  have  made  very  uncomfortable  for  him.  On 
July  18  it  was  announced,  to  the  very  general  relief  of 
those  who  feared  further  internal  dissensions,  that  Vice- 
President  General  Feng  Kuo-chang  had  agreed  to  accept 
the  Presidency,  and  that  he  would  co-operate  in  the  policy 
of  Premier  Tuan.  For  some  days  it  had  also  been  feared 
that  General  Feng,  an  opportunist  of  the  wait-and-see 
order,  might  elect  to  throw  in  his  lot  with  Tuan’s  adver- 
saries, the  Kuo-Min  tang  leaders,  and  the  Navy  in  the 
south.  The  Kuo-Min  tang  had  published  a manifesto  at 
Shanghai  in  which  they  declared  themselves  opposed  to 
Tuan,  for  the  same  reason  which  had  led  them  to  favour 
his  policy  of  war  against  Germany — namely,  that  they 
disliked  all  exponents  and  supporters  of  militarism.  The 
Navy  had  issued  a similar  document,  declaring  the  Govern- 
ment at  Peking  to  be  illegally  constituted,  and  demanding 
the  immediate  convocation  of  Parliament.  Had  Feng 
Kuo-chang  and  his  army  taken  sides  with  the  southerners, 
Tuan  Chi-jui’s  chances  of  organising  a Central  Govern- 
ment would  have  been  problematical.  Observers  on  the 
spot  had  reason  for  grave  misgivings  on  this  score,  because 
it  was  well  known  that,  apart  from  the  chronic  jealousies 
that  exist  between  the  Peking  and  Nanking  administra- 
tions, there  had  never  been  much  love  lost  between 
Generals  Tuan  and  Feng. 

The  return  to  power  of  Tuan,  practically  in  the  position 
of  a Dictator,  made  it  certain  that  China’s  diplomatic 
rupture  with  Germany  would  now  be  followed  by  a 


64 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


declaration  of  war,  involving  not  only  the  sequestration 
of  German  property  and  the  internment  or  deportation 
of  German  subjects,  but  also  the  systematic  uprooting  of 
German  financial  and  commercial  interests  throughout 
the  country.  It  was  not  long  before  the  Premier,  having 
formed  his  Cabinet  on  conciliatory  and  moderate  lines, 
gave  evidence  of  his  intentions  in  this  matter.  Having 
ascertained  General  Feng’s  willingness  to  accept  the 
Presidency,  he  informed  the  Allied  Ministers  that,  upon 
the  latter’s  arrival  in  Peking  and  assumption  of  office, 
the  Cabinet  would  proceed  to  declare  war ; in  the  mean- 
while, he  intimated  that  it  would  greatly  strengthen  his 
hands  if  the  Allied  Powers,  in  fulfilment  of  their  promises, 
would  make  a definite  declaration  of  the  financial  and 
other  advantages  which  they  were  prepared  to  concede 
to  China.  On  more  than  one  occasion  since  March,  the 
representatives  of  Great  Britain,  Japan,  and  the  United 
States  had  assured  the  Chinese  Government  that  the  Allies 
would  treat  China  generously  as  regards  the  suspension 
of  the  Boxer  indemnity  and  the  revision  of  the  Customs 
tariff ; and  the  Chinese,  on  their  side,  had  expressed  their 
readiness  to  declare  war  against  Germany  without  making 
a specific  bargain,  relying  upon  the  Allies’  promise  of  fair 
treatment.  Nevertheless,  bearing  in  mind  the  number 
of  Powers  concerned  in  the  indemnity  question,  and  their 
possibly  conflicting  interests,  it  was  only  natural  that 
Tuan  and  his  supporters  should  desire,  before  taking  the 
final  and  irrevocable  step,  to  receive  assurances  of  a kind 
that  would  give  confidence  to  waverers  and  prevent 
effective  criticism  by  their  opponents.  Owing  chiefly  to 
the  situation  in  Russia,  it  was  not  possible  for  the  Allied 
Governments,  however  well  disposed,  to  come  quickly  to 
a common  understanding  in  these  matters.  Recognising 
this  fact,  and  being  urged  by  the  Japanese  and  British 
Governments  to  rely  upon  the  good  faith  of  the  Allies, 
Tuan  decided  to  face  the  risk  of  the  Kuo-Min  tang’s 
opposition,  and  to  proceed  to  declare  war  against  the 
Central  Powers. 


CHINA  JOINS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR  65 


Feng  Kuo-chang  arrived  in  Peking  on  August  i;  his 
assumption  of  the  Presidency  greatly  strengthened  the 
position  and  prestige  of  the  Central  Government.  A few 
days  before.  Sun  Yat-sen  and  his  extremist  friends  had 
issued  a proclamation  in  Kuangtung,  refusing  to  recog- 
nise orders  from  Peking  and  proposing  that  Parliament 
should  meet  under  a Provisional  Government  at  Canton ; 
but  without  men  or  money  behind  them,  the  fulminations 
of  the  Kuo-Min  tang  leaders  might  well  be  disregarded. 
The  strength  of  Tuan’s  position  in  dealing  with  the  southern 
revolutionary  element  and  the  professional  agitators  of 
Young  China  lay  chiefly  in  his  good  understanding  with 
the  Japanese  Government ; for  the  first  time  since  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  the  Central  Government  at  Peking 
might  confidently  expect  the  Japanese  authorities  in 
China  and  Japan  to  discourage  any  further  attempts  at 
treasonable  conspiracies  and  sedition  in  the  central  and 
southern  provinces.  In  this  assurance  Tuan  Chi-jui  and 
his  Cabinet  proceeded,  therefore,  to  carry  out  their  policy, 
and  on  August  3 unanimously  resolved  on  declaring  war 
against  the  Central  Powers.  The  formal  declaration  took 
place  on  August  14. 

Had  it  not  been  for  the  peculiar  qualities  of  jealousy  and 
intrigue  which  habitually  dominate  politics  in  Eastern 
countries,  public  opinion,  so  far  as  it  exists  in  China, 
would  undoubtedly  have  brought  about  the  declaration 
of  war  at  the  same  time,  and  for  the  same  reasons,  that 
the  United  States  threw  in  her  lot  with  the  Allies.  Internal 
politics  intervened,  as  has  been  shown,  to  prevent  this. 
To  a certain  extent  it  may  be  admitted  that  President 
Li  Yuan-hung  and  those  who  supported  his  policy  of 
neutrality  were  influenced  by  considerations  of  a prudent 
and  patriotic  nature,  and  unaffected  by  the  atmosphere  of 
intrigue,  intimidation,  and  bribery  which  emanated  from 
Germany’s  diplomatic,  consular,  financial,  and  secret- 
service  agents.  President  Li  himself,  for  example,  was 
certainly  much  influenced  by  fear  of  the  effects  of  the 
revolution  in  Russia,  a fear  which  he  frankly  confessed, 

F 


66  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  which  outweighed  in  his  judgment  the  help  which 
the  Allies  might  expect  to  receive  from  the  United  States. 
But,  broadly  speaking,  the  opposition  to  President  Tuan’s 
war  policy  was  due  to  German  instigation,  and  maintained 
by  a considerable  expenditure  of  German  money. 

The  last  manifestation  of  internal  politics  with  which 
Tuan  Chi-jui  had  to  contend,  viz.  Chang  Hsiin's  coup 
d'etat,  was  undoubtedly  “ made  in  Germany.”  As  events 
proved,  however,  it  turned  out  to  the  advantage  both  of 
Premier  Tuan  and  of  the  Allies,  who  desired  to  see  China 
closed  to  the  activities  of  German  agents.  So  long  as  the 
President  and  the  Premier  at  Peking  were  divided  in 
counsel,  there  could  be  no  hope  of  establishing  anything 
in  the  nature  of  a strong  Central  Government,  in  which 
lay  China’s  only  hope  of  peaceful  progress  and  stability. 
Chang  Hsiin’s  blundering  attempt  to  restore  the  Manchus 
enabled  Tuan  Chi-jui  to  make  a fresh  start,  with  every 
prospect  of  financial  solvency  and  of  assistance  from  the 
Powers  best  able  to  give  the  Central  Government  effective 
support,  moral  and  material. 

By  an  agreement  between  the  Consortium  banks  at 
Peking  (excluding  the  German)  it  was  arranged,  upon 
China’s  declaration  of  war,  that  the  Chinese  Government 
should  receive  an  immediate  loan  of  10,000,000  yen  for 
general  administrative  purposes,  secured  against  the  Salt 
Gabelle  revenues.  The  Chinese  Government,  having 
many  claims  to  meet  at  home  and  abroad,  would  have 
liked  to  borrow  on  a much  larger  scale,  but  in  their  own 
interests  they  were  advised  that,  with  exchange  at  its  then 
high  level,  it  would  be  folly  to  do  so.  As  the  result  of  the 
war  in  Europe,  and  of  China’s  participation  therein,  she 
was  now  placed  in  a financial  position  which,  had  it  been 
wisely  and  honestly  handled,  would  soon  have  enabled 
her  to  recover  complete  stability.  Her  internal  resources 
were  increased  and  her  foreign  obligations  reduced. 
Under  these  conditions,  it  was  to  be  hoped  that  the  Allies 
would  agree  to  discourage  the  Chinese  Government  from 
any  further  dalliance  on  the  primrose  path  of  borrowing. 


A FISHERMAN  OF 


THE  WHANGPOO. 


CHINA  JOINS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR  67 


and  urge  them  to  take  advantage  of  the  existing  most 
favourable  conditions  to  set  their  house  in  order  and  to 
make  timely  provision  for  emergencies,  to  tabulate  and 
regulate  all  internal  loans  and  financial  claims ; above  all, 
to  take  steps  for  the  disbandment  of  irregular  armed 
forces  in  the  provinces  and  the  centralisation  of  military 
authority  in  a national  army  under  the  Ministry  of  War. 
As  will  be  shown  hereafter,  no  matter  how  great  the 
country’s  resources,  they  can  never  be  sufficient  for  its 
needs  so  long  as  independent  bodies  of  troops  are  allowed 
to  levy  taxes  on  their  own  account  and  to  claim  payment 
for  making  (or  for  not  making)  attacks  on  the  established 
order  of  things.  Coincident  with  the  elimination  of 
Germany,  chief  mischief-maker,  China  had  an  oppor- 
tunity, such  as  she  had  never  enjoyed  before,  for  working 
out  her  own  salvation.  She  had  a fair  field  and  much 
favour ; a splendid  and  unexpected  opportunity  for  prov- 
ing to  the  world,  without  let  or  hindrance.  Young  China’s 
capacity  for  efficient  self-determination  and  patriotic 
effort.  But  this  opportunity  has  been  lost,  frittered  away 
in  futile  strife,  consumed  by  the  greed  and  inefficiency  of 
politicians  of  all  professions,  old  and  new.  To  what  a 
state  they  have  since  brought  the  finances  and  adminis- 
tration of  the  country  is  matter  of  common  knowledge. 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 

During  the  winter  of  1919-1920  I made  a rapid  journey 
through  North  China,  Manchuria,  Korea,  and  Japan.  The 
sole  purpose  of  this  journey  was  to  investigate  on  the 
spot  the  changes  brought  about  by  the  World  War  and  by 
recent  political  events  in  these  countries ; to  discuss  the 
situation  in  all  its  bearings  with  the  men  best  qualified 
to  take  a broad-minded  view  of  its  facts  and  needs; 
and  finally  to  offer,  if  possible,  through  the  Press,  some 
practical  suggestions  with  a view  to  averting  the  immedi- 
ate dangers  which  threaten  China  from  within  and 
without.  Beyond  my  duty  to  The  Tunes  and  certain 
other  newspapers,  I had  no  mission,  nor  received  any 
remuneration  whatsoever,  from  any  quarter.  Having  no 
political  objects  to  serve,  I may  claim  to  have  studied  the 
situation,  if  not  with  impartiality,  at  least  with  complete 
independence,  and  to  set  forth  the  truth,  as  I see  it, 
without  fear  or  favour.  But  not  without  affection,  for 
I must  plead  guilty  to  very  sincere  feelings  of  kindly 
sympathy  for  the  long-suffering  and  lovable  Chinese  people, 
amongst  whom  the  best  years  of  my  fife  have  been  spent. 

I make  no  apology  for  this  personal  statement,  for  the 
reason  that  the  vernacular  Press  controlled  by  Young 
China  at  the  Treaty  Ports,  and  especially  the  organs  of 
its  irreconcilable  malcontents  at  Canton,  have  been  at 
pains  to  declare  that  my  opinions  on  the  situation  were 
untrustworthy,  because  I was  “ in  the  paid  service  of  a 
certain  foreign  Power  whose  militaristic  policy  is  antago- 
nistic to  the  national  aspirations  of  the  Young  China 
party  ” — meaning,  thereby,  Japan.  Referring  particu- 
larly to  my  views  on  the  ever- thorny  subject  of  centralised 

68 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 


69 


finance,  as  reported  at  an  interview  in  Shanghai,  the 
Chung  hua  Pao  characteristically  observed  that  they 
were  inspired  by  the  hope  of  obtaining  a lucrative  post 
as  financial  controller  at  Peking.  Scurrilous  falsehoods 
of  this  kind  are  unfortunately  common  currency  amongst 
the  hot-headed  and  half-educated  youths  who  now  claim 
to  represent  and  guide  public  opinion  in  China;  and 
one  cannot  afford  to  ignore  them  entirely,  because  the 
utterances  of  these  journals,  which  live  by  and  for  agita- 
tion and  sedition,  are  widely  circulated  abroad,  by  means 
of  the  “ Asiatic  News  Agency,”  and  thus  achieve  a 
fictitious  importance,  especially  in  the  United  States. 
On  my  return  from  the  East,  via  America,  I found  at 
San  Francisco  unmistakable  evidence  of  the  far-reaching 
influence  of  this  poisonous  Press  work. 

The  wrath  of  the  Cantonese  politicians  and  of  their 
jackals  of  the  Press  was  aroused  on  this  occasion  by  the 
public  expression  of  my  firm  belief — a belief  which  is  now 
widely  shared  by  responsible  Chinese  and  foreigners 
throughout  the  East — that,  unless  a way  can  be  found 
to  make  the  provinces  sink  their  differences  and  unite  in 
patriotic  support  of  a centralised  government,  nothing 
but  international  control  of  the  country’s  finances  can 
save  China  from  bankruptcy  and  disruption.  I had  also 
declared  my  conviction  that  nothing  had  done  more  to 
prevent  the  restoration  of  political  equilibrium  of  law 
and  order,  under  a strong  central  authority,  than  the 
ascendancy  in  public  affairs  of  the  student  class,  and 
particularly  that  undisciplined  section  of  it  which  com- 
bines crude  ideas  of  Republicanism  with  a smattering 
of  Western  science.  To  any  one  who  is  not  blinded 
by  sentimental  delusions  or  self-interest,  the  course  of 
events  during  the  past  five  years  has  brought  home  the 
obvious  fact  that  unless  a stable  and  effective  government 
can  be  established  speedily  at  Peking,  foreign  control  of 
China’s  finances  is  inevitable,  in  China’s  own  interest. 
And  since  the  passing  of  Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  the  hope  of 
establishing  such  a government  has  become  more  remote 


70 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


with  each  passing  year.  The  vision  of  a New  China, 
regenerate  and  invigorated  by  means  of  democratic 
institutions,  so  widely  proclaimed  after  the  triumph  of 
the  revolution,  was  a delusion  for  which  the  Chinese 
were  less  to  blame  than  the  foreigners  in  their  midst, 
who  inspired  and  encouraged  it.  That  vision  was  bound 
to  prove  a mirage,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  instinct 
and  capacity  for  representative  government  is  still 
lacking  in  the  Chinese  people. 

Since  it  is  the  Cantonese  section  of  Young  China  which 
is  ever  loudest  and  most  insistent  in  proclaiming  its  own 
virtues  and  demanding  sympathy  for  its  political  pro- 
grammes, let  us  cast  a passing  glance  at  the  present 
condition  of  the  two  Kuang  provinces,  those  fruitful 
breeding-grounds  of  unrest  and  rebellion,  and,  lest  we  be 
charged  with  prejudice  in  the  matter,  let  us  take  the 
evidence  of  a Cantonese  observer,  who  has  described  the 
situation  in  a recent  contribution  to  the  North  China 
Herald  (October  2,  1920).  The  story  which  he  tells,  an 
Oriental  version  of  the  tale  of  the  Kilkenny  Cats,  might 
be  told  with  equal  force  of  many  other  provinces,  for  at 
present  there  are  five  uncrowned  kings  fighting  for  the 
mastery  in  China.  But  the  Cantonese  leaders  of  Young 
China,  the  highly  vocal  Americanised  section  which  has 
produced  men  like  Tang  Shao-yi,  Sun  Yat-sen,  Wen 
Tsung-yao,  and  Wellington  Koo,  insist  so  eloquently 
upon  the  glorious  future  which  awaits  their  country 
(under  their  guidance)  when  a lawfully-elected  Parlia- 
ment gets  to  work  under  the  right  kind  of  Constitution, 
that  the  present  condition  of  the  people  in  Kuangtung 
and  Kuangsi  is  particularly  deserving  of  attention.  For 
at  Canton  the  Republicans  and  the  Reformers,  the 
Parliamentarians  and  Constitution-makers,  have  had 
practically  a free  hand  since  Yuan  expelled  them  and  the 
Kuo-Min  tang  from  Peking.  When  Canton  became  a 
law  unto  herself,  those  staunch  Republicans,  Wu  Ting- 
fang,  Sun  Yat-sen,  and  Tang  Shao-yi,  had  a chance  of 
proving  to  a sympathetic  world  that,  here  at  least,  it 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 


71 


was  possible  for  the  Chinese  to  organise  a system  of 
representative  government  based  on  honest  administra- 
tion. Theirs  was  the  opportunity,  while  all  the  world 
was  at  war,  of  proving,  by  practical  performance,  that 
capacity  for  efficient  self-government  which  they  had  so 
often  asserted  on  the  platform  and  in  the  Press;  this 
was  the  time  to  justify  their  demand  for  the  abolition 
of  extra-territoriality,  by  an  object-lesson  of  wise  and 
honest  administration.  What  the  actual  results  of  their 
leadership  have  been,  may  be  told  in  the  words  of  the 
Cantonese  writer : 

“ To  put  the  whole  subject  in  a nutshell,  the  Kuang- 
tung  troops  under  General  Chen,  who,  by  the  way,  is 
himself  a Cantonese,  are  trying  their  utmost  to  evict  the 
Kuangsi-ites.  General  Chen — like  General  Tan  Yen-kai, 
the  Hunan  General  who  was  successful  in  driving  out 
the  bandit  chief,  Chang  Chin-yao,  from  Hunan,  and  thus 
secured  the  freedom  of  his  province — is  trying  to  free  his 
fellow-provincials  from  despotism,  and  thus  make  way 
for  self-government  and  liberty. 

“ Kuangtung,  which  has  always  been  reputed  to  be 
the  most  progressive  and  most  prosperous  province  in 
China,  is  alleged  to  have  been  reduced  to  poverty  and  to 
a state  of  debt  amounting  to  not  less  than  §50,000,000, 
simply  because  of  the  misrule,  the  avarice,  the  corruption, 
and  the  incompetency  of  the  Kuangsi  party  in  Kuangtung, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  have  bled  the  province  of 
every  cash  by  all  kinds  of  illegal  methods. 

“ Since  their  entry  into  Kuangtung  under  the  cloak  of 
‘ defenders  of  the  Constitution,’  the  Kuangsi  militarists, 
numbering  more  than  50,000  troops,  are  said  to  have 
imposed  illegal  taxes,  licensed  disorderly  and  gambling 
houses,  forced  the  planting  of  poppy,  allowed  the  smug- 
gling of  opium  and  the  selling  and  smoking  of  the  drug, 
permitted  the  smuggling  of  arms  by  robber  bands,  and 
so  forth.  Well-tried  officials  have  been  removed  from 
office,  and  where  one  competent  man  was  enough  in 
former  days,  fifty  incompetent  men  are  used  nowadays 
— all  hangers-on  of  the  Kuangsi  party.  And,  moreover, 
the  salary  of  one  official  in  former  days  is  multiplied  not 
less  than  thirty  times  under  the  rule  of  Kuangsi.  Archives 


72 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


precious  to  the  hearts  of  the  Cantonese  are  said  to  have 
been  stolen.  The  machinery  from  the  Arsenal  and  the 
Mint  has  been  removed.  The  funds  of  the  Treasury  are 
missing.  Books  of  the  public  libraries  have  been  taken 
away  and  the  shelves  are  left  bare.  All  has  been  taken 
away.  Where? — To  Kuangsi. 

“ Progressive  enterprises  have  been  interfered  with. 
Government  schools  have  not  received  their  annual 
appropriations,  and  many  were  thus  forced  to  close. 
Civil  affairs,  which  were  left  in  the  hands  of  a few  military 
men,  were  forced  to  go  begging,  while  military  expenditure 
— not  to  mention  troops — has  increased  by  leaps  and 
bounds.  Newspapers  were  closed  simply  because  they 
voiced  public  opinion.  Editors  were  taken  out  and  sum- 
marily shot  without  being  accorded  a hearing  and  without 
being  allowed  to  defend  themselves  or  to  secure  the 
services  of  legal  counsel  to  defend  them — and  there  are 
supposed  to  be  law  courts  in  the  province.  The  district 
of  Kinchow  was  cut  off  from  Kuangtung  and  annexed  to 
Kuangsi  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the  Cantonese. 

“ All  of  these  misdeeds  have  occurred  since  the  break- 
up of  the  Military  Government.  General  Tsen  Chun- 
hsiian,  who  was  the  only  member  of  the  Military  Govern- 
ment left  in  Canton,  joined  with  Lu  Yung-ting  against 
the  Cantonese  people,  who  have  always  followed  the 
leadership  of  Dr.  Sun  Yat-sen.  In  order  that  he  might 
gain  the  sympathy  of  the  Cantonese,  he  enlisted  the 
services  of  Mr.  Wen  Tsung-yao,  a Cantonese  official  in 
the  north,  and  a man  full  of  promise,  and  Dr.  Chen  Chin- 
tao,  former  Minister  of  Finance,  to  aid  him.  Wen  and 
Chen  were  only  tools,  however,  in  the  hands  of  the 
militarists,  who  remained  as  arrogant  as  ever. 

“ The  problem  of  the  Cantonese,  therefore,  was  to 
drive  out  of  their  province  Generals  Tsen  and  Mu  Yung- 
hsien,  the  latter  being  the  Kuangsi  Tuchun  of  Kuangtung, 
as  well  as  Wen  and  Chen,  and  to  rid  the  province  of  the 
Kuangsi  bandit-troops.  Once  this  was  done,  Kuangsi 
influence  in  the  province  would  have  been  broken. 

“ The  next  problem  of  the  Cantonese,  after  regaining 
their  province,  is  to  defeat  the  Kuangsi-ites  in  their  own 
province  and  drive  out  Lu  Yung-ting,  the  bandit  Inspector- 
General  who  is  responsible  for  all  the  trouble.  Unless 
this  man  is  driven  from  power,  they  wall  constantly  be 
in  danger  of  his  recovering  strength  and  attacking  them 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 


73 


once  more.  With  this  bandit  in  power  there  can  be  no 
peace  in  China,  say  the  Cantonese.  He  wall  ever  remain 
a thorn  in  their  side. 

“ It  might  be  mentioned  that  although  neither  ‘ side  ’ 
has  a dollar,  some  of  the  individual  Kuangsi-ites  have 
amassed  fortunes  amounting  to  millions  of  dollars.  Lu 
Yung-ting  is  said  to  have  some  $30,000,000  buried  in  the 
earth  in  his  village  near  Nanning,  Kuangsi.  In  his 
peace  proposals  he  has  openly  stated  that  he  is  willing  to 
make  any  kind  of  peace  provided  he  be  allowed  to  keep 
these  ill-gotten  gains.” 


Now,  the  men  who  are  chiefly  responsible  for  this  state 
of  affairs  (which,  in  greater  or  less  degree,  now  prevails 
throughout  China)  are  the  professional  politicians  who 
came  to  the  front  at  the  time  of  the  revolution — the 
men  whose  message,  proclaimed  to  the  ends  of  the  earth, 
declared  that,  when  once  the  Republic  was  established, 
a new  era  of  peace  and  progress  would  dawn  and  China 
take  her  rightful  place  among  the  great  nations.  It  is 
important  to  remember  this,  because  to-day  a new 
generation  of  Young  China  is  coming  to  the  front,  pro- 
fessing the  same  lofty  aims  and  patriotic  fervour  as  those 
which  distinguished  the  utterances  of  Sun  Yat-sen  and 
his  revolutionary  colleagues,  and  once  more  we  are  asked 
to  believe  that,  if  only  their  hands  can  be  strengthened 
and  their  plans  fulfilled,  all  will  be  well  with  China. 
" Let  only  the  Dragon  Throne  be  abolished,”  said  Young 
China  in  1911,  “ and  we  will  show  you  how  the  country 
should  be  governed.”  To-day  the  dramatis  persona  have 
changed,  but  the  play  is  ever  the  same.  “ Let  only 
the  Militarist  Government  be  abolished,”  says  Young 
China;  “only  give  us  a chance  to  show  what  govern- 
ment should  be,  and  all  will  be  well.”  But  to  look  for 
salvation  from  this  quarter,  to  believe  in  a Chinese  world 
suddenly  made  free  for  democracy,  one  must  find  justi- 
fication for  the  belief  that  the  Western-learning  student 
of  to-day  is  likely  to  bring  to  the  conduct  of  public 
affairs  a mind  and  methods  different  from  those  of  his 


74  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


immediate  predecessors.  What  grounds  are  there  for 
any  such  belief? 

As  a matter  of  fact,  Young  China,  being  highly  intel- 
ligent, knows  very  well  that  the  root  of  the  trouble  in 
China  is  in  no  sense  militarism;  the  catchword  has 
been  adopted  from  Europe  by  the  politicians  in  order  to 
invest  a very  sordid  struggle  with  some  semblance  of 
moral  purpose.  Men  of  the  class  of  C.  T.  Wang  and 
Wellington  Koo  are  perfectly  well  aware  of  the  fact  that 
such  Government  as  exists  in  China  to-day  is  conducted 
not  on  militarist,  but  on  purely  mercenary  principles. 
They  know  that  the  “ Constitutional  ” battle-cry  of  the 
“ Outs  ” is  the  emptiest  make-believe,  and  that  there 
has  never  been  any  real  difference  of  political  principles 
at  issue  between  the  warring  factions,  north  or  south, 
east  or  west.  They  know  that  those  who  administer  the 
Government  at  Peking  and  in  the  provinces  are  merely 
groups  of  predatory  officials,  true  to  type  in  the  matter 
of  “ squeeze,”  but  far  more  rapacious  than  of  old, 
because  of  the  absence  of  the  restraining  authority  of 
the  Throne. 

Let  us  face  the  simple  truth,  which  Young  China’s 
record  of  the  past  eight  years  has  repeatedly  emphasised, 
namely,  that  one  thing,  and  one  thing  only,  prevents 
the  establishment  of  a stable  Central  Government  at 
Peking,  and  this  is  the  insatiable  greed  of  money  which 
possesses  every  Chinese  who  attains  to  public  office. 
Take,  for  example,  the  record  of  the  so-called  Republican 
leaders  who  came  to  the  front  in  1911.  Those  who  rose 
to  high  office  as  Tuchuns,  speedily  proved  that  a man- 
darin by  any  other  name  is  still  a mandarin.  Almost 
without  exception  they  proceeded  to  amass  great  fortunes 
at  all  costs  and  all  speed.  In  the  words  of  the  North 
China  Daily  News  (always  a well-disposed  observer), 
“ Chinese  officialdom  under  the  so-called  democracy  has 
become  more  irresponsible  and  more  flagrantly  venal 
than  ever  before.  Its  special  activities  have  been 
directed  to  the  business  of  recruiting  private  forces  with 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 


75 


public  money  and  of  selling  the  power  thus  acquired  to 
the  highest  bidder.”  Thus  in  China,  as  in  Russia-  and 
Mexico,  we  see  once  more  the  truth  demonstrated  that 
the  type  of  a social  structure  can  never  be  changed  by 
a political  revolution.  As  Spencer  says,  “ Out  of  the 
nominally  free  government  set  up,  a new  despotism  arises, 
differing  only  from  the  old  by  having  a new  shibboleth 
and  new  men  to  utter  it,  but  identical  with  the  old  in 
the  determination  to  put  down  opposition  and  in  the 
means  used  to  this  end.” 

Young  China  to-day,  as  in  1911,  loudly  proclaims  its 
patriotic  integrity  of  purpose  and  capacity  for  honest 
work  in  the  public  service;  but  the  fact  remains  (and 
the  Chinese  themselves  admit  it)  that  it  is  not  possible 
to  name  a dozen  men  in  all  the  ranks  of  the  bureaucracy, 
old  or  new,  whose  record  would  command  implicit 
confidence  in  the  matter  of  disinterested,  clean-handed 
administration.  It  is  because  of  the  lack  of  such  men, 
and  the  impossibility  of  reorganising  a stable  Government 
without  them,  that  the  great  majority  of  patriotic,  non- 
official  Chinese  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
country’s  best  chance  of  regaining  stability  and  security 
lies  in  placing  the  national  finances,  as  a whole,  under 
some  form  of  foreign  supervision.  And  the  machinery 
for  this  supervision  is  already  in  existence ; all  that  is 
required  is  gradually  to  extend  the  system  of  adminis- 
tration which  has  proved  so  beneficial  as  applied  to  the 
Maritime  Customs,  the  Salt  Gabelle,  and  the  Postal 
Service. 

During  my  recent  visit  to  China,  I discussed  this 
question  with  officials  of  all  classes,  with  those  in  office 
and  those  in  comfortable  retirement,  with  leading  repre- 
sentatives of  the  serious-minded  section  of  Young  China, 
with  merchants,  bankers,  and  scholars ; and  everywhere, 
from  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  Presidential  mansion 
at  Peking  to  the  guilds  and  compradores  of  the  Treaty 
Ports,  I found  a very  general  recognition  of  the  truth 
that,  left  to  itself,  the  country  does  not  possess  sufficient 


76  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


elements  of  constructive  statesmanship  to  put  an  end  to 
the  chaos  and  corruption  now  prevailing.  Amongst  the 
highest  officials  at  the  capital  and  in  the  provinces,  many 
were  prepared  to  admit,  in  private  conversation,  that  in 
foreign  intervention  lies  China’s  only  hope  of  putting  an 
end  to  the  pernicious  activities  of  the  political  adven- 
turers and  freebooters  who  have  made  of  civil  war  a 
lucrative  industry.  The  list  which  I could  make  of  the 
men  who  have  confessed  to  this  belief  would  be  interesting 
and  instructive.  It  cannot  be  published,  however,  for, 
since  the  students  at  Peking  expressed  their  dissatis- 
faction with  the  Versailles  Treaty  last  May  by  burning 
the  house  of  Tsao  Ju-lin  and  insisting  on  his  dismissal 
from  the  Cabinet,  officialdom  goes  in  deadly  fear  of 
openly  opposing  their  political  opinions.  One  of  the 
most  marked  characteristics  of  the  Chinese  is  their 
extraordinary  readiness  to  submit  to  intimidation  by 
their  own  countrymen.  It  is  a characteristic  which,  in 
the  case  of  Peking’s  officials,  has  been  intensified  by  the 
elimination  of  the  Throne  as  a rallying- point  for  authority, 
and  also  by  their  natural  anxiety,  as  rich  men,  to  incur 
no  avoidable  risks,  in  a world  full  of  perils  of  change. 
Let  but  the  yamens  be  disturbed  by  whisperings  of  some 
new  plot,  such  as  General  Chang  Hsiin’s  escapade  of 
1917,  and  straightway  long  lines  of  carts,  laden  with 
the  portable  wealth  of  the  mandarins,  make  their  way 
from  the  houses  of  the  great  to  the  refuge  of  the 
banks  and  battlements  of  the  Legation  quarter.  In 
the  natural  timidity  of  the  officials  and  merchants  lies 
the  real  secret  of  much  of  the  extraordinary  influence 
of  the  student  class  in  China  to-day.  And  the  student 
knows  it. 

The  increasing  authority  of  the  student  class  as  a 
factor  in  the  politics  of  the  Republic  is  a phenomenon  in 
itself  as  significant  as  the  unparalleled  wealth  accumu- 
lated by  the  official  class  during  the  past  eight  years, 
while  Europe  and  Japan  have  been  besieged  for  loans 
by  the  Government  drifting  ever  nearer  and  nearer  to 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 


77 


bankruptcy.  Both  are  symptomatic  of  the  demoralisa- 
tion which  became  inevitable  when,  with  the  central 
authority.  Young  China  cast  off  the  ethical  restraints  and 
moral  discipline  of  the  Confucian  regime;  when,  as 
the  result  of  “ Western  learning  ” on  the  younger  genera- 
tion, parental  authority — the  very  bed-rock  of  Chinese 
civilisation — lost  something  of  its  time-honoured  sanctity 
in  the  eyes  of  the  young  men  who  claimed  to  lead  public 
opinion. 

Even  before  the  Revolution,  the  overweening  conceit, 
the  undisciplined  and  nervous  excitability,  of  the  foreign- 
educated  student  had  led  many  competent  observers  to 
wonder  whether  the  wine  of  the  new  learning,  so  freely 
dispensed  and  rapidly  imbibed,  would  prove  to  be  a 
healthy  stimulant  or  a dangerous  intoxicant,  whether 
the  younger  generation  would  have  patriotism  and 
patience  enough  to  build  up  on  the  old  foundations  a 
new  system  of  government  acceptable  and  intelligible  to 
the  masses  of  their  countrymen.  After  the  passing  of 
the  Manchus  and  the  inauguration  of  parliamentary 
procedure  at  Peking,  it  soon  became  apparent,  to  all 
who  were  not  perversely  blinded  to  the  truth,  that 
Young  China  had  changed  its  old  lamps  for  new,  but  that 
neither  the  wick  of  wisdom  nor  the  oil  of  honesty  was 
forthcoming.  The  whole  record  of  the  parliamentarians 
and  professional  politicians  of  the  new  dispensation  during 
the  past  eight  years  has  been  a welter  of  sordid  con- 
spiracies, of  corruption  and  party  factions,  unredeemed  by 
any  genuine  manifestation  of  constructive  statesmanship 
or  self-denying  patriotism.  Western  learning  has,  of 
course,  produced  a small  number  of  men,  both  in  the 
last  generation  and  in  the  present,  who  combine  great 
intellectual  gifts  with  high  moral  qualities,  but  the  fact 
remains  that  it  is  not  possible  for  these  men,  if  they 
become  officials,  either  to  exact  or  to  practise  strict 
honesty  in  public  life.  Nor  is  it  possible  for  them  to 
impart  to  the  politically  unconscious  masses  about 
them  the  inspiration  of  democratic  institutions,  the 


78 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


communal  culture  of  our  European  civilisation.  What 
was  true  of  men  like  Wu  Ting-fang  and  Tang  Shao-yo  in 
1911,  is  true  of  C.  T.  Wang,  S.  G.  Cheng,  and  Wellington 
Koo  to-day. 

The  Young  China  of  to-day,  and  especially  the  irre- 
concilable faction  of  the  so-called  Southern  Government, 
professes  its  fervent  belief  in  the  regenerative  virtue  of 
democratic  institutions,  and  particularly  of  parliaments 
and  constitutions,  just  as  it  did  in  the  days  when  Sun 
Yat-sen  clamoured  for  the  abolition  of  the  Manchus. 
And  to-day,  as  then,  its  views  derive  much  of  their 
importance  abroad  and  influence  in  China  from  the  fact 
that  the  section  of  European  and  American  opinion 
which  is  identified  with,  and  chiefly  responsible  for,  this 
belief,  continues  to  encourage  it.  Most  missionary 
societies  continue  to  assure  Young  China  Militant  that 
Liberalism  abroad  sympathises  with  its  theories  and 
sanctions  its  practices.  Many  missionaries,  it  is  true, 
are  beginning  to  express  grave  doubts  as  to  the  future. 
Even  the  blindest  of  honest  enthusiasts  can  hardly  shut 
his  eyes  to  the  mass  of  tares  and  wild  oats  that  have 
sprung  up  in  the  field  so  carefully  sown.  The  pious 
aspirations  of  platform  patriotism  can  hardly  outweigh 
such  things  as  the  officially  organised  traffic  in  native- 
grown  opium,  or  the  unblushing  venality  and  profligacy 
of  the  parliamentary  delegates  at  Peking  and  Canton, 
which  has  become  a byword  among  the  Chinese  them- 
selves. 

Nevertheless,  there  are,  as  I have  said,  those  who  not 
only  advocate  encouragement  of  the  student  movement, 
but  who  profess  to  see  in  its  emotional  and  undisciplined 
activities  the  long-deferred  awakening  of  the  Chinese 
people  to  the  dawn  of  democracy.  They  forget  that  the 
foreign-educated  Chinese  student  has  indulged  in  these 
same  emotional  qualities,  this  passion  for  fierce  rhetoric, 
flag-waving,  and  solemn  processions,  for  at  least  a quarter 
of  a century.  They  overlook,  moreover,  the  deeply 
significant  fact  that  whereas  Young  China  will  work 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 


79 


itself  to  a semi-hysterical  condition  of  eloquence  and 
tears  over  China’s  sovereign  rights  in  the  Shantung  case, 
its  indignation  has  never  yet  been  publicly  directed 
against  the  growing  rapacity  of  the  metropolitan  and 
provincial  officials  or  the  notorious  corruption  of  both 
parliaments.  Those  who  profess  belief  in  the  possibility 
of  China’s  regeneration  at  the  hands  of  the  present 
generation  of  students,  are,  no  doubt,  in  certain  cases, 
sincere.  Amongst  missionaries  there  are  many  en- 
thusiasts whose  opinion  is  entitled  to  respect  because  of 
that  sincerity ; but  those  who  have  studied  the  student 
movement  closely,  know  that  most  of  its  political  acti- 
vities are  instigated  and  guided  by  the  professional 
politician.  The  raw  youths  and  schoolgirls  who  periodi- 
cally parade  the  streets  of  Shanghai,  Tientsin,  and  Peking, 
demanding  the  execution  of  the  Chiefs  of  Police  or 
denouncing  negotiations  with  Japan,  may  convey  to 
the  uninitiated  observer  a new  and  vivid  impression  of 
patriotic  national  consciousness,  but  those  behind  the 
scenes  are  well  aware  that  all  this  fervour  and  ferment 
of  turbulent  youth  is  often  skilfully  stimulated  by  the 
opponents  of  the  official  clique  in  power  at  Peking  for 
their  own  sordid  ends.  In  the  case  of  the  student  out- 
break last  winter  at  Tientsin,  for  instance,  there  is  no 
doubt  (I  have  seen  documentary  evidence  of  the  fact) 
that  the  anti- Japanese  processions  and  demonstrations 
were  deliberately  organised  by  paid  agents,  with  a view 
to  embarrassing,  and,  if  possible,  overthrowing,  the 
Cabinet  at  Peking.  The  actual  funds  employed  (some 
$200,000)  were  traced  to  the  estate  of  the  late  President, 
General  Feng  Kuo-chang,  who  died  in  possession  of  a 
vast  fortune  and  a deep,  unsatisfied  grudge  against  his 
Prime  Minister,  Tuan  Chi-jui.  In  the  present  state  of 
Chinese  politics,  the  fact  that  Tuan  and  his  adherents 
were  maintained  in  power  (at  a price)  by  Japan,  was 
quite  enough  to  account  for  much  of  the  fervour  dis- 
played by  the  Government’s  opponents  on  the  subject  of 
Shantung.  Incidentally,  it  may  be  observed  that  the 


80  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Shantung  agitation  has  not  been  in  any  true  sense  a 
national,  or  even  a provincial,  movement.  This,  I think, 
is  sufficiently  proved  by  the  fact  that,  in  Manchuria, 
the  Chinese — practically  all  Shantung  men — have  never 
organised  any  boycott  or  other  manifestation  of  hostility 
towards  the  Japanese. 

To  every  impartial  observer  the  truth  is  apparent  that 
neither  the  Shantung  question,  nor  the  far  wider  problem 
of  Japanese  political  ascendancy  at  Peking,  can  ever  be 
satisfactorily  settled  until  the  warring  factions  of  the 
“ Ins  ” and  “ Outs  ” cease  from  their  sordid  strife  and 
unite  in  supporting  a Central  Government,  be  it  what  it 
may.  And  it  is  because  nothing  in  the  present  attitude 
of  these  factions  justifies  any  hope  of  such  a solution  in 
the  near  future,  that  all  those  who  realise  the  dangers  of 
the  situation  also  realise  the  necessity  for  measures  of 
foreign  financial  control.  In  China’s  own  interest  the 
friendly  Powers  will  have  to  insist  upon  measures  by 
which  the  authority  of  the  Central  Government  may 
gradually  be  re-established.  In  no  other  way  can  the 
world’s  most  venerable  civilisation  be  brought  safely 
through  its  present  perils  to  self-reliant  independence 
and  prosperity. 

As  matters  stand  in  China  to-day,  it  is  more  con- 
spicuously evident  than  it  was  in  1911,  that  the  ascen- 
dancy of  Young  China  offers  no  hope  of  establishing  a 
strong  Central  Government  based  on  principles  intelligible 
to  the  masses,  and  that,  until  such  a Government  is 
established,  the  present  chaos  of  corruption  and  civil 
strife  will  continue.  Eight  years  ago,  when  I lectured 
on  the  subject  of  China  in  the  United  States,  most  people 
were  inclined  to  regard  opinions  of  this  kind  as  unin- 
spired pessimism.  The  Press  and  public  were  generally 
content  to  form  their  opinion  of  China  and  the  Chinese 
on  the  polished  platitudes  of  men  hke  Wu  Ting-fang  and 
Tang  Shao-yi,  diplomats  in  whom  the  Oriental  faculty 
for  tactful  blandishment  has  been  rendered  more  than 
usually  effective  by  their  foreign  University  education. 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 


81 


The  enthusiastic,  intelligent,  and  apparently  adaptable 
young  men  who  came  flocking  from  China  to  American 
colleges  in  ever-increasing  numbers  after  1900,  seemed  to 
justify  bright  hopes  for  the  future,  especially  as  they  all 
expressed  profound  admiration  for  American  institutions 
and  ideals  of  government.  But  China’s  experience  of 
the  past  eight  years  must  have  convinced  every  impartial 
observer — it  has  certainly  convinced  the  Chinese  them- 
selves— that  as  it  was  under  the  Manchus  so  it  is  under 
the  Republic : money  remains  the  be-all  and  end-all  of 
politics.  It  still  remains  emphatically  true,  that  ninety 
per  cent,  of  the  masses,  in  whose  name  Young  China 
professes  to  speak,  are  illiterate ; equally  true,  that  they 
care  nothing  whether  their  rulers  call  themselves  Emperors 
or  Presidents,  so  long  as  they  rule  in  accordance  with 
the  nation’s  time-honoured  traditions.  It  is  also  true 
to-day,  as  it  was  under  the  Manchus,  that,  with  the 
exception  of  the  small  Western-learning  class,  the  edu- 
cated minority  of  the  population,  following  the  Confucian 
teaching,  remains  profoundly  indifferent  to  politics. 
Patriotic  they  are,  no  doubt,  in  the  sense  that  they  love 
their  birthplace  with  a deep-rooted  attachment,  cherish 
a deep  pride  of  race,  and  can  be  aroused  to  swift  mani- 
festations of  hatred  against  the  foreigner,  when  con- 
vinced that  either  their  native  soil  or  their  immemorial 
customs  are  endangered  by  the  alien  invader.  But 
Chinese  patriotism,  beyond  the  small  circle  of  the  pro- 
fessional politician,  finds  no  expression  in  manifestations 
of  public  spirit  or  nationalistic  feeling.  It  is  safe  to  say 
that  the  agricultural  masses  of  the  population  are  far 
more  concerned  to-day  with  the  illegal  levies  and  taxes 
exacted  from  them  by  their  self-appointed  Republican 
rulers,  than  with  the  Shantung  question  or  any  of  the 
alleged  political  differences  between  North  and  South. 
All  they  ask,  these  patient,  toiling  millions,  is  a Govern- 
ment that  shall  so  order  things  that  a man  may  enjoy 
the  fruits  of  his  labour  in  peace;  a Government  whose 
necessities  and  rapacities  shall  not  exceed  the  limits 
G 


82 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


prescribed  by  centuries  of  established  custom.  They 
were  told,  when  the  Son  of  Heaven  passed  into  obscurity, 
that  a Republic  meant  peace  and  prosperity,  less  work 
and  less  taxes;  they  have  learned,  during  eight  years 
of  sack  and  pillage,  that,  Manchus  or  no  Manchus,  life 
and  property  were  safer  under  the  Dragon  flag  than  they 
are  to-day.  They  have  learned  that  the  new  type  of 
mandarin,  in  his  strange,  foreign  clothes,  has  nothing  to 
learn  from  the  old  (unless  it  be  restraint)  in  the  arts  and 
crafts  of  “ squeeze.”  And  the  scorpions  of  the  new 
dispensation  are  harder  to  bear  than  the  whips  of  the  old, 
because  every  Yamfin  has  become  a law  unto  itself, 
against  which  there  is  no  appeal. 

There  are  those  who,  while  admitting  these  truths, 
still  pin  their  faith  to  the  rising  generation  of  Young 
China,  to  the  student  class  which  has  not  yet  attained 
public  office,  but  perceives  that  the  shortest  road  thereto 
lies  through  the  platform  and  the  Press.  To  these,  I 
would  merely  observe  that  China’s  situation  is  too 
critical  to  permit  of  further  experiments  just  at  present; 
also  that,  even  if  a few  sincerely  honest  officials  were 
forthcoming,  they  could  do  nothing  to  stem  the  tide  of 
wholesale  " squeeze  ” now  running.  I would  go  further, 
however,  and  assert  that  the  instinct  which  impels  the 
Chinese  to  put  money  in  his  purse  whenever  and  however 
he  can,  is  no  more  capable  of  being  eradicated  in  one  or 
two  generations  than  the  colour  of  his  skin.  It  is  an 
instinct,  deep-rooted  in  the  structural  character  of  the 
race,  a direct  product  of  a struggle  for  existence  far  more 
severe  (because  rigorously  localised  for  centuries)  than 
anything  in  the  history  of  European  nations.  And 
nothing  can  possibly  mitigate  the  fierceness  of  this 
struggle,  no  political  institutions  can  ever  modify  the 
qualities  and  defects  which  it  produces,  so  long  as  the 
social  system  of  the  Chinese  continues  to  make  philo- 
progenitiveness a religious  duty.  Ancestor-worship, 
combined  with  the  polygamous,  patriarchal  family 
system,  have  produced  a state  of  society  in  which 


B.  T.  Priileanx J 


UNMARRIED  GIRLS  OF  THE  MIDDLE  CLASS  (SHANGHAI), 
SUMMER  COSTUME. 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 


83 


every  man  will,  if  he  can,  raise  himself  and  his  imme- 
diate posterity  above  the  level  of  the  masses,  for  ever 
struggling  for  the  bare  necessities  of  existence.  Turn  to  the 
pages  of  the  Old  Testament,  and  observe  how  the  instinct 
for  acquiring  wealth  is  recognised  and  sanctioned  as  a 
dominant  characteristic  of  the  Oriental  mind.  To-day 
in  China,  as  it  was  in  the  days  of  Solomon,  “ the  rich 
man’s  wealth  is  his  strong  city,”  and  “ money  answereth 
all  things.”  It  is  true  to-day,  as  it  was  in  the  days  of 
Babylon,  that  “ a man’s  gift  maketh  room  for  him  and 
bringeth  him  before  great  men.”  By  no  process  of 
exhortation  can  the  mandarin’s  incorrigible  greed  of 
gain  be  eradicated;  its  motive  force  lies  deep  in  the 
unrecorded  ages  of  the  past.  Looking  at  things  in  this 
light,  we  may  understand  why  the  bribery  and  cor- 
ruption of  the  official  class  in  China  arouse  no  more 
indignation  under  the  Republic  than  they  did  under  the 
Manchus.  And  finally,  one  has  only  to  realise  how 
irresistible  a temptation  besets  the  mandarin,  whether 
old  or  new,  in  the  big-scale  proposals  of  foreign 
financiers  and  concession-seekers,  to  perceive  the  root 
cause  of  China's  financial  chaos  and  the  imperative 
need  of  thorough  reorganisation  under  reliable  foreign 
supervision. 

If  I thus  insist  upon  the  financial  aspect  of  the  situa- 
tion and  the  urgent  need,  before  all  else,  of  compulsory 
honesty  in  the  public  service,  it  is  because  of  the  tendency 
now  prevalent  in  certain  quarters  to  put  the  cart  before 
the  horse.  No  possible  good  can  result  from  discussing 
the  quarrel  between  the  so-called  Northern  and  Southern 
factions,  the  pooling  of  “ spheres  of  influence,”  the 
unification  of  railway  control,  the  reform  of  the  currency, 
or  any  other  question,  so  long  as  all  the  energies  of  the 
official  class  are  centred  in  a struggle  for  possession  of 
the  public  purse,  to  be  refilled,  whenever  emptied,  by 
reckless  borrowing.  It  is  obviously  useless  to  attempt 
to  protect  the  nation’s  sovereign  rights  so  long  as  its 
Government  is  prepared  to  barter  them  for  cash. 


84 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Looking  back  over  the  history  of  China  as  it  has 
developed  during  the  last  century,  it  seems  impossible 
to  deny  that  most  of  the  nation’s  present  disabilities  and 
dangers  are  due  to  no  fault  of  its  own,  but  to  the  sudden 
creation  by  the  Western  Powers  of  a new  condition  of 
things  to  which  the  world’s  oldest  civilisation  was  unable 
to  adapt  itself.  Left  to  itself,  that  civilisation  would 
undoubtedly  have  been  sufficient  to  overcome  such 
internal  disorders  as  the  Taiping  Rebellion  or  the  down- 
fall of  the  Manchu  dynasty;  but  the  economic  pressure 
of  modern  Europe,  its  earth-hunger,  cosmopolitan  finance, 
and  man-killing  devices,  forbade  all  hope  of  China’s 
being  permitted  to  maintain  her  ancient  isolation.  The 
material  civilisation  of  the  West  asserted  its  superiority 
over  that  of  the  East  by  forcible  means,  with  which  all 
the  wisdom  of  the  East  was  unable  to  cope.  If  we 
admit  this — as  I think  we  must — then,  if  there  be  any- 
thing vital  in  the  ideals  which  the  Anglo-Saxon  race 
professes,  anything  attainable  in  the  League  of  Nations 
ideal  of  “ a reign  of  law,  sustained  by  the  organised 
opinion  of  mankind,”  the  West  owes  the  East  a deep 
debt  of  reparation.  And  it  can  only  be  discharged 
by  sympathetic  understanding  of  the  Chinese  people’s 
real  needs,  and  an  earnest,  self-denying  determination  to 
protect  their  helplessness  through  the  necessary  period 
of  administrative  reconstruction. 

And  never  has  there  been  a race  more  worthily  deserving 
of  protection  at  the  hands  of  humanity.  For,  say  what 
you  will,  that  very  passive  philosophy  which  exposes 
China  to  the  rapacity  of  earth-hungry  Powers,  approaches 
more  nearly  to  the  essential  principles  of  Christianity,  as 
laid  down  in  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  than  the  every- 
day practice  of  most  Christian  nations.  Here  you  have 
a people  in  very  truth  “too  proud  to  fight,”  because 
they  not  only  profess,  but  firmly  believe,  that,  in  the 
long  run,  reason  and  justice  must  triumph  over  force. 
The  polished  pacifism  of  Confucius  and  the  intellectual 
superiority  of  his  offspring,  the  classical  literati,  both 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 


85 


tempered  with  the  Buddhist  doctrine  of  gentleness 
and  compassion,  have  produced  a type  of  civilisation, 
a race-mind,  fixed  in  unity  of  ideas,  which  to  the 
Chinese  themselves  (and  to  many  Europeans)  seem 
morally  superior  to  that  of  the  West — a splendid 
inheritance. 

As  a French  writer1  has  recently  expressed  it,  “ The 
civilisation  of  China  has  stood  its  tests.  It  has  provided 
countless  generations  of  men  with  food,  not  only  for  the 
body,  but  the  soul.  It  has  been  a school  of  moral  beauty 
and  virtue,  of  gentleness  and  wisdom.  It  has  given  to 
China  a degree  of  happiness,  and  to  the  life  of  her  people 
a stability  and  harmony,  which  have  never  been  excelled 
(the  Chinese  would  say  never  equalled)  by  any  other 
civilisation.” 

Given  goodwill  and  a sincere  desire  on  the  part  of  the 
Powers  to  help  the  Chinese  people  to  preserve  this 
inheritance,  there  should  be  no  insuperable  difficulty  in 
restoring  law  and  order,  peace  and  prosperity  throughout 
the  country.  But  the  goodwill  must  be  there,  genuinely 
active,  and  based  upon  an  earnest  desire  to  co-operate 
in  a common  cause,  upon  principles  of  right  and 
justice. 

Is  this  a counsel  of  perfection  ? I think  not.  At  all 
events,  the  problem  is  simpler  than  many  of  those  which 
the  League  of  Nations  proposes  to  solve  in  Europe — 
for  instance,  that  of  Poland.  In  the  first  place,  it  is 
obviously  to  the  interest  of  the  commercial  Powers  con- 
cerned, and  especially  of  Japan,  to  put  an  end  to  the 
present  chaotic  state  of  affairs  in  China.  It  is  equally 
evident  that  no  one  Power  can  hope  to  tackle  the  business 
single-handed.  Intelligent  self-interest  points,  therefore, 
on  this  occasion,  in  the  same  direction  as  that  prescribed 
by  philanthropy.  There  is  still,  no  doubt,  a very  in- 
fluential body  of  opinion  behind  the  Military  Party  in 
Japan  which  holds  to  the  ideal  of  fishing  in  troubled 
waters,  but,  for  reasons  which  will  be  stated  hereafter, 

1 Lmile  Hovelaque,  La  Chine,  1920. 


86  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


I believe  that  even  the  Military  Party  is  rapidly  coming 
to  the  conclusion  that  a selfishly  aggressive  policy  towards 
China  is  not  likely  to  be  profitable.  Herein  lies  one  of 
the  most  hopeful  features  of  the  situation. 

For  observe,  that  while  the  dangers  and  difficulties 
which  immediately  threaten  China  are  one  and  all  the 
result  of  financial  mal-administration,  the  actual  wealth 
and  resources  of  the  country  are  such  that  an  effective 
Central  Government  might  easily  become  prosperously 
solvent  within  a comparatively  short  time,  certainly 
within  ten  years.  There  is  no  reason  whatever  why 
the  Chinese  Government  should  remain  impecunious,  if 
only  normal  fiscal  relations  can  be  re-established  between 
Peking  and  the  provinces,  and  the  country’s  debts  tabu- 
lated and  reorganised  under  expert  and  honest  supervision. 
So  long  as  the  present  senseless  warfare  of  political 
factions  continues,  the  Central  Government’s  revenue- 
collecting energies  must  remain  paralysed.  The  first 
thing  needful  is  to  place  it  in  such  a position  of  authority 
as  shall  enable  it  to  gather  into  the  national  Treasury  the 
land  tax,  salt  dues,  and  other  revenues  which  are  at 
present  collected  and  annexed  by  those  predatory  barons, 
the  provincial  Governors.  For  the  last  three  years  at 
least,  Peking  has  been  literally  existing  from  hand  to 
mouth,  borrowing  from  Peter  to  pay  Paul,  and  pawning 
the  country’s  last  realisable  assets  in  the  process. 

The  financial  situation  with  which  we  have  now  to 
deal  in  China  is  in  some  respects  more  encouraging  than 
it  was  just  before  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe.  Apart 
from  the  fact  that  co-operation  under  an  international 
reorganisation  scheme  would  now  seem  to  have  become 
possible — which  it  never  was  before  the  war — the  Chinese 
Government’s  revenues  have  been  greatly  increased  for 
debt-paying  purposes  owing  to  the  increase  in  the  Customs 
duties  and  the  rise  in  the  value  of  silver.1  Then  there  is 
the  probability  that  the  Powers  concerned  may  agree,  as 

1 This  was  written  before  the  price  of  silver  collapsed,  seriously 
increasing  the  difficulties  of  China’s  national  finances. 


THE  REPUBLIC  OF  TO-DAY 


87 


part  of  a reconstruction  scheme,  to  reduce,  or  completely 
remit,  China’s  obligations  under  the  Boxer  indemnities. 
Finally,  there  is  the  great  and  increasing  national 
revenue  produced  by  the  reorganisation  of  the  Salt 
Gabelle.  But  all  the  wealth  of  Golconda  will  never 
balance  the  Chinese  budget — indeed,  there  can  never  be 
a budget  to  balance — until  every  dollar  of  income  and 
expenditure  is  vouched  for  and  audited  by  responsible 
expert  accountants.  The  record  of  the  Imperial  Mari- 
time Customs,  and  that  of  the  railways  of  North  China, 
prove  that  a thoroughly  effective  system  of  auditing  can 
be  carried  out  without  offending  the  susceptibilities  of 
the  Chinese  authorities  and  with  indisputable  benefit  to 
the  national  exchequer.  On  the  other  hand,  the  history 
of  every  railway,  bank,  or  industrial  enterprise  under 
mandarin  control  has  been  financially  disastrous,  for  all 
but  the  officials  concerned. 

Under  the  scheme  which  originated  at  Washington  in 
1918,  steps  have  been  taken  to  establish  an  International 
Board  for  the  abolition  of  all  railway  spheres  of  influence 
and  for  merging  all  railway  concessions  into  a national 
Chinese  system,  wherein  the  principle  of  effective  financial 
control  would  be  observed.  The  scheme,  like  the  inten- 
tions of  the  financial  Consortium,  is  excellent  in  itself, 
and,  given  a stable  and  solvent  Government  at  Peking, 
it  should  be  feasible,  together  with  many  other  necessary 
reforms.  But  no  good  can  possibly  come  of  discussing 
any  of  these  schemes  until  the  problem  of  consolidating 
the  Central  Government  has  been  successfully  solved.  If 
China  is  to  escape  disruption,  if  her  people  are  to  be 
enabled  to  pursue  their  normal  ways  of  productive 
industry,  the  provincial  Governors  (Tuchuns)  must  cease 
from  being  each  a law  unto  himself.  This  will  only 
happen  when  their  rabble  armies  have  been  disarmed 
and  disbanded  under  such  conditions  as  will  ensure  their 
final  disappearance  from  the  scene;  that  is  to  say, 
under  the  watchful,  expert  eyes  of  foreigners  representing 
the  Consortium,  which  must  finance  the  disbandment 


88 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


operations.  This  at  first  may  seem  an  impossible  solu- 
tion, but,  as  a matter  of  fact,  many  competent  observers, 
Chinese  and  European,  consider  that  the  scheme  is 
practicable,  and  that  the  time  has  come  to  attempt 
its  execution.  In  any  case  it  offers  the  only  alternative 
to  anarchy.  For,  as  matters  stand,  civil  war  in  China 
has  become  a lucrative  profession. 


CHAPTER  V 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION 

Until  the  end  of  1919,  as  the  result  of  Young  China’s 
activities  in  the  Press  and  of  propaganda  work  done  by 
one  or  two  foreign  journalists  in  Chinese  pay,  a very 
general  impression  existed  abroad  that  the  southern  pro- 
vinces and  the  North  were  seriously  at  war.  Further- 
more, that  the  South  was  fighting  for  the  Constitution 
and  for  the  rightful  powers  of  Parliament  against  the 
northern  reactionaries  or  militarists ; and  that  the 
struggle  would  be  waged  to  the  bitter  end,  by  fervent 
patriots,  in  the  sacred  name  of  liberty  on  the  one  side, 
and  for  the  vindication  of  lawful  authority  on  the  other. 
Finally,  that  the  South  had  established  an  independent 
Republican  Government  of  its  own  at  Canton,  and  that 
a conference  of  northern  and  southern  delegates  was 
engaged  in  discussing  possible  terms  of  peace  in  that 
safe  and  very  hospitable  neutral  ground,  the  Foreign 
Settlement  of  Shanghai. 

From  the  utterances  of  the  American  and  the  British 
Press  concerning  this  protracted  but  strangely  silent 
struggle,  it  was  evident  that  either  its  own  preoccupa- 
tions or  the  vagueness  of  the  news  from  China  prevented 
the  outside  world  from  coming  to  any  satisfactory  con- 
clusion concerning  either  the  merits  of  the  combatants 
or  the  real  cause  of  their  strife.  The  picture  of  the 
South  nobly  struggling  to  be  free,  fighting  against  heavy 
odds  for  the  liberties  of  the  people,  naturally  aroused  a 
good  deal  of  sympathy  at  the  outset ; but  the  picture 
itself  was  so  confused,  and  in  some  respects  so  obviously 
intended  to  beguile,  that  sympathy  was  generally  tem- 

89 


90 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


pered  with  wait-and-see  discretion.  The  emergence  as 
Republican  leaders  of  men  like  the  ex-Minister  Wu  Ting- 
Fang,  the  ex-Viceroy  Tsen,  or  ex-Govemor  Tang  Shao-yi, 
was  certainly  sufficient  to  justify  any  amount  of  scepticism 
about  the  fervour  of  the  southern  Republic’s  radicalism ; 
for  had  not  all  of  them  contentedly  held  high  office  under 
the  Manchus  ? And  then  the  swift  series  of  events  which 
followed  upon  President  Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s  attempt  to 
seize  the  Throne,  and  his  sudden  death  in  June  1916; 
the  Manchu  Emperor’s  seven-day  emergence,  and  the 
subsequent  dismissals  of  Presidents  and  Premiers,  amidst 
tumult  and  shouting  of  Tuchuns — all  these  things  con- 
tributed to  make  impartial  observers  doubt  that  the 
Chinese  world  had  been  made  safe  for  Republicanism. 

Since  then,  the  picture  of  a war  being  waged  in  defence 
of  political  principles  has  faded  gently  into  the  Umbo  of 
things  that  are  easily  forgotten,  and  the  world  at  large 
has  gradually  learned  something  of  the  real  state  of 
affairs.  North  and  South,  not  to  mention  East  and  West, 
are  still  at  war,  in  the  sense  that  five  super-Tuchuns 
and  seventeen  lesser  satraps  maintain  armed  forces  in 
the  field,  and  even  more  on  paper.  But  these  forces  are 
not  seriously  engaged  in  any  systematic  warfare  for  the 
assertion  of  clearly-defined  political  principles.  The  only 
real  warfare  now  waged  is  the  same  old  struggle  for  place 
and  patronage  and  pelf  which  has  gone  on,  grim  and 
silent,  for  centuries  around  and  about  the  seats  of  the 
mighty  in  Peking.  Moreover,  there  is  no  longer  any 
serious  pretence  of  vital  difference  between  North  and 
South.  The  Peace  Conference  at  Shanghai  continues  to 
differ  in  perfect  accord,  partly  because  the  delegates  find 
in  the  Foreign  Settlement  a very  pleasant  and  profitable 
gathering-place,  but  chiefly  because  both  factions  are 
agreed  that  the  foreigner  must  somehow  be  impressed 
with  the  seriousness  of  the  strife.  Should  he  cease  to 
provide  further  loans,  either  for  the  disbandment  of 
troops  or  for  administrative  expenses,  the  bottom  would 
fall  out  of  a very  safe  and  lucrative  profession. 


SUNSET  ON  THE  HWEI  RIVER,  CHEKIANG. 

" Now  fades  the  glimmering  landscape  on  the  sight, 
And  all  the  air  a solemn  stillness  holds.” 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  91 


For  this  is  what  civil  war  has  actually  come  to,  in  the 
supple  hands  of  the  modern  mandarin.  To  show  that 
the  whole  business  is  a stupendous  farce,  what  better 
proof  can  be  given  than  the  fact  that,  in  recent  foreign 
loan  negotiations,  the  Peking  militarists  have  expressed 
their  willingness  to  allow  the  “ rebel  ” Cantonese  to  have 
a “ slice  of  the  melon,”  and  that  the  financiers  of  the 
Consortium  consent  to  do  business,  in  the  name  of  unity, 
with  the  house  thus  divided  ? Where,  outside  of  China, 
or  Gilbert  and  Sullivan,  would  it  be  possible  for  alleged 
fierce  belligerents  to  arrange  a businesslike  division  of 
Customs  revenues,  so  as  not  to  disturb  the  security  of 
the  foreign  bond-holder?  Young  China  is  in  the  habit 
of  denouncing  the  governing  clique  at  Peking  and  the 
provincial  Tuchuns  who  support  it  as  “ militarists,” 
and  the  Press  abroad,  which  gets  most  of  its  ideas  from 
and  through  Young  China,  has  been  misled  by  the  misuse 
of  this  badly  overworked  word.  Needless  to  say  that 
in  China  there  is  no  such  thing  as  militarism,  in  the 
true  sense  of  the  term.  The  two-and-twenty  Tuchuns 
who,  with  the  aid  of  their  uniformed  ex-bandits  and 
coolies,  hold  sway  each  in  his  own  province,  are  the 
direct  descendants,  true  to  type,  of  the  mandarin  Viceroys 
and  Governors  of  former  days. 

When  Young  China  denounces  General  this  or  Colonel 
that,  and  when  the  doings  of  these  warriors  are  recorded 
in  the  native  Press,  the  world  at  large  naturally  gets  an 
impression  of  truculent  fire-eaters,  boot-and-saddle  swash- 
bucklers of  the  picturesque  Mexican  type ; but  the  real 
article  is  something  very  different — generally  a sleek 
Confucianist  scholar  up  to  date,  a slim  and  subtle  intelli- 
gence, coldly  calculating  and  quite  ruthless,  who  uses 
men  and  money  with  consummate  ability.  In  the  new 
game  of  politics  which  developed  after  the  passing  of 
the  Dragon  Throne,  it  was  the  super-men  of  the  educated 
class  who  made  their  way  to  the  top  (never  to  the  front), 
ambitious  spirits  and  quick  brains,  that  saw  the  tide 
of  fortune  and  seized  it  when  it  served.  And  the  real 


92 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


question  in  China  to-day  is,  how  to  limit  the  power  and 
rapacity  of  these  Tuchuns,  how  to  bring  under  the 
authority  of  the  Central  Government  those  who,  during 
the  past  six  years,  have  had  time  not  only  to  taste 
the  sweets  of  independent  power,  but  to  perfect,  each 
in  his  own  province,  the  machinery  of  self-determi- 
nation. Very  self-determined  fellows  indeed  are  the 
Tuchuns. 

When  Young  China  declares  that  it  wishes  to  get  rid  of 
the  militarists,  what  it  really  means  is  that  it  would  like 
to  oust  from  power  the  men  who,  relying  on  their  hordes 
of  bandits,  have  been  able  to  amass  wealth  under  the 
Republic  far  greater  than  any  Viceroy  ever  amassed 
under  the  Empire.  The  object  of  the  Cantonese  “ con- 
stitutionalists ” in  1919-1920  was,  in  the  first  place,  to 
get  rid  of  the  northern  “ militarists,”  that  is  to  say,  of 
General  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  his  Anfu  Club  henchmen. 
This  they  claimed  to  do  on  high  moral  grounds,  because 
Tuan’s  power  had  undoubtedly  been  upheld  and  his 
purse  filled  by  Japanese  money,  at  a serious  risk  to 
China’s  sovereignty  in  more  than  one  direction.  After 
that,  they  aspired  to  get  rid  of  the  northern  Tuchuns 
and  to  replace  them,  in  the  public  interest,  by  their  own 
nominees.  The  only  weak  point  about  this  programme, 
from  the  public  point  of  view,  lay  in  the  notorious  fact 
that  the  men  who  since  1916  had  claimed  to  govern  the 
southern  Republic,  have  proved  themselves  just  as  greatly 
lacking  in  public  spirit  and  administrative  honesty  as 
their  colleagues  of  the  North,  and  that,  in  the  matter 
of  “ squeezing,”  there  is  nothing  whatsoever  to  choose 
between  a southern  and  a northern  Tuchun.  One  of 
the  most  earnest  intellectuals  of  foreign-educated  Young 
China,  Mr.  S.  G.  Cheng,  whom  I had  the  pleasure  of 
meeting  at  Peking  in  February  1920,  deals  very  frankly 
with  this  aspect  of  the  situation  in  his  recently  published 
work,  Modern  China.  One  passage  is  so  illuminating, 
coming  from  a southerner,  that  it  is  worth  quoting  in 
full: 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  93 


“ For  military  operations  against  the  North,  the  South 
depends  on  governors  who  are  just  as  selfish  as  their 
northern  colleagues.  It  also  receives,  as  its  allies,  brigands 
or  military  leaders  who  have  some  personal  grievance 
against  the  North  and  who  desire  to  gratify  their  greed 
and  ambition  by  taking  advantage  of  the  quarrel  between 
the  constitutionalists  and  the  militarists.  Among  the 
army  commanders  of  the  South,  many  have  no  sympathy 
at  all  with  the  democratic  aspirations  of  the  constitu- 
tionalists, but  fight  their  own  battle  under  the  cloak  of 
a good  cause.  This  hopeless  state  of  affairs  is  acknow- 
ledged and  deplored  by  the  southern  leader,  Dr.  Sun 
Yat-sen,  who  summarises  the  situation  by  saying  that 
the  struggle  of  military  leaders  for  supremacy  is  equally 
rampant  in  the  South  and  in  the  North,  and  that  he  has 
almost  exhausted  his  voice,  with  no  effect,  in  calling 
attention  to  the  incoherent  situation.” 

A good  deal  of  blood  has  flowed  under  the  bridges 
since  I ventured  to  suggest  to  Dr.  Sun  and  his  friends, 
in  1912,  that  nothing  but  anarchy  could  possibly  result 
from  their  attempt  to  introduce  ready-made  republicanism 
in  China.  And  much  more  blood  will  flow,  unless  the 
Powers  intervene,  before  the  inevitable  Dictator  emerges 
and  compels  the  warring  factions  to  cease  from  strife. 

As  a good  Confucianist,  Mr.  Cheng  believes  in  appealing 
to  the  patriotism  of  the  Tuchuns,  in  persuading  them 
" to  surrender  their  own  interests,  so  as  to  save  the 
country  from  further  bloodshed.”  But  to  appeal  to  the 
patriotism  of  the  Tuchuns  would  be  “ going  to  the  goat’s 
house  for  wool.”  It  is  reckoned  by  competent  observers 
that  every  one  of  them  (with  two  or  three  exceptions) 
has  amassed  a large  fortune,  and  many  are  known  to  be 
multi-millionaires.  Some  of  them  have  invested  vast 
sums  in  real  estate  at  the  Treaty  Ports,  whilst  others 
have  deposited  their  wealth  in  the  foreign  banks.  Others, 
again,  are  looking  about  for  safe  investments  in  Anglo- 
Chinese  companies,  a fact  which  has  a good  deal  to  do 
with  the  recent  development  of  the  “ co-operative  enter- 
prise ” idea.  It  has  been  estimated  that,  during  the  past 


94 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


eight  years,  the  twenty-two  Tuchuns  and  the  metro- 
politan officials  between  them  have  squeezed  enough 
money  to  pay  off  four-fifths  of  China’s  National  Debt ; 
a good  deal  of  this  money  has  been  “ squeezed  ” from 
foreign  loans  and  concession  contracts.  And  all  this 
time,  while  a handful  of  men  have  been  growing  fabulously 
rich,  the  Government,  which  they  are  supposed  to  serve, 
has  been  borrowing  up  to  the  very  last  limit  of  its 
credit.  If  there  were  any  real  patriotism  amongst  them, 
would  they  have  continued  to  borrow  abroad  at  ruinous 
rates  of  exchange?  Would  they  not  have  lent  to  the 
State  some  of  their  own  superfluous  wealth?  During 
the  progress  of  the  loan  negotiations  at  Peking  last  year, 
it  was  common  knowledge  that  many  leading  Chinese 
officials  were  ready  and  willing  to  subscribe  a large 
amount  of  capital  to  the  flotation  of  a chartered  Anglo- 
Chinese  company.  But  for  internal  national  loans,  to 
relieve  the  country’s  urgent  needs,  no  money  is  forth- 
coming, for  the  simple  reason  that  they  are  never  repaid. 
And  while  millions  of  people  are  starving  and  selling 
their  children  in  the  famine  districts,  the  Tuchuns  do 
practically  nothing  to  relieve  their  terrible  burden  of 
suffering. 

An  appeal  to  their  patriotism  is  evidently  useless, 
where  money  is  concerned,  but  the  very  wealth  of  the 
present  group  of  Tuchuns  might  well  be  made  instru- 
mental in  relegating  them  and  their  rabble  troops  into 
private  life,  if  they  were  once  persuaded  that  the  Powers 
were  in  earnest  and  that  the  provinces  would  have  to 
reckon  in  future  with  a real,  instead  of  a sham,  Govern- 
ment at  Peking.  To  the  Western  mind,  the  idea  may 
sound  fantastic ; nevertheless,  I heard  many  wise  and 
experienced  Chinese  discuss  the  situation  of  their  country 
at  Peking  and  Shanghai  last  winter,  and  most  of  them 
were  of  opinion  that  the  Tuchuns  wrould  be  quite  willing 
to  have  their  troops  disbanded  for  them  by  the  obliging 
foreigner,  so  that  they  themselves  might  retire  to  dignified 
leisure  in  their  wrell-feathered  nests.  As  Tang  Shao-yi 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  95 


put  it,  when  I discussed  men  and  affairs  at  his  private 
house  in  Shanghai,  “ I think  they  would  like  to  resign, 
so  as  to  have  time  to  attend  to  their  investments.  At 
all  events,”  he  said,  “ anything  would  be  better  than 
another  revolution  and  a new  lot  of  Tuchuns;  for  the 
new  lot  would  be  in  a great  hurry  to  get  rich,  while  the 
present  lot  ought  to  be  nearly  satisfied.”  (Tang  Shao-yi, 
ex-Minister  under  the  Manchus,  ex-Special  Envoy  to  the 
United  States,  scholar,  diplomat,  genial  host,  and  good 
sportsman,  seems  to  have  developed  a misanthropic  vein 
since  he  forsook  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  in  1912  and  became  a 
leader  of  the  Cantonese  secessionists.  When  I saw  him 
he  had  retired,  like  Achilles,  to  his  tent,  and  was  talcing 
no  part  in  the  Peace  Conference,  although  still  supposed 
to  be  chief  spokesman  for  the  South.) 

But  to  return  to  the  Tuchuns,  whose  predatory  habits 
and  methods  of  " self-determination  ” constitute  the 
immediate  problem  in  China.  The  ease  and  impunity 
with  which  they  have  plundered,  and  are  still  plundering, 
the  country,  their  cynical  pretences  of  civil  war,  their 
endless  plots  and  jealous  intrigues,  all  have  served  to 
convince  the  large  respectable  majority  of  Chinese  (who 
meddle  not  in  politics)  that  a strong  Central  Government 
is  the  only  possible  corrective  of  chaos.  The  merchant 
class,  in  particular,  fully  realises  that  there  is  at  present 
no  Government  in  China,  but  only  warring  groups  of  self- 
seeking  politicians,  and  that  this  fact  alone  accounts  for 
the  wickedness  and  the  wealth  of  the  Tuchuns.  Under 
the  Manchus,  if  the  wealth  of  a Viceroy  or  a Governor 
was  known  to  exceed  the  limits  prescribed  by  dignity 
and  decency,  the  offender  was  invited,  with  punctilious 
courtesy,  to  present  himself  for  an  audience  at  Peking, 
and  there,  with  the  utmost  delicacy,  a certain  proportion 
of  his  wealth  was  taken  from  him  and  found  its  way 
back  into  circulation.  Even  the  most  powerful  Viceroys 
could  never  resist  these  polite  invitations,  because  loyalty 
to  the  Throne  was  a vital  thing,  a rallying-point  and 
a restraining  force  throughout  the  entire  mandarin 


96 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


hierarchy.  That  restraining  force  having  disappeared,  it 
was  obviously  a case  of  “ to  your  tents,  O Israel.”  The 
Tuchun  of  to-day  has  become  a law  unto  himself,  and 
there  is  none  that  can  bring  him  to  account. 

It  is  worth  remembering  that,  as  I have  shown,  had 
it  not  been  for  the  intervention  of  Japan,  Yuan  Shih-k’ai 
would  assuredly  have  restored  the  Throne  in  1916,  and 
with  it  the  authority  of  the  Central  Government.  After 
Yuan’s  death,  the  mantle  of  his  power,  which  fell  upon 
the  shoulders  of  Tuan  Ch’i-jui,  was  very  ragged  at  the 
edges.  Tuan’s  reason  for  forsaking  his  old  chief  and 
declining  to  support  his  claims  to  the  Throne  lay  chiefly 
in  the  fact  that  he  himself  had  designs  on  the  Presidency 
of  the  Republic;  therefore  he  denounced  Yuan’s  policy 
as  that  of  an  autocrat  and  no  true  Republican.  But  no 
sooner  had  he  become  Prime  Minister  than  he  proceeded 
to  follow  Yuan’s  example,  by  appointing  his  own  hench- 
men to  vacancies  in  the  provincial  governorships  and 
then  proceeding  to  suppress  all  opposition  by  force.  His 
policy,  as  defined  by  himself,  lacked  the  terse  vigour  of 
Yuan’s  style,  but  it  was  quite  definite  enough  to  eliminate 
any  earnest  patriot’s  hopes  of  unity  and  concord. 

“ I hope,”  he  declared,  “ to  unite  and  pacify  the 
country  by  the  aid  of  my  northern  colleagues.  The 
policy  of  attacking  the  South  and  the  South-west  is  only 
adopted  because  the  Government  in  recent  years  has 
exhausted  its  wisdom  and  ability  in  meeting  parliamentary 
tumults  and  has  become  sick  of  party  compromise. 
Looking  around  the  country,  I find  that  only  the  real 
military  force  of  the  North  can  save  the  country  and 
enforce  the  law.” 

This  was  four  years  ago.  Since  then,  Tuan  has  learned, 
even  as  Yuan  learned  before  him,  that,  failing  the 
authority  of  the  Son  of  Heaven,  only  masterful  autocracy, 
well  provided  with  funds,  can  ever  hope  to  secure  the 
loyalty  of  ambitious  provincial  officials.  In  the  previous 
chapter,  the  story  of  those  five  years  was  roughly 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  97 


outlined;  it  is  a tale  so  saturated  with  the  treasons, 
stratagems,  and  spoils  of  rival  politicians,  that  no  single 
individual’s  record  can  be  associated  with  any  definite 
principle  or  policy.  When,  in  the  end,  Tuan  found 
himself  between  the  devil  of  a hostile  Parliament  and 
the  deep  sea  of  chronic  insolvency,  his  supporters,  the 
Northern  Governors,  would  only  continue  to  back  him 
at  a price.  That  price  had  to  be  paid  partly  in  cash, 
for  the  maintenance  of  their  real  and  alleged  forces,  and 
partly  by  recognition  of  their  fiscal  and  political  inde- 
pendence. Under  these  circumstances,  it  soon  became 
evident  to  Tuan  and  his  friends  in  power  at  Peking  that 
they  must  either  face  the  prospect  of  an  early  retirement 
into  private  life  or  find  some  means  of  raising  the  money 
necessary  to  retain  the  “ loyalty  ” of  the  Northern 
Governors.  Herein,  to  put  the  matter  frankly,  lay  the 
secret  of  the  well-established  ascendancy  of  Japan  in  the 
councils  of  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  the  so-called  Northern  Party. 
Up  to  the  summer  of  1920,  it  was  all  a question  of 
funds.  Tuan  and  the  Anfu  Club  have  since  been  over- 
thrown by  a rival  political  faction,  but  the  President  and 
the  Chihli  party  are  now  denounced  by  the  South,  on 
the  very  same  grounds  and  with  equal  fervour.  History 
repeats  itself,  in  this  matter,  with  monotonous  regularity. 
Just  as  in  1900  Li  Hung-chang  sold  a portion  of  his 
country’s  birthright  for  a savoury  mess  of  Russian 
pottage,  so  Tuan  Chi-jui,  the  Anfu  Club,  and  its  packed 
Parliament,  maintained  themselves  in  power  with  funds 
borrowed  from  Japan,  at  a price  which  will  be  found 
to  be  no  light  one  when  the  accounts  fall  due  for  pay- 
ment. And  Tuan  having  fallen  (with  a full  purse  and 
no  penalties),  the  two  great  satraps  of  the  North,  Chang 
Tso-lin  and  Tsao  Kun,  are  now  openly  accused  of  being 
in  Japanese  pay. 

And  so,  after  eight  years  of  that  Republic  which  was 
to  demonstrate  the  patriotism  of  the  classes  and  the 
self-governing  capacity  of  the  masses,  China  has  reached 
a condition  of  affairs  which  causes  most  of  her  people 

H 


98 


CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


to  sigh  for  the  comparatively  honest  days  of  the  old 
Empress  Dowager.  Neither  of  the  so-called  Governments 
of  the  North  and  the  South  makes  any  pretence  of  trying 
to  govern ; both  are  nothing  more  than  groups  of  officials, 
each  struggling  at  all  costs  to  feather  its  own  nest,  before 
the  bankruptcy  of  the  country  shall  compel  the  inevitable 
intervention  of  the  foreign  Powers.  Education,  which 
was  to  have  been  the  Republic’s  first  care,  is  either 
completely  neglected  or  left  to  the  initiative  of  public- 
spirited  scholars  and  local  gentry.  With  the  exception 
of  the  Customs,  Post-office,  and  Salt  revenues,  collected 
under  the  supervision  of  foreigners,  which  form  the 
security  for  China’s  foreign  debts,  the  Central  Govern- 
ment’s revenues  from  the  provinces  are  small  and  pre- 
carious. With  regard  to  such  internal  matters  as  the 
administration  of  justice,  the  regulation  of  trade,  opium- 
growing, and  military  equipment,  each  province  goes 
its  independent  way,  either  asserting  complete  rights  of 
autonomy  or  maintaining  polite  relations  with  the  capital, 
as  each  Governor  may  think  fit.  The  Northern  provinces, 
whose  Governors  have  usually  supported  the  nominal 
authority  of  Peking,  in  return  for  subsidies  in  cash,  have 
been  occasionally  and  to  some  extent  united  against  the 
southern  Tuchuns,  and  may  generally  be  relied  upon 
to  join  forces  to  prevent  the  Cantonese  (or  any  other) 
clique  from  ousting  and  replacing  their  own  friends  and 
nominees.  But  neither  in  the  North  nor  in  the  South 
has  there  been  at  any  time  anything  approaching  to  real 
cohesion  in  the  ranks  of  the  forces  supposed  to  be  at 
civil  war.  The  only  constant  and  conspicuous  feature 
of  the  situation  on  both  sides  has  lain  in  the  incessant 
intrigues  of  one  Tuchun  against  another.  There  is  no 
solidarity  in  any  group  or  party ; secret  emissaries  from 
northern  Tuchuns  are  constantly  being  sent  on  more 
or  less  treasonable  missions  to  leaders  in  the  south,  and 
vice-versa.  Men  who  should  be  working  together  are 
known  to  be  secretly  plotting  against  each  other;  it  is 
a case  of  every  man  for  himself,  and  the  devil  take  the 
hindermost. 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  99 


During  my  stay  in  Shanghai,  in  January  1920,  I spent 
several  days  in  endeavouring  to  ascertain  from  the 
alleged  leaders  of  the  Northern  and  Southern  delegates 
to  the  Peace  Conference  what  real  differences  prevented 
them  from  uniting  in  a patriotic  endeavour  to  rescue 
their  country  from  its  present  deplorable  condition. 
The  results  of  this  inquiry  were  purely  negative;  of  a 
nature,  in  fact,  to  confirm  one’s  conviction  that  none  of 
these  word-warriors  wanted  peace,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  they  all  stood  to  profit  individually  by  the  con- 
tinuance of  strife,  much  in  the  same  way  that  a con- 
siderable number  of  officials  have  always  waxed  fat  on 
the  devastating  floods  of  the  Yellow  River  and  the 
distribution  of  famine  relief. 

First,  I saw  the  Cantonese  leader,  Tang  Shao-yi,  whom 
in  the  old  Manchu  days  I had  known  as  Governor  of 
Fengtien,  and  later  as  Director-General  of  Railways  at 
Peking.  But,  as  I have  said,  Tang  had  but  then  just 
withdrawn,  in  dudgeon,  from  the  Conference,  because  of 
some  personal  objection  to  the  leading  Northern  delegate, 
Wang  I-Tang,  and  at  the  moment  the  Canton  province 
was  therefore  unrepresented : in  other  words,  the  Con- 
ference was,  officially  speaking,  at  a standstill.  Tang 
declined  to  discuss  the  idea  of  a Coalition  Government 
representing  both  North  and  South,  although  he  admitted 
that  the  leaders  of  the  opposing  factions  had  all  con- 
trived to  work  together,  amicably  enough,  under  the 
Manchus.  But  he  waxed  very  eloquent  in  denouncing 
Tuan  Chi-jui  and  the  Northerners,  who,  he  declared,  were 
basely  selling  the  country  to  the  Japanese.  Asked  for 
a clear  definition  of  the  political  principles  at  issue,  he 
frankly  confessed  that  it  was  no  longer  a question  of 
differences  between  North  and  South,  but  the  so-called 
Radicals  were  fighting  for  a principle  when  they  denied 
the  right  of  the  President,  under  compulsion  of  the 
Tuchuns,  to  dissolve  Parliament. 

“ If  Peking  were  to  recognise  this  principle,”  I inquired, 
" would  the  Cantonese  party  come  to  terms  ? ” 

It  is  too  late  for  that,”  he  replied,  “ but,  as  a matter 


100  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


of  fact,  there  is  no  real  fighting  at  present.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  will  be  no  real  peace  until  the  people 
in  power  at  Peking  put  an  end  to  the  Military  Agreement 
with  Japan,  and  to  all  the  other  secret  agreements  of 
the  last  five  years.  Every  one  of  the  ‘ eight  demands  ’ 
which  the  Southern  delegates  have  put  forward,  and 
which  Peking  declines  to  discuss,  arises,  directly  or 
indirectly,  from  the  fact  that  the  Government  at  Peking 
has  become  nothing  more  nor  less  than  a dependency 
of  Tokyo.  Even  the  Shantung  question  is  of  trifling 
importance  as  compared  to  this  fact.” 

There  is  no  doubt  that  at  this  time  the  South — or,  to 
describe  more  accurately  the  opponents  of  the  Peking 
Government,  the  “ Outs  ” — had  a good  rallying  cry  and 
a powerful  appeal  to  all  patriotic  sentiments  in  the 
country  when  they  demanded  “ the  abolition  of  the 
Military  Agreement  with  Japan,  and  of  the  War  Partici- 
pation Loan,  together  with  the  punishment  of  the  Chinese 
who  signed  them.”  The  significance  of  this  secret  treaty 
will  be  discussed  in  due  course,  when  we  come  to  con- 
sider the  whole  question  of  Japanese  policy  in  China. 
But,  looking  at  the  matter  from  the  Cantonese  malcon- 
tents’ point  of  view,  there  is  no  denying  the  force  of  the 
argument  on  which  they  based  their  demand  for  full 
publication  of  all  the  agreements  that  have  been  made 
from  1917  to  1920  between  the  Anfu  Club  clique  at 
Peking  and  the  Japanese  Government  or  its  agents. 
With  regard  to  the  Military  Agreement  in  particular, 
they  asserted  that,  instead  of  being,  as  it  was  announced, 
a convention  intended  to  protect  China’s  rights  and 
sovereignty  in  her  northern  dependencies,  threatened  by 
the  disorder  in  Siberia,  it  was,  in  fact,  a surrender  of 
Chinese  sovereignty  to  Japanese  agents,  in  return  for 
money,  equipment,  and  military  advisers,  all  of  which 
Tuan  and  his  friends  used  solely  to  strengthen  their  own 
position  against  their  political  opponents.  Tang  Shao-yi 
emphasised  the  fact  that,  when  the  agreement  was  made 
in  1918,  it  was  declared  to  be  for  common  action  by 


VILLAGE  ON  THE  CHIENTANG  RIVER. 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  101 


China  and  Japan  and  for  purposes  of  mutual  defence 
against  German  and  Bolshevik  attack,  and  especially  for 
the  protection  of  the  Eastern-Siberian  railway.  Further- 
more, that  it  was  to  terminate  automatically  at  the  same 
time  as  Allied  intervention  in  Siberia.  On  the  face  of 
it,  when  the  Allies  withdrew,  the  agreement  should  have 
lapsed.  The  full  details  of  the  agreement  itself  have 
never  been  disclosed,  but  Tang  Shao-yi  and  his  friends 
claimed  to  know  that  letters  were  exchanged  at  Peking 
on  the  loth  of  February  and  the  1st  of  March,  1919,  by 
virtue  of  which  the  agreement  remains  in  force  for  an 
indefinite  period.  They  declared  that  its  conditions  not 
only  conferred  upon  Japan  a rapidly-extending  control 
over  China’s  military  forces  in  the  North,  but  that  they 
virtually  reasserted  all  the  “ protectorate  ” conditions 
imposed  by  the  famous  “ fifth  group  ” of  the  twenty-one 
demands  of  May  1915.  They  pointed  to  the  number  and 
feverish  activity  of  the  Japanese  military  officers  already 
attached  to  the  Peking  and  Manchurian  divisions,  and 
professed  to  believe  that,  as  part  of  the  secret  pact, 
Japan  was  regularly  “ contributing  ” 2,000,000  yen  a 
month  towards  the  reorganisation  of  China’s  Army — in 
other  words,  towards  the  replenishment  of  its  leaders’ 
purses . 

Many  of  these  details  were  possibly  nothing  more  than 
intelligent  surmise,  and  incapable  of  proof,  but  it  remains 
unpleasantly  true  that  when  the  “ Outs  ” thus  denounce 
the  “ Ins  ” for  high  treason,  their  accusations  must 
remain  irrefutable,  so  long  as  the  party  in  power  at 
Peking  continues  to  depend  on  Japanese  loans  and 
subsidies  for  its  very  existence.  If  the  Opposition,  dis- 
carding all  side  issues,  had  ever  been  able  to  unite  in 
one  genuine  effort  of  patriotism  and  to  attack  the  ruling 
clique  at  Peking  on  this  question  alone,  they  would 
undoubtedly  have  commanded  a wide  measure  of  sym- 
pathy and  support,  not  only  in  China,  but  from  those 
Liberal  elements  in  Japan  which  have  frankly  denounced 
the  Military  Agreement  as  an  act  of  bad  faith  and  bad 


102  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


policy.  But  nothing  of  this  kind  is  to  be  expected  from 
either  of  the  present  Parliaments  or  from  any  influential 
body  of  public  opinion  in  China. 

The  proceedings  of  the  Peace  Conference  at  Shanghai 
made  it  abundantly  clear  that  the  “ Outs  " are  not  very 
much  in  earnest  about  anything,  except  getting  in,  or, 
failing  that,  getting  a share  of  whatever  loans  and  subsidies 
may  be  going. 

There  were  ten  Northern  delegates  at  Shanghai  in 
January  1920,  who  collectively  might  well  have  been 
described  as  “ Joy-riders  to  the  sea  ” ; for  at  that  time 
they  had  already  spent  five  months  very  contentedly,  on 
full  pay,  awaiting  the  pleasure  of  the  South  to  renew 
the  pleasant  game  of  logomachy  in  the  comfortable 
premises  which  were  once  the  German  club.  To  judge 
by  all  reports,  Wang  I-Tang,  their  chief  delegate,  had 
more  trouble  in  dealing  with  his  own  followers  than  with 
the  opposition;  for  each  of  these  Northern  delegates 
represented  first  an  individual  Tuchun,  or  party  chief- 
tain, and  the  North  only  as  a bad  second.  One  individual 
stood  for  the  interests  of  Chang  Tso-lin,  the  autocrat  of 
Moukden;  another  represented  Tsao  Kun,  the  Tuchun 
of  Chihli;  a third  held  his  brief  for  Little  Hsu,  warden 
of  the  Mongolian  borders,  and  so  on.  Each  and  every 
one  of  these  men  was  notoriously  ready  to  intrigue  with 
friend  or  foe,  if  by  so  doing  he  could  increase  his  own 
patron’s  power  and  prestige  at  the  expense  of  rival 
chieftains.  If  the  Peace  Conference  has  achieved  nothing 
else,  it  has  proved  conclusively  that  there  is  neither  solid 
North  nor  solid  South,  nothing,  in  fact,  but  a number  of 
kaleidoscopic  factions,  each  fighting  for  its  own  sordid 
ends. 

I saw  Wang  I-Tang  in  a house  of  many  mansions, 
surrounded  by  beautiful  gardens,  on  the  Bubbling  Well 
road  at  Shanghai.  Under  the  Manchus,  Wang  would 
probably  have  been  a typical  Taotai  of  the  old  classical 
model,  full  of  pomp  and  ceremony  and  polite  platitudes. 
As  a modern  Republican  mandarin,  he  gave  me  the 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  103 


impression  of  an  Oriental  Count  Fosco  with  bluntly 
democratic  manners  and  the  surface  geniality  of  a faux 
bonhomme ; but  he  had  the  coldly  vigilant  eye  of  a 
tortoise,  beady  and  unblinking.  The  man  whom  the 
Anfu  Club  had  selected  to  represent  them  could  be  no 
novice  at  the  political  game ; but  Wang’s  affable  manner 
was  intended  to  suggest  the  philosophical  detachment  of 
an  orthodox  mandarin.  When,  after  discussing  the  situa- 
tion and  its  perils,  I inquired  whether  nothing  could  be 
done  to  secure  unity  of  councils  for  the  good  of  the 
State,  he  thought  that  it  might  be  quite  possible,  in 
time.  But  for  the  moment,  inasmuch  as  Kuangtung 
was  unrepresented,  he  feared  that  the  Conference  could 
make  no  progress;  at  any  rate  he  was  not  prepared  to 
discuss  the  South’s  “ eight  demands.”  He  thought  that 
in  two  or  three  months  Tang  Shao-yi  might  perhaps  be 
persuaded  to  “come  out”  again  with  new  proposals; 
meanwhile  we  must  have  patience.  To  arrange  every- 
thing satisfactorily  would  take  a long  time,  probably 
five  or  ten  years.  He  cordially  agreed  that  Peking 
could  not  possibly  carry  on  much  longer  without  obtain- 
ing its  regular  revenues  from  the  provinces,  but  no  doubt 
the  foreign  Powers  would  continue  to  advance  the  neces- 
sary funds  for  some  time  to  come.  He  declared  that 
the  payment  of  troops  was  becoming  a matter  of  urgent 
and  serious  difficulty.  Disbandment  ? That  would  mean 
bonuses  and  payment  of  arrears  and  the  provision  of 
employment  for  about  1,500,000  men,  and  even  if  the 
money  were  obtainable  by  loan,  it  would  be  very  difficult 
to  bring  all  the  Tuchuns  to  one  mind  on  the  subject. 
When  I suggested  that  a strong  expression  of  public 
opinion,  proclaimed  through  the  delegates,  might  induce 
the  Tuchuns  to  devote  some  of  their  own  large  savings 
to  paying  off  their  troops,  he  smiled  what  the  Chinese 
call  a “ cold  smile  ” and  quickly  changed  the  conversa- 
tion. Was  it  true,  he  asked,  that  since  the  war  America 
had  become  so  rich,  and  England  so  poor,  that  the 
world’s  loan  market  will  be  in  New  York  for  the  future  ? 


104  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


I began  to  understand  why  the  Southern  delegates  object 
to  Wang  I-Tang  on  personal  grounds. 

A fortnight  later,  at  Moukden,  in  Manchuria,  I saw  the 
great  super-Tuchun,  Chang  Tso-lin,  whose  administrative 
ability,  bold  initiative,  and  shrewd  business  instincts  had 
already  spread  the  fame  of  his  name  all  over  China. 
Even  before  his  emergence  in  the  crisis  of  last  summer, 
Chang  held  the  three  Manchurian  provinces  in  the 
hollow  of  his  hand;  every  Chinese  official  therein  was 
his  most  obedient  servant  and  rejoiced  to  do  his  bidding. 
Down  south  they  will  tell  you  that  in  bygone  days  Chang 
was  a “ hung  hu  tzu,”  that  is  to  say,  a bandit,  and 
from  the  tales  men  tell  of  his  Draconian  methods  and 
feverish  activities,  you  imagine  to  yourself,  before  you 
meet  him,  a swashbuckler  in  a cocked  hat  surrounded 
by  fierce  retainers.  As  a matter  of  fact,  like  all  the 
other  Tuchuns,  Chang  does  wear  a cocked  hat  on 
occasions,  to  comply  with  the  Republic’s  curious  new 
ideas  of  dress  and  deportment ; but  when  he  receives 
the  passing  guest  without  ceremony,  in  his  sumptuously 
furnished  apartment  of  the  Moukden  yamen,  the  impres- 
sion he  gives  you  is  that  of  a scholar,  even  a dilettante, 
with  his  slender  figure,  in  its  sober-coloured  silk  riding- 
jacket,  and  his  careful  speech,  which  is  that  of  the  literary 
elegant.  Like  most  of  the  present-day  governors  of 
China,  Chang  is  a young  man  for  such  a post,  being 
now  in  his  forty-eighth  year;  but  as  you  talk  with  him, 
you  get  an  inkling  of  the  qualities  that  account  for 
his  extraordinarily  rapid  rise  to  power,  the  energy  and 
courage  of  the  man,  the  amazing  swiftness  and  clearness 
of  his  brain.  You  realise  that  the  qualities  that  bring 
a leader  to  the  front  in  China,  the  things  which  appeal 
to  the  instinctive  respect  of  the  masses,  are  the  same 
yesterday,  to-day,  and  to-morrow,  and  that  the  chief 
secret  of  Chang’s  power  is  that  (like  the  Empress  Dowager, 
or  Li  Hung-chang)  his  methods  conform  instinctively  to 
the  workings  of  the  Chinese  race-mind.  No  one  can  call 
him  over-scrupulous,  but  he  knows  to  a nicety  how  far 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  105 


to  go  without  undue  risk  in  any  direction;  and  in  the 
matter  of  official  trading,  his  countrymen — no  bad  judges 
— regard  him  as  a positive  genius. 

As  we  talked  of  Japanese  encroachments  on  China’s 
sovereign  rights,  of  the  growing  of  opium,  of  the  dis- 
bandment of  troops,  and  other  delicate  topics,  I under- 
stood why  it  is  that  the  name  of  Chang  Tso-lin  inspired 
respect  even  unto  the  Peace  Conference  at  Shanghai,  and 
why  his  armed  forces  are  on  a different  footing  to  those 
of  most  provincial  satraps.  At  the  end  of  January  he 
had  replied  to  the  Presidential  Mandate,  which  broached 
the  question  of  a general  disbandment,  that  no  reduction 
of  his  troops  was  possible;  on  the  contrary,  that  his 
forces  would  have  to  be  increased,  for  the  protection  of 
the  Chinese  eastern  railway  and  the  Mongolian  frontier. 
Many  Chinese  predict  that  when  the  bulk  of  the  Southern 
Tuchuns’  forces  are  disbanded — as  they  must  be,  sooner 
or  later — Chang  will  be  in  a position  to  dictate  his  own 
terms  to  Peking,  and  that  his  will  be  the  deciding  hand 
in  settling  most  of  the  political  questions  of  the  immediate 
future. 

In  the  meanwhile,  how’ever,  even  a brief  study  of  his 
masterful  methods  in  Manchuria  is  sufficient  to  throw 
a good  deal  of  light  on  the  way  the  Tuchuns  have 
amassed  their  fortunes.  Chang  combines  the  financial 
acumen  of  a Morgan  with  the  business  instincts  of  a 
Selfridge,  and  he  leaves  nothing  to  chance.  He  owns 
his  own  bank,  his  own  farms,  and  with  a finger  in  every 
commercial  pie,  makes  his  undisputed  authority  felt,  like 
a live  wire,  throughout  the  three  provinces.  As  banker 
and  Tuchun  combined,  his  method  of  dealing  with  the 
problems  of  local  finance  appears  to  be  simple  but  drastic. 
When,  in  1919,  certain  banks  at  Moukden  engaged  in  a 
combine  for  manipulating  exchange  in  a manner  more 
profitable  to  themselves  than  to  outsiders,  it  is  reported 
that  he  called  a meeting  of  all  concerned  and,  speaking 
as  Military  Governor,  genially  intimated  that  any  further 
attempt  to  corner  exchange  would  involve  the  summary 


106  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


execution  of  the  offenders.  Tuchun  bank  stock  has  been 
a good  market  ever  since.  The  bean  trade,  the  rice  trade, 
the  money  market,  the  operations  of  railway  transport 
companies,  one  and  all  recognise  and  obey  his  supple 
master-hand,  and  minister  to  the  wants  of  its  Treasury. 
His  emissaries  are  many  and  active,  not  only  in  Manchuria, 
but  at  Peking  and  even  as  far  as  the  Yangtsze  provinces; 
if  report  speaks  truly,  they  take  an  active  part  in  the 
speculative  but  very  profitable  opium  traffic.  When  I 
spoke  of  this  matter,  Chang  was  sure,  oh,  quite  sure, 
that  no  opium  was  grown  anywhere  within  the  limits 
of  his  jurisdiction;  nevertheless,  only  that  week  the 
Anti-Opium  Association  at  Peking  had  published  a state- 
ment that  the  poppy  was  being  freely  cultivated  in  the 
Moukden  district.  And  I myself  can  bear  witness  to  the 
fact  that  a brisk  trade  in  the  drug  was  being  carried  on, 
in  and  through  the  city  itself,  by  smugglers  (chiefly 
Russian  women),  who  bring  it  by  the  railway  from 
Vladivostock  and  Harbin,  and  thence  to  Shanghai  and 
beyond. 

In  Manchuria  proper  there  are  few,  if  any,  bandits 
to-day.  Chang’s  soldiers  are  regularly  paid,  and  he 
himself  organises  their  food  supply.  Law  and  order  are 
maintained  within  the  three  provinces,  and  productive 
industry  encouraged.  Here,  then,  before  our  eyes,  we 
have  an  object  lesson  which  emphasises  the  simple  fact 
that  only  a strong  hand  of  effective  authority  is  required 
to  make  China  peaceful  and  prosperous.  The  same 
obvious  truth  has  been  demonstrated  by  Yen,  Tuchun 
of  Shansi,  a wise  and  honest  ruler.  But,  as  matters 
stand,  China  as  a whole  is  hopelessly  misruled  by  the 
great  majority  of  the  twenty-two  Tuchuns  who  have 
attained  to  arbitrary  power  in  the  provinces ; the  ruling 
clique  at  Peking  are  still  in  bondage  to  foreign  pay- 
masters ; Parliament  is  utterly  discredited,  and  education 
at  a standstill.  Only  here  and  there,  in  a few  of  the 
Provincial  Assemblies  or  amongst  the  educated  local 
gentry,  does  one  find  a glimmer  of  patriotic  and  con- 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  107 


structive  energy.  The  present  self-elected  rulers  of  China 
are  utterly  incapable  of  restoring  order,  and  if  the 
country  is  to  have  ten  or  fifteen  years  of  peace,  which 
it  needs,  foreign  intervention  will  have  to  establish  it. 

The  events  of  the  past  year,  the  recent  clash  of  armed 
forces  struggling  for  the  mastery  at  Peking,  and  the 
present  position  of  political  affairs  throughout  China, 
afford  conclusive  proof — if  proof  be  still  needed — of  the 
futility  of  hoping  for  the  evolution  of  any  well-ordered 
system  of  stable  self-government  from  the  existing  chaos. 
Only  a benevolent  despotism  can  restore  peace  and 
prosperity,  and  unfortunately  there  is  at  the  moment  no 
super-mandarin  in  sight,  “ no  man  of  mark,”  as  Sir 
Robert  Hart  put  it,  “ whom  all  China  would  accept.” 
It  would  therefore  seem  that  chaos  must  continue,  with 
all  its  burden  of  unnecessary  suffering  for  the  wretched 
people,  until,  by  process  of  exhaustion,  the  elements  of 
strife  shall  disappear.  Meanwhile,  let  us  examine  briefly 
the  actual  condition  of  affairs  and  ask  ourselves  dis- 
passionately in  what  respect,  and  to  what  extent,  has 
the  welfare  of  the  Chinese  people  been  advanced  by  the 
revolution  of  1911  and  its  consequences? 

Last  July,  when  various  political  groups  united  in  wrath 
against  the  Anfu  Club,  and  when,  by  force  of  arms,  Tuan 
Chi-jui,  Little  Hsu,  and  other  leaders  of  the  so-called 
“ Militarist  ” faction  had  been  driven  from  power,  it 
was  hoped  that  the  victorious  General,  Wu  Pei-fu,  with 
Chang  Tso-lin  to  support  him,  would  be  able  to  carry 
through  his  plan  of  convening  a Citizens’  Convention, 
and  thus  put  an  end  to  the  strife  of  rival  Parliaments. 
Hopes  were  forcibly  expressed  by  Young  China’s  organs 
at  Shanghai  and  in  the  South  that  the  downfall  of  Tuan’s 
party  meant  the  end  of  Japanese  ascendancy  and  a 
prospect  of  popular  government  in  a united  country. 
But  what  are  the  actual  results  of  the  struggle?  No 
sooner  had  the  Chihli  party,  headed  by  the  President 
and  the  Tuchuns  Chang  Tso-lin  and  Tsao  Kun,  defeated 
their  opponents,  than  new  symptoms  of  strife  became 


108  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


manifest  in  the  camp  of  the  victors.  Some  of  them 
(notably  the  President)  began  to  display  unmistakable 
signs  of  sympathy  for  the  defeated  Anfu  leaders  who 
had  sought  refuge  and  protection  as  guests  of  the  Japanese 
Minister.  Tuan  Chi-jui,  allowed  to  retire,  with  the  honours 
and  profits  of  war,  is  living  as  a prosperous  citizen  in 
close  proximity  to  the  Presidential  mansion.  Little 
Hsu,  for  whose  arrest  a large  reward  was  originally 
offered,  has  been  allowed  to  escape  from  the  Japanese 
Legation  and  is  believed  to  have  returned  to  his  former 
stamping-grounds  in  Mongoha.  The  “ two  traitors,” 
Tsao  Ju-lin  and  Lu  Tsung-ju,  removed  from  office  in 
disgrace  as  the  result  of  the  students’  violent  agitation 
two  years  ago  because  of  their  financial  dealings  with 
Japan,  are  now  the  President’s  honoured  guests  and 
confidential  advisers.  General  Wu  Pei-fu  has  been  rele- 
gated to  the  background  by  common  consent  of  the 
scheming  politicians,  and  with  him  the  National  Con- 
vention idea  has  been  quietly  shelved.  It  is  the  declared 
intention  of  the  Government,  or  rather  of  the  chieftains 
who  for  the  moment  control  the  situation,  to  convoke 
a new  Parliament  so  soon  as  an  agreement  concerning 
the  spoils  of  war  can  be  concluded  with  Lu  Yung-ting, 
who  commands  what  is  left  of  public  opinion  and  military 
forces  in  Kuangtung.  It  is  evidently  to  the  interest  of 
all  the  warring  factions  at  Peking  to  come  to  terms  with 
Canton,  and,  as  before,  to  present  the  appearance  of 
agreeing  to  differ  in  peace,  because  all  are  equally  anxious 
to  borrow  money  from  the  Consortium,  and  it  would 
seem  natural  to  expect  that  all  loans  from  that  quarter 
must  cease  so  long  as  the  nation  is  at  war  with  itself. 
But  even  if  such  an  agreement  were  concluded,  it  might 
produce  a loan,  but  it  could  not  bring  either  peace  or 
a Parliament  to  Peking.  Leaving  the  South  out  of  the 
question,  the  leaders  of  the  Chihli  faction  are  evidently 
incapable  of  sinking  their  individual  ambitions  and 
greed  in  any  common  purpose  of  patriotism.  Hardly 
had  they  made  an  end  of  congratulations  and  rejoicings 


WAYSIDE  SHRINE  (AT  SIAU-CHI,  ON  THE  HWEI  RIVER,  CHEKIANG). 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  109 


over  the  defeat  of  the  Anfu  faction,  than  Chang  Tso-lin 
and  Tsao  Kun  began  insisting  on  their  respective  claims 
to  any  money  that  might  be  forthcoming,  for  payment 
of  the  expenses  of  their  week’s  campaign  (the  com- 
bined total  of  these  claims,  as  stated  by  the  native 
Press,  amounting  to  some  $40,000,000).  At  the  same 
time,  they  began  to  compete  with  each  other  to  secure 
the  disbanded  troops  of  the  two  Frontier  Defence  Corps, 
while  the  President,  on  his  side,  proceeded  to  strengthen 
his  own  hand  by  recruiting  two  new  brigades  of  troops 
through  his  representative,  Wang  Huai-ching.  So,  while 
the  shadow  of  famine  spread  darkly  over  the  Northern 
provinces,  these  leaders  of  the  people  continued  to 
squander  the  public  substance  and  to  sow  new  seeds  of 
civil  strife.  The  net  result  of  the  latest  political  upheaval 
has  been  to  diminish  the  power  of  some  of  the  smaller 
Tuchuns,  and  to  increase  that  of  the  great  political 
chieftains,  so  that  at  the  beginning  of  October  there  were 
five  clearly-marked  spheres  of  influence  in  China,  each 
ruled  by  its  own  satrap,  and  each  more  or  less  hostile 
to  all  the  others.  Both  the  President  and  Chang  Tso-lin 
are  now  openly  denounced  as  being  more  completely 
subject  to  Japanese  influence  than  the  Anfu  Club  itself, 
and  the  youthful  patriots  of  the  Treaty  Ports  are  begin- 
ning to  declare  that  the  new  era  cannot  dawn  until 
President  Hsu  has  disappeared  from  public  life.  And 
so,  da  capo.  The  fact  that  no  body  of  politicians  at 
Peking  carries  any  weight  whatsoever  outside  the  metro- 
polis, is  gradually  producing  a vague  movement  in  favour 
of  provincial  autonomy  and  the  creation  of  a Central 
Government  entrusted  only  with  international  and  inter- 
provincial relations ; but  its  advocates  can  offer  no  con- 
vincing arguments  to  justify  the  hope  that  such  a solution 
would  put  an  end  to  inter-provincial  strife.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  restoration  of  General  Chang  Hsiin  and 
other  avowed  monarchists  to  place  and  power,  under  the 
immediate  patronage  of  the  President  and  Chang  Tso-lin, 
leads  many  observers  to  the  belief  that  a restoration  of 


110  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


the  Throne  is  not  only  probable,  but  that,  because  it 
would  create  a rallying-point  for  disinterested  loyalty, 
it  offers  the  best,  if  not  the  only,  hope  of  restoring  some- 
thing like  normal  conditions  and  tranquillity  throughout 
the  land. 

The  matrimonial  alliance  concluded  in  September 
between  the  families  of  Chang  Tso-lin  and  Tsao  Kun, 
and  the  rapprochement  of  these  two  powerful  Tuchuns 
with  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  his  followers,  point  to  a new 
combination  and  consolidation  of  power  in  the  hands  of 
these  mandarins,  who  will  undoubtedly  exercise  that 
power  in  accordance  with  the  traditions  of  their  class. 
In  their  hands.  Cabinets,  Presidents,  Parliaments,  the 
Republic  itself,  become  empty  names,  toys  for  the 
delectation  of  innocents  abroad.  And  it  may  safely  be 
predicted  that  under  their  administration  the  ascendancy 
of  Japanese  influence  at  Peking  will  be  increased,  rather 
than  diminished,  and  that  the  patriots  and  malcontents 
of  Young  China  will  therefore  be  in  a position  to  denounce 
the  Northern  militarists  more  vehemently  than  ever,  and 
new  combinations  of  military  forces  will  be  formed  in 
the  Central  and  Southern  provinces  to  “ punish  the 
traitors.” 

Amidst  all  the  tangled  web  of  frauds  and  futility 
produced  by  the  word-spinners  who  live  on  and  around 
the  warring  Tuchuns,  one  instructive  and  somewhat 
pathetic  figure  emerges,  that  of  the  Kiangsu  Tuchun, 
Li  Shun,  who  committed  suicide  on  October  12,  leaving 
a quarter  of  his  fortune  (estimated  at  $10,000,000)  to 
famine  relief  and  another  quarter  to  educational  work. 
Li  Shun  and  his  career  recall  to  mind,  in  some  ways, 
the  orthodox  type  of  Confucianist  scholar-mandarin; 
and  his  death,  offered  up  in  a valedictory  message  as 
a plea  for  national  unity,  struck  the  kind  of  note  which 
always  makes  a powerful  appeal  to  the  mind  of  the 
masses.  But  the  pathos  of  his  death  lies  in  the  utter 
futility  of  a self-sacrifice  that  had  no  vital  principle 
behind  it.  General  Li  Shun,  as  a Tuchun,  was  no 


CIVIL  WAR  AS  A PROFESSION  111 


better  and  no  worse  than  most  of  his  contemporaries. 
As  leader  of  the  League  of  Tuchuns  which  set  out  to 
destroy  the  power  of  Tuan  Chi-jui,  and  subsequently  as 
chief  Northern  delegate  at  the  Peace  Conference,  he 
displayed  in  his  public  utterances  a genuine  desire  to 
put  an  end  to  the  strife  of  the  warring  parties.  In  a 
manifesto  which  he  issued  last  June,  he  called  on  all 
good  citizens  to  unite  against  the  Anfu  Club;  at  the 
same  time,  he  begged  the  latter  to  abandon  its  evil  ways, 
to  cease  from  selling  the  country  to  foreign  capitalists, 
and  unite  for  the  preservation  of  China.  He  was  a 
professed  progressive,  a friend  of  the  student  movement, 
and  an  advocate  of  the  National  Convention;  neverthe- 
less, when  the  Anfu  party  had  been  overthrown  and  all 
the  Liberal  elements  in  the  country  were  calling  for  an 
immediate  disbandment  of  troops,  he  behaved  just  like 
any  other  Tuchun,  that  is  to  say,  he  cordially  supported 
the  movement,  while  increasing  his  own  forces  by  five 
brigades.  In  other  words,  like  most  of  his  colleagues, 
he  was  a theoretical  reformer  and  a practical  reactionary. 
His  suicide  was  generally  attributed  to  the  combined 
effects  of  illness  and  of  chagrin  at  having  been  deprived 
of  a certain  amount  of  “face”  by  Chang  Tso-lin;  but 
his  valedictory  words,  in  the  classical  manner,  imputed 
no  blame,  either  to  friend  or  foe.  “ In  vain,”  he  declared, 
“ have  I worked  for  the  unification  of  my  beloved  country ; 
“ I can  see  no  sign  of  any  agreement.  It  is  my  dying 
“ wish  that  all  my  fellow-citizens,  men  and  women  alike, 
“ should  cease  from  striving  after  wealth  and  rank,  and 
“ do  everything  in  their  power  to  save  China  from  destruc- 
" tion.  If  each  were  willing  to  sacrifice  something  for  his 
“ country,  then  might  I smile  in  Hades.”  For  which 
parting  words,  according  to  Chinese  ideas,  much  will  be 
forgiven  Li  Shun.  He  had  found  in  civil  war  a profes- 
sion which  brought  him  no  small  share  of  wealth  and 
power.  Originally  a captain  in  the  service  of  the  Viceroy 
Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  he  had  thrown  in  his  lot  with  the 
revolutionaries  in  1911,  and  on  that  flood  of  ciT" 


112  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


war  been  borne  on  to  fortune.  But  in  the  end  he 
made  restitution,  and  for  the  rest,  it  could  never  be  said 
of  him  that  he  had  traffic  with  the  alien  money- 
lender, or  sold  any  of  his  country's  birthright  to  the 
foreigner. 


CHAPTER  VI 


CHINA  : THE  PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION 

Any  suggestions  for  the  reorganisation  of  China’s 
finances  and  the  reconstruction  of  the  Central  Govern- 
ment upon  a new  basis  of  effective  authority  must 
proceed  on  the  assumption  that  the  commercial  Powers 
chiefly  concerned  in  the  solution  of  the  problem — America, 
England,  and  Japan — are  sincerely  desirous  of  solving 
it  and  are  prepared  to  co-operate  to  that  end.  In 
particular,  it  must  be  assumed  that,  given  a clear  indication 
of  policy,  the  growing  strength  of  genuine  Liberalism  in 
Japan  will  be  able  to  bring  sufficient  weight  of  public 
opinion  to  bear  upon  the  Jingo  element  of  the  Military 
Party  to  induce  it  to  desist  from  further  encroachments 
upon  China’s  territory  and  sovereign  rights.  It  may  be 
objected  that  these  assumptions  admit  of  wide  discussion. 
No  doubt  they  do;  nevertheless,  they  are  not  more 
Utopian  than  those  upon  which  the  civilised  world 
proposes  to  reconstruct  Central  Europe,  and  they  are 
much  less  involved.  The  question  of  Japanese  policy 
in  China  will  be  discussed  in  a later  chapter;  for  the 
moment,  I would  merely  observe  that  neither  the  utter- 
ances of  public  men  in  Japan  nor  the  general  tendency 
of  public  opinion  in  that  country  precludes  the  hope  of 
a practical  agreement,  by  means  of  which  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  China  may  be  undertaken  in  a liberal  spirit  of 
co-operation,  and  the  attitude  recently  displayed  by  the 
Japanese  Government  towards  the  Consortium  justifies 
this  hope.  Speaking  from  personal  observation,  I am 
convinced  that  the  intellectual  and  progressive  movement 
in  Japan — especially  conspicuous  in  the  younger  genera- 
i 113 


114  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


tion — is  genuinely  in  favour  of  a policy  towards  China 
which  shall  cultivate  her  friendship  and  preserve  her 
independence  and  self-respect,  whilst  assisting  in  the 
development  of  her  latent  resources.  But  if  the  forces 
of  conservatism  and  military  Imperialism  should  still 
prove  to  be  too  strong;  if  Japan,  when  faced  with  the 
necessity  of  coming  to  a definite  decision,  should  decline 
to  co-operate  in  an  international  scheme  for  the  reorganisa- 
tion of  China,  there  can  be  no  immediate  prospect  of  any 
peaceful  solution  of  the  problem.  In  that  case,  matters 
must  continue  to  drift,  and  the  helpless  Chinese  people 
to  suffer  all  the  penalties  of  chaotic  misrule  until  the 
country’s  disorders  precipitate  a new  crisis  and  make  it 
once  again  a cockpit  and  centre  of  international  strife. 

The  Western  world  has  had  enough  on  its  hands  for 
the  past  six  years  without  troubling  itself  about  China, 
so  that,  generally  speaking,  it  knows  little  or  nothing 
about  the  course  of  events  in  the  Far  East  during  this 
period.  It  is  generally  understood  that  Japan  has  taken 
advantage  of  the  opportunities  which  the  war  gave  her 
to  develop  her  economic  and  political  position  in  China 
by  measures  which  have  been  severely  criticised;  that 
the  Peking  Government  is  hopelessly  insolvent ; and 
that  Young  China’s  political  activities — as  indicated  by 
the  student  movement  and  the  anti-Japanese  boycott — 
have  become  a conspicuous  feature  of  the  situation. 
But,  because  the  masses  of  the  Chinese  people  are  un- 
represented by  platform  or  Press,  and  themselves  wholly 
inarticulate,  the  central  fact  of  the  situation  is  commonly 
ignored.  That  fact  is,  that  the  present  condition  of  the 
country,  its  internecine  strife,  fiscal  disorganisation,  and 
administrative  chaos,  with  all  the  burden  of  suffering 
which  these  conditions  inflict  upon  the  peasantry  and 
traders,  are  no  new  thing.  Chaos  and  confusion  arose 
with  the  disappearance  of  the  authority  of  the  Manchu 
dynasty,  and  have  continued  ever  since,  gradually  under- 
mining the  ancient  fabric  of  established  law  and  order, 
to  the  point  that  every  province  is  now  a law  unto  itself. 


PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  115 


This  fact  must  be  emphasised,  if  only  to  remind  those 
who  may  have  forgotten  it,  that  the  problem  with  which 
the  world  has  to  deal  in  China,  is  not  due  to  any  recent 
or  transient  causes,  nor  can  it  be  ever  solved  by  temporary 
or  partial  measures.  There  is  a tendency  very  prevalent 
amongst  the  supporters  of  Young  China’s  political 
aspirations,  and  advocates  of  “ self-determination,”  to 
ignore  this  all-important  fact.  It  is  a tendency  which 
has  already  done  a great  deal  of  harm,  and  is  likely  to  do 
much  more. 

Long  ago,  Prince  Ito,  wisest  of  Oriental  statesmen, 
uttered  words  of  warning,  addressed  to  those  who 
believed  in  the  capacity  of  Young  China  to  organise 
and  lead  a truly  national  movement  : 

“ Within  the  last  few  years,”  he  said,  “ there  has  been, 
no  doubt,  a considerable  and  very  rapid  change,  but  even 
that  change  is  not  so  much  a spontaneous  growth  from 
within,  as  the  result  of  the  importation  of  Western  ideas 
from  without  by  Young  Chinese  who  have  been  educated 
abroad  and  who  have  returned  to  their  own  country  not 
only  imbued  with  Western  conceptions,  but  so  greatly 
estranged  from  all  the  old  Chinese  conceptions  that  they 
almost  as  much  lost  contact  with  the  Chinese  point  of 
view  as  if  they  themselves  were  foreigners  by  birth. 
Hence  the  crudity  and  violence  of  the  doctrines  which 
they  teach.  . . . The  young  students  form  a very  vocal 
and  not  unimportant  body  of  agitators,  many  of  whom 
are  animated  by  excellent  intentions,  but  they  have 
hardly  any  roots  in  the  country,  and  they  can  hardly  be 
said  to  form  a class  capable  of  directing  any  practical 
course  of  action.” 

Prince  Ito’s  words  were  written  eleven  years  ago,  that 
is  to  say,  two  years  before  the  Chinese  revolution.  Since 
then  Young  China’s  “ crudity  and  violence  ” have  rather 
increased  than  diminished,  but  of  any  practical  course 
of  action  it  has  given  no  sign.  A number  of  the  agitators 
to  whom  Prince  Ito  then  referred  have  since  attained 
to  high  official  posts  under  the  Republic.  Some  have 


116  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


become  Members  of  Parliament,  others  members  of  the 
Government,  and  some  have  even  become  Tuchuns 
(provincial  Military  Governors).  They  have  had  their 
full  share  of  opportunity  in  the  Metropolitan  Ministries, 
in  the  provincial  yamens,  and  in  the  missions  and  com- 
missions of  the  diplomatic  and  Consular  services;  but 
in  none  of  these,  as  a class,  have  they  made  good.  In 
their  lack  of  integrity,  disinterested  patriotism,  and 
constructive  efficiency,  they  have  remained,  almost 
without  exception,  typical  mandarins,  whilst  they  have 
frequently  lacked  the  sense  of  dignity  which,  with  all  its 
faults,  the  mandarinate  displayed  under  the  old  regime. 
But  Young  China  still  continues  to  proclaim  all  the  old 
illusory  visions  of  a Promised  Land  of  peace  and  plenty, 
to  be  attained  by  the  magic  of  a paper  Constitution,  all 
the  old  familiar  programme  of  a New  Era,  to  be  achieved 
by  replacing  the  “ Ins  ” by  the  “ Outs.”  Indeed,  in  the 
matter  of  professions  and  aspirations,  the  polished 
periods  of  Mr.  C.  T.  Wang  and  Mr.  Wellington  Koo  bear 
so  striking  a family  likeness  to  the  rhetoric  of  Mr.  Sun 
Yat-sen,  that  one  cannot  help  wondering  whether  the 
student  of  to-day  has  ever  read  the  high-sounding 
manifestoes  of  the  founder  of  the  Republic. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  hopes  and  dreams  of 
ten  years  ago,  the  Chinese  themselves,  the  merchants, 
gentry,  and  solid  elements  in  the  country,  have  certainly 
ceased  to  believe  in  the  vision  of  the  Promised  Land. 
On  the  contrary,  they  are  frankly  weary  of  the  fruitless 
clamour  of  the  politicians  and  the  shameless  rapacity 
of  the  new  bureaucracy.  They  are  all  convinced  that 
what  China  needs  above  all  else,  is  ten  years  of  uninter- 
rupted peace,  of  law  and  order.  Given  such  a breathing 
space,  together  with  the  development  of  the  country’s 
natural  resources,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  her  from 
becoming  one  of  the  most  productive  and  prosperous 
nations  on  earth.  But  this  peace  she  cannot  possibly 
achieve  under  her  present  rulers,  unless  forcibly  assisted 
from  without ; of  that  there  is  no  longer  any  doubt. 


Ft.  T.  Prideaux ] 

“ SHE  DWELT  AMONG  THE  UNTRODDEN  WAYS." 


PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  117 


If  therefore  the  Powers  desire  to  see  China’s  ancient 
civilisation  preserved,  if  they  desire  to  develop  a great 
centre  of  trade  and  to  remove  a grave  source  of  danger 
in  the  Far  East,  that  assistance  must  be  forthcoming, 
and  without  delay. 

As  to  the  manner  in  which  this  assistance  should  be 
rendered  and  the  objects  towards  which  it  should  be 
directed,  differences  of  opinion  will  necessarily  arise, 
and  the  conflicting  interests  of  the  Powers  concerned 
will,  no  doubt,  find  their  reflection  in  the  working  out 
of  any  practical  scheme  for  co-operative  action.  But 
disinterested  opinion,  including  that  of  the  most  in- 
fluential Chinese,  is  united  at  the  outset  in  one  con- 
clusion, namely,  that  the  first  step  which  the  Powers 
must  take  is  to  insist  upon  the  disbandment  of  the 
provincial  Tuchuns’  so-called  armies.  If  China  is  to 
escape  disruption,  this  step  has  become  imperatively 
necessary.  Many  leading  Chinese  officials  would  be 
prepared  to  advocate  it  openly,  though  now  they  dare 
not,  if  they  were  once  convinced  that  the  friendly  Powers 
would  see  the  thing  through.  They  are  quite  clear  in 
their  minds  that  if  China  is  to  survive,  not  only  her 
Government,  but  her  Army  must  be  centralised.  And 
the  Army,  when  centralised,  should  not  exceed  250,000 
men,  enough  to  provide,  say,  a brigade  for  each  province, 
with  a mobile  force  of  four  or  five  picked  divisions  at 
Peking  to  be  available  for  the  suppression  of  disorder  at 
any  given  point. 

The  present  four-Power  financial  Consortium,  initiated 
by  the  United  States,  has  made  disbandment  under 
foreign  supervision  one  of  the  conditions  of  new  loans. 
The  Chinese  Government  professes  to  desire  this  dis- 
bandment, but  it  will  not  consent  to  the  necessary 
effective  supervision,  except  under  firm  pressure.  It 
will  try  its  best  to  “ save  its  face  ” and  preserve  its  own 
opportunities  of  “ squeeze  ” as  well  as  those  of  the 
Tuchuns;  a firm  front  and  a clear-cut  policy  on  the 
part  of  the  Consortium  Powers  in  this  matter  are  there- 


118  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


fore  absolutely  necessary.  There  must  be  no  more 
independent  loans  by  Japan  or  by  any  other  Power,  no 
further  acquiescence  in  the  plea  of  the  mandarins  in 
power  at  Peking  that  failure  to  supply  them  with  funds 
will  involve  a rising  of  their  mutinous  troops,  with  the 
usual  looting  and  bloodshed.  That  argument  has  served 
to  fill  the  pockets  of  the  Tuchuns  with  unearned  in- 
crement for  the  past  four  years.  A revolution  would  be 
cheaper  and  healthier  than  to  yield  to  it  again. 

But  there  is  no  danger  of  a real  revolution,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  the  masses,  and  most  of  the  classes, 
are  all  in  sympathy  with  the  disbandment  scheme. 
They  are  tired  of  being  harried  and  plundered.  Certain 
of  the  Tuchuns  would  probably  defy  the  Government — 
especially  those  of  the  distant  provinces  of  the  South  and 
West — just  as  the  Southern  supporters  of  the  Ming 
dynasty  defied  the  Manchus  for  some  years  before  they 
were  led  back  into  the  family  fold.  But  once  they  were 
convinced  that  there  was  no  more  foreign  money  to  be 
made  out  of  the  pretence  of  civil  war,  and  that  public 
opinion  was  all  against  them,  there  would  be  but  little 
heart  left  in  the  business  of  rebellion.  Let  the  work  of 
disbandment  begin  with  the  nearer  Northern  and  Central 
provinces,  where,  as  I have  said,  several  Tuchuns  are 
quite  ready  to  retire  on  large  fortunes  into  private 
life.  Let  the  disbandment  in  each  case  be  thorough 
and  irrevocable.  Let  each  soldier’s  pay  and  arrears  be 
issued  to  him,  with  transportation  to  his  home  if  necessary, 
under  the  direct  supervision  of  a competent  representative 
of  the  Consortium,  and  only  after  he  has  handed  over 
his  rifle,  ammunition,  and  equipment.  Let  it  be  under- 
stood that  henceforth  the  executive  and  administrative 
authority  in  each  province  will  be  vested  in  the  Civil 
Governor  and  maintained  by  his  police  force;  also  that 
any  military  force  stationed  in  the  province  will  be  paid 
and  controlled  by  the  Central  Government.  Let  half 
a dozen  provinces  be  dealt  with  in  this  way  and  their 
fiscal  relations  with  the  capital  restored,  so  that  the 


PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  119 


nucleus  of  a national  revenue  is  assured,  and  the  rest 
should  be  only  a matter  of  time  and  determination.  If 
Chihli,  Shantung,  Shansi,  Anhui,  Kiangsu,  and  Chekiang 
can  be  gently  but  firmly  induced  to  support  an  authorita- 
tive Government  at  Peking,  instead  of  their  present 
predatory  barons  and  bandits,  and  if  Peking,  receiving 
regular  remittances  from  these  rich  provinces,  is  thus 
enabled  to  command  the  loyal  services  of  a reliable 
fighting  force,  the  combative  ardour  of  the  Southern 
chiefs  would  fade  like  the  smile  of  the  Cheshire  cat.  For 
their  armies  have  lived  for  booty,  not  for  battles,  and 
the  last  thing  that  they  desire  is  real  fighting.  They 
know  that  no  Parliament  is  worth  it. 

Here  let  me  digress  to  observe  that,  as  a matter  of 
internal  politics,  the  composition  and  command  of  the 
Central  Government’s  standing  Army  present  certain 
obvious  difficulties.  Not  only  will  the  fierce  jealousy  of 
rival  chieftains  be  aroused  (as  it  was  last  summer  in  the 
case  of  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  Little  Hsu)  if  any  party  waxes 
strong  enough  to  deny  the  others  a share  of  the  spoil, 
but  there  must  always  be  a risk,  as  matters  stand,  that 
any  powerful  Commander-in-Chief  may  be  tempted  to 
attempt  a coup  d’etat  on  his  own  account,  like  that  of 
General  Chang  Hsun  in  1917.  But  this  is  a risk  which 
must  be  taken — one  cannot  make  omelettes  without 
breaking  eggs — and  the  prospect  of  a Dictatorship,  such 
as  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  exercised  for  three  years,  is  greatly 
preferable  to  the  prospect  of  interminable  strife.  Above 
all  else  to-day,  China  needs  a wise,  strong  leader  who 
shall  give  the  people  peace.  But  of  his  coming,  there  is, 
alas,  as  yet  no  sign. 

In  connection  with  the  scheme  for  the  disbandment 
of  the  troops,  it  has  been  suggested  by  the  Chinese  that, 
in  order  to  prevent  the  disbanded  men  from  becoming 
bandits  and  freebooters,  the  foreign  Powers  should 
undertake  to  provide  funds  for  their  employment  on 
road-making,  or  other  public  works,  for  a term  of  years. 
This,  be  it  observed,  is  merely  an  old  mandarin  dodge  in 


120  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


a new  dress — an  attempt  to  obtain  a little  more  ready 
money  by  appealing  to  the  credulity  or  the  benevolence 
of  the  foreigner.  Assuming  that  the  number  of  bona-fide 
soldiers  to  be  disbanded  in  the  first  instance  is  about 
600,000  men  (a  liberal  figure  if  the  four  “ rebel  ” provinces 
of  the  South  are  not  included),  it  is  simply  ludicrous  to 
suggest  that  they  could  not  find  their  way  back  peacefully 
into  civil  life  without  financial  assistance,  when  once  they 
have  received  the  full  amount  of  pay  and  arrears  due  to 
them.  To  say  that  they  would  become  bandits  and 
outlaws,  is  to  cast  immediate  doubts  upon  any  scheme 
of  disbandment  which  is  not  rigorously  supervised  by 
foreign  experts,  and  to  emphasise  the  fact  that  these 
must  be  experts  with  the  temperament  of  the  man  from 
Missouri.  Disbanded  and  unpaid  soldiers  who  carry 
their  rifles  into  private  life  are  likely  to  become  brigands, 
no  doubt ; but  it  would  go  very  hard  with  any  Chinese 
who  tried  to  terrorise  his  fellow-countrymen  in  his  native 
place  without  weapons  and  merely  on  the  strength  of 
his  military  reputation.  There  is  always  a submerged 
tenth  in  China,  an  element  of  disorder,  hungry  and  eager 
for  pillage  and  plunder  whenever  the  strong  arm  of 
authority  is  relaxed,  but  with  these  the  community  may 
be  trusted  to  deal  in  its  own  drastic  way,  sooner  or  later. 
With  the  armed  and  semi-organised  plunderers  of  the 
Tuchuns’  armies,  the  case  is  different.  Against  them 
the  common  people  are  defenceless. 

As  a matter  of  expediency,  it  might  be  found  advisable 
to  organise  a Public  Works  Commission,  for  the  con- 
struction of  roads,  railways,  river  conservancy,  and  other 
much-needed  improvements.  These  would  provide  em- 
ployment, not  only  for  ex-soldiers,  but  for  a much  more 
deserving  class,  the  innocent  victims  of  floods  and  famines. 
It  might  even  be  expedient  at  first  to  allow  payment  for 
such  public  works  to  be  defrayed  out  of  a foreign  loan, 
but  this  only  on  condition  that  every  dollar  of  the  money 
be  accounted  for,  with  proper  vouchers,  under  the  expert 
direction  of  responsible  foreigners.  Broadly  speaking* 


PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  121 


and  except  to  meet  special  emergencies,  borrowing,  for 
anything  except  legitimate  self-supporting  enterprises, 
should  be  sternly  discouraged.  This  obviously  means  a 
clear-cut  policy  and  concerted  action  between  the  Govern- 
ments concerned,  not  only  towards  the  insatiable  borrower, 
but  towards  the  highly  respectable  lenders,  the  banks 
and  financial  syndicates,  whose  lucrative  business  of 
bond-selling  has  contributed  in  no  small  degree  to  hasten 
China’s  progress  towards  insolvency. 

To  preserve  China’s  self-respect  and  the  smooth  working 
of  the  necessary  measures  of  reform,  it  would,  of  course, 
be  best  that  the  initiative  should  come  from  the  Chinese 
themselves,  in  the  form  of  a request  for  the  expert  assist- 
ance required.  In  any  case  China’s  sovereignty  and 
dignity  must  be  preserved,  by  maintenance  of  all  the 
outward  and  visible  signs  of  her  independent  authority. 
But  with  Young  China  loudly  clamouring  at  their  doors, 
the  older  and  wiser  heads,  be  they  mandarins  or  merchants, 
will  never  dare  openly  to  advocate  foreign  financial 
control,  even  in  the  matter  of  disbandment,  though 
behind  closed  doors  nearly  all  of  them  are  ready  to 
confess  that  there  is  no  other  way  of  salvation.  Whilst 
at  Peking  in  February  last  I heard  much  cautious  talk  on 
this  subject,  many  fervent  wishes  expressed,  even  in 
high  places,  that  England  and  America  might  come  for- 
ward and  help  to  put  an  end  to  the  chaos  and  corruption 
of  the  Tuchun  regime.  And  there  were  many  who 
attributed  the  country’s  present  dangers  and  discontents 
to  the  social  demoralisation  born  of  “ Western  learning  ” 
and  the  revolution — to  the  younger  generation’s  lack  of 
respect  for  the  family  system,  upon  which  the  whole 
fabric  of  society  depends  in  the  East.  These  men  (some 
of  them  bear  great  names)  are  convinced  that  only  the 
restoration  of  the  Throne  can  secure  respect  for  the 
Central  Government  in  the  provinces,  let  the  Powers  do 
what  they  may  in  the  matter  of  finance.  But  as  a class 
they  are  timid,  with  the  ingrained  timidity  of  Orientals — 
fearful  of  assassination,  fearful  of  losing  their  wealth; 


122  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  their  inveterate  distrust  of  each  other  precludes  all 
hope  of  their  displaying  any  collective  and  patriotic 
initiative.  We  saw  the  same  thing  in  1900,  when  the 
Boxers  kept  the  whole  Manchu  Court  and  its  Chinese 
dignitaries  in  terrified  silence. 

As  an  indication  of  the  mandarin  attitude  on  the 
subject  of  disbandment,  the  attitude  which  has  con- 
tinually distinguished  both  sides  at  the  make-believe 
Peace  Conference  at  Shanghai,  the  “ Plan  for  the  Military 
and  Civil  Reorganisation  of  China,”  submitted  to  that 
Conference  in  1919  by  Chu  Chi-chien,  is  worthy  of  atten- 
tion. Chu  Chi-chien,  a Southerner,  age  about  fifty,  is  an 
official  of  unusually  wide  experience,  courage  and  organis- 
ing ability.  By  conviction  a staunch  Monarchist,  he 
supported  Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s  attempt  to  restore  the  Throne 
in  1916,  and  after  Yuan’s  death  retired  for  a while  from 
public  life,  to  manage  a colliery  in  Shantung.  During 
the  last  years  of  the  Manchu  dynasty  he  held  many  posts, 
first  under  the  Viceroy  of  Chihli,  then  as  Chief  of  Police 
at  Peking,  and  finally  under  the  Viceroy  Hsii  (now 
President  of  the  Republic)  in  Manchuria.  In  all  of  these 
he  displayed  unusual  energy  and  initiative.  After  1912, 
under  the  Republic,  he  held  office,  first  as  Minister  of 
Communications,  and  then  as  Minister  of  the  Interior. 
To  him  are  due  the  present  satisfactory  condition  of  the 
roads,  police  and  municipal  administration  at  Peking. 
When,  therefore,  at  the  President’s  request,  he  accepted 
the  post  of  chief  Northern  delegate  to  the  Peace  Con- 
ference at  Shanghai,  something  different  from  the 
usual  mandarin  line  of  thought  was  expected  from  him. 
The  hope  was  doomed  to  disappointment.  His  plan  for 
the  reorganisation  of  China  might  have  been  compiled 
by  the  greybeards  of  the  Board  of  Revenue  under  the 
Manchus  : its  figures  and  arguments  are  the  stuff  that 
mandarin  dreams  are  made  of,  having  no  relation  to 
actualities.  He  quoted  from  the  national  Budget  as 
confidently  as  Sun  Yat-sen  himself,  cheerfully  ignoring 
the  fact  that  the  thing  itself  exists  only  in  name;  and 


PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  123 


his  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter,  as  far  as  disbandment 
was  concerned,  amounted  to  a proposal  to  reduce  the 
existing  number  of  troops  (which  he  put  at  1,300,000) 
by  half,  at  a cost  of  over  $200,000,000,  to  be  borrowed 
abroad. 

Mr.  Chu  prefaced  this  modest  scheme  with  the  observa- 
tion that,  since  the  Great  War,  the  world  has  come  to 
“ seek  a new  order,  in  which  right  will  reign,  reason  will 
rule,  justice  will  prevail,  and  happiness  will  be  the  pursuit 
of  life.  It  is  no  exaggeration,”  he  declares,  “ to  say  that 
the  dawn  of  a happier  period  is  imminent — so  imminent, 
indeed,  that  in  this  very  country  strong  efforts  are  being 
made  to  effect  a reorganisation  which  will  lay  the  national 
foundation.”  The  Tuchuns’  delegates  in  meeting 
assembled  were,  no  doubt,  impressed  (they  have  heard 
of  a good  many  New  Eras  dawning  since  1911),  but, 
whatever  their  views  on  the  millennium,  they  certainly 
agreed  with  his  practical  conclusion,  namely,  that  “ in  the 
last  analysis,  no  change  can  be  effected  without  money, 
and  any  social  structure  based  on  an  insufficient  financial 
foundation  is  bound  to  fall.”  It  was  not  a very  lofty 
conception  of  the  true  foundation  of  the  new  order,  but 
it  undoubtedly  represented  every  mandarin’s  ideas  of 
political  economy. 

Coming  to  the  Army,  Mr.  Chu  estimated  that  “ there 
are  not  less  than  one  hundred  Army  Corps  at  present  in 
the  country.”  In  another  place  he  gave  the  actual 
figures  (on  paper)  for  each  province,  showing  a grand 
total  of  1,290,657  men,  of  whom  540,344  were  supposed 
to  be  under  the  order  of  the  Central  Government.  He 
proposed  to  disband  the  “ superfluous  troops  ” of  the 
Central  Government  and  of  the  provinces  simultane- 
ously, the  operation  to  take  a year  or  eighteen  months. 
He  advised  that  “ the  Ministry  of  War  and  the  pro- 
vincial authorities  should  jointly  be  held  responsible 
for  the  disbanding  of  those  troops  which  are  considered 
unnecessary.”  As  each  Tuchun  naturally  considers  the 
troops  of  his  neighbours  to  be  unnecessary,  and  as 


124  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


none  of  them  recognises  the  authority  of  Peking,  the 
scheme  was  not  likely  to  bring  China  much  nearer  to 
the  dawn.  It  ignored  the  vital  point  of  the  whole 
question,  namely,  how  to  guarantee  that  the  troops,  once 
disbanded,  would  not  reappear  forthwith  under  other 
names  and  other  commanders?  Mr.  Chu  incidentally 
referred  to  the  fact  that,  in  1913,  a foreign  “ reorganisa- 
tion ” loan  was  raised  and  with  it  thirty  Army  Corps 
were  disbanded  at  a cost  of  $30,000,000.  Some 
316,000  soldiers  and  19,000  officers  were  then  supposed 
to  have  retired  into  civil  life.  But  he  said  nothing  of 
the  equally  interesting  fact  that  the  Chinese  Army  (on 
paper)  is  no  smaller  to-day  than  before  that  disbandment 
took  place — in  other  words,  that  the  “ reorganisation 
loan  ” reform  was  a sorry  farce,  profitable  only  to  the 
officials  and  financiers  concerned. 

I draw  attention  to  this  officially  proposed  scheme 
because,  in  spite  of  its  almost  childish  crudity,  it  indicates 
some  of  the  difficulties  with  which  the  present  Consortium 
Powers’  representatives  will  be  confronted  when  they 
come  to  discuss  practical  details  with  the  Chinese 
Government.  The  results  of  the  1913  loan  have  proved 
conclusively  that  no  further  assurances  or  half  measures 
will  serve  in  the  vital  matter  of  supervision  over  ex- 
penditure. Nobody  doubts  for  a moment  that  the 
whole  Chinese  Army  would  be  delighted  to  return  to  its 
ancestral  homes  with  all  arrears  of  pay  and  a three 
months’  bonus.  The  question  is,  however,  who  is  going 
to  prevent  the  Tuchuns  from  replacing  them  next 
morning  by  a new  set  of  loot-hungry  coolies  ? 

Mr.  Chu’s  memorandum,  for  all  its  vagueness,  throws  a 
good  deal  of  light  upon  the  pitiful  plight  to  which  the 
Chinese  Government  has  been  reduced  by  the  corruption 
of  its  own  officials  and  the  refusal  of  the  provinces  to 
remit  their  quota  of  revenues.  “ The  Army,”  he  declared 
in  a sudden  burst  of  frankness,  “ has  become  an  insup- 
portable burden  to  the  nation;  until  the  military  are 
permanently  deprived  of  their  usurped  power,  it  is  vaio 


PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  125 


to  look  for  any  real  improvements  in  the  civil  administra- 
tion.” Yet,  realising  this,  his  only  remedy  was  “ a 
foreign  loan  which  will  cover  all  these  items,”  its  proceeds 
to  be  divided  between  Peking  and  the  provinces.  There 
is  no  word  in  all  his  elaborate  plan  for  the  “ proper  and 
efficient  audit  ” to  which  the  Chinese  Government  pledged 
itself  when  borrowing  in  1913,  and  which  they  then  failed 
to  carry  out. 

Writing  of  those  loan  negotiations,  the  late  Mr.  Willard 
Straight,  then  representative  of  the  American  financial 
group,  observed  : “ The  Chinese  officials  charged  with 
the  expenditure  of  the  loan  funds  had  placed  every 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  a proper  and  efficient  audit,  to 
which  they  had  agreed.”  Because  of  their  bad  faith  in 
this  matter,  the  Consortium  of  that  day  stipulated  that 
“ China  should  herself  create  a system  of  audit  in  which 
foreigners  should  be  employed,  with  powers  not  merely 
advisory,  but  also  executive,  so  as  to  ensure  the  effective 
expenditure  of  loan  funds  borrowed,  for  the  purposes 
specified.”  Here  we  have  the  gist  of  the  whole  matter. 
The  “ reorganisation  loan  ” of  1913  produced  a loan,  but 
no  reorganisation,  in  so  far  as  the  disbandment  of  troops 
was  concerned.  It  led  to  the  establishment  of  foreign 
supervision  over  the  revenues  of  the  Salt  Gabelle,  with 
immediate  benefit  to  China’s  finances,  but  the  Audit 
Department  has  never  been  anything  more  than  an  empty 
name,  and  its  foreign  adviser  a monumental  figure- 
head. Every  politician  in  the  country,  irrespective  of 
party,  has  opposed  the  effective  supervision  of  loan  funds 
expenditure,  for  the  simple  reason  that  it  means  the 
curtailment  of  lucrative  opportunities.  If  China  is  to 
be  saved,  this  opposition  must  be  overcome;  and  it  can 
be  overcome  if  the  new  Consortium  represents  a common 
purpose  of  disinterested  goodwill  towards  China,  and 
united  action  between  the  Governments  concerned.  The 
problem  of  the  Tuchuns’  armies  is  urgent  and  vital ; the 
manner  in  which  it  is  dealt  with  will  show  whether  there 
is  any  hope  of  effective  reconstruction  or  not. 


126  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Under  the  scheme  of  reorganisation  which  has  been 
roughly  outlined  in  London  and  New  York  by  the  British 
and  American  delegates  to  the  Consortium,  the  question  of 
disbandment  figures  on  the  agenda;  but  its  place  upon 
the  list  of  subjects  tabled  for  discussion  by  the  financial 
groups,  and  the  agenda  list  as  a whole,  would  appear  to 
indicate  that  neither  the  banking  groups  nor  the  Govern- 
ments behind  them  yet  recognise  the  paramount  im- 
portance of  this  question.  Indeed,  the  conditions  under 
which  the  new  four-Power  Consortium  has  come  into 
being,  and  the  utterances  of  its  chief  spokesmen,  have 
hitherto  breathed  a spirit  of  vague  humanism  and  bene- 
volent intentions  which,  however  admirable,  are  some- 
what difficult  to  associate  with  the  natural  aspirations 
and  methods  of  financial  syndicates.  Mr.  Thomas  W. 
Lamont  (representing  J.  P.  Morgan  & Co.)  declares,  for 
example,  that  the  four  Powers  have  come  together  in 
the  forming  of  the  Consortium  because  they  had  decided 
“ to  put  an  end  to  the  old  pre-war  system  of  international 
jealousies  and  rivalry.”  Sir  Charles  Addis  put  the  same 
thing  in  simpler  words  when  he  defined  the  principle  on 
which  the  new  Consortium  is  founded  as  “ the  substitution 
of  international  co-operation  in  China  for  international 
competition.”  So  far,  so  good;  but  even  at  this  stage 
the  fact  confronts  us  that,  as  a matter  of  goodwill  and 
freewill,  the  Chinese  are  unlikely  to  encourage  the 
abolition  of  competition;  and  it  is  not  recorded  that 
international  jealousies  ceased  to  play  their  part  when, 
in  order  to  put  an  end  to  competition,  the  Germans 
were  admitted  into  the  old  Consortium  in  1909.  But 
let  that  pass.  The  new  Consortium  has,  at  all  events, 
achieved  the  first  requisite  of  success  in  its  working 
understanding  with  the  Japanese  Government  on  the 
subject  of  future  enterprises  and  concessions  in  Manchuria 
and  Mongolia.  It  has  also  done  good  work  in  its  agree- 
ment for  the  unification  of  the  whole  of  the  railway 
system  in  China,  though  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
a Railway  Board  under  a Chinese  Minister,  assisted  by 


B.  T.  Pridcaux] 

THINGS  ANCIENT  AND  MODERN  (IN  A TEMPLE  AT  HANGCHOW). 


PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  127 


four  foreign  engineers  of  different  nationalities,  is  a 
practical  proposition.  For  the  rest,  it  is  apparently 
content  to  rely  upon  the  “ new  spirit  ” in  China  to  make 
international  co-operation  pleasant  and  profitable  for 
all  concerned.  Writing  to  the  New  York  Times  last 
July,  Mr.  Lamont  explained  the  new  policy  toward 
China,  “ a policy  made  possible  through  American 
initiative,”  in  the  following  significant  passage  : 

" China  herself  has,  in  the  five  years  of  the  war,  under- 
gone great  changes.  Outwardly,  to  be  sure,  she  bears 
an  appearance  of  disorganisation,  but  underneath  there 
flows  a new  and  powerful  current  of  nationality,  a spirit 
fostered  by  the  great  and  influential  student  bodies,  by 
many  earnest  intellectuals,  former  pupils  of  American 
missionaries,  who  are  now  giving  their  lives  to  develop 
China  from  a people  into  a nation,  so  that  the  Powers 
recognised  that  it  was  no  longer  a slumbering  giant 
with  which  they  had  to  deal,  but  one  waking  into  a 
national  self-consciousness.” 

Mr.  Lamont ’s  tribute  to  the  political  activities  of 
American  missionaries  is  interesting,  but  readers  familiar 
with  the  realities  of  life  in  China  are  likely  to  concur  in 
the  opinion  that,  approached  in  this  spirit,  the  problem 
of  disbandment  is  not  likely  to  be  solved  by  the  Con- 
sortium; moreover,  between  the  lines  of  the  utterances 
of  its  chief  sponsors,  one  perceives  that,  in  spite  of  this 
Wilsonian  idealism,  as  practical  men  they  are  not  asking 
too  much  from  the  new  spirit,  or  asking  it  with  any  great 
urgency.  According  to  Sir  Charles  Addis,  whose  know- 
ledge of  the  East  is  considerably  greater  than  that  of  his 
American  colleague,  “ China  can  only  be  saved  by  her 
own  exertions.”  Nor  is  he  under  any  illusions  concerning 
the  Consortium.  “ It  is  at  present  only  a machine. 
Before  it  becomes  a living  organism,  it  must  have  breathed 
into  it  the  spirit  of  life.”  In  his  opinion,  “ China 
would  be  well  advised  to  accept  this  offer  in  the  spirit 
in  which  it  is  made.  It  may  be  that  she  will  reject  it. 
Even  so,  the  Consortium  will  remain.  ...  It  may  even 


128  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


serve,  by  God’s  grace,  as  a means  to  lay  one  more  stone 
on  the  foundation  of  the  temple  of  peace.” 

God’s  grace  will  have  to  be  very  bountifully  bestowed 
if  the  business  of  cosmopolitan  finance  is  to  become  a 
corner-stone  of  that  temple.  But  grace  or  no  grace,  it  is 
evident,  I think,  that  if  the  commercial  Powrers  really 
desire  to  put  an  end  to  chaos  in  China,  they  will  need  to 
devise  some  form  of  concerted  action  and  machinery 
other  than  that  of  a group  of  syndicates,  whose  ultimate 
objects,  say  what  you  will,  are  financial,  and  whose 
natural  inclination,  in  avoiding  competition,  must  be  to 
follow  the  line  of  least  resistance.  It  is  also  evident 
(Mr.  Lamont  himself  must  see  it)  that,  so  far  as  Young 
China  is  concerned,  a Consortium  is  damned  at  the 
outset  which  accepts  Japan's  position  in  Shantung  as 
chose  jugee.  Finally,  it  is  absolutely  certain  that  the 
political  faction  in  power  at  Peking,  no  matter  what  its 
name  and  antecedents,  will  not  accept  the  Consortium’s 
proffered  “ co-operation  ” so  long  as  they  can  borrow 
elsewhere,  unless  they  are  sure  in  advance  that  they  will 
still  be  able  to  reduce  to  a dead  letter  the  conditions  of 
a loan  agreement  which  stipulate  for  strict  supervision 
over  the  expenditure  of  loan  funds,  and  especially  of 
funds  borrowed  for  the  disbandment  of  troops.  It  may, 
therefore,  safely  be  predicted  that,  unless  the  Govern- 
ments concerned  place  the  question  of  disbandment  in 
its  right  place,  at  the  head  of  the  Consortium’s  agenda, 
and  insist  upon  it  in  a manner  very  different  to  that  of 
those  who  proffer  loans,  the  Tuchuns’  armies  will  not 
be  disbanded,  and  the  Consortium  will  continue  to 
devote  its  activities  and  resources  to  matters  of  immediate 
financial  interest,  such  as  currency  reform  and  railway 
construction.  The  crucial  problem  will  still  remain 
unsolved. 

Even  assuming,  however,  that  the  problem  of  dis- 
bandment shall  have  been  partially  solved  by  united 
action  of  the  Powers,  and  the  provincial  administration 
transferred  from  the  military  to  the  civil  authorities ; 


PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  129 


even  if  we  assume  that  gradually,  province  by  province, 
the  Central  Government’s  authority  and  fiscal  machinery 
have  been  restored  and  parliamentary  government  made 
more  responsible  and  more  representative : the  real 

task  of  reconstruction  will  only  have  begun,  will,  in  fact, 
have  then  been  rendered  possible.  The  reorganisation 
of  the  country’s  civil  administration,  finances,  railways, 
and  system  of  justice,  together  with  measures  for  the 
development  of  its  economic  resources,  will  still  necessi- 
tate years  of  honest  patriotic  effort  on  the  part  of  the 
Chinese  themselves.  Given  peace  within  their  borders, 
and  a genuine  desire  on  the  part  of  the  friendly  Powers 
to  assist  them,  one  may  reasonably  hope  that  the  thing 
can  be  done.  Honesty  in  the  public  service  can  only  be 
secured  from  without;  but,  given  this,  there  is  enough 
intelligence,  administrative  ability  and  patriotism  avail- 
able in  China  to  make  her  a prosperous  and  united  nation 
within  a comparatively  short  space  of  time. 

It  is  important  to  remember  that  insistence  upon  the 
vital  condition  of  a “ proper  and  efficient  audit  ” of  official 
accounts,  wherever  foreign  loans  are  involved,  need  not 
in  any  way  conflict  with  the  maintenance  of  China’s 
sovereignty,  unimpaired  and  unthreatened.  On  the 
contrary,  it  offers  the  only  possible  chance  of  preserving 
that  sovereignty  and  of  gradually  enabling  China  to 
regain  her  proper  place  and  dignity  in  the  comity  of 
nations.  Nor  does  it  involve  any  new  departure.  It 
merely  means  the  extension  of  a system  which,  with 
China’s  consent,  and  to  her  infinite  advantage,  has 
already  been  in  force  for  seventy  years.  Had  it  not  been 
for  the  revenues  honestly  collected  and  regularly  remitted 
to  the  Central  Government  by  the  Imperial  Maritime 
Customs  since  the  days  of  the  Taiping  rebellion,  China 
would  long  since  have  been  faced  with  bankruptcy  and 
all  that  it  entails.  The  Customs  service,  international  in 
its  personnel,  was  brought  into  existence  for  the  purpose 
of  securing  the  “ proper  and  efficient  audit  ” which 
Chinese  officialdom  was  unable  to  supply.  But  it  has 

K 


130  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


never  been  an  imperium  in  imperio,  or  anything  other 
than  a loyal  branch  of  the  Chinese  public  service. 

The  same  principle  has  been  applied  in  the  case  of  the 
Imperial  railways  of  North  China,  a lucrative  source  of 
revenue  to  the  Chinese  Government.  By  the  terms  of 
the  British  loan  which  provided  the  capital  for  building 
the  line,  supervision  of  the  railway’s  finances  is  vested 
in  a British  accountant.  On  other  Chinese  railways 
(such  as  the  Peking-Hankow  and  the  Tientsin-Pukou 
lines),  where  the  principle  of  financial  supervision  was 
waived  by  British  and  French  financiers  because  of  the 
clamour  of  Young  China  on  the  one  hand  and  the  intrigues 
of  German  financiers  on  the  other,  the  existing  state  of 
affairs  is  so  undeniably  rotten,  that  it  affords  the  strongest 
possible  argument  for  foreign  financial  control.  Every 
Chinese  with  whom  you  discuss  the  pitiful  condition  of 
these  railways  (except  the  officials  directly  concerned) 
admits  that  if  they  were  honestly  handled  they  could 
not  fail  to  become  veritable  gold-mines  for  the  State. 
As  it  is,  their  freight  and  passenger  rates  are  higher  than 
those  in  England,  rolling  stock  and  permanent  way  are 
in  a lamentable  state,  and  practically  no  provision  is 
made  for  depreciation.  Even  the  special  fund  set  apart 
for  the  rebuilding  of  the  great  bridge  over  the  Yellow 
River  on  the  Peking-Hankow  line  has  disappeared, 
devoured  for  “ administrative  expenses  ” by  the  man- 
darins of  the  new  dispensation.  The  day  is  fast  approach- 
ing when  foreign  financiers  will  be  asked  for  new  loans 
to  set  these  railways  in  order.1  Will  any  of  the  mandarins 
of  Young  China  and  Old,  who  have  made  fortunes  by 
starving  and  squeezing  these  railways,  subscribe  towards 
such  loans  ? No,  they  will  apply  to  the  foreigner  for 

1 Since  the  above  was  written  the  British,  and  Chinese  Corpor- 
ation’s representative  in  China  has  informed  the  shareholders  that 
the  net  revenues  of  railways  supervised  by  the  Ministry  of 
Communications  have  increased  by  64  per  cent,  since  1915. 
At  the  same  meeting  it  was  announced  that  the  Corporation  had 
made  a loan  of  $2,000,000  to  the  Chinese  Government  for  the 
purchase  of  rolling  stock,  etc.,  for  the  Hupei-Hunan  section  of 
the  Hankow-Canton  Railway ! 


PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  131 


further  funds,  while  denouncing  the  idea  of  financial 
control  in  the  name  of  “ sovereign  rights.” 

Inasmuch  as  nearly  every  source  of  public  revenue  in 
China  has  been  pledged  for  the  service  of  foreign  loans, 
the  Powers  behind  the  Consortium  are  now  in  a position 
to  extend  the  principle  of  financial  control,  in  China’s 
own  interest,  and  to  insist  upon  its  effective  application. 
Just  as  the  revenues  of  the  Salt  Gabelle  have  steadily 
increased  since  even  a partial  system  of  foreign  super- 
vision was  introduced  in  1913,  so  reliable  sources  of 
income  can  be  developed  from  the  land  tax,  the  wine 
and  tobacco  taxes  (recently  pledged  for  an  American 
loan),  and  from  the  opium  trade.  (The  tax  on  opium- 
growing, now  independently  levied  by  many  provincial 
authorities,  is  bound  to  become  a recognised  and  lucrative 
Government  monopoly  in  the  near  future.)  China’s 
sources  of  national  revenue  are,  I repeat,  quite  sufficient 
for  the  needs  of  government ; all  that  is  required  is  to 
protect  their  output  from  the  hands  of  predatory  officials 
and  to  restore  the  fiscal  arrangements  destroyed  by  the 
revolution. 

During  my  recent  visit  to  Peking,  it  seemed  to  me, 
when  discussing  the  situation  there,  that  the  essential 
features  on  which  I have  laid  stress  are  in  danger  of  being 
frequently  overlooked,  if  not  submerged,  by  reason  of 
the  multitude  of  counsellors,  experts,  advisers,  and  Special 
Commissioners  who  live,  move,  and  have  their  being  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  Legations  and  the  Presidential  mansion. 
Of  many  nations  and  kindreds  is  the  lost  legion  of  the 
Chinese  Government’s  foreign  advisers.  It  includes  all 
sorts  and  conditions  of  men,  from  ex-Ministers,  ex- 
missionaries, and  professional  men  of  good  repute,  down 
to  hirelings  of  the  baser  sort  and  the  hungry  jackals  of 
journalism.  From  the  cynical  Chinese  point  of  view, 
many  of  these  advisers  have  been  engaged  on  the  lucus  a 
non  lucendo  principle,  that  is  to  say,  they  are  neither 
asked  nor  expected  to  advise.  Sometimes  they  are 
simply  window-dressing,  inanimate  figures,  intended  to 


132  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


inspire  confidence  in  the  foreign  buyer  of  Chinese  bonds ; 
sometimes  they  have  been  imposed  on  the  Chinese 
Government  as  the  result  of  international  jealousies 
arising  in  the  field  of  international  finance.  Many  of 
them  are  held  in  reserve  for  use  in  emergencies,  either  as 
scapegoats  or  buffers,  in  the  event  of  serious  difficulties 
with  their  respective  Legations.  But  whatever  their 
record  or  their  role,  the  result  of  their  collective  opinions 
and  activities  is  to  confuse  the  mind  of  any  earnest  seeker 
after  truth,  especially  if  he  be  a newcomer  and  unfamiliar 
with  the  peculiar  methods  of  Oriental  statecraft. 

Over  and  above  the  voices  of  the  professional  “ advisers  ” 
directly  and  permanently  employed  by  the  Chinese 
Government,  there  are  those  of  a number  of  foreign 
experts,  appointed  or  engaged  to  report  on  technical 
subjects,  or  to  represent  the  special  interests  of  actual 
or  potential  creditors,  experts  in  law,  finance,  railways, 
salt,  or  police  organisation.  Behind  these,  again,  a 
confused  but  indefatigable  chorus,  are  the  voices  of 
the  amateur  advisers — missionaries,  journalists,  sincere 
friends  of  China — what  you  will.  And  in  each  of  these 
classes  there  are  to  be  found  men  whose  professional 
bias  or  individual  interest  leads  them  to  proclaim  their 
own  particular  remedies  for  the  ills  that  afflict  the  State. 
Thus  while  one  clamours  for  currency  reform,  another 
will  pin  his  faith  to  the  League  of  Nations;  while  one 
sees  salvation  in  the  revision  of  the  tariff,  another  looks 
for  it  in  the  making  of  roads  and  railways.  And  so, 
amidst  the  money-changers,  scribes,  and  doctors,  there 
arises  a cloud  of  words  which  obscures  the  fundamental 
truth,  that  China  is  financially  and  politically  bankrupt, 
and  that  nothing  but  honesty  of  administration,  com- 
pulsorily imposed,  can  save  her.  This  aspect  of  the 
situation  is  one  which  the  professional  adviser  generally 
either  takes  for  granted  or  discreetly  ignores. 

And  all  the  while,  in  the  background,  silent,  inscrutable, 
but  ever  vigilant,  are  the  expert  advisers  of  Dai  Nippon, 
some  four  hundred  Japanese  military  officers,  attached 


B.  T.  Prideaux ] 

" THOSE  THAT  DIG  AND  WEAVE,  THAT  PLANT  AND  BUILD.” 


" J UST  A SONG 


AT  TWILIGHT.” 


PROBLEM  OF  RECONSTRUCTION  133 


to  China’s  Northern  armies  in  fulfilment  of  the  secret  pact 
of  1918.  Here,  again,  you  have  a fundamental  fact  of 
the  situation.  For  it  is  evident  that  no  international 
Consortium,  intended  to  reform  the  administrative  abuses 
and  financial  chaos  at  present  existing,  can  ever  be 
anything  more  than  a pious  aspiration,  unless  Japan 
agrees  to  abandon  the  policy  foreshadowed  by  the  Twenty- 
One  Demands  of  May  1915.  No  concerted  action  can 
be  inaugurated  unless  she  decides,  once  and  for  all,  to 
abide  by  the  terms  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  and 
to  co-operate  with  her  ally  in  a sincere  effort  to  prevent 
further  disintegration  in  China.  Nor  is  it  possible  for 
Japan  to  become  an  honest  partner  in  the  Consortium 
so  long  as  the  terms  of  her  secret  Military  Agreements 
remain  in  force  and  undisclosed.  The  exclusion  of 
Japan’s  special  interests  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  from 
the  scope  of  the  Consortium’s  operations  was  a matter  of 
secondary  importance  as  compared  with  the  effect  of 
this  Military  Agreement.  Not  only  does  it  paralyse  the 
sovereignty  of  China  at  its  source,  but  it  precludes  all 
hope  of  ever  restoring  the  unity  of  the  country.  It 
constitutes,  in  fact,  a violation  of  the  fundamental 
principles  for  which  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  was 
made.  Unless  it  be  frankly  abandoned,  the  Consortium 
is  stultified  from  the  outset,  and  its  activities  can  serve  no 
purpose  other  than  to  promote  the  ends  of  financiers. 
This  being  so,  it  is  remarkable  that  the  Consortium 
Powers,  and  particularly  the  United  States,  should  have 
strained  at  the  Manchurian  gnat  and  swallowed  the 
camel  of  the  Military  Agreement. 

To  sum  up  : the  situation  of  China  is  critical  and  the 
need  for  remedial  measures  urgent.  I have  endeavoured 
to  suggest  how  these  may  be  applied  with  some  hope  of 
success,  and  that  the  common  interest  of  the  commercial 
Powers  concerned  makes  it  advisable  to  apply  them 
without  further  delay.  That  the  country  as  a whole 
would  be  grateful  for  the  restoration  of  law  and  order, 
no  matter  from  what  source,  is  indisputable.  There 


134  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


remains  therefore  only  the  question,  is  any  continuity  of 
concerted  action  between  the  Powers,  and  particularly, 
in  the  first  place,  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  a matter  of  practical  possibility,  and,  if  so,  under 
what  conditions  ? Public  opinion  in  America,  so  far  as 
one  can  gauge  it,  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  no 
clear-cut  policy  in  Far  Eastern  affairs  can  be  expected 
from  the  State  Department  for  some  months  at  least.  If 
that  be  so,  China’s  difficulties  and  dangers  are  likely  to 
be  greatly  increased,  and  with  them  the  risk  of  serious 
complications  in  the  future.  As  far  as  Japan  is  concerned, 
everything  justifies  the  belief  that  the  moment  is  oppor- 
tune for  coming  to  a new  and  comprehensive  under- 
standing, which  would  make  the  Consortium  a practical 
instrument  for  reconstructive  work  in  China.  My 
reasons  for  this  belief  are  based  on  a close  study  of  the 
present  position  of  affairs  in  Japan,  to  which  the  reader’s 
attention  will  now  be  directed. 


CHAPTER  VII 


JAPAN  : HER  VITAL  PROBLEM 

If,  as  I have  endeavoured  to  show,  the  only  practical 
way  of  preserving  China’s  independence  as  a nation  lies 
in  the  adoption  by  the  Consortium  Allies  of  a common 
policy  of  helpful  and  disinterested  friendship  towards  her,  it 
is  evident  that,  in  the  first  place,  everything  possible  should 
be  done  to  bring  about  more  cordial  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  Japan.  No  one  who  takes  an 
interest  in  this  question  can  travel,  as  I have  recently 
done,  in  the  United  States  and  in  the  Far  East,  without 
perceiving  that  on  both  sides  the  differences  and  mis- 
understandings that  have  arisen  during  the  last  few 
years  are  often  reflected  in  a dangerous  state  of  tension. 
Yet  there  is  really  nothing  of  irreconcilable  difference 
in  the  questions  now  at  issue  between  the  two  nations, 
nothing  which  could  not  be  satisfactorily  settled  with  a 
little  goodwill  and  a sense  of  fair  play  on  both  sides. 
The  trouble  is,  that  the  goodwill  is  not  likely  to  come 
into  play  so  long  as  a powerful  section  of  the  Press  in 
both  countries  panders  to  the  Jingo  element  by  fomenting 
jealous  suspicions  and  exciting  popular  passion.  Neither 
America  nor  Japan  wants  war,  either  over  the  Californian 
question  or  Shantung  or  Manchuria,  but  in  both  countries 
there  are  elements  at  work  whose  active  propaganda 
tends  to  produce  increasing  irritation,  and  to  create  in 
the  public  mind  a belief  that  sooner  or  later  war  is 
inevitable. 

It  were  idle  to  shut  one’s  eyes  to  the  fact  that  the  elimina- 
tion of  Russia,  and  the  emergence  of  the  United  States 
as  a great  military  Power,  have  completely  changed  the 
balance  of  power  in  the  Far  East,  and  that,  as  a result, 

135 


186  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


new  lines  of  national  antagonism,  new  conflicts  of  economic 
interests,  have  become  manifest.  It  is  also  undeniable 
that,  so  long  as  China  remains  in  her  present  state,  she 
must  be  a source  of  danger  to  the  peace  of  the  world. 
Nevertheless,  if  there  be  any  virtue  in  statesmanship, 
anything  vital  in  the  new  impulses  and  ideals  which  have 
sought  expression  in  the  League  of  Nations,  it  should  be 
quite  possible  for  America  and  Japan  to  work  together 
on  terms  of  friendship  in  the  Far  East,  commercial  rivalry 
and  differences  of  opinion  notwithstanding. 

But  “ he  who  knows  only  his  own  side,  knows  little  of 
that.”  Most  of  the  present  misunderstandings  and  con- 
sequent irritation'  are  not  due  to  any  distinctive  racial 
antagonism,  but  merely  to  popular  ignorance.  One 
half  of  the  world  does  not  know  how  the  other  half  lives. 
It  is  very  necessary  that  the  American  people  should  know 
how  Japan  lives,  in  order  to  see  the  Far  Eastern  problem 
in  its  true  light.  Humanly  speaking,  the  salvation  of 
China  and  the  peace  of  the  Orient  depend  largely  upon 
a just  appreciation  of  the  whole  situation  by  public 
opinion  in  the  United  States;  given  this,  it  should  be 
possible  to  find  a solution  for  all  outstanding  questions, 
even  such  questions  as  the  Yellow  Peril  and  the  “ open 
door.” 

I propose  in  the  first  instance  to  trace  the  connection 
between  Japan’s  national  policies  and  her  economic 
situation,  so  that  the  reader  may  be  able  to  judge  whether 
those  policies  are  dictated  by  a wanton  spirit  of  aggression, 
or  by  imperative  necessity,  or  by  both.  It  is  hardly 
possible  for  the  average  foreigner,  unless  he  has  seen  and 
studied  the  causes  and  results  of  economic  pressure  in 
the  Far  East,  to  make  due  allowance  for  the  absence  in 
Oriental  statecraft  of  the  altruism  and  lofty  idealism 
which  are  so  conspicuously  associated  with  American 
statesmanship.  Even  the  most  imaginative  students  at 
a distance  can  have  but  a faint  conception  of  the  fierceness 
of  the  struggle  for  life  which  was  the  East’s  birth-burden 
centuries  ago. 


JAPAN:  HER  VITAL  PROBLEM  137 


The  results  of  economic  pressure  in  Japan  are  far-reach- 
ing, but  the  problem  itself  is  very  simple.  It  is  merely 
a question  of  providing  food  for  a population  which  already 
exceeds  the  limit  that  the  country’s  soil  can  support, 
and  which  is  debarred  by  our  Exclusion  Acts  from  seeking 
its  livelihood  in  less  congested  countries  overseas.  The 
problem,  be  it  observed,  is  only  one  of  many  manifesta- 
tions of  the  unpleasant  truth,  sternly  emphasised  by  the 
World  War,  that  the  pressure  of  population  upon  the  world’s 
food  supply  has  become,  and  must  remain,  acute.  The 
severity  of  this  pressure  in  Japan  is  grimly  indicated  by 
the  death-rate,  which  averages  2i’5  per  thousand. 

The  fundamental  facts  of  the  situation  in  Japan  are  : 

(1)  That  with  a birth-rate  of  32  per  thousand,  the  popula- 
tion increases  annually  at  the  rate  of  about  750,000; 

(2)  that,  in  the  last  ten  years,  the  inhabitants  of  Japan 
proper  (that  is,  excluding  Korea  and  Formosa)  have 
increased  from  50,000,000  to  57,000,000,  giving  an  average 
of  380  persons  to  the  square  mile;  (3)  that  during  this 
period,  the  area  of  land  under  cultivation  has  been  increased 
by  5 per  cent,  and  the  rice  production  by  4 per  cent.,  as 
against  an  increase  of  12  per  cent,  in  the  number  of  mouths 
to  feed;  and  (4)  that  so  long  as  the  present  birth-rate 
is  maintained,  the  nation  must  depend  more  and  more 
upon  imported  food  supplies. 

There  is  no  possibility  of  materially  increasing  either 
the  productivity  of  the  soil  or  the  area  under  cultivation. 
Certain  arm-chair  theorists,  having  in  mind  the  successful 
result  of  the  “ Wisconsin  Idea  ” as  applied  to  American 
agriculture,  are  wont  to  argue  that  similar  results  might 
be  obtained  by  similar  methods  in  China  and  Japan. 
I have  even  seen  an  enthusiastic  attempt  to  introduce 
rice-planting  by  machinery  in  China,  oblivious  of  the  fact 
that  agricultural  man-power  in  that  country  is  far  cheaper 
than  any  fuel-driven  machine.  Those  who  have  studied 
the  matter  know  that  in  no  other  part  of  the  world  has 
the  productivity  of  the  soil  been  developed  by  intensive 
culture  as  it  has  been  for  centuries  in  China  and  Japan; 


138  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


nowhere  else  has  the  stern  law  of  necessity  taught  the 
farmer  to  struggle  with  such  dogged  determination  against 
the  law  of  diminishing  returns.  In  Japan  the  rice-fields 
not  only  fill  the  valleys,  but  everywhere  on  the  hill- 
sides you  will  find  them,  terraced  and  artificially  irrigated 
at  an  incredible  cost  of  human  labour.  As  I journeyed 
last  February  from  Mogi  to  Kobe,  by  the  railway  which 
skirts  the  beautiful  shore  of  the  Inland  Sea,  it  seemed  to 
me  that  the  villages  have  grown  perceptibly  larger  and  the 
rice-fields  smaller,  in  the  last  ten  years.  The  dead  take 
up  no  portion  of  the  food-growing  area  here,  as  they  do 
in  China;  but  one  cannot  see  the  children  swarming  in 
these  close-clustering  villages  without  asking  oneself, 
can  these  tiny  fields  be  still  further  sub-divided,  and  if  not, 
what  peaceful  solution  of  the  problem  can  there  be  other 
than  in  wholesale  emigration  ? 1 

In  August  1918,  the  steadily  increasing  cost  of  rice 
led  to  serious  rioting  at  Kobe,  Tokyo,  and  other  industrial 
centres;  the  violence  of  the  crowd  and  the  organised 
character  of  their  attacks  upon  the  property  of  war 
millionaires,  were  very  significant  features  of  the  outbreak, 
and  of  the  social  changes  which  industrialism  has  produced 
and  is  producing  in  the  larger  cities  of  Japan.  The  dis- 
turbances were  not  quelled  before  a good  many  civilians 
had  been  injured  and  much  property  destroyed.  In 
the  end,  the  Government  practically  justified  the  rioters 
by  making  large  grants  of  free  rice  to  the  distressed  dis- 
tricts, and  these  were  followed  up  by  a public  subscription 
list,  in  which  the  war  millionaires  figured  conspicuously. 
The  moral  of  this  outbreak  has  not  been  lost,  either  on  the 
Government  or  on  the  classes  immediately  affected  by 
the  high  price  of  food  and  the  increasing  burdens  of 
taxation. 

1 According  to  figures  recently  published,  there  are  6,000,000 
farmer  families  in  Japan,  whose  average  holding  is  2-45  acres. 
The  Bureau  of  Land  Development  in  the  Board  of  Agriculture  is 
endeavouring  to  obtain  Government  grants  in  aid  for  farmers 
breaking  up  and  tilling  lands  of  the  poorer  kind  at  present  unculti- 
vated, whereby  it  is  estimated  another  million  families  might  be 
provided  for. 


JAPAN:  HER  VITAL  PROBLEM  139 


The  general  economic  condition  of  the  masses  in  Japan, 
largely  resulting  from  the  war,  is  in  some  respects  very 
similar  to  that  which  obtains  in  England.  There  is  a 
new  upper  class  vulgarised  by  its  wealth,  a new  lower 
class  demoralised  by  the  heady  wine  of  democracy,  and 
a middle  class  pulverised  between  the  two.  The  profiteer 
is,  if  anything,  more  conspicuous  in  Japan  than  in  America 
or  England,  for  the  reason  that  before  the  war  he  was  a 
rare  bird  in  these  parts;  as  in  China,  the  family  system 
prevented  the  accumulation  of  great  wealth  in  the  hands 
of  individuals.  In  1914  there  were  only  twenty-two 
persons  in  Japan  who  paid  income  tax  on  fortunes 
declared  at  over  100,000  yen;  in  1918,  there  were  336, 
and,  to  judge  by  the  number  of  new  palatial  residences 
and  motor-cars  in  Tokyo,  the  tax  collector  should  be  able 
to  find  a good  many  more,  if  there  were  no  holes  in  his  net. 

Generally  speaking,  the  cost  of  living  for  the  poorer 
class  in  Tokio  has  increased  more  rapidly  than  in  most  of 
the  world’s  capitals ; and  Tokyo  and  Osaka  are  the  centres 
from  which  microbes  of  unrest  are  propagated  in  Japan. 
Taking  1909  as  a basis,  with  the  index  figure  of  100,  the 
cost  of  living  for  clerical  workers  had  risen  to  320  in 
1919,  and  is  now  considerably  higher.  During  the  same 
period,  the  incomes  of  these  workers  had  risen  to  227. 
The  details  on  the  expenditures  side,  as  worked  out  from 
the  statements  of  a large  number  of  bank  clerks,  are 
interesting  : 


Items  of  Expenditure 

1909 

1914 

1919 

Rent  . 

. 12-50 

13-75 

20-63 

Rice 

11-00 

1177 

50-05 

Other  foods  . 

• 15-50 

16-74 

47-59 

Fuel  . 

. 5-oo 

5-60 

17-90 

Clothes 

14-00 

15-68 

58-38 

Car  fares 

2-00 

2-58 

3-86 

Sundry  items 

. 40  00 

44-80 

123-20 

100-00 

110-92 

320-61 

In  the  case  of  manual  labourers,  the  figures  (compiled 
from  the  statements  of  coal-heavers,  stevedores,  carters. 


140  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  scavengers)  show  that,  whereas  the  increase  in  the 
cost  of  living  was  practically  the  same  as  in  the  case  of 
clerical  workers,  their  incomes  rose  from  ioo  to  494,  or 
more  than  twice  as  much.  Also,  it  will  be  observed  from 
the  following  figures,  that  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  rice 
affects  the  working  classes  in  Japan  even  more  directly 
than  the  price  of  bread  affects  the  same  classes  in  Europe. 


Items  of  Expenditure 

1909 

1914 

1919 

Rent 

16-00 

17.60 

26-40 

Rice 

18-70 

20-01 

8509 

Other  foods  . 

- 18-50 

I9-98 

56-80 

Fuel 

. 6-io 

6-83 

21-84 

Clothes 

7-3° 

8-i8 

3°’44 

Car  fares 

2-50 

3-23 

3-58 

Sundry  expenses  . 

. 30-90 

34-6i 

95-17 

100-00 

110-44 

3I9’32 

It  is  small  wonder  that  a ricksha  coolie  in  Tokyo  declines 
to  work  under  4 yen  (at  present  exchange,  say,  $2' 00) 
per  day,  and  that  a carpenter  gets  5 yen  or  more.  Small 
wonder  that  clerks  and  journalists  (reporters  are  still 
expected  to  work  for  50  yen  a month)  now  prefer  to 
join  the  ranks  of  manual  labour.  For  the  cost  of  respecta- 
bility is  becoming  prohibitive;  the  price  of  clothes  is 
actually  an  insoluble  problem  for  many  middle-class 
families,  having  risen  nearly  400  per  cent,  in  the  last  five 
years.  Here  are  the  figures  for  the  retail  prices  of 
commodities  in  Tokyo  : 


Number  of 
Articles  Taken 

Price 

1909 

1914 

1919 

Foodstuffs 

33 

100 

I07 

296 

Fuel 

4 

IOO 

1 12 

362 

Building  materials  . 

10 

IOO 

97 

360 

Clothes  . 

17 

IOO 

108 

419 

Miscellaneous  . 

6 

IOO 

127 

259 

Roughly  speaking,  the  rice  problem  began  to 

assume 

its  present  chronic  form  after  1915.  The  nation's  annual 
rice  crop  may  be  put  at  an  average  of  56,000,000  koku, 
and  the  consumption  per  head  at  ro8  koku  (say,  5^ 
bushels).  Therefore,  we  find  that  in  1918  the  country 


JAPAN:  HER  VITAL  PROBLEM  141 


required  to  import  7,500,000  koku  of  rice,  of  which 
4,500,000  came  from  foreign  countries,  and  the  rest  from 
Korea  and  Formosa.  As  in  England,  the  increase  of 
population  has  been  chiefly  urban,  following  directly 
from  the  nation’s  industrial  expansion;  during  the  last 
decade  the  number  of  agricultural  families  has  remained 
practically  unchanged,  but  they  now  represent  only 
54  per  cent,  of  the  total  population,  as  against  59.5 
in  1909. 

It  is  evident  that,  for  the  moment,  and  so  long  as  Japan 
remains  in  a position  to  purchase  the  surplus  food  she 
requires  by  maintaining  a balance  of  trade  in  her  favour, 
the  problem  presents  no  insuperable  difficulty.  But 
Japanese  statesmen  take  long  views,  and  they  realise  that 
each  year’s  addition  to  the  population  involves  a corre- 
sponding increase  in  the  food  supply,  which  can  only 
be  obtained  by  the  sale  of  manufactured  goods  in  foreign 
markets,  where  Japan  will  have  to  face  the  keenest 
competition.  The  nation,  debarred  from  emigration  to 
the  American  and  Australian  continents,  is,  in  fact,  faced 
with  three  alternatives  : (1)  a reduction  of  the  birth- 
rate; (2)  increase  in  food  supplies,  to  be  obtained  by 
successful  industrial  expansion ; and  (3)  territorial  expan- 
sion into  the  less-populated  regions  of  the  Asiatic  continent. 
A reduction  of  the  birth-rate  is  not  to  be  expected,  so 
long  as  either  of  the  other  two  alternatives  is  possible, 
because  it  must  involve  a radical  change  of  the  race-mind 
and  social  system.  Looking  to  the  immediate  future, 
Japanese  statesmanship  is  therefore  compelled  to  adopt 
one  or  both  of  the  other  alternatives.  Here  you  have 
in  a nutshell  the  explanation,  if  not  the  justification, 
of  all  Japan’s  diplomatic  and  economic  activities  in  the 
Far  East ; of  her  feverish  eagerness  to  secure  new  sources 
of  supply  of  the  raw  materials  needed  by  her  expanding 
industries;  of  her  claims  to  "special  interests”  in  the 
undeveloped  regions  of  Manchuria,  Mongolia,  and  possibly 
Siberia.  Japan,  to  put  it  plainly,  is  overcrowded  and 
must  overflow,  just  as  Great  Britain  and  other  congested 


142  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


countries  of  Europe  have  overflowed,  but  there  is  no  New 
World  open  to  her  surplus  millions.  Her  expansion  must 
proceed  along  the  line  of  least  resistance,  that  is  to  say, 
into  China’s  loosely  held  and  thinly  populated  dependencies 
of  the  Asiatic  continent.  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  are 
thus  inevitably  destined  to  follow  Korea  down  the  path 
of  “ geographical  gravitation.”  Morally  speaking,  and 
from  the  Chinese  point  of  view,  it  is,  of  course,  lamentable 
that  any  nation  should  expand  at  another’s  expense; 
but  the  struggle  for  survival  between  races  has  not  ended 
with  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  and  the  principle  of  self- 
determination  must  always  remain  an  empty  phrase 
when  it  comes  into  contact  with  a virile  instinct  of  self- 
preservation.  As  the  French  say,  “ Empty  stomachs 
have  no  ears.” 

A Japanese  writer  in  the  World's  Work  has  put  the 
matter  succinctly  by  observing  that  “ the  Japanese 
people  must  either  die  a saintly  death  in  righteous  starva- 
tion, or  expand  into  the  neighbour’s  backyard — and  Japan 
is  not  that  much  of  a saint.”  The  editor  of  the  Tokyo 
Yorodzu,  defending  his  countrymen’s  right  to  emigrate 
to  Korea,  prior  to  the  annexation  of  1910,  wrote  with 
bitter  irony,  “ How  shall  we  dispose  of  our  surplus 
millions  ? Our  small  country  can  hardly  find  room  within 
its  narrow  boundaries  to  accommodate  its  yearly  increase 
of  half  a million  people.  We  cannot  kill  them  wholesale, 
nor  can  we  fill  up  the  Sea  of  Japan  and  make  dry  land 
of  it  for  them  to  settle  on.  We  would  like  to  go  to  Kansas, 
or  anywhere  but  Hades,  where  we  could  escape  starvation. 
But  however  hospitable  America  may  be,  she  refuses  to 
receive  so  many  newcomers  all  at  once.  We  would  wish 
very  much  to  cross  over  to  Australia ; but  that  is  a White 
Man’s  Land,  and  although  the  continent  is  many  times 
larger  than  Korea  and  very  thinly  populated,  no  coloured 
people  are  admitted  there.  W7e  know  that  Korea  is 
thickly  populated,  but  there  the  least  resistance  is  offered, 
and  so  we  go  there,  just  as  Englishmen  went  to  America 
and  Australia  and  elsewhere,  forcing  the  natives  to 


JAPAN:  HER  VITAL  PROBLEM  143 


make  room  for  them,  in  days  of  yore.”  (As  a matter  of 
fact,  the  density  of  population  in  Korea  is  roughly  50  per 
cent,  less  than  in  Japan.) 

It  is  impossible  to  discuss  any  phase  or  feature  of  the 
Far  Eastern  problem  with  any  educated  Japanese,  from 
the  highest  statesman  to  the  youngest  student,  without 
realising  how  deeply  the  national  mind  is  imbued  with 
a bitter  sense  of  the  injustice  of  the  white  races,  which 
deny  the  principle  of  “ racial  equality  ” in  the  Western 
World,  while  insisting  upon  the  “ open  door  ” and  “ equal 
opportunity  ” in  the  East.  The  resentment  felt  upon  the 
subject  of  racial  discrimination,  always  widespread  and 
bitter,  has  been  greatly  aggravated  by  Mr.  Wilson’s 
short-sighted  handling  of  this  question  at  Versailles; 
it  undoubtedly  constitutes  the  strongest  asset  of  the 
Japanese  Military  Party  and  of  the  Pan-Asian  Imperialists, 
who  dream,  as  Germany  dreamt,  of  a great  war  of  con- 
quest and  the  overlordship  of  Asia  by  Dai  Nippon.  The 
Japanese  as  a race  will  never  forget  that  twice,  after 
victorious  wars  fought  for  the  preservation  of  their 
national  security,  the  white  races  have  intervened  on 
the  side  of  the  vanquished  and  practically  dictated  the 
terms  of  peace.  Japan  fought  Russia  for  Korea  and 
Manchuria,  because  Russian  domination  of  those  Chinese 
dependencies  threatened  her  very  existence  as  a nation. 
Control  of  the  Korean  peninsula  is  even  more  vital  to 
the  national  security  of  Japan  than  that  of  Panama  to  the 
United  States  or  of  Egypt  to  Great  Britain,  and  every 
Japanese  chafes,  more  or  less  openly,  at  the  discrimination 
which  fails  to  recognise  this  undeniable  fact. 

The  “ racial  equality  ” decision  of  the  Versailles  Con- 
ference remains  inexplicable,  a colossal  and  gratuitous 
blunder.  Its  results,  plainly  manifested  in  the  deep 
feeling  of  resentment  which  prevailed  in  Japan  last  year, 
must  militate  against  friendly  co-operation  for  the  benefit 
of  China,  unless  the  diplomacy  of  common  sense  is  speedily 
invoked  to  put  the  whole  matter  on  a rational  basis. 
For  what  are  the  facts?  Every  one,  unless  obsessed  by 


144  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


the  claptrap  of  catch-words,  knew  perfectly  well  that 
when  the  Japanese  delegates  at  Versailles  put  forward 
their  claim  to  “ racial  equality  ” they  had  no  intention 
of  discussing  an  obviously  futile  abstraction.  What 
they  intended  to  claim,  as  Marquis  Okuma  and  Marquis 
Saionji  have  both  frankly  declared,  was  equality  of  treat- 
ment for  Japanese  in  the  matter  of  naturalisation  and 
land  tenure  in  the  United  States  and  Canada,  or,  in  the 
alternative,  a free  hand  in  Manchuria  and  Shantung. 
But  Mr.  Wilson  and  his  colleagues  allowed  the  catch -word 
to  pass.  Common-sense  statesmanship  would  have  replied 
that  “ racial  equality  ” is  a meaningless  expression.  On 
the  field  of  battle,  Japan  has  vindicated  her  claim  to 
equality;  in  the  arts,  sciences,  and  industries,  she  has  a 
record  of  achievement  which  admits  of  no  discussion. 
Clear-sighted  perception  of  the  real  issues  involved  must 
have  led  to  frank  admission  of  the  obvious  truth,  that 
American  and  British  exclusion  laws  are  not  based  on 
racial  or  moral  objections,  but  simply  on  grounds  of 
imperative  economic  necessity.  Racial  equality  has  no 
more  to  do  with  the  case  than  the  flowers  that  bloom  in 
the  spring.  If  it  had,  the  only  thing  that  could  usefully 
be  said  about  it  is,  that  economically  the  white  races 
are  unequal  to  the  Asiatics,  and  that  to  admit  their  free 
competition  in  the  labour  market  would  simply  mean 
race  suicide  for  the  white  man.  When  the  academic 
diplomacy  of  the  Peace  Conference  placed  on  record  its 
denial  of  the  principle  of  “ racial  equality  ” (it  might 
just  as  well  have  repudiated  the  signs  of  the  Zodiac), 
it  greatly  strengthened  the  hands  of  the  Jingo  element 
in  Japan.  Had  Mr.  Wilson  resisted  the  Japanese  claim 
to  equality  of  treatment  as  immigrants  into  the  American 
continent  on  purely  economic  grounds,  his  position  would 
have  been  incontestable,  and  the  best  elements  in  Japan 
would  have  understood  and  respected  his  decision.  The 
growing  force  of  Japanese  Liberalism  would  have  appre- 
ciated the  economic  argument,  whereas  insistence  on 
racial  discrimination  has  merely  served  to  wound  the 


THE  PALACE  MOAT,  TOKYO. 


JAPAN:  HER  VITAL  PROBLEM  145 


dignity  of  a people  ever  keenly  sensitive  in  matters  of 
national  pride. 

The  Japanese  delegates  might  have  been  reminded,  if 
necessary,  that  aliens  have  never  been  entitled  to  own  land 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  Treaty  Ports  in  Japan,  and  that 
the  Japanese  Government  denies  to  the  Chinese  that 
“ racial  equality  ” which  it  claims  from  the  rest  of  the 
world.  Those  Japanese — and  they  are  many — who 
proclaim  their  country’s  right  to  a place  in  the  sun  in 
California,  Canada,  and  Mexico,  are  always  quite  ready 
to  admit  that  discrimination  against  the  Chinese  is  reason- 
able and  right.  The  well-known  publicist,  Mr.  Kawakami, 
puts  the  matter  thus  : “ We  say  that  the  United  States 
need  not  extend  to  the  countries  not  yet  admitted  into 
the  family  of  civilised  Powers,  the  privileges  which  she 
has  conferred  upon  the  subjects  of  a country  which  has 
been  recognised  as  a first-class  Power ; and  we  hope  that 
our  American  critics  will  give  us  credit  for  what  we  have 
accomplished  in  the  brief  period  of  fifty  years,  and  recog- 
nise that  Japan  is  the  only  nation  in  Asia  imbued  with  the 
modern  civilisation.”  There  you  have  the  keynote  of 
Japan’s  restless  discontent ; her  people,  citizens  of  “ a 
first-class  Power  imbued  with  modern  civilisation,”  are 
excluded  from  the  United  States,  while  Syrians,  Hindus, 
and  other  Asiatics  are  admitted.  As  the  Marquis  Saionji 
tactfully  puts  it,  “ Japan  has  no  intention  of  ever  attempt- 
ing to  dictate  to  another  country  how  it  should  regulate 
its  internal  affairs,  but  our  normal  human  pride  would 
always  be  irritated  by  specific  legal  discrimination  against 
us  as  Japanese.”  To  reach  an  amicable  adjustment 
of  this  delicate  question,  the  issue  must  be  fairly  and 
squarely  faced,  and  the  truth  plainly  declared,  namely, 
that  no  white  race  dares  to  expose  itself  to  the  free  com- 
petition of  Asiatic  labour.  If  Hindus  and  Syrians  were 
to  threaten  the  American  continent  with  immigration  in 
large  numbers,  they  also  would  be  required  to  observe 
a " gentleman’s  agreement.”  British  Columbia  has 
denied  immigration  rights  to  Hindus. 

L 


146  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Debarred  from  any  outlet  on  the  American  shores  of 
the  Pacific,  Japan  is  compelled  to  seek  relief  for  her  surplus 
population  and  food  shortage  on  the  Asiatic  continent; 
and  everything  points  to  the  conclusion  that  her  rulers 
will  not  consent  to  allow  the  country’s  expansion  to  be 
confined  to  Korea  and  Manchuria.  Marquis  Saionji, 
for  one,  has  distinctly  intimated  that  they  will  not  do  so, 
and  every  conversation  that  I have  had  with  responsible 
statesmen  and  public  men  in  Japan  leads  me  to  believe 
that  any  deliberate  attempt  to  restrict  Japan’s  expansion 
(they  may  call  it  “ peaceful  penetration  ” in  deference 
to  the  conventions)  would  unite  the  entire  nation  in  an 
outburst  of  patriotic  indignation. 

Let  me  not  be  misunderstood.  Militarism,  that  is  to 
say,  the  dominance  of  the  Imperialist  war-for-war’s-sake 
element,  is  undoubtedly  declining  in  Japan,  for  reasons 
that  will  be  explained  in  due  course.  But  Japanese 
patriotism  and  the  spirit  of  nationalism  show  no  signs  of 
diminishing  ardour;  on  the  contrary,  Japan  impresses 
one,  almost  more  than  any  other  country,  by  the  preva- 
lence throughout  all  classes  of  society  of  that  spirit  which 
Prince  Ito  described  as  “ full  consciousness,  confidence, 
and  intense  interest  in  the  national  mission  and  the 
national  destiny.”  Marquis  Okuma  seems  to  voice  the 
common  national  sentiment  when,  in  an  article  recently 
published,  he  says,  “ I have  no  doubt  that  Japan  will 
propagate  to  China  and  other  countries  in  the  Orient, 
whose  standard  of  civilisation  is  low,  her  new  civilisation, 
which  is  a product  of  harmonising  the  Japanese  and  Euro- 
pean civilisations.  In  a sense  Japan  may  be  said  to  have 
the  mission  of  harmonising  Eastern  and  Western  civilisa- 
tion and  of  propagating  the  new  civilisation;  nay,  I do 
not  hesitate  to  declare  that  this  is  her  mission.”  Wdien 
severe  economic  pressure  underlies  a virile  nation’s 
belief  in  its  divine  mission,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted, 
I think,  that  such  a nation’s  claims  to  expansion  are 
not  likely  to  be  permanently  checked,  except  by  superior 
force. 


JAPAN:  HER  VITAL  PROBLEM  147 


At  the  same  time,  everything  in  Japan’s  history,  since 
her  first  successful  war  with  China  determined  the  fate 
of  Korea,  justifies  the  conclusion  that  the  future  policy 
of  her  far-seeing  rulers  and  their  solution  of  her  vital  food 
problem  will  tend  rather  in  the  direction  of  economic 
than  of  territorial  expansion.  Several  events  have 
occurred  within  the  past  ten  years  to  discredit  the  Pan- 
Asian  dream  of  expansion  by  conquest,  and  to  bring 
her  statesmen  to  look  rather  to  the  development  of  her 
industries  and  the  expansion  of  her  commerce.  These 
events,  in  the  order  of  their  importance,  are : first,  experi- 
ence in  Korea  and  Manchuria  has  led  the  Japanese  to 
perception  of  the  fact  that  they  are  not  a colonising  race, 
in  the  sense  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  are ; second,  the  United 
States  has  come  to  the  front  as  a great  naval  and  military 
nation,  instinctively  opposed  to  the  claims  of  any  Asiatic 
Power  to  overlordship  of  the  Asiatic  continent  and  the 
mastery  of  the  Pacific;  third,  there  has  been  a rapid 
growth  of  unmistakable  hostility  to  Japan  in  China, 
hostility  of  a kind  that  may  seriously  endanger  Japanese 
commerce  at  its  most  vital  point. 

Ten  years  ago,  when  Korea  was  formally  annexed  and 
became  part  of  the  Japanese  Empire,  and  later,  when 
Japan’s  “ special  interests  ” in  Manchuria  were  asserted 
and  made  effective,  it  was  generally  expected  that  these 
comparatively  unpopulated  and  undeveloped  regions 
would  rapidly  absorb  a large  number  of  Japanese  emigrants. 
The  Japanese  themselves  undoubtedly  hoped  for  expan- 
sion of  this  kind,  expansion  that  would  tend  to  relieve 
the  pressure  of  population  in  the  home  country.  But 
practical  experience  has  shown  that  the  class  of  emigrant 
who  goes  to  Korea  and  Manchuria  is  rarely  a tiller  of 
the  soil : the  great  majority  are  artisans,  shopkeepers, 
and  small  traders.  In  both  countries,  the  population 
of  every  Japanese  Settlement  includes  a large  proportion 
of  restaurant-keepers,  photographers,  and  barbers,  trades 
which  live  largely  as  parasites  on  the  brothel  business. 
The  number  of  Japanese,  generally  classed  as  “ Geisha  ” 


148  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


or  as  waitresses  in  the  official  records,  is  very  large ; even 
the  smallest  towns  have  their  red-light  sections,  established 
under  official  auspices.  In  1911  there  were  134  Japanese 
houses  of  ill  fame  in  the  Korean  capital,  and  the  class  of 
women  inhabiting  them  was  nearly  5 per  cent,  of  the  total 
Japanese  community.  Before  the  annexation  of  Korea, 
there  were  about  170,000  Japanese  already  established 
in  the  kingdom,  mostly  congregated  at  the  Treaty  Ports; 
the  increase  of  their  numbers  during  the  last  ten  years 
has  been  less  than  200,000.  Similarly,  Japanese  emigration 
to  Manchuria  has  been  comparatively  small  and  chiefly 
limited  to  town-dwellers.  The  broad  fact  stands  out  in 
both  countries  that,  as  a day-labourer  or  farmer,  the 
Japanese  emigrant  cannot  compete  either  with  the  native 
or  with  the  Chinese  settler.  He  is  like  the  Frenchman,  in 
that  his  heart  is  never  in  the  colonising  business ; he  goes 
to  a foreign  country,  not  to  find  there  a new  home,  but 
in  the  hope  of  making  enough  money  to  retire  on  a modest 
competence  to  his  native  land.  The  following  figures, 
taken  from  statistics  supplied  to  me  by  the  courtesy  of 
President  Inouye,  of  the  Bank  of  Japan,  are  instructive  : 


Number  of  Japanese  Resident  Abroad 


In  Asia  (chiefly 
China  and 
Manchuria) 

Males 

Females 

Europe 

Males 

Females 

North  America 

Males 

Females 

South  America 

Males 

Females 

Oceania 

Males 

Females 

1913 

191S 

64A74 

103,991 

56,136 

120,310 

87,996 

191.987 

1,046 

875 

171 

1,217 

124 

QQQ 

79,652 

98,059 

13,849 

93.501 

37,555 

135.614 

12,435 

20,459 

5.102 

17.535 

10,702 

31,161 

68,196 

34.i89 

82,683 

5F378 

134,061 

102,385 

334.950 


493.845 


JAPAN:  HER  VITAL  PROBLEM  149 


Having  recently  travelled  through  Manchuria  and 
Korea  after  an  absence  of  ten  years,  I have  no  hesitation 
in  saying  that  in  both  countries  the  natives  are  very  much 
better  off  to-day,  economically  speaking,  than  they  were 
before  the  coming  of  the  Japanese.  Their  standard  of 
living  has  been  materially  raised,  the  bandit  has  practically 
gone  out  of  business  in  most  districts,  and  a man  may  enjoy 
in  security  the  fruits  of  his  labour  (political  agitation 
excepted) . The  local  Japanese  administration  has  made  its 
mistakes,  Japanese  agents  have  done  those  things  which 
they  ought  not  to  have  done,  and  the  Japanese  soldiers 
in  Korea  have  committed  acts  of  brutal  severity ; but  the 
policy  of  the  Imperial  Government  on  the  whole  has  been 
wise,  far-seeing,  and  liberal.  Japan  has  spent  a great 
deal  of  money  in  both  countries  (far  more  than  she  is 
ever  likely  to  get  out  of  them),  and  their  natural  resources 
are  being  systematically  developed  in  a way  that  no  Korean 
or  Chinese  administration  could  ever  think  of  attempting. 
But  the  fact  stands  out  that  all  this  development  is  adminis- 
trative, and  that  most  of  the  actual  work  is  done  by  native 
labour.  It  is  part  of  the  Japanese  Government’s  liberal 
policy  of  feeding  Japan’s  home  industries  by  the  establish- 
ment, with  all  possible  safeguards  for  the  future,  of  new 
sources  of  raw  material  and  new  markets  for  the  consump- 
tion of  Japanese  manufactures.  It  is  a conquest  by 
railway  and  bank,  development  unaccompanied  by  any 
large-scale  movement  of  Japanese  settlers  or  soldiery, 
and  this,  for  the  simple  reason  that  Chinese  labour  is 
far  more  economical  and  more  efficient  than  Japanese; 
even  the  Korean  peasantry  are  superior  on  their  own  ground 
to  the  Japanese  immigrant  farmer.  The  final  results 
from  all  this  activity  are,  of  course,  auxiliary  to  the 
industries  and  commerce  of  Japan,  but,  in  the  meanwhile, 
those  who  have  benefited  most  materially  from  her  peace- 
ful penetration  in  this  region  are  the  Koreans,  the  Man- 
churian farmers,  and  the  Chinese  labourers,  who  come 
swarming  in  by  thousands  from  Shantung. 

You  need  not  go  far  in  any  direction  to  find  conclusive 


150  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


proof  that,  whether  it  be  at  farming,  manual  labour, 
trade  or  industrial  work,  the  Chinese  are  vastly  superior 
to  the  Japanese,  just  as  they  are  to  every  other  race; 
that  is  to  say,  they  can  produce  better  work  and  at  a 
lower  cost.  Slowly  but  surely,  in  every  place  where  the 
Chinese  enjoy  equal  opportunities,  the  wealth  of  that 
place  becomes  theirs,  as  Hong  Kong  and  the  Malay 
States  can  testify.  In  Dalny  to-day,  there  are  no  Japanese 
menservants;  even  the  ricksha  coolies  are  Chinese.  At 
the  docks  of  that  flourishing  Japanese  colony,  nearly 
all  the  manual  labour,  and  a great  deal  of  the  office  work, 
is  done  by  Chinese.  When  I asked  Dr.  Uyeda,  the 
Secretary  of  the  South  Manchurian  Railway,  why  he 
employed  a Chinese  rather  than  a Japanese  butler,  his 
answer  was  simple,  “ Because  as  a servant  the  Chinaman 
is  cheaper  and  better.”  Which  accounts,  does  it  not,  for 
the  small  number  of  emigrants  from  Japan  to  Manchuria  ? 

In  Mongolia  it  is  the  same  story.  In  speaking  of 
Mongolia  most  people  probably  have  the  impression  that 
the  country  still  consists,  as  it  did  in  the  day  of  the  Manchus, 
of  rolling  pastoral  lands,  sparsely  inhabited  by  nomad 
Mongol  tribes.  But,  as  a matter  of  fact,  a broad  tide  of 
Chinese  settlers,  mostly  hardy  farmers  from  Shantung, 
has  been  steadily  flowing  northwards  throughout  all 
that  region  ever  since  the  Mongolian  Colonisation  Bureau 
of  the  Chinese  Government  began  work  in  earnest  in  1906, 
under  Chu  Chi  Chien.  (This  official,  it  will  be  remembered, 
is  he  who  gave  to  Peking  its  good  roads  and  efficient 
police.)  I recollect  discussing  this  colonisation  scheme 
with  the  Viceroy  of  Manchuria  at  Moukden  in  1907;  he 
and  the  Governor  Tang  Shao-yi  were  very  enthusiastic 
on  the  subject,  declaring  that  in  ten  years’  time  prosperous 
towns  and  villages  would  be  springing  up  and  well-tilled 
fields  would  replace  the  barren  camping-grounds  of  the 
Mongols.  And  so  it  is ; the  peaceful  invasion  of  Chinese 
settlers  has  been  steadily  advancing,  at  the  rate  of  about 
four  miles  a year,  making  the  wilderness  to  blossom  as 
the  rose;  and  the  same  process  has  been  going  on,  only 


JAPAN:  HER  VITAL  PROBLEM  151 


less  methodically,  in  Eastern  Siberia.  There  are,  of 
course,  large  tracts  of  country  still  untouched  by  the 
plough,  but  it  can  only  be  a matter  of  brief  time  before 
the  tide  of  China's  surplus  millions  flows  over  them  all. 
Nothing  but  Exclusion  Acts,  forcibly  applied,  can  ever 
stem  that  tide;  the  province  of  Shantung  alone,  with 
its  population  of  600  to  the  square  mile,  could  probably 
fill  up  the  whole  of  Eastern  Mongolia  in  the  lifetime 
of  one  generation.  Against  these  thrifty  pioneers  even 
the  best  of  Japanese  farmers  cannot  hope  to  compete, 
and  they  know  it.  With  anything  like  equal  opportunity, 
the  Chinese  will  always  outwork  them  and  under-live 
them.  Japan  may  obtain  political  and  administrative 
control  of  these  undeveloped  regions;  profiting  by  the 
demoralisation  of  Russia,  she  can  establish  there  her 
strategic  and  economic  position;  but  the  Chinese  will 
surely  inherit  the  land.  As  Russia  discovered  before 
1910  in  the  Amur  and  maritime  provinces  of  Siberia, 
no  protective  legislation  can  hold  behind  land  frontiers 
the  resistless  tide  of  their  advance. 

I believe  that  all  these  things  have  combined  to  lead 
the  Japanese  Government  to  modify  its  policy,  not  only 
in  China,  but  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  and  that  the 
idea  of  Eastern  Asia  as  a wide  field  for  Japanese  emigration 
(which  Marquis  Komura  proclaimed  in  the  Diet  ten  years 
ago)  has  gradually  come  to  be  replaced  by  a policy  of 
commercial  and  industrial  expansion  in  those  regions, 
which  shall  feed  Japan’s  home  industries  in  the  same  way 
as  India  feeds  those  of  Great  Britain.  Such  a policy,  of 
course,  does  not  solve — it  merely  defers — the  problem  of 
congestion  on  Japanese  soil.  It  means  that  each  year’s 
growth  of  population  must  be  absorbed  into  the  nation’s 
expanding  industries,  making  Japan,  like  England,  more 
and  more  dependent  upon  imported  food  supplies,  more 
and  more  exposed,  therefore,  to  the  risks  which  such  a 
condition  entails.  Looked  at  in  this  light,  we  perceive 
why  Japanese  Liberalism  (as  distinct  from  the  Military 
Party)  is  doing  all  that  it  can  to  gain  and  retain  the  good- 


152  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


will  of  the  Chinese,  while  at  the  same  time  losing  no 
opportunity  of  extending  its  conquests  by  railway  and 
bank,  and  fortifying  its  preferential  rights  against  the 
claimants  of  the  “ open  door.”  To  commit  any  act  of 
military  aggression  against  China  would  be  fatal,  I think, 
to  the  fundamental  object  of  Japan’s  present-day  policy, 
which  is,  to  secure  raw  materials  for  her  factories  on  the 
most  advantageous  terms.  The  Foreign  Minister,  Viscount 
Uchida,  put  the  matter  very  plainly  when  he  said  last 
year  in  the  Diet,  that  “ Japan  is  compelled  to  rely  in 
a large  measure  upon  the  rich  natural  resources  of  China 
in  order  to  assure  her  own  economic  existence.”  Her 
Liberal  statesmen  (men  like  Viscount  Kato,  Mr.  Ozaki, 
and  Baron  Hayashi)  believe  that  if  China’s  goodwill 
and  confidence  can  be  secured,  Japan  can  and  should 
assist  China  to  develop  these  resources,  as  she  is  doing  in 
Manchuria  and  Korea,  for  the  ultimate  benefit  of  both 
countries  and  of  international  trade. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  during  the  past  five  years 
many  of  the  steps  which  the  Japanese  Government  has 
taken  or  sanctioned  with  a view  to  establishing  her 
“ special  rights  and  interests  ” in  China,  constitute  in 
effect  a violation  of  the  principle  of  the  “ open  door.” 
Viscount  Ishii’s  negotiations  with  Mr.  Lansing,  like  every 
utterance  of  every  statesman  in  Japan  when  you  come  to 
the  point,  made  it  perfectly  plain  that  Japan  will  never 
willingly  consent  to  being  debarred  from  emigration  to 
America  and  at  the  same  time  forbidden  to  seek  expansion 
in  Asia.  To  conform  to  the  conventions  of  diplomacy 
she  may  base  her  claim  to  those  " special  interests  ” 
on  geographical  propinquity,  but  one  cannot  study  her 
history  for  the  past  thirty  years,  or  examine  her  actual 
situation,  without  realising  that  it  is  based  on  imperative 
economic  necessity.  Above  the  clamour  of  the  politicians, 
above  the  war  cries  of  the  Military  Party,  the  far-seeing 
statesmen  of  Japan  hear  the  voice  of  the  people,  that  asks 
for  bread  and  will  not  be  denied.  There  has  never  been 
any  swerving  or  inconsistency  in  the  national  policy  since 


JAPAN:  HER  VITAL  PROBLEM  153 


Japan  first  went  to  war  with  China  in  1894,  and  the  main- 
springs of  that  policy  have  been  essentially  economic. 
Realising  the  impossibility  of  expansion  in  the  direction 
which  they  would  have  preferred — that  is  to  say,  on  to 
the  American  continent — the  rulers  of  Japan  have 
concentrated  every  effort  upon  obtaining  a firm  foothold 
on  the  Asiatic  mainland.  And  even  though  the  path 
be  fraught  with  danger,  they  must  needs  go  forward, 
for  they  know  that  the  nation’s  existence  is  at  stake. 
Even  before  the  war  in  Europe,  when,  in  July  1910,  she 
concluded  her  agreement  with  Russia,  Japan  had  advanced, 
and  Great  Britain  had  admitted,  her  “ rights  and  special 
interests  ” in  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Mongolia.  The 
Government  of  the  United  States  tacitly  recognised  those 
interests  when  it  acquiesced  in  the  Russo-Japanese  veto 
on  the  construction  of  the  railway  from  Chinchow  to 
Aigun  with  American  capital.  Mr.  Lansing’s  explanation 
of  the  phrase  “ special  interests,”  as  made  before  the 
Senate's  Foreign  Relations  Committee  in  August  1919, 
leaves  the  matter  much  where  it  was.  To  “ recognise 
that  Japan,  because  of  her  geographical  position,  had  a 
peculiar  interest  in  China,  but  that  it  was  not  political 
in  nature,”  was  meaningless,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
in  China,  where  the  foreigner  enjoys  extra-territorial 
rights,  it  is  impossible  to  assert  any  kind  of  special  interest 
that  is  not  also  in  a sense  political.  Japan’s  latest 
reassertion  of  her  special  interests  in  Manchuria  and  Mon- 
golia will  be  discussed  hereafter.  The  point  which  I 
now  desire  to  emphasise  is,  that  this  claim  is  no  new  thing, 
but  part  and  parcel  of  a perfectly  natural  and  consistent 
policy,  for  the  furtherance  of  which  the  nation  has  fought 
two  great  wars,  and  for  which,  if  needs  be,  it  will  fight 
again.  For  the  alternative,  as  they  see  it,  is  extinction. 

Setting  aside  the  purely  Japanese  aspect  of  this  problem, 
the  question  arises,  what,  as  a matter  of  practical  politics 
is  the  alternative  to  recognition  of  Japan’s  special  interests 
in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  and  to  her  development 
of  the  resources  of  this  rich  territory?  That  it  cannot 


154  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


be  satisfactorily  developed  by  the  Chinese  Government, 
is  evident;  it  is  equally  evident  that,  apart  from  its 
strategical  value,  this  region  is  of  vital  importance  to 
Japan  as  a new  source  of  raw  materials.  The  scientific 
development  of  this  country,  as  I have  shown,  must  be  of 
immediate  benefit  to  the  Chinese  population.  There  are, 
no  doubt,  political  and  sentimental  reasons,  based  either 
on  single-minded  morality  or  enlightened  self-interest, 
to  justify  objections  to  Japanese  expansion  in  these 
regions,  but  the  practical  question  remains,  will  the 
United  States,  or  any  other  Power,  assume  a mandate 
to  maintain  China’s  shadowy  sovereignty  over  her  loosely- 
held  dependencies?  Let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  Mon- 
golia repudiated  that  sovereignty  in  1913  and  has  only 
recently  announced  its  desire  to  return  to  the  fold;  also 
that,  as  far  back  as  1901,  Germany  notified  the  world 
at  large  that  the  geographical  term  “ China  ” could  not 
be  held  to  include  Manchuria.  Sooner  or  later,  whatever 
happens,  Japanese  expansion  on  the  Asiatic  mainland 
will  have  to  reckon  with  the  Slav ; but  in  the  meanwhile 
what  can  it  profit  the  civilised  world  to  oppose  this  expan- 
sion, so  long  as  it  takes  the  form  of  peaceful  penetration 
in  thinly-peopled  regions? 

Ten  years  ago  I ventured  to  forecast  the  development 
of  this  question,  as  follows  : 

“ For  Canada  and  for  Australia,  as  well  as  for  America, 
the  economic  pressure  of  Japan  involves  problems  of 
far-reaching  importance,  seriously  affecting  Imperial 
policies  and  the  balance  of  power.  A highly  organised 
military  nation,  collectively  amongst  the  most  efficient 
on  earth,  demands  more  elbow-room  and  new  markets; 
thus  considered,  the  present  course  of  Japanese  policy 
clearly  reflects  the  elementary  truths  of  biological  science. 
The  Japanese  are  not  a passive  type  of  race,  prepared 
to  solve  the  problem  of  food  supply  by  fatalist  acceptance 
of  famines,  infanticide,  and  scourges  of  disease.  They 
prefer,  and  are  able,  to  expand  at  the  expense  of  their 
weaker  neighbours.  If  once  we  admit  the  inherent 
political  and  military  inefficiency  of  China,  the  fate  of 


JAPAN:  HER  VITAL  PROBLEM  155 


Manchuria  and  Mongolia  is  sealed.  Japan  will  not 
(indeed  she  cannot)  consent  to  be  excluded  from  those 
regions  to  gain  which  she  resisted  Russia’s  advance.” 

If  this  was  true  ten  years  ago,  Japan’s  need  of  elbow- 
room  and  new  markets  is  much  greater  to-day.  If,  as  I 
have  endeavoured  to  show,  the  maintenance  of  China’s 
sovereign  rights  and  independence  can  best  be  secured 
by  harmonious  co-operation  between  the  United  States, 
England,  and  Japan,  it  follows,  I think,  that  this  aspect 
of  the  situation  must  be  generally  recognised.  For  what 
is  the  alternative  ? To  fight  for  the  shadow  of  the  “ open 
door  ” in  Manchuria,  and  meanwhile  to  allow  China  to 
go  her  self-determined  way  to  irretrievable  ruin  ? The 
“ open  door  ” became  a shadow  in  Manchuria  when  Japan 
took  over  the  South  Manchurian  Railway  from  Russia 
as  the  price  of  victory,  and  the  real  problem  which  awaits 
solution  by  the  civilised  world  to-day  is,  how  to  preserve 
China  from  complete  dissolution,  to  re-establish  and 
guarantee  the  absolute  independence  of  her  eighteen 
provinces  under  their  own  re-organised  Government  ? 
Without  the  loyal  co-operation  of  Japan,  the  thing  cannot 
be  done;  but  there  would  seem  to  be  good  grounds  for 
hoping  that  this  co-operation  will  be  forthcoming,  unless 
an  arbitrary  disregard  of  the  fundamental  facts  of  the 
situation  should  compel  her  to  fight  for  her  very  existence. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


japan’s  policy  in  china 

In  the  previous  chapter  I have  endeavoured  to  show, 
firstly,  that  the  motive  force  behind  Japan’s  imperative 
claims  to  expansion  is  severe  economic  pressure,  due 
to  increasing  over-population  of  the  Island  Kingdom; 
secondly,  that  this  pressure  is  compelled  to  seek  relief 
on  the  Asiatic  continent,  because  insistence  on  a free  right 
of  entry  into  America  and  Australia  is  impracticable; 
thirdly,  because  it  is  evident  that,  as  labourers,  colonists, 
and  farmers,  the  Japanese  cannot  hope  to  compete  with 
the  Chinese  in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  the  Japanese 
Government’s  policy  of  expansion  now  aims  chiefly  at 
obtaining  control  of  the  latent  resources  of  these  regions, 
and  developing  them  as  economic  protectorates,  so  to 
speak,  for  the  supply  of  raw  materials.  I have  also 
endeavoured  to  show  that,  if  China  is  to  be  protected 
from  internal  disintegration,  a common  purpose  of  good 
will  towards  her  must  actuate  the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  and  Japan ; that  this  cannot  possibly  be  achieved 
if  Japan  has  reason  to  consider  that  her  claims  to  expan- 
sion are  being  arbitrarily  thwarted  by  the  same  Powers 
which  deny  her  the  rights  of  emigration  to  white  men’s 
countries ; and  that  therefore  it  would  seem  to  be  good 
statesmanship  to  recognise  Japan’s  “ special  interests  ” 
in  Manchuria  and  Mongolia.  Such  recognition,  of  course, 
would  have  to  form  part  of  a general  settlement  of  the 
Far  Eastern  question,  the  main  purpose  of  which  would 
be  to  reaffirm,  and  guarantee  beyond  all  risk  of  further 
violation,  the  fundamental  object  of  the  Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance,  namely  : 

156 


JAPAN’S  POLICY  IN  CHINA  157 


“ The  preservation  of  the  common  interests  of  all 
Powers  in  China,  by  ensuring  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of 
all  nations  in  China.” 

As  far  back  as  1913,  in  connection  with  the  old  Con- 
sortium’s reorganisation  “ loan  negotiations,”  the  Russian 
and  Japanese  Governments  filed  their  claims  to  respective 
" special  rights  and  interests  ” in  Manchuria  and  Mon- 
golia. Russia,  for  the  time  being,  has  left  the  stage; 
but  Japan,  in  forming  the  new  Consortium  initiated  by 
the  United  States  Government,  has  reasserted  (though 
in  a modified  form)  her  separate  claim.  The  Japanese 
base  their  claim  in  this  matter  upon  strategical  and  also 
upon  economic  grounds.  Discussing  the  matter  with 
one  of  the  Under-Secretaries  of  the  Foreign  Office  at 
Tokyo,  I was  informed  that  ''  Japan’s  claim,  prompted 
as  it  is  by  the  special  relations  in  which  she  stands  with 
Manchuria  and  Mongolia,  is  only  the  demand  for  a 
reservation,  whereby  certain  enterprises  vital  to  her 
existence  and  self-defence  could,  if  required  by  the  force 
of  circumstances,  be  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
Consortium.”  Viscount  Uchida,  the  Foreign  Minister, 
and  other  statesmen  whose  views  on  the  subject  have 
been  made  public,  are  generally  content  to  base  their 
objections  to  international  enterprises  in  these  regions 
on  the  ground  of  their  “ territorial  propinquity  ” to 
Japan.  They  also  point  out  that  the  present  dangerous 
position  of  affairs  in  Siberia,  abandoned  by  the  Allies, 
makes  it  more  necessary  than  ever  for  Japan  to  protect 
her  national  interests.  But,  stripped  of  all  diplomatic 
verbiage,  the  simple  fact  emerges  that  Japan  won  her 
" special  interests  ” in  Manchuria  at  the  cost  of  a long 
and  costly  war  with  Russia,  and  that,  had  she  not  done 
this,  these  provinces  would  long  since  have  been  Russian. 
As  far  back  as  1907,  when  she  vetoed  British  and  American 
railway  concessions  granted  by  the  Chinese  Government 
in  Manchuria,  she  gave  an  unmistakable  indication  of 


158  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


the  policy  which  she  has  since  consistently  pursued,  so 
that  the  Consortium  reservation  is  no  new  thing. 

Inasmuch  as  the  nature  of  Japan’s  “ special  rights  and 
interests  ” has  never  been  definitely  submitted  to,  or 
recognised  in  detail  by,  the  Governments  concerned,  and 
because,  while  claiming  special  rights  and  interests, 
Japan  has  always  been  at  pains  to  assert  that  they  involve 
no  economic  monopolies  and  will  not  violate  the  principle 
of  the  “ open  door,”  they  should  provide  scope  for  negotia- 
tion and  a basis  for  revision  of  the  whole  situation  in  the 
Far  East.  That  revision  should  entail  not  only  a settle- 
ment of  the  Shantung  question,  with  full  recognition  of 
China’s  unimpaired  sovereignty  throughout  the  entire 
province,  but  the  abolition  of  all  “ special  interests  ” in 
China  proper  which  infringe  or  diminish  that  sovereignty. 
Assuming  that  Japan  is  really  prepared  to  act  in  concert 
with  Great  Britain  and  America,  and  in  the  best  interests 
of  China,  recognition  of  her  privileged  position  in  Man- 
churia and  Mongolia  should  be  balanced  by  her  consent 
to  a new  deal  and  a square  deal  all  round.  The  civilised 
world  might  acquiesce  with  a clear  conscience  in  Japanese 
economic  expansion  into  the  undeveloped  and  loosely- 
held  dependencies  north  of  the  Great  Wall,  but  if  there 
be  any  truth  in  all  our  profession  of  noble  ideals,  any 
real  sympathy  for  the  misfortunes  of  the  Chinese  nation, 
the  Powers  must  agree,  once  and  for  all,  to  call  a halt 
to  further  exploitation  of  this  defenceless  people.  For 
Mongolia  is,  so  to  speak,  an  empty  house,  and  Manchuria 
a house  with  rooms  to  let ; but  China’s  house  is  her  own, 
and  its  many  mansions  are  crowded;  there  is  no  room 
in  them  for  hungry  strangers. 

If  one  were  justified  in  gauging  the  future  development 
of  the  situation  by  the  light  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment’s recent  declarations  of  its  policy  towards  China, 
such  an  agreement  as  I have  outlined  above  would  appear 
to  be  not  only  feasible,  but  to  the  obvious  advantage  of 
all  concerned,  since  only  by  some  such  understanding 
can  China’s  resources  be  peacefully  and  rapidly  developed 


JAPAN’S  POLICY  IN  CHINA 


159 


for  the  common  benefit  of  the  world’s  trade.  Looking 
back  over  the  past  three  years,  we  find  a remarkable 
family  likeness  in  all  the  pronouncements  by  Japan’s 
Foreign  Ministers  in  regard  to  China.  At  the  close  of 
1916,  the  policy  publicly  announced  by  Count  Terauchi 
and  his  Cabinet  was  founded  on  a self-denying  resolution 
to  allow  China  henceforward  to  manage  her  own  affairs 
without  interference;  to  co-operate  with  China  for  the 
preservation  of  peace  in  the  Orient ; and  not  to  seek  to 
acquire  any  further  “ rights  and  special  interests  ” in 
China.  Since  then  many  similar  declarations  have  been 
recorded.  For  example,  Viscount  Uchida,  the  present 
Foreign  Minister,  announced  in  January  1919,  “ in  view 
of  mischievous  rumours  that  had  been  circulated,”  that 
Japan  had  no  territorial  ambitions  in  China,  as  elsewhere ; 
neither  did  she  contemplate  any  action  which  might 
militate  against  the  development  of  the  legitimate 
interest  and  welfare  of  the  Chinese  nation.  Again,  at 
last  year’s  opening  of  the  Diet,  the  same  Minister  an- 
nounced that  it  was  contrary  to  the  desires  of  the  Japanese 
Government  that  “ civil  strife  should  be  protected  in 
China  for  years.  It  was  really  in  the  hope  of  facilitating 
the  reconciliation  of  the  North  and  South  that  we  have 
taken  so  much  pains  in  the  control  of  loans,  as  well  as  in 
the  restrictions  of  the  export  of  arms  to  China.  In  short, 
we  are  most  anxious  to  see  an  early  completion  of  the 
work  of  unification  in  China.” 

So  far,  so  good.  Japan’s  declared  policy  towards 
China  is,  on  the  face  of  it,  calculated  to  facilitate  the 
concerted  action  required  to  restore  good  government 
in  that  country.  Unfortunately,  however,  it  still  remains 
true  that  Japan’s  foreign  policy  is  not  in  the  hands  of 
her  Foreign  Minister,  or,  for  that  matter,  in  the  hands 
of  the  Cabinet.  And  it  is  also  incontrovertibly  true  that, 
during  the  past  six  years,  while  England  was  fighting  for 
her  national  existence,  the  invisible  Powers  behind  the 
Throne,  which  actually  control  Japanese  policy,  have 
done  many  things  in  China  which  are  not  only  flagrantly 


160  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


opposed  to  the  public  declarations  of  the  Government, 
but  are  in  direct  violation  of  the  spirit  and  the  letter 
of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance.  Making  all  due  allow- 
ance for  Japan’s  economic  difficulties,  and  for  her  natural 
desire  to  take  every  advantage  of  the  opportunities 
created  by  the  war  to  establish  herself  in  a preferential 
position  in  China;  making  allowance  also  for  the  indis- 
putable fact  that  the  arbitrary  demands  which  she 
forced  upon  China  in  May  1915  were  chiefly  inspired  by 
the  conviction  that  Germany  would  win  the  war — it 
still  remains  impossible  to  reconcile  her  actual  and  present 
proceedings  in  China  with  her  public  professions  of  good 
will  toward  that  country  and  her  avowed  respect  for  the 
principle  of  the  “ open  door.” 

Let  us  consider,  in  the  first  instance,  the  public  utter- 
ances of  Viscount  Uchida,  above  quoted,  and  compare 
them  with  the  actual  facts  of  the  situation.  The  Foreign 
Minister  declares  it  to  be  the  policy  of  his  Government 
" to  facilitate  the  reconciliation  of  the  North  and  the 
South,”  and  to  “ assist  in  the  work  of  unification  in 
China.”  But  he  knows — indeed,  the  whole  world  knows — 
that  the  chief  cause  of  quarrel  between  the  political  faction 
which  calls  itself  the  South,  and  the  party  in  power  at 
Peking,  lies  in  the  secret  agreements  which  the  latter  has 
been  compelled  or  persuaded  to  make  with  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Japanese  General  Staff,  the  irresponsible 
but  real  controllers  of  Japan’s  foreign  policy.  He  knows 
that  the  Military  Agreement  of  March  1918,  in  particular, 
has  aroused  something  more  than  partisan  hostility  in 
China,  that  all  the  best  elements  in  the  country  resent 
and  fear  the  dominating  influence  which  Japan  has 
thereby  acquired  over  the  corrupt  politicians  of  the 
“ Northern  ” party.  As  to  “ the  pains  which  Japan  has 
taken  in  the  control  of  loans  and  export  of  arms  to 
China,”  there  has  undoubtedly  been  a certain  slackening 
of  activity  of  late  on  the  part  of  Japanese  official  and 
semi-official  money-lenders,  which  may  possibly  be 
attributed  to  the  revival  of  the  Consortium,  but  is  more 


FUJIYAMA,  THE  PEERLESS. 


JAPAN’S  POLICY  IN  CHINA  161 


probably  due  to  the  fact  that  every  reliable  security  has 
now  been  pledged.  Some  thirty  secret  loan  agreements 
were  made  by  Japanese  agents  at  Peking  and  in  the 
provinces  during  1918,  the  security  usually  being  some 
railway,  mine  or  industrial  concern,  possession  of  which 
is  calculated  to  promote  Japanese  control  of  raw  materials 
at  their  source.  The  total  amount  of  these  loans 
exceeds  200,000,000  yen.  That  these  equivocal  activities 
represent  a definite  policy  is  clearly  indicated  by  the 
rewards  and  decorations  which  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment has  bestowed  upon  officials  of  the  Finance  Depart- 
ment “ for  services  rendered  in  connection  with  loans  to 
China,”  and  to  military  officers  “ upon  the  conclusion  of 
the  Sino-Japanese  Military  Agreement.” 

It  is  unnecessary  to  labour  the  point.  It  is  undeniable 
that,  next  to  the  disorganisation  of  China,  the  most 
important  factor  in  the  Far  Eastern  problem  lies  in  the 
hidden  hand  of  the  Military  Party  at  Tokyo.  As  it  was 
thirty  years  ago,  so  it  is  to-day — Japan’s  policy  in  foreign 
affairs  is  directed  not  by  the  Foreign  Office,  but  by  the 
War  Office.  The  voice  is  the  voice  of  Uchida,  but  the 
hand  is  the  unseen  hand  of  Yamagata.  Therefore,  in 
considering  the  possibility  of  a new  deal  and  a square 
deal  in  the  Far  East,  one  is  always  confronted  by  the 
question  : Is  the  power  of  the  Military  Party  really 

waning  (as  every  one  in  Japan  assures  you  it  is),  and 
will  it  be  replaced  by  real  Cabinet  government  in  time 
to  allow  of  satisfactory  co-operation  between  the  great 
commercial  nations  ? I have  discussed  this  question 
with  leading  men  of  all  parties  in  Japan,  from  the  Prime 
Minister  downwards — with  politicians,  business  men,  and 
journalists — and  everywhere  I find  them  expressing  the 
same  opinion,  namely,  that  the  liberal  and  conciliatory 
policy  proclaimed  in  the  Government’s  public  utter- 
ances will  surely  triumph  over  the  Imperialist  and 
aggressive  policy  of  the  Military  Party,  and  that  before 
long  representative  government  will  replace  the  domina- 
tion of  the  Satsuma-Choshiu  Clans.  Nevertheless,  it 

M 


162  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


remains  true  that  Japan’s  policy  in  China  is  still  domi- 
nated by  the  military  staff,  and  this  fact  makes  it  im- 
possible to  regard  the  declarations  of  her  Foreign  Ministers 
as  more  than  pious  aspirations.  One  of  the  best  books 
that  has  been  written  on  this  situation  in  the  Orient 
since  the  war,  Mr.  Frederick  Coleman’s  Unveiling  of  the 
Far  East,  shows  that  in  1916  Japanese  statesmen  spoke 
of  the  waning  influence  of  the  military  party  just  as 
confidently  as  they  do  to-day,  and  professed  the  same 
faith  in  the  triumph  of  a liberal  policy  of  fair  competition 
or  friendly  co-operation  in  China.  But  the  fact  remains 
that  the  aggressive  and  unjustifiable  policy  of  the  “ twenty- 
one  demands  ” of  May  1915  is  still  in  force,  that  the 
secret  Sino-Japanese  Military  Agreement  of  March  1918 
has  aggravated  the  situation  thereby  created,  and  that 
neither  public  opinion  as  voiced  in  the  Press,  nor  the 
responsible  government  of  Japan,  gives  any  indication 
of  a determination  to  put  an  end  to  this  anomalous  state 
of  affairs.  Yet  end  it  must,  if  there  is  to  be  any  renewal 
of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  and  any  hope  of  peace 
in  the  Orient. 

On  March  1,  1920,  I had  an  opportunity  of  dis- 
cussing these  matters  with  Viscount  Kato,  who  was 
Foreign  Minister  at  the  time  the  famous  “ Twenty-One 
Demands  ” were  formulated.  He  took  occasion  to  observe 
that  the  fifth  group  of  those  demands  (subsequently 
withdrawn)  was  never  meant  to  be  anything  more  than 
an  expression  of  the  Japanese  Government’s  hopes  and 
wishes.  Without  contesting  this  somewhat  delicate 
question,  or  referring  to  the  still  more  delicate  point  that 
President  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  had  been  bound  over  to  keep 
these  hopes  and  wishes  secret,  I pointed  out  that,  accord- 
ing to  common  report  in  Peking,  the  present  secret 
Military  Agreement  confers  on  the  Japanese  military 
party,  its  heirs  and  assigns,  rights  and  special  interests 
very  similar  in  effect  to  the  “ hopes  ” abandoned  with 
Group  V of  this  secret  agreement.  Viscount  Kato,  like 
every  one  else  in  Japan,  professed  ignorance ; but,  looking 


JAPAN’S  POLICY  IN  CHINA  163 


at  the  matter  from  the  point  of  view  required  by  the 
Anglo- Japanese  Alliance,  he  was  bound  to  confess  that 
the  agreement  would  either  have  to  be  terminated  before 
long  or  its  terms  made  public. 

This  so-called  Mihtary  Agreement  was,  in  effect,  nothing 
more  than  a financial  deal,  by  virtue  of  which  Tuan 
Chi-jui  and  his  friends  kept  themselves  in  power  and 
funds,  by  the  aid  of  Japanese  loans.  Two  months  after 
it  was  made,  the  Chinese  Government,  to  allay  the  sus- 
picions which  it  had  aroused,  published  a statement  to 
the  effect  that  it  was  intended  to  provide  for  joint  military 
action  against  German  and  Bolshevik  movements  in  the 
Siberian  borders.  “ The  scheme,”  said  this  statement, 
“ has  no  reference  to  any  other  matters,  and  will  lapse 
with  the  conclusion  of  the  war.  The  agreement  will 
not  actually  become  operative  unless  enemy  influences 
actually  penetrate  Siberia.  It  is  not  a Treaty,  but  an 
understanding,  which  becomes  null  and  void  if  there  is 
no  danger  of  enemy  invasion.  The  only  reason  for 
non-pubhcation  of  its  terms  is  to  prevent  their  coming 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy.  The  convention  involves 
no  loss  of  territorial  sovereign  rights  and  confers  no 
privileges  on  Japan.”  An  official  statement  was  pub- 
lished by  the  Japanese  Government  on  June  8 to  the 
same  effect. 

But  what  are  the  facts  to-day,  when  the  war  has  been 
over  for  more  than  two  years  and  the  Allies  have  with- 
drawn from  Siberia  ? It  is  evident  that  the  avowed  object 
of  the  agreement  has  ceased  to  exist  and  that  there  can 
be  no  further  justification  for  concealing  its  terms,  quite 
apart  from  the  provisions  that,  by  the  terms  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Agreement,  Great  Britain  is  entitled  to  know 
them.  But  according  to  Tang  Shao-yi,  and  others  who 
are  in  a position  to  know  the  facts,  the  Agreement  will 
not  lapse,  because  it  was  secretly  renewed  by  exchange 
of  letters  in  the  spring  of  1919.  The  420  Japanese 
mihtary  officers  attached  to  the  Chinese  forces  in  Chihli 
and  Fengtien  will  not  fold  up  their  tents  like  the  Arab — 


164  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


at  least,  not  just  yet.  The  Sino-Japanese  Military  Agree- 
ment, with  all  that  it  entails,  will  remain  valid  and 
binding  upon  China  as  long  as  the  General  Staff  at  Tokyo 
desires  it. 

Several  sincerely  liberal-minded  public  men  in  Japan 
(such  as  Mr.  Ozaki  of  the  Kenseikai  party)  assured  me 
that  all  these  sad,  bad  things  are  rapidly  passing  away, 
and  that,  even  if  the  Government  cannot  yet  control 
the  unfortunate  proceedings  of  the  General  Staff,  there 
is  every  reason  to  hope  and  believe  that  the  Military 
Party  itself  is  beginning  to  realise  the  error  of  its  ways. 
Its  policy,  they  say,  may  be  expected  to  conform  in  the 
near  future  to  the  public  declarations  of  the  Government. 
Is  not  General  Tanaka,  the  Minister  for  War,  a very 
reasonable  man,  and  has  not  the  Prime  Minister  proved 
the  growing  influences  of  Liberalism  by  stopping  the  sale 
of  arms  to  China,  and  by  substituting  civilian  for  military 
authority  in  Korea  and  the  Liaotung  peninsula?  If 
only  the  world  will  be  patient,  all  will  be  well.  It  may  be 
so,  but,  as  I have  said,  the  best  men  in  Japan,  men  like 
Baron  Hayashi  and  Baron  Ishii,  were  saying  precisely 
the  same  thing  four  years  ago ; and  the  sands  are  running 
out.  I believe  that  the  influence  of  the  Chauvinists  and 
the  Jingoes  is  waning,  but  that  the  process  may  prove 
to  be  too  slow  to  be  of  much  practical  benefit  in  the 
present  critical  stage  of  the  Far  Eastern  question.  There  is, 
no  doubt,  much  truth  in  the  opinion,  frequently  expressed 
to  me  in  conversation  by  bankers  and  other  business 
men,  that  the  process  might  be  materially  accelerated 
were  there  any  indication  of  a definite  “ China  policy  ” 
either  in  England  or  the  United  States. 

Meanwhile,  there  are  signs  and  to  spare  that  the 
militarists  are  not  without  honour  in  their  own  country, 
aye,  even  among  those  who  profess  to  deplore  their 
irresponsible  activities  in  China.  One  of  the  most 
significant  of  these  straws  on  the  political  wand  is  the 
Asian  Review,  a journal  of  which  the  first  number  appeared 
with  a great  flourish  of  trumpets  in  February  1920.  It 


JAPAN’S  POLICY  IN  CHINA  165 


is  edited  by  Mr.  Ryohei  Uchida,  the  notorious  ronin 
leader  of  the  Black  Dragon  Society,  and  as  a literary 
production  calls  for  little  notice.  But  its  appearance 
on  the  scene  at  this  juncture,  with  a published  list  of 
supporters  which  includes  most  of  the  leading  men  in 
the  Government  and  the  Press,  cannot  be  ignored.  For 
Mr.  Ryohei  Uchida  and  the  Black  Dragon  Society  have 
been  too  frequently  employed  by  the  military  party  as 
agents  provocateurs,  and  have  rendered  too  many  valuable 
services  in  that  capacity,  to  be  lightly  set  aside.  Now 
the  attitude  of  the  review  is  one  of  truculent  chauvinism, 
of  impartial  hostility  to  Great  Britain,  the  United  States, 
or  any  other  country  which  may  attempt  to  thwart  the 
Pan-Asian  dream,  with  Japan  as  undisputed  ruler  of  the 
East.  Mr.  Uchida’s  views  on  the  subject  of  “ Asia  for 
the  Asiatics,”  as  set  forth  in  an  inaugural  article,  are 
childishly  crude,  but  the  article  contains  certain  interest- 
ing admissions  concerning  the  activities  of  the  Black 
Dragon  Society  in  China,  which  should  prove  embarrass- 
ing to  some  of  his  official  supporters.  Mr.  Uchida  con- 
fesses, for  instance,  that  before  the  war  with  China,  he 
and  his  friends,  as  an  organised  association,  were  the 
first  to  “ extend  aid  to  the  Korean  people,  who  had  been 
struggling  hard  to  throw  off  the  shackles  of  Chinese 
interference.”  Again  in  1911,  “ when  a revolution  broke 
out  in  China,  we  organised  an  association  and  gave 
assistance  to  the  Chinese  revolutionaries.”  The  fact 
has  long  been  notorious  that  the  Black  Dragon  Society 
and  others  (with  the  tacit  approval  of  the  Japanese 
Government)  have  for  years  been  fomenting  rebellion 
in  the  South,  whilst  the  Japanese  Government  itself  has 
been  lending  money  to  the  North  on  the  security  of 
valuable  concessions.  The  Foreign  Minister’s  recent 
assurance,  that  it  is  the  earnest  wish  of  his  Government 
to  “ facilitate  the  reconciliation  of  the  North  and  the 
South”  gains  nothing  in  weight  from  the  publication  of 
his  own  name  and  those  of  most  of  his  colleagues  as 
supporters  of  a publicist  who  boasts  that  he  has  done 


166  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


his  best  to  prevent  that  reconciliation.  The  Asian 
Review’s  first  list  of  supporters  included  not  only  the 
Premier,  the  Minister  for  War,  and  most  of  the  Cabinet, 
but  practically  all  the  permanent  officials  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  from  Viscount  Uchida  downwards.  Within  the 
first  few  days  after  this  journal’s  first  appearance,  I had 
occasion  to  discuss  the  matter  with  several  of  these 
officials.  I talked,  for  instance,  with  Mr.  Hanihara, 
Vice-Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  with  Mr.  Yoshizawa, 
Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Political  Affairs ; with  Viscount 
Kato,  Marquis  Komura,  and  Mr.  Tokonami,  Minister  of 
Home  Affairs,  and,  after  them,  with  a number  of  bankers, 
business  men,  and  Members  of  Parliament.  Amongst 
these  officials  I found  none  who  could  see  anything 
improper  in  the  public  association  of  their  names  with 
a propaganda  which  is  frankly  anti-British  and  provoca- 
tive. All  professed  to  regard  Mr.  Ryohei  Uchida  as  a 
harmless  fanatic,  a ronin  in  political  journalism,  who 
must  be  allowed  to  let  off  steam,  but  whose  influence  was 
absolutely  nil.  They  could  not,  or  would  not,  see  that 
if  this  man  possesses  influence  enough  to  have  his  review 
god-fathered  by  the  Premier  and  the  Minister  of  War, 
and  to  include  in  his  first  number  articles  by  Marquis 
Okuma,  Baron  Shibusawa,  and  Dr.  Soyeda,  public  opinion 
abroad  may  be  forgiven  for  not  regarding  him  as  an 
irresponsible  person. 

I have  referred  to  this  question  of  the  Asian  Review 
at  some  length  because  the  association,  however  indirect, 
of  any  member  of  the  Government  with  the  fire-eating 
leader  of  the  Black  Dragons  must  remain  open  to  serious 
misconstruction,  so  long  as  Japan’s  policy  in  China 
continues  to  express  itself  in  secret  agreements  based  on 
the  lines  of  the  “Twenty-One  Demands.”  For  it  is 
beyond  dispute  that  the  policy  represented  by  those 
“ Demands  ” and  by  the  subsequent  “ Military  Agree- 
ments ” is  practically  identical  with  the  policy  which 
Ryohei  Uchida  and  his  friends  have  consistently  advo- 
cated. Take,  for  instance,  the  Black  Dragon  chief’s 


JAPAN’S  POLICY  IN  CHINA 


167 


“ programme  for  the  solution  of  the  Chinese  question,” 
as  published  several  years  ago  in  a pamphlet  issued  for 
private  circulation  : 

“ Two  points  are  most  important  in  connection  with 
the  solution  of  this  question  : (i)  to  cause  the  sovereignty 
over  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Mongolia  to  be 
entirely  transferred  to  Japan,  and  (2)  to  hold  the  power 
of  supervision  and  direction  over  China’s  finances. 

“ South  Manchuria  and  Eastern  Mongolia,  under  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Imperial  Government,  should  be 
made  the  base  from  which  to  control  China  proper.  As 
to  China  proper,  we  should  at  first  hold  the  real  power 
of  direction  and  make  the  control  of  its  foreign  policy 
and  the  management  of  its  affairs  (internal,  financial, 
and  military)  our  goal.  To  take  all  these  matters  into 
our  hands  at  once  would  create  anxiety  in  the  world, 
but  the  acquisition  of  the  sovereignty  over  the  two 
regions  mentioned  and  of  the  power  of  direction  would 
enable  us  to  extend  our  influence  and  finally  to  attain  our 
goal. 

“ After  the  acquisition  of  the  power  to  supervise 
China’s  finances,  we  must  decrease  her  Army  and  arma- 
ments. In  case  of  trouble  arising  from  the  disbandment 
of  troops,  Japan  would  be  responsible  for  the  dispatch 
of  a force  to  suppress  it.  In  that  case,  she  would  obtain 
the  power  of  training  the  Chinese  Army  and  of  inter- 
fering with  the  internal  administration  through  the 
control  of  revenue.” 

Now  the  reader  who  has  followed  me  thus  far  will 
remember  that  the  rulers  of  Japan  consider  that  the 
country’s  economic  situation  justifies  their  claim  to 
expansion  into  the  thinly-peopled  regions  to  the  north 
of  the  Great  Wall,  and  that  this  claim  is  moreover  war- 
ranted by  the  fact  that  Japan  drove  Russia  from  these 
regions  at  great  cost  of  blood  and  treasure.  I have 
suggested  that  no  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  Far 
Eastern  question  is  possible  without  some  recognition 
of  this  claim,  which  no  Japanese  Government  would 
dare  to  abandon.  But  inasmuch  as  the  preservation  of 
China’s  independence  and  the  strict  maintenance  of  the 


168  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


“ open  door  ” are  the  only  objects  of  British  policy — to 
say  nothing  of  the  other  nations  concerned — it  is  evident 
that  the  Powers  behind  the  Consortium  must  refuse  to 
recognise  Japan’s  claims  in  this  direction  so  long  as 
there  is  any  possibility  of  Manchuria  and  Mongolia 
being  used  as  a base  for  further  aggression  upon  China 
proper.  Therefore,  so  long  as  the  activities  of  the  Military 
Party  continue  to  justify  the  suspicions  which  they  have 
aroused  since  1915,  so  long  as  the  general  tendency  of 
those  activities  proceeds  along  the  lines  advocated  by 
Mr.  Ryohei  Uchida  and  his  fellow- Jingoes,  it  is  useless 
for  either  the  Intellectuals  or  the  Liberals  to  proclaim 
their  good  intentions  towards  China  and  their  good 
faith  towards  England.  We  must  give  these  men  credit 
for  sense  enough  to  know  that  Great  Britain  is  not  likely 
to  renew  the  Alliance  under  conditions  which  would 
threaten  the  extinction  of  her  trade  with  China.  We 
must  also  believe  that  these  men  are  sincere,  when  they 
say  that  the  great  bulk  of  public  opinion  in  Japan  depre- 
cates the  proceedings  of  the  Military  Party  and  would 
like  to  see  China  helped  by  the  united  action  of  the 
friendly  Powers  to  become  a strong  nation  and  a rich 
market.  But  it  remains  for  Japan  to  give  assurances 
that  the  declared  policy  of  the  Government  will  hence- 
forth be  binding  upon  the  Military  Party,  as  well  as  upon 
its  civil  exponents. 

Close  examination  of  the  arguments  put  forth  during 
the  last  few  years  by  the  diplomatic  spokesmen  of  Japan 
(particularly  by  Marquis  Saionji  and  Marquis  Ishii)  shows 
that,  stripped  of  all  verbiage,  they  amount  to  claiming 
a privileged  position  not  only  in  Manchuria,  but  in 
China,  on  grounds  of  territorial  propinquity,  community 
of  race,  etc.  On  these  grounds,  Burma,  Siam,  and  Thibet 
might  claim  similar  advantages  with  greater  force.  The 
truth  of  the  matter,  of  course,  is  that  Japan’s  national 
existence  is  going  to  depend  more  and  more  upon  her 
being  able  to  secure  from  China  and  her  dependencies 
the  supplies  of  steel,  iron,  and  other  raw  materials  which 


JAPAN’S  POLICY  IN  CHINA  169 


she  needs  for  her  industries.  Like  Great  Britain,  though 
in  a lesser  degree,  she  has  to  face  the  problem  of  feeding 
her  surplus  millions  by  the  profits  of  those  industries, 
under  ever-increasing  competition.  Therefore,  all  her 
efforts  since  the  war  with  Russia  have  been  continually 
directed  to  making  for  herself  in  China  such  a position 
of  economic  advantage  as  shall  protect  her  hereafter 
from  that  competition  to  the  utmost  extent  possible. 
The  activities  of  the  Military  Party  at  Peking  have  only 
been  one  means  to  that  end;  those  of  her  diplomatic 
agents,  financiers,  and  merchants  have  all  contributed 
to  the  same.  But  all  with  one  accord  continue  to  pay 
lip  service  to  the  principle  of  the  “ open  door  ” because, 
since  the  war,  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  has  again 
become  a desirable  asset  and  an  insurance  policy.  From 
the  Anglo-American  point  of  view,  therefore,  there  should 
be  leverage  and  to  spare  in  the  renewal  of  that  Alliance, 
and  it  should  be  possible  thereby  to  induce  Japan  to 
abandon  those  policies  and  proceedings  which  since  1915 
have  violated  it  both  in  the  spirit  and  the  letter. 

Most  Japanese,  when  cornered  in  argument,  will  confess 
that  they  did  those  things  because,  in  1915  and  1916, 
it  seemed  to  them  that  Germany  was  not  going  to  be 
decisively  beaten,  and  that  they  were  therefore  justified 
in  pegging  out  their  new  claims  on  the  assumption  of 
a stalemate  between  the  exhausted  European  Powers. 
Cynical,  if  you  like,  and  yet  natural  enough  from  the 
Oriental  point  of  view.  But  from  the  same  point  of 
view  it  is  only  natural  for  Great  Britain  to  insist  upon 
a return  in  the  direction  of  the  status  quo  ante. 

Without  attempting  to  suggest  the  scope  and  effect 
of  such  a new  deal,  I think  it  is  evident  that,  to  be 
of  any  real  benefit  to  China,  it  should  involve  the  com- 
plete abolition  of  all  “ spheres  of  influence,”  Shantung 
included;  the  unification  of  all  railway  concessions  in 
China  proper,  under  one  Chinese  Board,  with  the  necessary 
foreign  financial  control ; and  the  cancellation  of  all  the 
vague  claims,  advisorships,  and  petty  encroachments  on 


170  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


China's  sovereignty,  which  have  grown  out  of  leased 
territories  and  concessions  and  railway  rights.  It  is  not 
seemly  that  the  Powers  should  continue  solemnly  to 
assure  each  other  of  their  unswerving  determination  to 
uphold  the  sovereignty  of  China  whilst  every  day  witnesses 
the  unprotesting  acceptance  of  fresh  encroachments  upon 
that  sovereignty.  No  nation  is  blameless  in  this  matter ; 
even  the  United  States  has  its  extra-territorialised  post 
offices,  which  compete  with,  and  at  the  present  moment 
underbid,  the  Chinese  Postal  Service.  But,  in  pursuance 
of  the  policy  of  the  “ Twenty-One  Demands,”  Japan  has 
arrogated  to  herself  rights,  powers,  and  special  interests 
for  which  there  can  be  no  possible  justification.  It  is 
not  enough  that  at  Peking  her  military  and  other  agents 
swarm  in  such  numbers  as  to  convey  the  idea  of  a Pro- 
tectorate; that  her  wireless  service  from  the  capital 
communicates  directly  with  Japan,  and  that  she  has  even 
introduced  Imperial  Japanese  pillar-boxes  and  postmen 
in  every  district  of  the  capital ; all  over  China  since  1915 
her  proceedings  have  been  those  of  a creditor  infringing 
on  the  rights  of  a defenceless  debtor. 

Of  the  Shantung  question  it  is  not  necessary  to  say 
much.  Japan  does  not  need  Kiaochao  as  a miniature 
naval  base  (the  General  Staff  advised  against  it  in  1915), 
and  the  Imperialists’  attempt  to  have  the  place  made 
into  a colony  under  a Military  Governor  was  defeated 
upon  the  advice  of  Baron  Hayashi.  It  is  therefore  to 
be  expected  that  in  due  course  Japan  will  withdraw  her 
troops  from  the  Shantung  railway  and  the  Kiaochao 
district  and  restore  Tsingtao  to  the  Chinese  authorities. 
But,  except  for  the  matter  of  Customs  revenues  and  the 
preservation  of  China’s  much-injured  “ face,”  the  restora- 
tion, as  a Chinese  writer  puts  it,  will  simply  amount  to 
handing  back  the  shell  after  eating  the  oyster.  Even  if 
President  Wilson  at  the  Versailles  Conference  had  not 
conferred  upon  Japan  by  treaty  her  rights  of  succession 
to  Germany’s  property  in  China,  and  even  if  the  Japanese 
Government  now  fulfils  its  solemn  pledge  not  to  deprive 


JAPAN’S  POLICY  IN  CHINA 


171 


China  of  anything  which  she  possessed  before  the  war, 
nothing  can  alter  the  fact  that  the  town  and  harbour  of 
Tsingtaohave  been  converted  since  1915  into  an  entrenched 
and  evidently  permanent  outpost  for  Japanese  trade. 
And  this  has  been  done  not  only  with  complete  dis- 
regard of  most  of  the  conditions  under  which  Germany 
held  the  leased  territory  from  the  Chinese,  but  in  viola- 
tion of  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  where  other 
nations  are  concerned. 

Their  desire  to  make  hay  while  the  sun  shone  was 
natural  enough,  but  the  methods  by  which  the  Japanese 
have  achieved  their  end  at  Kiaochao  have  not  been  of  a 
nature  to  endear  them  either  to  the  Chinese  or  to  other 
nations.  For  instance,  in  laying  out  the  new  Japanese 
town  which  has  replaced  the  German  colony  at  Tsingtao, 
a place  had  to  be  set  apart  for  the  local  Yoshiwara,  the 
“ red-light  section,”  without  which  no  Japanese  settle- 
ment is  ever  complete.  The  site  chosen  was  a large  one, 
and  on  it  several  blocks  of  buildings  have  been  erected 
surrounded  by  neat  gardens,  all  in  the  best  Japanese 
manner.  Unfortunately,  those  who  selected  the  spot 
overlooked  the  fact  that  it  adjoins  the  residences  and 
schools  of  the  Presbyterian  Mission.  This  is,  no  doubt, 
one  of  the  cases  which  that  prolific  apologist,  Mr.  Kawa- 
kami,  would  include  in  his  list  of  “ unfortunate  blunders  ” ; 
and  he  might  add  that  it  took  place  five  years  ago.  But 
there  are  other  and  much  more  recent  cases.  Early  in 
1920  there  were  several  ex-German  properties  to  be 
disposed  of  by  public  auction  at  Tsingtao,  for  some  of 
which  the  agents  of  three  or  four  well-known  British 
firms  had  been  instructed  to  bid.  On  a certain  Tuesday 
the  Japanese  authorities  gave  notice  that  the  auction 
would  take  place  on  the  following  Friday,  but  that  only 
registered  estate  agents  would  be  allowed  to  bid.  As 
this  class  consisted  entirely  of  Japanese,  the  results  of 
the  auction  would  have  been  a foregone  conclusion  had 
it  taken  place.  But  the  Foreign  Office  in  London  spoke 
the  word  in  season  and  Tokyo  cancelled  the  arrangements. 


172  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


One  meets  with  many  honest  gentlemen  in  Japan  who 
inquire  why  it  is  that  their  countrymen  have  become  so 
generally  disliked  abroad  in  recent  years.  Incidents  of 
the  kind  above  described  suggest  one  answer  to  that 
question.  They  suggest  also  the  reflection  that  Tokyo 
can,  if  it  will,  prevent  many  of  these  things,  and  that 
the  establishment  of  a good  understanding  between  the 
Powers  must  hereafter  depend  to  a very  great  extent 
upon  the  class  of  agents  that  Japan  employs  in  China 
and  the  orders  upon  which  they  proceed. 

England,  in  particular,  has  reason  to  complain  of 
her  Allies'  activities  in  China  during  the  past  five  years. 
I need  not  dwell  on  the  violent  anti-British  Press  campaign 
which  broke  out  and  swept  through  Japan,  with  scarcely 
a protesting  voice,  in  1916,  when  Germany’s  star  appeared 
to  be  in  the  ascendant.  It  was  not  what  we  had  a right 
to  expect  from  a nation  that  prides  itself  on  chivalry, 
but  the  Japanese  would  wish  that  unfortunate  episode 
to  be  forgotten ; let  bygones  be  bygones.  Their  feverish 
hay-making  in  China,  however,  and  especially  in  the 
Yangtsze  Valley,  at  the  time  when  Great  Britain  was 
not  in  a position  to  protect  her  interests,  could  hardly 
help  leaving  a distinctly  disagreeable  impression.  Their 
activities  in  the  matter  of  loans  to  the  provincial  authori- 
ties, and  of  railway  and  mining  concessions  in  the  Yangtsze 
provinces,  have  all  been  conducted  without  the  slightest 
regard  for  Great  Britain’s  prior  claims  to  a particular 
interest  in  the  development  of  this  region.  They  may 
say,  no  doubt,  that  Great  Britain’s  claim  to  a sphere  of 
interest  had  been  allowed  to  lapse  in  1900  and  again  in 
1909,  after  having  been  successfully  contested  by  the 
Germans ; but  this  line  of  argument  overlooks  the  moral 
obligations  incumbent  upon  a loyal  Ally.  When,  for 
example,  in  January  1915,  the  Japanese  Government 
instructed  its  Minister  at  Peking  to  include  under  Group 
III  of  the  “ Twenty-One  Demands  ” recognition  of 
Japan’s  claims  to  priority  of  rights  in  the  Hanvehping 
Coal  and  Iron  Company,  with  an  extensive  mining 


JAPAN’S  POLICY  IN  CHINA  173 


monopoly  attached  thereto,  it  was  not  “ playing  the 
game.”  It  was  a direct  attack  upon  the  principle  of  equal 
industrial  opportunity  at  a point  where  England  was 
fully  entitled  to  expect  fair  play.  The  Ally,  whose  claims 
we  have  recognised  to  veto  all  but  Japanese  railway 
concessions  in  Manchuria,  and  who  now  claims  the  rever- 
sion of  Germany’s  exclusive  privileges  in  Shantung, 
should  have  been  the  last  to  assert  her  determination  to 
establish  herself  at  the  heart  of  the  Yangtsze  Valley  by 
means  of  concessions  privily  obtained  by  loans  to  hungry 
Chinese  officials.  Japan  now  keeps  a small  garrison  at 
Hankow,  intended,  no  doubt,  to  emphasise  the  principle 
of  the  “ open  door.”  Her  agents  are  also  working  con- 
tinually, and  by  methods  which  will  seldom  bear  inspec- 
tion, to  increase  Japanese  political  influence  at  Shanghai. 
If  Japan’s  urgent  need  is  trade,  if  she  must  at  all  costs 
find  and  develop  new  markets,  the  same  holds  good  of 
Great  Britain.  Japan  has  all  the  advantage  of  geo- 
graphical propinquity ; to  seek  further  and  unfair  advan- 
tage at  her  Allies’  expense  is  surely  bad  policy;  and 
many  fair-minded  men  in  Japan  recognise  the  fact. 

A good  many  business  men  with  whom  I had  occasion 
to  discuss  these  matters,  frankly  admitted  that  so  long  as 
Mr.  Obata  continues  to  be  Minister  at  Peking  it  may 
reasonably  be  assumed  that  Japanese  policy  in  China  will 
continue  to  be  framed  in  the  spirit  of  the  “ Twenty-One 
Demands,”  and  distinguished,  moreover,  by  an  unpleasant 
combination  of  slimness  and  aggressiveness.  From  per- 
sonal observation  I can  vouch  for  it  that  if  the  Japanese 
Government  wishes  to  avoid  increasingly  cordial  re- 
lations with  China,  they  have  got  the  right  man  in 
Mr.  Minister  Obata  at  Peking.  Those  who  believe  that 
the  policy  of  friendliness  and  fair  dealing  is  destined 
before  long  to  triumph  over  the  Military  Party  and  its 
preference  for  ways  that  are  dark,  believe  also  that  Mr. 
Obata  will  soon  be  translated.  There  have  been  rumours 
lately  in  Tokyo  that  Mr.  Minister  Ijuin  is  likely  to  resume 
his  old  post  at  Peking,  and  that  important  changes  will 


174  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


be  made  at  the  Foreign  Office.  Should  these  changes 
occur,  they  will  go  far  to  justify  fair  hopes  of  a settlement 
of  the  Far  Eastern  question  on  a basis  of  good  under- 
standing and  good  will. 

It  is  evident  that  the  present  position  of  affairs,  especially 
as  regards  the  Shantung  question  (not  to  speak  of  secret 
agreements),  cannot  continue  indefinitely.  Sooner  or 
later  there  must  be  an  International  Conference  of  the 
Powers  chiefly  concerned  for  the  settlement  of  these 
questions.  In  September  1916,  the  State  Department 
at  Washington  let  it  be  knowm  that  it  would  take  up 
these  and  other  questions  “ with  all  the  world  Powers 
actually  or  tacitly  committed  to  the  ‘ open  door  ’ policy.” 
But  experience  of  international  affairs  in  China  has 
generally  proved  that  where  the  Powers  concerned  are 
numerous,  conferences  are  unprofitable  and  unpractical, 
and  that  they  lead  chiefly  to  the  exhibition  of  inter- 
national jealousy,  from  which  the  mandarins  issue  dis- 
creetly triumphant.  It  would  therefore  seem  most 
desirable  that  without  further  delay  Great  Britain  should 
communicate  fully  and  frankly,  as  the  Treaty  of  Alliance 
prescribes,  and  make  proposals  to  Japan  for  regularising 
the  entire  situation.  But  two  conditions  must  be  essential 
preliminaries  to  any  general  negotiation : first,  that 

Japan  should  be  willing  to  co-operate  loyally  in  such 
measures  as  may  be  proposed  for  the  financial  recon- 
struction of  China;  second,  that  the  Military  Party  in 
Japan  should  cease  from  carrying  out  an  independent 
policy,  which  conflicts  with  the  Japanese  Government’s 
public  assurances  and  undertakings. 

Many  competent  observers  of  Oriental  affairs  consider 
that  this  second  condition  is  not  likely  to  be  attained 
until  Marshal  Prince  Yamagata  shall  have  passed  from 
the  scene.  Time  will  show.  Personally,  I believe  that 
the  moment  is  opportune  for  this  vital  change,  and  that 
the  strength  of  Liberalism  in  Japan  should  be  sufficient 
to  achieve  it,  if  convinced  of  the  sympathy  and  confidence 
of  public  opinion  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 


JAPAN’S  POLICY  IN  CHINA 


175 


Premier  Hara  and  the  Seiyukai  Party  behind  him  would, 
I believe,  welcome  an  Anglo- American- Japanese  entente 
and  a common  reconstructive  policy  in  China — indeed, 
they  have  publicly  advocated  it.  For  they,  like  our- 
selves, have  one  principal  object  in  view,  which  is  trade, 
and  ever  more  trade,  in  China;  and  the  events  of  the 
last  few  years  have  convinced  many  of  them  that  the 
Military  Party’s  methods  are  not  calculated  to  advance 
that  object.  And  even  those  who  hold  that  a continuance 
of  chaos  in  China  would  be  profitable  to  Japan,  are  begin- 
ning to  realise  that  such  profit  would  be  very  dearly 
purchased  at  the  price  of  national  isolation. 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE  JAPAN  OF  TO-DAY 

In  China,  despite  the  parlous  state  of  politics  and  the 
fictitious  clamour  of  the  students,  one  feels,  as  of  old, 
that  the  established  order,  the  structural  life  of  the  people, 
rests  upon  solid  foundations  of  ancient  and  venerable 
tradition.  Perils  of  change  there  are,  of  course,  actions 
and  reactions ; but  most  of  them  are  external,  imposed 
by  the  invading  alien,  and  therefore  of  their  nature, 
impermanent.  They  are  but  wind-driven  breakers,  roar- 
ing on  the  rocks  : beyond  them,  “ unsailed  by  ship  of 
yours,  stretch  to  the  blue  horizon  the  silent  spaces  of  the 
sea,”  the  tranquil,  brooding  soul  of  a nation  whose  philo- 
sophy has  stood  the  test  of  ages.  So  far  as  the  mind  of 
the  Chinese  people  is  concerned,  our  five  years  of  devastat- 
ing war  might  have  been  fought  on  another  planet : its 
causes  and  results  concern  them  no  more  than  the  rumble 
of  a distant  drum. 

In  Japan  (revisited  for  the  first  time  after  ten  years)  I 
found  myself  wondering,  as  of  old,  at  that  quality  in 
the  average  European  resident  which  “ cannot  see  the 
wood  because  of  the  trees.”  Just  as  the  student  clamour 
in  China  tends  to  confuse  the  historical  sense  and  political 
perspective  of  the  Treaty  Port  inhabitants,  so  in  Japan, 
observers  on  the  spot  seem  to  be  so  impressed  by  the 
growth  of  political  ferment  and  labour  unrest,  that  they 
are  liable  to  lose  sight  of  the  inherent  vitality  and  cohesive 
value  of  the  family  system,  on  which  the  whole  structure 
of  Japan’s  society  is  based.  A great  strain  is  being  brought 
to  bear  upon  Japan’s  social  structure  by  reason  of  her 
rapid  transition  into  industrialism,  of  her  newly-acquired 
wealth,  and  the  effect  of  Western  political  ideas  upon  the 

176 


THE  JAPAN  OF  TO-DAY 


177 


masses  since  the  war.  Of  this  there  is  no  doubt ; but 
those  who  judge  by  the  more  uncivil  and  unruly  elements 
of  Japanese  life  with  which,  alas,  one  meets  at  the  sea 
ports,  and  come  thus  to  darkly  pessimistic  conclusions, 
are  inclined  to  overlook  the  protective  force  of  the  family 
system.  It  constitutes,  beyond  all  doubt,  the  strongest 
moral  and  political  force  in  Japan ; so  deep  in  the  past  lie 
its  roots,  so  strong  are  its  inherited  impulses  of  obedience 
and  loyalty,  that  I cannot  bring  myself  to  believe  that 
Western  civilisation  will  ever  dominate  or  destroy  it. 
Beyond  the  voices  of  the  politicians  and  the  turmoil  of 
the  Press,  I see,  with  the  eye  of  faith,  “ these  that  dig  and 
weave,  that  plant  and  build ; men  whose  deeds  are  good, 
though  their  words  may  be  few;  men  whose  lives  are 
worthy  of  honour,  be  they  never  so  humble,”  and  I 
remember  gratefully  that  there  are  as  yet  only  about  two 
million  Japanese  in  factories,  while  more  than  half  the 
population  are  living  and  working  on  the  land. 

Nevertheless,  there  is  a sense  of  increasing  tension,  of 
contagious  unrest,  in  Japan,  which  has  no  counterpart  in 
China,  and  which  is  giving  food  for  anxious  thought  to  the 
nation’s  leaders.  It  is  essentially  a town-bred  disease, 
but  it  is  serious  for  all  that,  now  that  Tokyo  has  grown  to 
be  a city  of  three  million  inhabitants,  and  popular  educa- 
tion and  railways  have  brought  the  newspapers  into  the 
country  districts.  It  is  an  unrest  both  social  and  political, 
and  its  origin  may  be  ascribed  in  large  measure  to  the  war, 
which,  as  I have  shown,  has  increased  the  cost  of  living 
for  the  masses,  while  it  has  brought  enormous  fortunes 
to  a small  class  of  privileged  traders  and  profiteers. 

Long  ago,  Lafcadio  Hearn,  in  Japan:  An  Interpreta- 
tion, predicted  that  the  country  of  his  adoption  would 
incur  its  greatest  perils  if,  as  he  feared,  spiritual  decay 
should  follow  in  the  wake  of  sordid  commercialism.  He, 
who  sincerely  admired  the  Japanese,  who  loved  the  dignity 
and  wisdom  of  the  “ Way  of  the  Gods,”  described  the 
effect  of  the  West’s  modern  materialism  upon  the  ancient 
virtues  of  loyalty  and  courage  and  simple  faith ; and 

N 


178  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


many  of  Japan’s  wisest  and  best  leaders  have  realised  this 
danger,  and  have  striven,  as  far  as  possible,  gradually  to 
adapt  the  material  and  political  devices  of  the  West  to 
the  existing  social  structure,  to  assimilate  and  utilise  our 
many  inventions  without  loss  of  national  individuality 
and  virtue.  From  the  outset  of  Japan’s  relations  with 
the  outside  world  it  has  been  the  fixed  policy  of  her  older 
statesmen,  beginning  with  Ito  and  Inouye,  to  build  the 
new  edifice  of  State  upon  the  old  foundations.  Their 
determination  to  permit  no  violent  break  with  the  past 
undoubtedly  saved  the  nation  from  many  perils  of  violent 
factions.  To  cite  one  instance  only,  it  has  enabled  the 
people  to  study  the  practical  machinery  of  representative 
government,  even  though  the  Diet  is  a voice  without 
authority  and  all  real  power  is  still  vested  in  the  hands 
of  the  old  ruling  class;  thus,  by  process  of  education, 
the  masses  of  the  people  are  gradually  being  fitted  to 
take  their  part  in  the  expression  of  public  opinion. 

The  effects  of  the  war  have  undoubtedly  disturbed  the 
calculations  of  Japan’s  rulers  in  more  than  one  direction. 
They  have  produced  a wave  of  restlessness,  indiscipline, 
and  incivility  amongst  the  town-bred  labouring  classes. 
Indeed,  the  sudden  ferment  of  new  ideas  has  manifested 
itself  throughout  all  classes  of  society.  When  a professor 
of  the  Tokyo  Imperial  University  is  dismissed  for  trans- 
lating Prince  Kropotkin’s  Essays  on  the  Blessedness  of 
Anarchy,  and  when,  within  a comparatively  short  space 
of  time,  four  young  ladies  of  good  family  elope  with  their 
chauffeurs ; when  thousands  of  women  meet  in  a kimono’d 
Convention  at  Osaka  to  discuss  their  rights — there  is 
evidently  something  to  account  for  the  pessimism  of 
Japanese  Conservatives,  when  they  declare  that  the  family 
system  is  in  danger  and  that  the  nation  will  perish  with 
it.  In  the  same  spirit  you  may  hear  elderly  gentlemen 
in  London  Clubs  predicting  the  immediate  end  of  the 
British  Empire  because,  for  a little  while,  the  deep-rooted 
common-sense  of  the  English  working-man  has  been  misled 
by  the  plausible  clap-trap  of  our  parlour  Bolsheviks. 


THE  JAPAN  OF  TO-DAY 


179 


In  the  domain  of  politics  in  Japan  it  is  unsafe  to  attach 
too  much  importance  to  the  currents  of  thought  which 
prevail  at  any  particular  moment,  however  deep  they  may 
appear  to  be.  For  your  Japanese,  like  the  Athenians  of 
old,  is  ever  avid  of  new  things,  ever  ready  to  follow  after 
strange  gods ; his  intellectual  creed  is  largely  a matter  of 
fashion.  Therefore  it  would  seem  unwise  to  exaggerate, 
as  many  do,  the  significance  of  the  tide  of  democratic 
opinions  which  flowed  with  such  force  immediately  after 
the  defeat  of  Germany.  It  is  still  strong  enough  to  make 
many  competent  observers  believe  in  the  impending 
triumph  of  genuine  Liberalism  over  the  Military  Party, 
and  it  certainly  accounts  for  much  of  the  fervour  of  public 
opinion  on  the  subject  of  universal  suffrage.  It  is  some- 
thing, of  course,  that  the  word  “ democracy  ” is  no  longer 
tabu  to  the  platform  and  Press;  that  the  prestige  of 
Liberalism  has  been  increased,  and  that  of  the  Prussian- 
ised bureaucracy  correspondingly  diminished,  since  the 
collapse  of  German  militarism.  But  of  late  there  have 
been  signs  of  reaction,  signs  that  the  vogue  of  Liberal  and 
Democratic  ideas  is  on  the  wane.  Much  of  its  first  strength 
was  derived  from  popular  acceptance  of  the  world’s  new 
gospel  of  Democracy,  as  proclaimed  by  President  Wilson, 
but  its  ardour  has  been  unmistakably  dampened  by 
gradual  perception  of  the  truth  that  the  world  is  not 
going  to  be  saved  by  fine  phrases.  If  the  Military  Party 
in  Japan — stronghold  of  the  reactionaries — can  now  take 
new  heart  of  grace,  the  fact  is  largely  due  to  President 
Wilson’s  insistence  on  racial  discrimination  at  the  Paris 
Conference  and  to  the  American  Senate’s  refusal  to 
subscribe  to  the  League  of  Nations. 

Without  under-rating  the  strength  of  Liberalism  in 
Japan,  I believe  that  it  is  not  likely  to  achieve  a real 
triumph  over  the  Military  Party  unless  some  of  the 
elements  which  support  the  latter  are  convinced  of  the 
danger  of  national  isolation.  Surely  it  is  significant  of 
the  real  state  of  affairs,  of  the  entrenched  strength  of  the 
bureaucracy,  when  a progressive  leader,  such  as  Yukio 


180  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Ozaki,  declines  to  organise  and  lead  a Labour  Party,  and 
advises  Labour  that  for  the  present  it  should  endeavour 
to  secure  better  education  as  a step  towards  exercising 
greater  influence.  Rice  riots  and  labour  strikes  have 
their  significance,  of  course,  but  one  can  hardly  believe 
in  the  “ will  to  power  ” of  Liberalism  and  democracy  in 
Japan,  until  there  is  evidence  of  a determined  national 
movement  to  make  the  Diet  a sovereign  assembly,  not 
only  representative  of  the  people,  but  able  to  give  effect  to 
its  resolutions.  Of  this,  although  ricksha  coolies  discuss 
“ de-mo-kra-sie  ” at  street  corners,  there  is  as  yet  no  sign, 
even  in  the  high  places  of  Liberalism.  Even  supposing 
that  the  actual  rulers  of  the  country — the  aristocratic 
military  and  bureaucratic  influences  of  the  leading  Clans 
— agree  to  please  Demos  by  not  opposing  universal 
suffrage,  what  difference  can  it  make  whether  there  be 
two,  or  fifteen,  million  voters,  so  long  as  their  elected 
House  wields  no  power  except  a very  limited  power  of 
obstruction,  so  long  as  the  Government  remains  at  the 
mercy  of  the  military  and  naval  General  Staff? 

In  discussing  such  questions  with  politicians  of  all 
parties  in  Japan,  one  gets  a curious  impression  of  con- 
flicting instincts — of  a desire,  on  the  one  hand,  to  see  Japan 
take  her  place  amongst  the  politically  progressive  nations, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  of  a strange  reluctance  to  discuss 
the  mysterious  power  of  the  Military  Party.  When,  for 
instance,  I asked  Baron  Hayashi  to  explain  why  neither 
the  Kenseikai  nor  the  Independent  Party  in  the  Diet  have 
raised  the  vital  question  of  the  secret  Military  Agreement 
with  China,  the  only  explanation  he  could  give  was  that 
the  Japanese  people  “ are  very  proud  of  their  Army.” 
Yet  the  next  man  you  talk  to  will  tell  you  that  the  prestige 
of  the  military  class  has  now  so  greatly  diminished  that  no 
young  woman  of  good  family  will  marry  an  officer  if  she 
can  possibly  avoid  it.  Most  Japanese  statesmen  are  quite 
prepared  to  recognise  the  justice  of  the  contention  that, 
if  the  renewal  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance  is  to  produce 
any  satisfactory  result,  England  must  feel  secure  that  the 


THE  JAPAN  OF  TO-DAY 


181 


high  contracting  party  in  Japan  is  not  only  willing,  but 
able,  to  fulfil  its  share  of  the  pact.  But,  as  matters  stand, 
this  is  not  the  case.  In  foreign  affairs,  such  as  the  direc- 
tion of  policy  in  China,  the  hidden  hand  of  the  General 
Staff  undoubtedly  dominates  the  Cabinet. 

How,  you  may  ask,  is  this  possible?  By  an  Imperial 
Ordinance  of  December  19,  1908,  it  was  ordained  that 
the  Minister  of  War  must  be  either  a General  or  a 
Lieutenant-General,  that  is  to  say,  one  of  a total  of 
seventy-seven  officers  on  the  active  list.  Similarly,  by  an 
ordinance  of  March  31,  1916,  it  was  laid  down  that  the 
Minister  of  Marine  must  be  one  of  a list  of  forty-five 
Admirals  and  Vice-Admirals  on  the  active  list.  These 
Ministers  dominate  the  Cabinet  whenever  (as  in  the  case 
of  China)  they  attend  with  specific  instructions  from  the 
General  Staff  and  from  Prince  Yamagata  behind  it.  For 
the  resignation  of  the  War  Minister,  if  it  took  place, 
would  only  mean  the  appointment  of  another  officer  from 
the  specified  list,  acting  under  the  same  old  orders.  To 
take  a concrete  case.  If  the  Hara  Cabinet  were  categoric- 
ally to  decline  to  accept  General  Tanaka’s  views  on  the 
China  question,  and  to  insist  on  the  cancellation  of  the 
Military  Agreements  at  Peking,  the  General’s  resignation 
would  mean  the  dissolution  of  the  Government,  for  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  a Cabinet  cannot 
exist.  The  present  condition  of  affairs  differs  but  little 
in  reality  from  that  which  was  attained  at  the  Restora- 
tion by  a transference  of  power  from  the  old  feudal  Lords 
to  the  ruling  Clans  of  Satsuma  and  Choshiu,  with  Mikado- 
worship  as  a rallying-point  for  the  people.  A demand  for 
popular  rights  followed  naturally  from  the  abolition  of  the 
old  feudal  system,  but  the  Constitution  which  the  Elder 
Statesmen  provided  was  what  the  Japanese  call  “ a bone 
without  marrow.”  Its  Diet  was  never  intended  to  control 
the  Government,  and  until  the  Constitution  is  altered,  it 
never  can.  Now  every  member  of  the  Diet,  every  writer 
of  the  Japanese  Press,  knows  this  perfectly  well.  All 
of  them  will  discourse  most  earnestly  about  universal 


182  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


suffrage,  about  a conciliatory  policy  in  China,  about  the 
renewal  of  the  Alliance,  labour  reforms,  and  what-not,  but 
one  and  all  carefully  avoid  reference  to  the  only  question 
that  really  matters.  When  the  Kenseikai  or  the  Press 
begin  to  move  in  earnest  for  the  revocation  of  the  Imperial 
Ordinances,  to  which  I have  referred  above,  when  the 
Government  can  give  the  portfolio  of  the  War  Ministry 
to  a civilian,  it  will  be  time  enough  to  regard  Liberalism 
in  Japan  as  a completely  effective  factor  in  the  situation. 
But  not  before. 

There  is  much  food  for  thought  in  the  fact  that  even 
the  leading  Intellectuals,  men  who  profess  ultra-demo- 
cratic opinions,  and  those  young  sprigs  of  nobility  who 
recently  started  a movement  for  the  abolition  of  hereditary 
peerages,  one  and  all  fight  shy  of  any  serious  discussion 
of  the  Military  Party  question.  And  in  the  end  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  avoid  the  conclusion  expressed  by  the  cynical 
Mr.  Pooley,  that  nearly  every  one  who  is  any  one  in  official 
Japan,  is  closely  bound  by  ties  of  some  sort — marriage, 
feudal  patronage,  or  Clan  loyalty — to  one  or  other  of  the 
two  great  Clans,  which  since  1873  have  controlled  not 
only  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  but  nearly  every  depart- 
ment of  the  public  service.  And  when  one  remembers  that 
from  the  very  first,  after  their  usurpation  of  the  govern- 
ment, these  fighting  Clans  have  been  steadily  bent  on  an 
aggressive  military  policy — particularly  directed  against 
China — one  begins  to  realise  why  it  is  so  difficult  to  elicit 
any  serious  criticism  of  that  policy.  Every  one  professes 
to  deplore  it ; every  one  will  tell  you  that  the  influences 
behind  are  steadily  waning ; but  no  public  man  ever  dares 
to  attack  it  openly.  It  is  at  first  difficult  to  reconcile 
this  condition  of  affairs  with  other  such  signs  of  the  times 
as  the  younger  generation’s  excursions  into  Socialism,  or 
the  movement  in  favour  of  Labour  Unions ; but  the  ex- 
planation lies,  of  course,  in  the  fact  that,  in  the  Orient, 
society  is  an  aggregation  of  families,  and  the  Clan  system 
therefore  an  integral  part  of  the  national  life. 

In  regard  to  such  questions  as  universal  suffrage  and 


THE  JAPAN  OF  TO-DAY 


183 


labour’s  right  to  form  unions,  I found  much  more  evidence 
of  genuine  interest  in  the  Press  and  amongst  the  people 
of  Tokyo,  than  in  the  ranks  of  the  politicians.  I was 
present  in  the  Strangers’  Gallery  of  the  Diet  on  the  last 
day  of  the  Suffrage  Bill  debate,  when  the  House  was 
dramatically  dissolved,  and  I was  impressed  by  the 
orderly  and  decorous  behaviour  of  the  Chamber.  There 
were  interruptions,  of  course,  but  the  proceedings  as  a 
whole  were  extremely  dignified — rather  disappointing,  in 
fact,  as  the  vast  number  of  policemen  in  the  adjoining 
streets  and  the  predictions  of  radical  enthusiasts  had 
seemed  to  justify  the  prospect  of  wigs  on  the  green.  The 
number  of  youthful  members  was  comparatively  small 
and  the  general  appearance  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives very  different  to  that  of  Young  China’s  Parliament. 
And  I came  away  from  the  debate  with  much  the  same 
sense  of  unreality  that  one  feels  nowadays  in  our  own 
House  of  Commons  when  the  party  voting  has  been  pre- 
ordained, and  neither  the  wit  nor  wisdom  of  the  greatest 
of  orators  can  change  one  jot  of  it.  One  felt  that  neither 
the  supporters  nor  the  opponents  of  universal  suffrage 
could  really  be  in  earnest,  as  they  all  knew  that  an  increase 
of  the  electorate  would  merely  confer  on  a larger  number 
of  people  the  right  to  elect  members  of  a House  which 
has  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  actual  government  of 
the  country.  There  are  honest  men  and  able  men  in  the 
Tokyo  Diet,  but,  like  politicians  all  the  world  over,  they 
have  no  ambition  for  the  martyr’s  crown,  and  are  generally 
prepared  to  take  things  (including  their  salaries)  as  they 
come. 

In  the  same  way,  one  is  surprised  at  the  average 
business  man’s  comparative  indifference  to  the  labour 
problems  which,  sooner  or  later,  employers  in  Japan  will 
have  to  face  like  the  rest  of  the  world.  On  all  sides  you 
will  hear  complaints  of  the  workers’  newly-developed 
habits  of  laziness,  of  their  exorbitant  demands  and  sense- 
less strikes,  and  Japanese  employers  are  wont  to  lay 
particular  stress  upon  the  modern  youth’s  lack  of  discipline 


184  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  good  manners,  as  new  and  unpleasant  signs  of  the 
change  in  times.  But  you  hear  comparatively  little  of 
the  probable  effect  upon  Japanese  labour  of  those  dynamic 
ideas  which  are  changing  the  whole  structure  of  Indus- 
trialism in  the  West.  Japanese  capitalists — and  especially 
those  whose  new  fortunes  have  been  made  during  the  war 
— appear  to  devote  remarkably  little  attention  to  labour 
unrest  in  their  own  country.  At  a Tokyo  meeting  of 
“ big  business  ” men  early  in  1920,  mostly  connected  with 
shipping,  a proposal  to  inaugurate  a modest  scheme  of 
profit-sharing  was  almost  unanimously  voted  down  as 
quixotic  foolishness.  In  coming  from  China  to  Japan  I 
had  fully  expected  to  find  widespread  symptoms  of  unrest 
among  the  workers,  and  a corresponding  uneasiness 
amongst  employers ; one  could  hardly  fail  to  get  some  such 
impression  from  a study  of  the  Treaty  Ports’  Press.  But 
a closer  study  of  the  subject  on  the  spot  led  me  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  observers  who  create  this  impression 
(like  those  who  have  written  of  the  student  movement  in 
China)  attach  an  exaggerated  importance  to  surface 
phenomena,  whereas  the  employer  of  labour  relies  upon 
the  fact  that  the  national  virtue  of  loyalty,  in  any  great 
crisis,  still  possesses  as  strong  a hold  upon  the  masses  of 
industrial  workers  as  it  does  upon  the  Army.  He  knows, 
or  thinks  he  knows,  that  so  long  as  the  family  system 
remains  the  foundation  of  Japan’s  social  structure,  the 
gospel  of  Karl  Marx  will  make  no  headway. 

Needless  to  say,  there  are  some  big  businesses,  like  the 
Mitsu-bishi  Company,  which  are  looking  ahead,  introduc- 
ing real  reforms,  and  improving  the  conditions  of  life  for 
their  workers ; but,  broadly  speaking,  there  is  very  little 
evidence  to  be  found  in  Japan  of  a general  desire  that  the 
country  should  subscribe  to  the  findings  of  any  inter- 
national Labour  Conference.  On  the  contrary,  there  is 
evidence  of  a very  definite  desire  to  let  things  be,  to  allow 
Japanese  industry  to  enjoy  the  competitive  advantage  of 
free  trade  in  human  material,  unfettered  by  any  restric- 
tions as  to  child  labour,  hours  of  work,  or  a minimum  wage, 


B.  T.  Prideaux ] 

THE  RICE  HARVEST,  JAPAN. 


B.  T.  Prideaux] 


PRIMITIVE  TRANSPORT  IN  JAPAN. 


THE  JAPAN  OF  TO-DAY 


185 


It  is  true  that  many  people  on  the  spot  hold  a different 
opinion,  and  point  to  the  increasing  number  of  strikes,  and 
the  movement  in  favour  of  labour  unions,  as  proof  that 
Japanese  labour  is  beginning  to  find  itself.  There  are 
one  or  two  “ big  business  ” Japanese  who  believe  that 
industrial  conditions  must  be  radically  changed  if  Japan 
is  to  hold  her  own  in  competition  with  Western  nations. 
It  may  be  so ; but  against  these  views  two  solid  facts 
stand  out : (i)  That  there  are  25,000  factories  in  Japan 
employing  over  two  million  hands,  and  that  until  now 
the  Government  has  gently  but  firmly  declined  to  allow 
them  the  organisation  of  Labour  Unions ; (2)  that  there 
is  as  yet  no  organised  Labour  Party  in  the  country,  nor 
any  prominent  politician  who  is  anxious  to  form  or  to  lead 
one.  There  is  not  even  an  organised  Socialist  movement 
in  Japan.  Mr.  Ozaki  is  probably  right  when  he  advises 
the  working  classes  to  get  themselves  a better  education ; 
but  he  has  omitted  to  tell  them  how  they  are  to  get  it. 

While  there  is  yet  no  sign  of  any  effective  organisation 
on  the  part  of  labour,  it  is  also  undoubtedly  true  that 
industrialism  has  produced,  and  is  producing,  a type  of 
working  man  very  different  to  those  of  old  Japan.  In 
him  Hearn’s  prediction  is  verified  : sordid  commercialism 
has  led  to  spiritual  decay.  Gone,  as  far  as  the  public  is 
concerned,  are  the  old  restraints  of  the  Samurai  tradi- 
tion, the  old  virtues  of  courtesy  and  dignity  and  self- 
control.  The  working  classes  of  Tokyo  and  other  swarm- 
ing hives  of  toilers  (though  they  may  still  bear  favourable 
comparison  as  regards  manners  with  those  of  many 
Western  countries)  have  become  distinctly  rude,  quarrel- 
some, and  lazy  as  compared  with  their  forefathers.  Some 
of  these  unpleasant  characteristics  may  possibly  be 
transient,  attributable  to  the  swollen  head  which  comes 
from  a rapidly  swollen  purse,  but  of  the  increasing  rude- 
ness of  the  man  in  the  street — as  distinct  from  the  man 
in  the  field — there  can  be  no  doubt.  It  impresses  itself 
most  forcibly  upon  the  tourists  of  the  beaten  track  in 
Jap^n  and  upon  the  dwellers  at  the  Treaty  Ports,  for  the 


186  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


sad  but  true  reason  that  the  very  worst  classes  of  Japanese 
are  those  who  have  come  into  close  contact  with  foreigners. 

No  one  who  revisits  Japan  to-day  after  some  years  of 
absence  can  fail  to  be  struck  by  the  fact  that  the  relations 
between  foreigners  and  natives  are  distinctly  more  strained 
than  they  used  to  be.  The  ill-feeling  on  both  sides  is 
widespread  and  unmistakable.  Making  every  allowance 
for  trade  rivalry  and  the  somewhat  aggressive  quality  of 
self-assertion  which  the  lower  classes  of  Japanese  have 
developed  since  the  war  with  Russia,  the  prevalence  of 
this  unconcealed  hostility,  in  a community  which  has 
everything  to  gain  from  friendly  relations,  is  significant. 
When  one  remembers  that  at  the  time  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  the  sympathies  of  Englishmen  and 
Americans  were  all  on  the  side  of  the  Japanese,  it  is  a 
little  difficult  to  account  for  so  complete  a revulsion  of 
feeling.  There  are,  of  course,  faults  on  both  sides.  The 
Japanese,  acutely  sensitive  in  their  amour  propre  since 
Japan  became  one  of  the  “ Big  Five,”  resent  the  European 
residents’  assumption  of  superiority,  and  this  feeling  has 
been  distinctly  aggravated  by  the  “ racial  equality  ” 
discussion  at  Versailles.  There  is  also  no  denying  that 
many  European  presidents — especially  among  the  old- 
timers — are  unable  to  recognise  the  fact  that  the  Japanese 
now  consider  themselves,  with  some  show  of  justice,  to 
have  “ grown  up  ” as  a nation ; many  of  them  habitually 
display  a lack  of  courtesy  and  consideration  for  Japanese 
feelings  which  would  inspire  resentment  in  a worm.  I 
have  known  an  Englishwoman  to  get  into  a first-class 
railway  carriage,  where  there  were  half  a dozen  well- 
dressed  Japanese,  and  remark  in  a loud  voice  on  “ the 
repulsive  habits  of  these  creatures.”  (It  is  true  that  many 
Japanese  travellers  take  their  boots  off  and  that  they  are 
somewhat  lavish  with  orange  peel,  but  then  this  happens 
to  be  their  country.)  In  the  same  way,  I have  heard  an 
American  traveller  on  board  a Japanese  ship  crossing  the 
Pacific  hold  forth  for  the  benefit  of  a smoke-room  audience, 
including  many  Japanese,  on  the  somewhat  delicate  topic 


THE  JAPAN  OF  TO-DAY 


187 


of  the  position  of  woman  in  Japan.  The  increasingly 
strained  relations  between  the  Japanese  and  foreign  resi- 
dents in  Japan  are  also  attributable  in  some  measure  to 
the  fact  that,  within  the  last  few  years,  the  prestige  of  the 
white  races  has  been  considerably  lowered  by  the  arrival 
in  the  Far  East  of  certain  types  of  Europeans  and 
Americans  heretofore  happily  unknown  in  these  parts : 
of  barbarous  Bolsheviks,  gorged  with  blood-stained  loot, 
of  evil  women  and  camp  followers  that  are  the  flotsam 
and  jetsam  from  Siberia.  And  from  America  there  has 
come  since  the  war  a class  of  business  man  new  to  the 
East,  hustling  bagmen  and  touts  of  the  baser  kind 
(generally  of  German- Jew  extraction),  who  have  created  a 
deplorable  impression,  both  on  the  Japanese  and  the 
Chinese. 

One  of  the  oldest  residents  of  Yokohama  attributed  the 
increasing  dislike  of  the  Japanese  shown  by  foreigners  to 
remembrance  of  several  things  that  have  happened  since 
1914,  which  most  Anglo-Saxons  in  the  country  find  it 
difficult  to  forgive  or  forget.  First,  he  said  Englishmen 
felt  deeply,  and  still  resent  bitterly,  the  concerted  attack 
made  by  the  Japanese  Press  upon  Great  Britain  in  1916. 
Then  there  is  always  the  feeling  of  sympathy  for  China, 
as  the  under-dog,  and  dislike  of  the  policy  of  the  aggressor, 
which  chose  the  moment  when  all  the  world  was  at  war 
to  bully  and  despoil  its  helpless  neighbour.  Then  there 
was  the  fact  that,  while  Japan  took  credit  to  herself  for 
joining  the  Allies,  not  only  was  she  never  really  in  the 
war,  but  that  she  had  made  lucrative  opportunities  of 
her  Allies’  necessities,  and  developed  her  trade  in  ship- 
ping as  fast  as  possible  at  their  expense.  Finally,  there 
were  the  old  complaints,  if  anything  more  acute  than 
before,  of  the  Japanese  trader’s  lack  of  commercial 
morality,  of  his  violation  of  trade-marks,  of  contracts 
unfulfilled,  and  of  goods  not  up  to  sample.  If  ever  there 
was  a time  in  the  history  of  Japan  when  patriotism  and 
foresight  should  have  endeavoured  to  establish  a good 
reputation  for  Japanese  goods  abroad,  it  was  during  the 


188  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


unparalleled  opportunity  created  for  her  by  the  war; 
yet  it  remains  an  astonishing  paradox  that  a nation  which 
has  proved  itself  capable  of  so  much  self-sacrificing  devo- 
tion in  other  ways,  should  still  be  unable  to  practise 
ordinary  honesty  in  commerce,  though  most  of  its  leaders 
realise  that  the  country’s  future  must  largely  depend 
upon  it. 

The  increasing  dislike  shown  by  most  Europeans  for  the 
Japanese  is  by  no  means  confined  to  Japan.  From  Peking 
to  Penang,  you  will  find  indisputable  evidence  of  it,  afloat 
and  ashore.  Recognising  and  endeavouring  to  explain  it, 
Baron  Ishii  stated  in  America  that  the  seeds  of  this  ill-will 
have  been  insidiously  planted  by  German  propagandists. 
Marquis  Okuma,  writing  in  the  Asian  Review,  is  inclined 
to  ascribe  it  chiefly  to  jealousy  of  Japan’s  marvellous 
progress  in  warfare  and  industry,  but  he  also  thinks  it 
possible  that  his  countrymen  may  have  waxed  “ selfish 
and  conceited  ” as  the  result  of  their  successes.  Marquis 
Saionji,  on  his  return  to  Tokyo  in  September  1919,  deplored 
the  fact  that  “ Japan  had  become  a general  object  of 
distrust  and  misunderstanding;  a fact  not  only  deeply 
injurious  to  Japan,  but  very  unfortunate  for  foreign 
nations,  whose  policy  in  the  Far  East  is  influenced  thereby. 
It  was  the  duty  of  the  nation  to  inspire  a spirit  of  confi- 
dence and  good-will  among  its  friends  abroad.” 

I have  selected  these  three  utterances  by  leading  states- 
men to  show  that  public  opinion  in  Japan  is  seriously 
concerned  at  the  world’s  lack  of  confidence  and  good- 
will ; deeply  conscious  also  of  the  fact  that  the  antipathies 
which  have  been  aroused  are  something  wider  and  deeper 
than  the  local  animosities  of  Treaty  Port  traders.  Every- 
where amongst  educated  people  in  Japan  to-day,  there  is 
evidence  of  the  whole  country’s  very  real  fear  of  moral 
isolation.  On  the  day  before  my  departure  from  Tokyo 
in  March  1920,  I lunched  with  Mr.  Inouye,  President  of 
the  Bank  of  Japan,  to  meet  a small  party  of  bankers  and 
business  men.  They  were  all  men  of  wide  experience 
at  home  and  abroad,  captains  of  industry,  intimately 


THE  JAPAN  OF  TO-DAY 


189 


acquainted  with  the  State-controlled  machinery  of 
Japanese  commerce  and  finance,  and  one  and  all  were 
evidently  much  concerned  at  their  country’s  peril  of 
isolation  and  most  anxious  to  see  it  averted  by  a renewal 
of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance.  They  recognised  the 
supreme  importance  of  establishing  friendly  relations,  as 
a basis  of  satisfactory  trade  with  China,  and  they  realised 
also  the  dangers  which  threaten  Japan’s  imperfectly 
developed  industrial  efficiency  in  the  competition  of 
more  highly  organised  countries.  The  frankly  expressed 
opinions  of  these  men,  representing  the  best  brains  of  the 
country,  seem  to  me  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  “ big 
business  ” in  Japan  is  quite  prepared  to  support  a renewal 
of  the  Alliance  under  conditions  which  will  guarantee 
fair  treatment  of  China  in  the  first  place,  and,  in  the 
second  place,  absolute  reciprocity  in  matters  such  as 
trademarks  and  coast  trade  facilities,  wherein  British 
and  American  merchants  have  hitherto  suffered  great 
disadvantage. 

I refer  to  this  particular  conversation  because  it  was 
typical  of  many,  which  produced  a cumulative  impression 
that  the  keynote  of  Japanese  policy  in  the  immediate 
future  is  likely  to  be  national  security  at  all  costs.  It  is 
dangerous  to  dogmatise  in  such  matters,  but  it  appears  to 
me  that,  politics  apart,  there  is  a new  and  very  influential 
school  of  thought  in  Japan  which  has  realised  that  the 
times  are  critical,  that  the  nation  stands  literally  at  the 
parting  of  the  ways,  and  that  continuance  in  the  path  of 
unjustifiable  aggression  in  China  may  well  lead  to  disaster. 
The  men  who  hold  these  views  feel  also  that,  before  Japan 
can  deal  on  fair  and  equal  terms  with  Great  Britain  or 
France  or  the  United  States,  she  must  find  a way  to  put 
an  end  to  the  autocratic  power  of  the  Military  Party  and 
to  make  the  nation’s  elected  representatives  responsible 
for  its  foreign  policy.  The  crucial  question  of  the  whole 
Far  Eastern  problem  remains  therefore  to-day  where  it 
was  five  years  ago  : Are  the  Japanese  Progressives  in 
earnest,  and  if  so,  how  long  will  it  take  them  to  achieve 


190  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


this  fundamental  change  ? Opinion  on  this  question  is  so 
hopelessly  divided  amongst  the  Japanese  themselves,  that 
the  stranger  within  their  gates  may  be  excused  from 
attempting  to  answer  it. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  alternative,  as  prescribed  by 
stalwart  Imperialists  of  the  Black  Dragon  school,  contains 
much  that  is  attractive  to  the  elemental  Jingo  which 
lurks  in  most  human  beings.  A very  alluring  thing  is  the 
great  Pan-Asian  programme  of  the  Militarists : an  Empire 
of  the  East,  greater  than  that  of  ancient  Rome  or  modem 
England,  over  which  the  flag  of  the  Rising  Sun  shall  float 
in  majesty  unchallenged.  It  is  Mouravieff’s  dream  in  a 
new  guise;  and  yet  not  new,  for  the  fighting  Clans  of 
Satsuma  and  Choshiu  have  long  pursued  the  vision  of 
Japan  as  overlord  of  Asia.  The  writings  of  one  Yoshida 
Shoin,  a leader  of  the  Choshiu  Clan,  who  died  in  1859, 
proved  clearly  that  the  Military  Party  of  that  date  had 
their  plans  all  laid  for  the  gradual  annexation  of  Formosa, 
Korea,  Saghalien,  Manchuria,  and  Eastern  Siberia.  These 
plans  were  then  deferred,  but  by  no  means  abandoned, 
because  the  Clan  leaders  of  that  day  had  sense  enough  to 
perceive  the  wisdom  of  the  advice  which  Ito  gave  them, 
namely,  that  Japan  should  set  herself  to  acquire  the 
appliances  and  sciences  of  the  West  before  attempting  a 
policy  of  aggression.  The  Military  Party  of  to-day  can 
point  with  justifiable  pride  to  the  record  of  their  achieve- 
ments during  the  sixty  years  that  have  passed  since  Ito 
gave  them  that  advice ; they  can  also  remind  their  country- 
men that,  as  the  result  of  two  successful  wars,  a substantial 
portion  of  their  programme  has  already  been  accomplished. 
On  these  grounds  they  can  appeal  to  the  racial  pride  and 
martial  spirit  of  the  Japanese  people.  Were  it  possible  of 
immediate  attainment,  the  dream  of  a great  Japanese 
Empire  of  the  East  would  certainly  allure  not  only  the 
bureaucracy,  but  the  masses  of  the  people,  to  this  great 
adventure.  But  just  as  in  1895,  when  the  prudent 
wisdom  of  the  Elder  Statesmen  realised  that  it  was 
impossible  for  Japan  to  cling  to  her  fruits  of  victory  when 


THE  JAPAN  OF  TO-DAY 


191 


threatened  by  the  coalition  of  Russia,  France,  and  Ger- 
many, so  to-day  the  same  wisdom  appears  to  have  per- 
ceived that  the  time  has  come  to  call  a halt  to  the  aggres- 
sive policy  of  the  Clansmen  in  China.  They  certainly  fear 
that  persistence  in  this  course  may  lead  to  a very  danger- 
ous position  of  isolation,  and  they  also  seem  to  realise  that, 
as  in  i860,  the  nation  needs  to  set  its  house  in  order 
and  to  take  careful  stock  of  its  position  before  embarking 
on  any  perilous  enterprise.  The  immediate  future,  the 
adjustment  of  the  present  intolerable  condition  of  affairs 
at  Peking,  lies  on  the  knees  of  the  gods.  The  Japanese 
Government’s  formidable  naval  programme  is  a disturbing 
feature  of  the  situation.  Nevertheless,  considering  it  in 
the  light  of  all  the  information  available,  I venture  to 
believe  that  before  long  Japan  will  see  fit  to  abandon  the 
policy  of  military  aggression  and  will  concentrate  all  her 
efforts  upon  obtaining  economic  ascendancy  in  China. 
The  consolidation  of  national  security  being  the  first  aim 
of  her  statesmen,  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  the 
leading  naval  Power,  is  evidently  essential  for  the  fulfil- 
ment of  that  purpose.  If  these  views  are  well  founded, 
the  Military  Party,  which  mocked  at  the  Alliance  in  1916, 
will  be  obliged  to  perform  a graceful  volteface,  and  in  so 
doing  abandon,  for  the  present  at  all  events,  its  secret 
claim  to  rule  the  rulers  of  Peking.  But  the  Pan-Asian 
dreamers  will  bide  their  time  for  all  that,  and  the  dream 
itself  will  never  die. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  MOVEMENT  IN  KOREA 

It  is  a curious  and  significant  fact,  indicative  of  the 
complexity  of  the  problems  which  await  the  League  of 
Nations,  that  the  United  States  should  have  come  to 
be  recognised  as  the  spiritual  home  of  the  new  gospel 
of  “ self-determination,"  and  therefore  in  a large  measure 
responsible  for  the  birth  and  growth  of  the  Independence 
Movement  in  Korea.  For,  as  an  American  writer  of 
wide  experience  in  world  affairs  has  recently  observed,1 
the  whole  history  of  the  United  States  has  been  that 
of  a nation  of  “ imperialists,  expansionists,  unionists, 
enactors  of  the  doctrine  that  a small  State  in  a strategic- 
ally vital  relation  to  a larger  State  must  accommodate 
its  freedom  to  the  security  of  its  larger  neighbour.  In 
words  and  in  deeds,  the  United  States  have  denied  that 
a small  nation  has  a right  to  independence  where  such  a 
right  infringes  the  higher  right  of  a vastly  larger  nation 
to  health  and  tranquillity  behind  secure  frontiers.  Cuba, 
Porto  Rico,  Haiti,  San  Domingo,  the  whole  Caribbean, 
both  flanks  of  the  Panama  Canal,  the  Pacific — they  all 
tell  the  same  story."  And  again  he  observes  : “ The 
right  of  the  few  to  liberty  is  not  so  high  a right  as  the 
right  of  the  many  to  live.  Did  not  Lincoln,  with  his 
hand  firmly  upon  the  sword-hilt,  say  to  the  Confederate 
States  : ‘ You  have  not  a right  to  self-determination  that 
imperils  the  peace  and  well-being  of  the  American 
continent  ? ’ ” 

In  other  words,  self-determination,  like  the  principle 
of  the  innate  equality  of  all  men,  depends  for  its  appli- 
cation upon  time  and  place,  and,  at  the  long  last,  upon 

1 Edward  Price  Bell  in  The  Times,  December  9,  1920. 

192 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  MOVEMENT  193 


force.  Contrasted  with  the  activities  of  those  of  her 
citizens  who  believe  that  the  Great  War  has  brought  us 
within  sight  of  the  Promised  Land  and  the  Brotherhood 
of  Man,  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  Government 
towards  Korea’s  aspirations  to  independence  affords  a 
striking  object-lesson,  one  of  the  kind  which  leads  the 
logically-minded  Latin  and  the  astute  Oriental  to  impute 
hypocrisy  to  the  Anglo-Saxon.  For  these  races  lack  the 
idealist  quality  of  mind  which  fails  or  refuses  to  perceive 
the  wide  gulf  which  lies  between  benevolent  theories  and 
hard  practice. 

There  is  no  disguising  the  plain  truth  that  the  recent 
agitation  in  favour  of  self-determination  for  Korea  owed 
much  of  its  inspiration  originally  to  the  influence  and 
teaching  of  American  missionaries  in  the  Hermit  King- 
dom, and  finally  to  President  Wilson’s  momentous 
declaration  that  the  League  of  Nations  had  appeared 
upon  the  scene  with  a Heaven-sent  mission,  “ to  prevent 
the  domination  of  small  nations  by  big  ones.”  What 
Mr.  Thomas  W.  Lamont  has  said  of  the  political  in- 
fluence exercised  by  American  missionaries  in  China 1 
is  even  more  conspicuously  true  of  their  work  in  Korea  : 
they  and  their  " Intellectual  ” pupils  have  undoubtedly 
done,  and  are  doing,  their  best  to  " develop  Korea  from 
a people  into  a nation.”  Another  well-known  American 
writer,2  who  has  lately  made  a careful  study  of  the 
actual  position  of  affairs  in  Korea,  deplores  the  political 
activities  for  which  so  many  American  and  Canadian 
missionaries  have  been  conspicuous  since  the  establish- 
ment of  Japan’s  “ Protectorate  ” in  1908.  He  reminds 
them  that  the  American  people  openly  sympathised  with 
the  Japanese  cause  in  their  Russian  war,  and  that  President 
Roosevelt  approved,  and  formally  recognised,  the  annexa- 
tion of  Korea  by  Japan ; and  this  being  so,  he  urges  them 
to  render  unto  Caesar  the  things  which  are  Caesar’s,  and 
to  conduct  their  religious  teachings  with  proper  respect 

1 Vide  supra,  p.  127. 

2 Charles  H.  Sherrill,  in  Scribner’s  Magazine  for  March  1920. 
o 


194  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


for  lawfully  constituted  authority.  “ There  are  too 
many  of  our  missionaries,”  he  observes,  “ who  have  lived 
so  long  in  Korea  that  they  think  they  own  the  country, 
and  they  can  countenance  no  changes  therein,  even 
improvements.  In  this  connection  it  is  discouraging 
to  note  that  in  that  flourishing  missionary  field,  with 
hundreds  of  missionaries  and  over  300,000  Korean  con- 
verts, Christianity  seems  to  have  left  its  converts  about 
as  ignorant  and  filthy  as  before  their  conversion,  and 
nothing  like  so  advanced  in  civilisation  and  decency 
of  life  as  the  near-by  Buddhists  and  Shintoists  of 
Japan.” 

Mr.  Sherrill  is  an  uncompromising  realist,  with  the 
courage  not  only  of  his  convictions,  but  of  his  conver- 
sions. Touching  the  question  of  “ foreigners  unthink- 
ingly abusing  a nation’s  hospitality  by  acts  or  teachings 
subversive  of  its  authority,”  he  confesses  to  having 
believed,  before  visiting  the  Far  East,  that  democracy 
was  the  best  form  of  government  for  all  peoples.”  A 
study  on  the  spot  “ of  the  contrast  between  the  excellently 
functioning  Imperial  Government  of  Japan  on  the  one 
hand,  and,  on  the  other,  the  disheartening  venality  of 
many  officials  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  plus  the  situation 
in  Siberia  made  too  free  for  democracy,”  has  re-adjusted 
his  point  of  view. 

Now,  setting  aside  the  question  of  the  responsibility 
for  the  agitation  in  favour  of  Korean  independence,  let 
us  turn  to  consideration  of  its  actual  results  in  Korea 
and  abroad.  Mr.  F.  A.  McKenzie,  an  English  writer 
who  has  always  sympathised  deeply  with  Korea  in  her 
defencelessness,  and  pleaded  her  cause  against  aggression, 
has  recently  published  an  account  of  the  events  which 
followed  upon  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  signed 
and  promulgated  by  thirty-three  Korean  patriots  in 
March  1919.  His  book,  Korea's  Fight  for  Freedom , 
confirms  and  amplifies  the  indictment  which  he  brought 
against  the  Japanese  Government  in  an  earlier  work 
(1908).  The  righteous  indignation  which  he  felt  on  the 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  MOVEMENT  195 


subject  of  Korea’s  wrongs  in  the  days  of  the  Protectorate, 
has  since  been  intensified  by  reason  of  the  sufferings 
and  humiliations  which  the  Koreans  have  been  com- 
pelled to  endure  since  the  annexation  of  their  country 
in  1910.  Mr.  McKenzie,  having  been  an  eye-witness 
of  those  sufferings  and  humiliations,  now  appeals  to  the 
Christian  Churches,  and  to  the  statesmen  of  the  United 
States,  Canada,  and  Great  Britain,  to  demonstrate  their 
practical  sympathy  and  support  on  behalf  of  a sorely- 
oppressed  people.  His  indictment  of  the  Japanese 
Government’s  harsh  rule  and  policy  of  savage  repression, 
supported  by  the  detailed  evidence  of  a cloud  of  wit- 
nesses, is  not  pleasant  reading.  It  is  a record  of  grievous 
tyranny,  of  wholesale  arrests  of  political  offenders  and 
suspects,  of  inhuman  treatment  of  thousands  of  untried 
prisoners,  of  floggings  and  severe  tortures  inflicted  upon 
men,  women,  and  children,  of  schoolboys  and  young 
girls  shamefully  beaten.  Many  of  the  charges  of  terror- 
ism and  cruelty  which  he  brings  against  the  Japanese 
administration  in  Korea  have  not  only  been  substantiated 
by  independent  Japanese  witnesses,  but  practically  ad- 
mitted by  the  Imperial  Government  at  Tokyo.  In 
August  1919,  an  Imperial  Rescript  was  issued,  announcing 
that  the  Government  of  Korea  was  to  be  reformed,  the 
military  gendarmerie  in  many  districts  abolished,  and 
replaced  by  a civil  police  under  the  orders  of  the  local 
governors,  and  a Liberal  regime  instituted,  under  which 
Koreans  are  to  enjoy  the  same  civic  rights,  liberties,  and 
privileges  as  the  Japanese.  The  Military  Party’s  policy 
of  terrorism  and  methods  of  frightfulness  have,  in  fact, 
been  repudiated,  and  assurances  publicly  given  that 
the  administration  will  henceforward  be  conducted  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  originally  laid  down  by 
Prince  Ito,  who  deprecated  forcible  exploitation  and 
aimed  at  securing  a genuine  amalgamation  of  the  Koreans 
with  the  Japanese  Empire  by  processes  of  education  and 
conciliation.  There  are  many  observers  in  the  Far  East 
who  doubt  the  efficacy,  not  to  say  the  sincerity,  of 


196  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


these  latest  reforms,  and  who  believe  that  the  policy 
of  forcible  assimilation,  and  with  it  unjust  exploitation, 
will  be  maintained.  Mr.  McKenzie,  amongst  others, 
holds  that,  unless  Japanese  Liberalism  and  a policy 
of  peaceful  expansion  can  abolish  the  Militarists  and 
their  methods  once  and  for  all  (of  which  there  is  as  yet 
no  sign),  Japan’s  harsh  rule  in  Korea,  and  her  policy 
of  aggression  in  China,  will  continue,  and  “ eventually 
produce  a titanic  conflict,  of  which  none  can  foresee 
the  end.” 

If  these  observers  are  correct  in  their  views,  the  pros- 
pect of  peace  in  the  Far  East  and  goodwill  towards  men 
is  indeed  remote.  But  whether  the  policy  of  the  Japanese 
Government  in  the  immediate  future  proves  to  be  wisely 
Liberal  or  harshly  oppressive,  one  fact  remains  obvious, 
namely,  that  many  of  those  who  sympathise  most  strongly 
with  the  misfortunes  of  the  Korean  people,  fail  to  per- 
ceive that  the  cause  and  claims  of  common  humanity, 
and  the  cause  of  Korean  political  independence,  are 
two  separate  and  distinct  questions.  There  is  also  a 
very  prevalent  tendency  to  overlook  the  incontestable 
fact  that  many  of  the  pains  and  penalties  suffered  by 
the  Koreans  since  the  active  assertion  of  their  claims 
to  independence  are  primarily  due  to  the  false  hopes 
inspired  in  the  patriotic  leaders  of  that  movement  by 
President  Wilson  and  other  well-meaning  political  vision- 
aries. Mr.  McKenzie,  at  all  events,  is  under  no  delusion 
on  this  score.  “ If  any  outsider  was  responsible  for 
the  uprising  of  the  Korean  people,”  he  declares,  “ that 
outsider  was  Woodrow  Wilson,  President  of  the  United 
States.”  His  declaration  that  the  civilised  world  was 
determined  henceforth  to  protect  the  rights  of  weaker 
nations,  was  " the  clarion  call  to  Korea : here  was  the 
promise  of  freedom,  given  by  the  head  of  the  nation 
they. had  all  learned  to  love.”  The  grievous  fate  which 
swiftly  overtook  the  unsophisticated  people  who  hearkened 
to  that  clarion  call,  the  bitter  disappointment  that 
awaited  their  young  delegates  and  leaders,  first  in  America 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  MOVEMENT  197 


and  then  at  Versailles,  should  surely  suffice  to  prevent 
even  those  who  sympathise  most  profoundly  with  the 
Korean  people  from  incurring  this  kind  of  responsi- 
bility, and  from  encouraging  another  self-determination 
movement,  at  least  until  the  day  comes  when  the  League 
of  Nations  shall  have  become  an  authoritative  Tribunal 
and  the  acknowledged  keeper  of  the  conscience  of  the 
world. 

The  thirty-three  Korean  patriots  who  signed  and  pro- 
mulgated the  Declaration  of  Independence  (and  paid 
heavily  for  their  courage)  fully  believed  that  President 
Wilson’s  words  proclaimed  the  end  of  Korea’s  centuries 
of  vassaldom.  “ A new  era,”  they  declared,  " wakes 
before  our  eyes,  the  old  world  of  force  is  gone,  and  the 
new  world  of  righteousness  and  truth  is  here.”  Of 
practical  politics,  of  the  great  world  beyond  the  Hermit 
Kingdom,  these  simple  old-world  scholars  and  guileless 
enthusiasts  knew  little  or  nothing;  they  only  knew 
that,  under  the  rule  of  Japan,  they  were  humiliated 
and  unhappy,  and  that  “ after  the  agony  of  ten  years 
of  foreign  oppression,”  the  clarion  call  had  sounded 
which  was  to  give  them  unfettered  liberty.  Had  they 
studied  the  history  of  their  own  country  in  the  light 
of  international  affairs ; had  they  remembered  how 
many  of  the  great  Powers,  America  included,  had  solemnly 
guaranteed  its  independence  and  then  acquiesced  with- 
out protest  in  its  annexation  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
Japanese  Empire,  they  might  well  have  hesitated  before 
starting  on  their  forlorn  crusade.  Well  had  it  been  for 
them  had  they  been  advised  to  stop  and  consider  how 
far  President  Wilson’s  words  might  be  relied  upon  to 
represent  a definite  American  policy;  well  had  they 
remembered  that,  only  a decade  before,  President  Roose 
velt  had  declined  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  Korea's  inde- 
pendence, on  the  ground  that  “ it  was  out  of  the  question 
to  suppose  that  any  other  nation,  with  no  interest  of  its 
own  at  stake,  would  do  for  the  Koreans  what  they  were 
utterly  unable  to  do  for  themselves.” 


198  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Had  any  practical  statesmanship  been  available  to 
guide  the  counsels  of  the  Korean  leaders,  they  must 
have  realised  that,  pending  the  establishment  of  a League 
of  Nations  invested  with  moral  or  physical  authority 
sufficient  to  enable  it  to  restrain  the  elemental  forces 
and  instincts  which  impel  strong  nations  to  expand  at 
the  expense  of  their  weak  neighbours,  Japan  will  con- 
tinue to  invoke  the  law  of  self-preservation  as  justification 
for  asserting  her  supremacy  in  Korea,  as  a matter  of 
vital  necessity  imposed  by  economic  and  strategical 
conditions.  For  the  last  fifty  years,  Korea  has  been 
(to  use  Mr.  Churchill’s  phrase)  the  lynch-pin  of  Japanese 
policy,  the  key-land  of  north-eastern  Asia.  Her  utter 
helplessness  has  made  her  the  cockpit  of  the  Far  East 
and  a constant  cause  of  wars  between  her  powerful 
neighbours,  in  which  wars  her  twenty  million  people 
have  played  the  part  of  apathetic  spectators,  all  their 
political  activities  concentrated  meanwhile  upon  internal 
strife,  on  treasons,  stratagems,  and  spoils.  If  Japan 
had  not  defeated  China  in  1895,  Korea  would  still  be  that 
country’s  humble  and  misgoverned  vassal.  Had  Japan 
not  fought  Russia  in  1904,  the  peninsula  must  then  have 
passed  into  the  possession  of  the  Slav.  And  even  the 
sincerest  of  Korean  patriots  can  hardly  overlook  the 
fact  that  Japanese  ascendancy  was  materially  assisted 
from  1905  onwards  by  the  II  Chin  Hoi  and  other  pro- 
Japanese  groups  of  native  politicians,  and  that  the 
gendarmerie,  by  whom  most  of  the  brutalities  of  last 
year  were  committed,  consisted,  to  some  extent,  of 
Koreans  in  Japanese  pay. 

I had  occasion  to  discuss  the  whole  question  of  Japanese 
policy  in  Korea  in  February  of  last  year  with  Dr.  Midzuno, 
the  new  Director-General  of  Administration,  at  Seoul. 
While  gravely  deprecating  and  regretting  the  excesses 
committed  by  the  militarists  in  the  past,  and  expressing 
his  belief  that  a Liberal  and  conciliatory  policy  would 
produce  good  results,  especially  when  Korea  becomes 
properly  represented  in  the  Imperial  Diet,  Dr.  Midzuno 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  MOVEMENT  199 


denied  that  the  Independence  demonstration  of  1919 
was  in  any  true  sense  a national  movement.  He  re- 
minded me  that,  even  against  their  own  Emperor,  after 
China’s  suzerainty  had  been  abolished  in  1898,  the 
malcontents  of  the  Independence  Club  had  started  a 
popular  agitation,  kept  the  country  in  a ferment  for 
months,  and  finally  been  suppressed  by  the  Conservative 
party  and  the  “ Pedlars’  Guild  ” Secret  Society,  with 
great  severity.  He  pointed  out  that,  from  1894  to  1904, 
when  Korea  was  an  independent  kingdom,  the  country 
demonstrated  its  incapacity  for  self-government,  foreigners 
being  the  first  to  recognise  the  truth  that  no  man’s  life 
or  property  was  safe  from  the  rapacity  of  the  Court 
party  and  their  myrmidons.  He  emphasised  the  fact 
that  independent  and  competent  observers,  like  Mr. 
Frederick  Coleman  and  Mr.  A.  Judson  Brown,  have 
testified  in  their  writings  to  the  material  improvement 
which  has  taken  place  in  the  condition  of  the  Korean 
peasantry  under  Japanese  administration.  Finally  we 
came  to  the  question  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  the 
inherent  right  of  small  nations  to  self-determination  and 
the  pursuit  of  their  own  kind  of  happiness. 

Dr.  Midzuno  is  a distinguished  scholar,  a student  of 
international  politics,  and  a firm  believer  in  the  Ito 
tradition  of  administration.  “ Japan,”  he  said,  “ is  all 
in  favour  of  the  League,  but  as  a matter  of  practical 
politics,  as  things  are,  she  can  no  more  accept  the  idea 
of  an  independent  Korea  than  Great  Britain  can  afford 
to  recognise  an  independent  Irish  Republic.” 

Later  on,  discussing  the  same  question  in  Tokyo  with 
Japanese  statesmen  and  diplomats,  I heard  the  same 
opinion,  often  more  bluntly  expressed.  “ It  will  be  time 
enough  to  consider  the  question  as  one  of  international 
importance,”  said  an  official  of  the  Foreign  Office,  “ when 
the  League  of  Nations  is  in  a position  to  enforce  recog- 
nition of  the  equality  of  races,  and  to  guarantee  Korea 
against  the  political  influence  and  aggressive  designs  of 
other  Powers.” 


200  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


But  out  of  the  evils  of  the  uprising  of  1919,  some  good 
has  come.  The  strength  and  sober  restraint  of  the 
movement  in  Seoul,  the  earnestness  of  its  dignified 
leaders,  belonging  to  the  older  generation  in  Korea, 
together  with  its  forcible  appeal  to  the  conscience  of 
the  civilised  world,  all  had  an  unmistakable  effect  upon 
the  Japanese  Government.  Judging  by  what  I saw  and 
heard  in  Seoul  and  Tokyo,  I believe  that  the  Japanese 
authorities  have  now  been  led  to  perceive  that  the  policy 
of  forcible  assimilation  has  been,  and  must  continue  to 
be,  a failure,  because  it  merely  tends  to  evoke  a strong 
spirit  of  nationalism  among  the  Koreans  and  to  increase 
their  hatred  of  their  new  rulers.  In  attempting  to  break 
the  spirit  of  the  Korean  people  and  to  make  them  accept 
“ assimilation,”  Japan  has  come  up  against  an  un- 
suspected quality  of  quiet  determination  in  the  Korean 
character,  a quality  which,  beneath  the  appearance  of 
apathy,  makes  the  Korean  a passive  resister  and  con- 
scientious objector  of  the  most  dogged  type,  too  proud 
or  too  weak  to  fight,  but  ready  for  martyrdom,  if  needs 
be.  The  Japanese  Government  has  discovered,  as  the 
independent  investigator  sent  from  Tokyo  by  the  Consti- 
tutional Party  reported,  that  "it  is  a great  mistake  of 
Colonial  policy  to  attempt  to  enforce  upon  the  Koreans, 
with  their  two  thousand  years  of  history,  the  same 
spiritual  and  mental  training  as  that  of  the  Japanese 
people.” 

Meanwhile,  as  the  case  of  Korea  has  been  taken  up 
by  a number  of  Labour  members  and  “ Wee  Frees  ” 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  in  America  by  many 
ardent  believers  in  the  pure  gospel  of  self-determination, 
it  is  desirable  that  they  should  be  quite  clear  in  their 
minds  as  to  the  remedial  measures  to  be  proposed  and 
the  manner  of  their  application.  In  this  connection  it 
is  of  interest  to  note  that  the  Provisional  Government 
of  the  Korean  Republic,  with  its  “ headquarters  ” at 
Shanghai,  resembles  irreconcilable  Sinn  Fein,  in  that  it 
declines  to  entertain  any  discussion  of  local  autonomy, 


KOREAN  FAMILY  IN  WINTER  COSTUME.  CORNER  OF  THE  AUDIENCE  HALL  IN  THE  OLD  PALACE, 


- - - - - - — 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  MOVEMENT  201 


Dominion  Home  Rule,  or  full  State  rights  for  Korea  as 
an  integral  part  of  the  Japanese  Empire,  but  asserts 
an  unswerving  claim  to  absolute  and  complete  inde- 
pendence. It  differs  from  Sinn  Fein  inasmuch  as  its 
methods  are  essentially  those  of  passive  resistance;  but 
its  young  “ Intellectual  ” leaders  (mostly  educated  at 
Universities  abroad),  who  have  joined  together  to  form 
a Cabinet  in  ftartibus,  cling  firmly  to  the  Wilsonian  doc- 
trine of  self-determination,  and  they  are  just  as  fully 
convinced  as  Sinn  Fein  of  their  ability  to  organise  and 
maintain  a model  Republic,  equipped  with  all  the  latest 
improvements.  Like  Young  China,  they  completely 
ignore  the  fact  that  the  great  majority  of  their  country- 
men are  by  nature  and  education  totally  unfit  to  co- 
operate in  any  system  of  representative  government,  and 
that  the  establishment  of  a Republic  in  Korea  could 
therefore  only  mean,  as  in  China,  the  unchecked  ex- 
ploitation of  the  masses  by  a small  privileged  class. 
And  just  as  Young  China,  while  proclaiming  its  infallible 
panaceas,  has  failed  to  do  anything  whatsoever  to  im- 
prove the  condition  of  the  masses,  either  physically  or 
spiritually,  so  Young  Korea,  as  represented  by  this  self- 
elected  Cabinet  at  Shanghai,  remains  wholly  absorbed 
in  the  political  aspects  of  the  situation.  Needless  to  say, 
these  very  able  and  interesting  young  men  do  not  repre- 
sent the  feelings  and  needs  of  the  Korean  peasantry  so 
much  as  those  of  the  “ Korean  National  Association,” 
a society  founded  in  America  by  Mr.  Ahn  Chang-ho, 
which  claims  to  have  a membership  of  over  a million 
Koreans,  living  in  voluntary  exile  throughout  Manchuria, 
Siberia,  and  China.  Mr.  Ahn,  Minister  for  Labour  in 
the  Provisional  Cabinet,  has  always  been  distinguished 
for  activity  in  the  field  of  political  and  patriotic  agitation. 
At  Shanghai,  last  February,  he  declared  that  the  Cabinet 
was  being  regularly  sustained  by  funds  voluntarily 
paid  as  taxes  by  the  Korean  people,  “ who  recognise  our 
Government  as  the  only  government  to  which  they  owe 
allegiance.”  (Much  in  the  same  spirit,  in  moments  of 


202  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


expansion,  the  Chinese  Republican  leader,  Sun  Yat-sen, 
and  his  friends,  are  wont  to  declare  that  millions  of  their 
countrymen  are  ready  to  follow  them  and  their  ideas  to 
the  death.)  One  may  sympathise  with,  and  admire, 
those  ardent  spirits,  but  those  foreigners  who  encourage 
them  to  hope  for  the  early  fulfilment  of  their  political 
aspirations  are  no  better  than  the  blind  leaders  of  blind, 
and  the  result  of  such  encouragement  can  only  be  to 
involve  the  unsophisticated  and  inarticulate  Korean 
people  in  further  misfortunes. 

Politicians  of  the  ultra-modern  school,  who  profess 
to  see  neither  danger  nor  difficulty  in  self-determination 
all  round ; those  who  believe  that  the  world  will  be 
happier  and  more  peaceful  when  Ireland,  India,  Egypt, 
and  every  turbulent  State  in  Europe  has  been  handed 
over  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  group  of  word-spinners 
which  happens  to  be  in  the  ascendant,  will  no  doubt 
find  the  case  of  Korea  exceedingly  simple.  But  to  those 
old-fashioned  people,  with  whom  human  nature  and 
accomplished  facts  still  carry  a certain  weight,  it  will 
probably  continue  to  be  advisable,  in  considering  this 
question  and  its  best  solution,  to  devote  a certain  measure 
of  attention  to  the  point  of  view  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, if  only  because  all  the  civilised  Powers  have 
recognised  the  fact  that  Korea  forms  part  of  the  Japanese 
Empire.  It  is  highly  desirable  that  the  practical  side 
of  the  question  should  not  be  completely  obliterated 
by  the  sentimental,  so  that,  when  the  question  comes 
before  the  Tribunal  of  the  League  of  Nations  (be  it  only 
for  the  registration  of  a pious  opinion)  the  heathen 
blaspheme  not,  and  the  true  friends  of  Korea  be  not 
stultified.  It  is  devoutly  to  be  hoped  that,  either  with 
or  without  the  League,  some  equitable  settlement  of 
many  questions  in  the  Far  East  may  be  reached  before 
Germany  emerges  again  upon  the  scene  in  her  accustomed 
role  of  “ honest  broker.”  But  in  preparing  for  such  a 
settlement,  we  may  as  well  face  the  fact  that,  so  long 
as  the  European  and  American  nations  are  not  prepared 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  MOVEMENT  203 


to  confine  their  activities  within  the  limits  of  their  own 
geographical  frontiers,  it  is  futile  to  expect  Japan  to 
withdraw  from  Korea.  Great  Britain,  ruling  India,  and 
making  ready  to  establish  a thinly-veiled  protectorate 
over  Persia;  France,  holding  large  provinces  of  what 
was  once  China ; the  United  States,  steadily  expanding, 
for  the  protection  of  its  position  at  Panama,  over  all 
the  smaller  States  of  the  Caribbean  seaboard  : upon 
what  moral  grounds  can  any  of  these  Powers  approach 
Japan  and  ask  her,  in  the  name  of  humanity  and  civilisa- 
tion, to  surrender  her  dominion  over  Korea?  Only  by 
some  self-denying  ordinance,  universally  applied,  could 
the  high  moral  argument  be  invoked,  and  the  only 
alternative  is  the  argument  of  force.  Russia,  Germany, 
and  France  invoked  that  argument  in  1895,  when  Japan 
was  compelled  to  hand  back  the  Liaotung  peninsula  to 
China,  so  that  it  might  be  laid  open  to  Russia’s  “ peace- 
ful penetration  ” ; and  Japan  has  not  forgotten  that 
object  lesson  of  Europe’s  benevolent  sympathy  for  the 
oppressed. 

Apart  from  the  admitted  severities  of  Japan’s  military 
regime  in  Korea,  and  setting  aside  all  irresponsible 
counsels  of  political  idealism,  the  Japanese  Government 
asserts  its  justification  for  remaining  as  the  supreme 
Power  in  the  peninsula  on  grounds  similar  to  those  which, 
in  the  opinion  of  reasonable  men,  justify  Great  Britain 
in  retaining  control  of  Egypt.  The  record  of  Japan’s 
progressive  activities  in  Korea  has  been  dispassionately 
summarised  by  an  American,1  for  the  enlightenment  of 
his  countrymen,  in  the  following  words  : 

“ In  December  1918  there  were  336,872  Japanese  in 
Korea,  of  whom  66,943  were  in  Seoul.  What  are  they 
doing  for  the  country  and  its  18,000,000  people?  Its 
range  on  range  of  bare  hills  remind  one,  travelling  from 
the  seaport  of  Fusan  to  Seoul,  of  New  Mexico  and  Arizona, 
or  Spain,  or  Algeria.  This  is  because  the  improvident 


1 Charles  H.  Sherrill,  op.  cit. 


204  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Koreans  nearly  denuded  the  country  of  its  splendid 
forests.  The  Japanese  (successful  foresters,  as  their  own 
pine-clad  hills  show)  have  set  out  no  less  than  473,000,000 
trees  in  Korea  and  are  still  pressing  on  with  its  reforesta- 
tion. They  are  employing  as  many  Koreans  as  possible ; 
over  three  times  as  many  as  were  so  employed  in  1910. 
April  3 was  selected  as  Arbour  Day,  and  six  years  later 
over  750,000  participated  in  its  beneficent  exercises.  The 
output  of  the  Korean  coal-mines  has  been  nearly  trebled 
since  1910.  Her  foreign  trade  went  up  from  59,000,000 
yen  in  1910  to  131,000,000  in  1917.  Her  railway  mileage 
has  doubled  under  Japanese  control.  Savings  are  being 
encouraged,  as  appears  from  the  last  available  report 
(January  1917),  which  shows  827,215  Korean  depositors 
and  an  increase  of  177,687  individuals  during  the  pre- 
ceding year.  . . . Both  highways  and  street  extensions 
show  handsome  increase,  and  Seoul,  with  its  many  broad 
avenues,  is,  thanks  to  the  Japanese,  one  of  the  best-paved 
cities  in  the  Orient.  Extensive  harbour  improvements 
have  transformed  the  old-fashioned  Korean  ports  into 
models  of  modern  embarkation  points.  Especially  have 
the  Japanese  encouraged  agriculture  in  their  new 
province,  and  thereby  secured  constantly  increasing 
benefits  for  the  inhabitants,  of  whom  80  per  cent,  are 
normally  agriculturalists,  producing  70  per  cent,  of  their 
country’s  exports.  Model  farms,  experimental  stations, 
and  training  schools  have  been  set  up  in  many  centres, 
and  over  1,000,000  yen  is  thus  annually  expended  to 
uplift  the  Korean  farmer.  Left  to  himself,  he  would 
cultivate  nothing  but  rice,  and  when  it  was  harvested, 
wait  till  next  season  for  the  same  crop,  but  the  Japanese 
are  teaching  him  new  side-lines — fruit  trees,  cotton, 
sugar-beet,  hemp,  tobacco,  silkworms,  sheep-breeding, 
etc.  An  increase  of  several  hundred  per  cent,  in  wheat, 
bean,  and  barley  acreage  has  been  achieved.  The  cotton 
acreage  increased  from  1123  cho  in  1910  to  48,000  in  1917, 
and  the  number  of  fruit  trees  more  than  trebled.  Numer- 
ous factories,  something  hitherto  unknown  in  the  land, 
have  been  introduced,  affording  occupation  for  thousands 
of  Koreans.  Startling  improvements  in  health  con- 
ditions have  been  effected  by  means  of  hygienic  inspec- 
tion and  Government  hospitals  and  by  new  waterworks 
everywhere.  The  schools,  especially  industrial  schools, 
are  vigorously  and  successfully  combating  the  old  Korean 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  MOVEMENT  205 


ignorance  and  shiftlessness.  The  foregoing  is  a fair 
picture  of  Japanese  rule  in  Korea,  and  it  richly  deserves 
to  be  hung  alongside  of  the  one  depicting  England’s 
service  to  Egypt,  nor  need  it  fear  comparison.” 

From  personal  observation  on  the  spot  (a  brief  survey 
only  of  the  surface  of  things),  I am  convinced  that  the 
general  condition  of  the  Korean  peasantry  and  their 
standard  of  living  are  appreciably  higher  to-day  than 
ever  they  were,  or  could  have  been,  under  Korean 
administration.  And  if  this  be  admitted,  the  practical 
question  next  presents  itself : is  it  not  desirable  that 
this  material  and  educational  progress  should  continue, 
even  under  alien  rulers,  until  such  time  as  the  Koreans 
are  either  fit  for  self-government,  or  in  a position  to 
claim  complete  social  and  economic  equality  with  the 
Japanese  as  fellow-subjects  ? Would  not  the  immediate 
application  of  the  principle  of  self-determination  (if  it 
were  possible)  merely  throw  the  country  back  into  the 
chaotic  helplessness  of  the  old  Hermit  Kingdom  ? Does 
not  the  example  of  present-day  China  afford  sufficient 
proof  of  the  folly  of  endeavouring  to  apply  Republican 
principles  to  a people  which  is  by  nature  and  traditions 
incapable  of  organising  any  form  of  representative 
government  ? The  real  Korean  question  lies  here  : to 
devise  an  alternative  to  Japanese  rule,  which  shall  give 
the  country  (and  its  neighbours)  a reasonable  prospect 
of  peace  and  progress. 


* 


PART  II 

STUDIES  AND  IMPRESSIONS 


CHAPTER  XI 


ON  A JAPANESE  PACIFIC  LINER 

It  was  the  good  ship  Shiny o Maru,  and  she  sailed  from 
San  Francisco  for  Japan  on  December  4,  1919,  with  a full 
complement  of  passengers,  saloon  and  steerage.  When 
I say  that  she  sailed,  I mean  that  by  noon  all  the  pas- 
sengers were  aboard  and  that  by  six  o’clock  she  had  put 
out  from  the  wharf  into  the  harbour,  but,  as  a matter  of 
fact,  it  was  not  until  next  morning  that  we  put  forth 
into  the  deep.  For  there  was  a great  gale  blowing  beyond 
the  Golden  Gate,  a heavy  sea  breaking  on  the  bar,  and 
very  little  chance  of  being  able  to  drop  the  pilot  outside. 
The  Japanese  shipping  companies  are  great  sticklers  for 
schedules;  there  is  nothing  in  their  methods  or  move- 
ments of  that  easy-going  indifference  to  dates  which 
marks  the  comings  and  goings  of  most  British  and 
American  vessels  in  these  waters;  but  they  are  also 
prudent  mariners,  taking  no  risk  of  wind  and  tide.  At 
8 a.m.,  therefore,  we  passed  out  through  the  Golden 
Gate,  and  straightway  many  weak  vessels  went  below,  to 
seek  the  refuge  that  the  cabin  grants. 

Our  saloon  passengers  were  a strange  consortium  of 
East  and  West.  The  Japanese  were  in  the  majority,  the 
rest  composed  of  Americans  of  many  types,  Britishers  for 
Hongkong  and  the  China  Ports,  Scandinavians,  Russians, 
and  a plentiful  sprinkling  of  the  chosen  people.  China 
was  represented  by  one  solitary  individual,  as  far  as  the 
saloon  was  concerned,  and  the  fact  was  eloquent  of  the 
force  which  at  that  moment  lay  behind  the  anti- Japanese 
boycott.  The  steerage  passengers,  fore  and  aft,  were 
practically  all  Japanese.  Of  the  six  hundred  there  were 
p 209 


210  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


only  nine  Chinese,  half  a dozen  Hindoos,  and  a few 
Filipinos.  As  a rule,  in  normal  times  of  amity,  the 
Toyo  Risen  Kaisha  carries  large  numbers  of  Celestials, 
and  the  forward  steerage  is  given  over  to  them  exclu- 
sively, for  peace  sake;  but  as  the  result  of  the  boycott 
they  had  taken  to  travelling  by  other  lines,  and  -per  contra, 
the  “ China  Mail  ” boats  carried  hardly  any  Japanese. 
So  much  for  “ the  ties  with  a kindred  Asiatic  race  ” of 
the  Pan-Asian  dream  ! So  much  for  the  poetic  fiction 
of  “ East  is  East  and  West  is  West  ” when  tested  in  the 
stern  struggle  for  race  survival.  There  are,  no  doubt, 
insuperable  barriers  of  creed  and  colour  between  East 
and  West,  permanent  causes  of  jealousy  and  distrust 
between  Anglo-Saxons  and  Japanese,  born  of  trade 
rivalry  and  racial  ambitions,  but  they  are  mild  in  their 
effects  when  compared  with  the  antagonism  which  the 
events  of  the  past  ten  years  have  created  between  the 
Chinese  and  their  cousins  of  the  land  of  the  Rising  Sun. 

On  the  neutral  soil  of  California  the  clear-cut  division 
between  the  two  races  is  plainly  manifested  to-day 
in  mutual  contempt  and  dislike.  Both  Chinese  and 
Japanese  mix  freely  with  the  American  community  for 
purposes  of  business  and  pleasure,  but  rarely  at  the 
same  time  and  place.  The  China  Commerce  Club  invites 
no  Japanese  to  its  luncheons  and  receptions  nowadays ; 
to  do  so  would  merely  make  everybody  uncomfortable, 
and  this  despite  the  fact  that  the  leading  members  of 
the  Japanese  community  are  men  of  liberal  education 
and  broad  views,  who  have  many  American  friends.  It 
is  unquestionably  true  that  public  opinion  in  California 
is  much  more  friendly  disposed  towards  the  Chinese  than 
towards  the  Japanese  at  the  present  time ; but  it  would, 
I think,  be  unwise  to  attach  too  much  importance  to 
this  fact,  or,  because  of  it,  to  ascribe  to  either  race  any 
permanence  of  superior  virtue.  The  sympathies  and 
antipathies  of  nations  are  not  deep-rooted  in  racial 
origins,  as  some  would  have  us  believe.  Broadly  speak- 
ing, they  reflect  the  ever-changing  conditions  of  economic 


ON  A JAPANESE  PACIFIC  LINER  211 


necessity,  new  phases  in  the  world-wide  struggle  for 
survival.  A century  ago,  England  and  Germany  were 
fighting  France;  fifty  years  hence,  the  United  States 
may  have  to  defend  its  amassed  wealth  against  a hungry 
League  of  European  nations.  Fifteen  years  ago,  when 
Japan  fought  Russia,  American  sympathy  was  all  with 
the  Land  of  the  Rising  Sun,  and  during  the  past  thirty 
years  the  Chinese  settlers  in  California  and  Canada  have 
more  than  once  had  occasion  to  complain  of  harsh  treat- 
ment. To-day’s  distinct  preference  of  the  Californian 
for  the  Chinese  is  easily  explained  : he  has  come  to  be 
recognised  as  an  indefatigable  worker,  without  inclination 
or  capacity  for  aggression,  a passive  resister  on  occasions, 
but  asking  little  more  than  to  be  allowed  to  glean  a little 
wealth  in  the  land  of  plenty,  and  then  to  return,  dead  or 
alive,  to  his  ancestral  home.  He  brings  no  women  with 
him,  makes  no  claim  to  rights  of  citizenship  or  the  open 
door,  raises  no  contentious  issues.  Therefore  California, 
needing  efficient  labour  in  many  fields  of  industry,  looks 
kindly  on  the  Chinese.  But  the  Japanese,  more  and 
more  inclined — nay,  compelled — to  claim  a place  in  the 
sun  for  their  surplus,  hungry  millions ; a race  that  has 
proved  itself  ready  and  able  to  fight  for  that  place — this 
is  a very  different  matter.  Here  is  the  Yellow  Peril 
knocking  at  the  Californian’s  door,  an  economic  menace 
not  to  be  denied,  an  issue  in  which  every  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  comes  directly  into  conflict  with  Utopian 
idealism  and  the  doctrine  of  the  Brotherhood  of  Man. 
And  just  as  most  Americans  fail  to  realise  the  inexorable 
necessity  which  compels  Japan  to  seek  expansion  over- 
seas, so  the  average  Japanese  fails  to  recognise  the 
insuperable  force  of  the  self-preserving  instinct,  which 
leads  the  white  races  to  refuse  to  grant  rights  of  citizen- 
ship and  unfettered  competition  to  Asiatics — to  sign,  in 
fact,  their  own  death  warrant.  Only  fuller  knowledge, 
a better  understanding  on  both  sides,  can  ever  solve  a 
problem  such  as  this. 

Aboard  the  Shiny o Maru,  as  in  California,  the  East  was 


212  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


frankly  divided  against  itself  and  the  West  stood  watch- 
fully between.  There  were  a good  number  of  Cantonese 
stewards,  working  side  by  side  with  Japanese  in  the 
saloon,  and  the  cook’s  galley  was  a Chinese  monopoly. 
But  the  Company  had  found  it  possible  to  prevent 
outbreaks  of  battle,  murder,  and  sudden  death  amongst 
them,  by  rigidly  enforcing  the  drastic  rule  that  in  everj' 
case  of  battery  and  assault,  all  concerned  were  instantly 
dismissed.  It  was  clear  to  the  least  observant  eye  that 
there  was  no  love  lost  between  the  representatives  of  the 
two  races,  and  that  fierce  passions  smouldered  beneath 
the  damper  of  enforced  neutrality,  but  as  far  as  the 
passengers  were  concerned,  their  rivalry  was  conducive 
to  efficient  service.  According  to  Mr.  Kawakami,  the 
Japanese  are  the  only  civilised  race  in  Asia.  It  may  be 
so — it  all  depends  upon  whether  we  regard  civilisation 
as  a product  of  machinery,  or  a state  of  mind — but, 
speaking  for  myself,  I must  confess  that  in  the  mixed 
company  of  our  saloon,  I frequently  found  myself 
reflecting  that  the  Cantonese  stewards  cut  a more  dig- 
nified figure,  seemed  nearer  to  the  philosophic  ideal  of 
the  Superior  Man,  than  all  the  rest  of  us  put  together. 
The  Chinese  attitude  towards  life  in  general  makes 
them,  as  a race,  an  embodiment  of  the  Intellectual  Ideal. 
Incidentally,  it  also  explains  the  failure  of  this  ideal  to 
achieve  material  reward  in  the  world  of  things-as-they- 
are. 

All  the  executive  officers  of  the  Toyo  Risen  Kaisha 
are  now  Japanese — the  last  of  the  English  captains  have 
been  replaced  since  1917 — but  the  Shinyo  Maru  carries, 
nevertheless,  for  the  benefit  of  non- Japanese  passengers, 
a “ travelling  ” doctor  (American),  an  Irish  chief  steward, 
an  English  purser,  and  an  American  barber.  After  a 
good  deal  of  experience  in  all  the  Seven  Seas,  I can 
honestly  say  that  I know  of  few  steamship  routes  on 
which  the  passenger  will  find  more  kindly  consideration, 
more  courtesy  and  care,  than  on  this  Japanese  line.  And 
this  courtesy  and  consideration  are  by  no  means  confined 


THE  MOATEl)  WALLS  OF  CHIYODA  PALACE.  ON  BOARD  A JAPANESE  LINER  : A WRESTLING  BOUT. 


ON  A JAPANESE  PACIFIC  LINER  213 


to  the  saloon  passengers.  For  the  steerage,  there  are 
theatrical  performances  and  wrestling  matches,  organised, 
and  obviously  enjoyed,  by  the  crew;  and  on  Sundays 
there  are  religious  services,  conducted  by  Japanese 
Christians  and  attended  by  surprisingly  large  congre- 
gations. 

The  number  of  small  children  belonging  to  the  Japanese 
steerage  passengers  on  this  voyage  was  remarkable : 
there  were  some  seventy  of  them.  Now  every  one  of 
these  quaint  little  bundles  is  a political  asset  of  no  small 
importance  to  Japan,  because,  as  an  American-born 
citizen,  he  or  she  can  claim  rights  of  land  tenure  denied 
to,  and  coveted  by,  the  ordinary  Japanese  immigrant. 
It  is  evident  that  the  fundamental  purpose  of  the  “ gentle- 
man’s agreement  ” will  be  nullified,  or  at  least  greatly 
modified,  if  large  numbers  of  Japanese  children  are  born 
on  American  soil.  It  is  also  evident  that  the  marriages 
of  “ picture  brides  ” in  California  were  an  expedient 
devised  and  quietly  encouraged  to  promote  that  end. 
It  was  a characteristically  Oriental  stratagem,  intended 
to  take  advantage  of  the  curiously  unpractical  and  self- 
contradictory nature  of  America’s  naturalisation  laws, 
and  to  build  up,  within  the  letter  of  those  laws,  rapidly 
increasing  Japanese  communities,  with  full  rights  of 
citizenship,  on  American  soil.  It  seemed  therefore,  at 
first  sight,  a surprising  thing  that  the  Shiny o Maru  should 
be  taking  back  to  Japan  so  many  valuable  little  stakes 
pegged  out  at  such  pains  in  the  land  of  promise.  Eco- 
nomically, and  perhaps  politically,  a Japanese  child  born 
in  California  should  be  worth  its  weight  in  gold.  There 
was  a certain  distinguished  member  of  the  Japanese 
Diet  on  board,  and  to  him  I went,  seeking  information 
as  to  the  reason  for  the  return  to  their  native  land  of 
all  these  fortunate  parents  and  their  precious  offspring. 
Anxious,  no  doubt,  to  improve  the  shining  hour,  he  said 
that  he  believed  these  humble  workers  were  leaving  the 
inhospitable  shores  of  America  because  the  attitude  of 
the  Californians  towards  them  had  made  it  impossible 


214  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


for  them  to  continue  to  live  there  any  longer  with  any 
peace  of  mind  or  self-respect.  But  subsequent  and  more 
direct  inquiries  served  to  show  that  the  member  of  the 
Diet  was  either  misleading  or  misled.  I ascertained  that 
nearly  all  these  families  were  going  back  to  Japan  for  a 
holiday,  with  plenty  of  money  in  their  pockets ; returning 
to  their  native  haunts,  much  as  the  Irish  do,  to  astonish 
their  kinsfolk  with  unwonted  prodigality  and  tales  of 
adventure;  to  put  the  elder  children  to  school  and  let 
the  younger  learn  something  of  the  glories  of  Dai  Nippon ; 
but  all  fully  intending  to  return  before  long  to  the  land 
of  easy  money.  They  were,  in  fact,  mostly  joy-riders, 
and  as  cheerful  a lot  of  human  beings  as  one  could  wish 
to  meet. 

But  the  steerage  contained  also  another  and  a sad 
type  of  home-coming  Japanese — the  sick,  the  broken- 
down,  and  the  crippled,  returning  to  die  in  the  land  of 
their  fathers.  The  pitiful  story  of  this  human  wreckage 
was  emphasised  by  immediate  contact  and  contrast  with 
all  the  young  and  joyous  life  about  them;  no  doubt 
but  that  they  felt  the  pathos  of  it  themselves,  for  suicides 
were  sadly  frequent  occurrences  in  that  sad  company. 
On  the  previous  trip  of  the  Shiny o Mam  there  had  been 
four  cases ; there  is  seldom  a voyage  in  which  some  of 
these  unfortunates  do  not  slip  overboard,  unnoticed,  to 
oblivion.  On  this  trip  one  case  occurred,  typical  of  the 
old  Japanese  ideal  of  conjugal  fidelity.  At  midnight, 
under  the  pale  glimpses  of  the  stars,  a husband  and  wife 
tied  themselves  together  and  jumped  overboard,  leaving 
a polite  note  of  apology  to  the  Captain,  with  a pathetic 
little  valedictory  verse  from  “ two  dewdrops  that  merge 
softly  in  the  sea.”  The  husband  was  a young  bank 
clerk,  invalided  home  with  consumption,  and  with  nothing 
but  pain  and  poverty  to  look  forward  to  for  himself  and 
his  wife;  and  so,  when  the  moonlight  lay  like  silver 
upon  the  wine-dark  sea,  they  “ perished  on  the  midnight, 
without  pain.”  Surely,  a beautiful  death.  But  the 
frequency  of  suicides  amongst  the  younger  generation  of 


ON  A JAPANESE  PACIFIC  LINER  215 

the  Japanese  seems  to  be  one  of  several  symptoms  of  social 
instability,  of  the  unhealthy  unrest  of  a people  which 
has  striven  to  divest  itself  too  rapidly  of  the  old  ways, 
the  old  wisdom,  of  the  East.  Happily,  in  Japan  itself 
one  finds  evidence  to-day  of  a healthy  reaction  against 
this  feverish  modernism. 

There  was  a band  of  alleged  musicians  aboard  the 
Shinyo  Maru,  a well-meaning  quartette  of  industrious 
blowers  and  scrapers,  whose  business  it  was  to  produce 
dance  music,  grand  opera,  or  hymns,  as  required,  which 
they  did  with  a perfectly  obvious  indifference  to  melody 
or  harmony.  It  is  natural  enough,  I suppose,  that 
ultra-modem  Japan  should  wish  to  prove  that  there  is 
nothing  in  the  outfit  of  Western  civilisation  which  cannot 
be  produced  from  her  own  native  sources ; nevertheless, 
these  attempts  to  make  European  music  popular,  not 
only  as  an  art,  but  as  a profession,  seem  to  me  pathetically 
suggestive  of  laudable  intentions  misdirected.  In  Tokyo 
they  will  assure  you  that  the  masses  really  understand 
and  enjoy  the  band  music  which  is  dispensed  to  them 
by  the  authorities,  and  you  will  hear  much  learned  argu- 
ment based  on  the  meteoric  career  of  Madame  Myra; 
but  for  all  that,  I venture  to  assert  that  it  is  no  more 
possible  to  popularise  the  music  of  Europe  in  China  or 
Japan  than  to  make  these  people  appreciate  the  doctrines 
of  our  sectarian  Churches,  and  for  precisely  the  same 
reason.  It  is  undeniable,  I admit,  that  here  and  there 
individuals  may  be  able  to  perform  the  necessary  miracle 
of  psychic  acrobatics;  but  for  the  masses,  the  feat  is 
simply  impossible.  In  the  matter  of  European  band 
music,  Japan  would  be  well  advised  to  allow  the  gentle 
Filipino  to  discourse  it.  But  if,  as  a matter  of  patriotic 
policy,  Japanese  liners  must  carry  home-made  bands, 
then  let  them  at  least  not  play  to  us  whilst  we  eat.  Their 
efforts,  however  chaotic,  may  be  defensible  when  confined 
to  the  production  of  the  noise  required  by  those  who 
fox-trot  and  shimmy  it  on  the  quarter  deck;  but  they 
serve  to  wreck  the  first  travail  of  digestion. 


216  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


That  which  strikes  one  most  forcibly  after  a few  days 
at  sea  aboard  a Japanese  liner,  is  the  meticulous  quality 
of  the  official  organisation,  which  attends  to  every  detail 
of  the  passenger’s  day,  which  has  an  hour  for  everything 
and  everything  at  its  hour.  It  is  evidently  part  of  the 
business  of  the  Captain  and  crew  to  see  to  it  that  the 
travelling  public  shall  never  lack  for  entertainment.  The 
wireless  news  service  is  chiefly  conspicuous  by  its  absence, 
but  the  ship’s  printer  is  kept  so  busy  with  programmes 
and  announcements  of  every  kind,  that  for  seventeen  days 
we  are  quite  content  to  dispense  with  news  of  the  outside 
world,  to  play  our  own  little  harmless  games,  and  forget 
those  of  the  politician.  Of  an  evening  there  is  always 
something  doing  : exhibitions  of  Japanese  fencing  and 
wrestling,  generally  excellent;  moving  pictures  of  the 
kind  that  make  one  blush  for  our  Western  manners  and 
morals  in  partibis  infidelium ; concerts,  dances,  and 
lectures  (the  last  chiefly  by  Japanese  for  Japanese) — 
all  winding  up  with  the  Captain’s  farewell  dinner,  and  a 
well-worn  speech  in  English  by  that  worthy  mariner. 
As  one  surrenders  oneself  to  the  routine  of  an  existence 
in  which  everything  from  bath  to  bedtime  proceeds 
smoothly  “ according  to  plan,”  one  begins  to  realise 
dimly  what  life  must  be  in  Japan  under  a bureaucratic 
system  which  is  merely  the  old  feudalism  slightly  modified 
in  externals,  and  which  relieves  the  masses  of  all  necessity, 
or  indeed  of  any  opportunity,  of  thinking  for  themselves. 

The  cost  of  the  journey  across  the  Pacific,  of  seventeen 
halcyon  days’  travel,  not  to  mention  board  and  lodging, 
appeared  to  me,  a year  ago  (no  doubt,  like  everything  else, 
it  has  since  gone  up),  to  be  one  of  the  few  surviving 
instances  of  value  for  money  on  this  distressful  planet. 
The  price  of  the  ticket  worked  out  at  about  $15  a day, 
which,  as  times  go,  seems  a very  modest  sum  to  pay  for 
the  privilege  of  existing,  not  to  speak  of  being  carried 
across  six  thousand  miles  of  ocean.  All  the  same,  unless 
you  happen  to  be  a teetotaller,  the  journey  may  prove 
expensive  in  the  end,  for  the  American  and  the  Japanese 


ON  A JAPANESE  PACIFIC  LINER  217 


liners  have  bound  themselves  by  an  unholy  pact  to  bleed 
without  mercy  any  man  who  chooses  to  season  his  meat 
with  wine  or  his  tobacco  with  spirits.  Talk  of  profiteering  ! 
The  cost  of  a bottle  of  Scotch  whisky  in  Yokohama  is, 
roughly,  $i  gold;  they  make  you  pay  $6  for  it  on  the 
Pacific  Mail  and  Japanese  boats.  Champagne  is  $10 
(fifty  shillings,  egad  !)  a bottle,  cocktails  two  shillings, 
and  everything  else  in  proportion.  Last  spring  the  Nippon 
Yusen  Kaisha  paid  its  shareholders  a dividend  of  70 
per  cent,  and  a little  bonus  of  100  per  cent. ; since  then 
they  have  announced  their  intention  to  raise  the  rates 
of  passenger  travel  on  the  ground  that  the  present  charges 
do  not  cover  expenses.  It  may  be  so — since  the  war 
company  finance  has  passed  far  beyond  the  range  of  an 
ordinary  man’s  understanding — but  whatever  the  charge 
for  the  passage  may  be,  one  would  like,  once  aboard,  to 
be  allowed  to  forget  both  Pussyfoot  and  Profiteer.  Ex- 
tortion on  the  high  seas  rankles  worse  than  on  dry  land, 
for  the  reason  that  there  is  no  possible  means  of  escape. 

The  organised  efficiency  and  imitative  adaptability  of 
the  Japanese  race  of  to-day  were  very  clearly  reflected 
on  board  the  Shinyo  Maru,  and  to  me,  returning  to  the 
East  after  an  absence  of  ten  years,  there  was  something 
very  significant  and  instructive  in  every  fresh  manifesta- 
tion of  this  adaptability,  which,  in  the  lifetime  of  a man, 
has  mastered  all  the  material  secrets  of  our  Western 
civilisation  and  most  of  our  parlour  tricks  as  well.  As  I 
sat  in  the  smoking-room  and  watched  twenty  or  thirty 
typical  Japanese  of  the  class  that  travels — bankers, 
politicians,  doctors,  merchants,  and  students — nearly  all 
wearing  European  clothes,  and  dividing  their  time 
between  games  of  poker  and  endless,  earnest  conversa- 
tions ; as  I saw  them  in  the  saloon,  eating  European 
food  and  placidly  enduring  the  relentless  music,  I found 
myself  continually  wondering  whether  the  race-mind  is, 
and  can  be  permanently,  satisfied  with  all  this  alien 
window-dressing?  It  pleases  me  rather  to  think  that, 
having  proved  her  ability  to  acquire  the  gospel  of  force, 


218  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  achieved  her  place  amongst  the  great  Powers,  Japan 
will  see  fit  some  day  to  return  to  her  own  old  gracious 
ways  of  thinking  and  living,  replacing  all  these  foreign 
tricks  and  trappings  with  things  seemly  and  suitable  to 
the  soul  of  the  people.  I like  to  believe  in  the  possible 
renaissance  of  the  glory  that  was  Old  Japan,  of  her 
people’s  birthright  of  sweetness  and  beauty,  of  conscious 
joy  in  simple  things,  of  chivalry  and  self-control.  I like 
to  hope  for  the  coming  of  another  Inouye,  who  shall  teach 
Japan  to  be  true  to  herself  and  to  cease  from  following 
after  strange  gods. 

Take,  for  example,  the  question  of  clothes.  Can  it  be 
possible  that  a race  of  artists  like  the  Japanese  are  really 
satisfied  with  the  horrible  hybrid  appearance  of  the 
people  as  at  present  arrayed?  In  the  case  of  their 
women-folk,  thank  goodness,  they  have  come  to  under- 
stand that  to  clothe  them  in  European  garments  is  an 
offence  which  cries  aloud  to  heaven.  Do  the  men  really 
fail  to  realise  the  utter  hideousness  and  incongruity  of 
their  own  clothes,  especially  when  contrasted  with  the 
dainty  charm  of  Madam  Butterfly,  or  do  they  wear  these 
reach-me-downs  as  offerings  on  the  altars  of  patriotic 
duty?  Of  all  the  Japanese  passengers  aboard  the 
Shinyo  Maru,  there  were  only  two  who  wore  their  own 
dignified  and  comfortable  national  dress,  and  both, 
curiously  enough,  were  men  who  had  lived  most  of  their 
days  abroad.  When  you  ask  a Japanese  whether  he  really 
prefers  European  clothes,  the  usual  reply  is  that,  for  pur- 
poses of  travel  or  office  work,  they  are  more  convenient 
than  native  dress.  This  may  be  true  for  the  very  small 
minority  of  well-to-do  people  who  can  afford  a complete 
European  outfit,  including  boots,  but  the  average  indi- 
vidual that  one  sees  in  the  streets  of  Tokyo  or  Osaka 
presents  an  appearance  that  suggests  no  idea  of  con- 
venience. A slouchy  bagman’s  hat  or  cloth  cap,  a 
dingy  cape  overcoat  with  a fur  collar,  a shapeless  pair 
of  trousers — and  the  West  has  done  its  share  of  a dreadful 
business.  The  East  ends  it  fittingly  with  white  tabi 


ON  A JAPANESE  PACIFIC  LINER  219 


(stockings)  and  a pair  of  high  wooden  sandals,  which 
our  friend  removes,  as  of  old,  whenever  he  enters  a 
tea-house  and  even  when  he  goes  shopping  at  Mitsu- 
koshi’s  new  department  store. 

A nation  which  has  learned  to  build  and  man  its  own 
Pacific  liners  was  bound,  I suppose,  to  get  gramophones 
and  dress  suits  and  department  stores,  as  part  of  its 
competitive  outfit ; there  is  even  talk,  here  and  there, 
of  a movement  for  adopting  some  form  of  Christianity 
as  the  national  religion,  on  the  same  principle.  In  the 
smoking-room  of  the  Shinyo  Maru,  I frequently  discussed 
these  things  at  great  length  with  the  member  of  the  Diet 
aforesaid  and  a rich  steel-plate  manufacturer  from  Kobe, 
both  men  of  liberal,  not  to  say  radical,  views.  And  in 
the  minds  of  both,  beneath  their  complacent  satisfaction 
at  Japan’s  material  progress,  I found  unmistakable  signs 
of  that  which  I,  too  (though  only  a passer-by),  feel  and 
fear : apprehension  of  the  perils  of  change  which  lie 
beyond. 


CHAPTER  XII 


MODERN  TOKYO 

“ What  wonderful  changes  you  must  see  ! ” Here  in 
Tokyo,  as  in  Shanghai,  when  you  tell  any  one  that  it  is 
years  since  you  last  visited  these  parts,  the  set  phrase 
greets  you  inevitably,  a regular  shibboleth.  Moreover, 
whether  it  comes  from  a native  or  a foreign  resident, 
the  manner  of  its  utterance  clearly  implies  that  you  are 
expected  to  express  amazement  at  the  prodigious  pro- 
gress which  the  city  has  achieved  since  last  you  saw  it. 
As  to  the  magnitude  and  multitude  of  the  changes  which 
have  taken  place  in  Tokyo,  there  can  be  neither  doubt 
nor  discussion ; they  confront  you  at  every  step.  During 
the  last  ten  years  the  population  has  increased  from 
858,000  to  3,000,000,  of  whom  nearly  300,000  are  em- 
ployed in  industrial  labour.  Since  1917  the  number  of 
factories  has  increased  twofold,  the  cost  of  living  has 
risen  swiftly  to  the  European  level,  and  strikes  have 
become  a favourite  form  of  recreation  amongst  all  classes 
of  manual  workers.  The  chief  business  districts  of  the 
city  are  altered  beyond  all  recognition ; only  a few  ancient 
landmarks  remain,  here  and  there,  little  islets  of  stability 
in  an  ocean  of  change,  to  remind  one  of  the  tranquil 
Tokyo  of  bygone  days.  And  far  beyond  the  city  limits 
of  those  days,  crowded  residential  suburbs  have  sprung 
up,  in  places  where  one  remembers  seeing  little  villages 
clustering  and  rice-fields  shimmering  in  the  sun.  Where 
once  the  kuruma  ran  through  quiet  little  streets  to  a 
rhythmical  accompaniment  of  the  vox  humana,  the  clamour 
of  tramcars  now  resounds,  amidst  great  blocks  of  build- 
ings in  the  European  style,  and  motor-cars  combine  with 

220 


MODERN  TOKYO 


221 


handcarts,  bicycles,  and  jinrickshas  to  produce  a very 
horrid  congestion  of  traffic.  There  are  now  whole  streets 
of  shops  with  window  displays  in  the  latest  foreign  style, 
and  at  the  great  department  stores,  like  Mitsukoshi’s, 
Madame  Butterfly  and  Madame  Morning  Glory,  with  their 
babies  on  their  backs,  may  snatch  a fearful  and  exotic 
joy  from  electric  lifts,  moving  stairways,  and  shopping 
to  the  strains  of  an  alleged  Strauss. 

Oh  yes,  there  is  no  question  as  to  the  greatness  of  the 
changes,  and  if  we  cling  to  the  creed  of  the  virtuous 
Victorians,  who  declared  that  “ progress  is  the  kind  of 
improvement  which  can  be  measured  by  statistics,”  then 
Tokyo  has  undoubtedly  progressed.  If  (to  quote  Dean 
Inge)  we  accept  the  view  that  a nation  which  travels 
sixty  miles  an  hour  must  be  five  times  as  civilised  as 
one  which  travels  only  twelve,  then  the  capital  of  Japan 
to-day  greatly  excels  in  civilisation  the  ancient  city  of 
the  Tokugawa  Shogunate,  of  which,  nevertheless,  the 
poets  continue  to  sing.  Whether  or  not  to  join  in  the 
chorus  of  congratulation  which  the  up-to-date  citizen 
evidently  expects,  must  depend  upon  one’s  individual 
conception  of  the  meaning  of  the  words  “ civilisation  ” 
and  “ progress.”  If  the  ultimate  aim  of  human  endeavour 
is  to  produce  a great  increase  of  population,  gathered 
together  in  huge  cities,  making  vast  quantities  of  un- 
necessary things  by  machinery,  with  ever-increasing  noise 
and  haste,  so  be  it  : wisdom  may  yet  be  justified  of  her 
children.  But  for  myself,  looking  as  an  old  friend  upon 
Tokyo  and  other  cities  of  Japan,  and  remembering  the 
many  grateful  and  gracious  things  which  the  present-day 
materialism  has  slowly  but  surely  taken  from  the  daily 
life  of  these  town-dwellers : their  simple  serenity,  their 
old-world  virtues  of  courtesy  and  kindliness,  I confess 
myself  unable  to  derive  any  comfort  from  the  triumphant 
statistics  of  their  Chambers  of  Commerce,  or  any  joy  from 
the  sight  of  a dozen  motor-cars  awaiting  their  top-hatted 
owners  at  the  gates  of  the  Diet.  If,  as  I believe,  the  first 
aim  of  a wise  civilisation  should  be  to  increase  the  average 


222  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


individual’s  opportunities  for  rational  happiness,  then 
the  old  Japan  was  nearer  to  wisdom  than  the  new,  if  only 
because  it  had  a clearer  perception  of  the  things  that 
matter,  and  because  its  traditions  and  ideals  came  nearer 
to  the  absolute  values  of  Truth  and  Beauty.  In  the 
streets  of  Tokyo  to-day,  as  in  Glasgow  or  Chicago  or 
Berlin,  the  “ progress  which  is  measured  by  statistics  " 
has  produced,  and  is  producing,  material  and  spiritual 
ugliness.  There  has  been,  no  doubt,  a notable  advance 
in  the  experience  and  machinery  of  life,  but  it  is  an 
advance  not  only  unaccompanied  by  any  indication  of 
increased  happiness  and  morality,  but  one  which  reveals 
in  itself  many  symptoms  of  unrest  and  discontent. 

As  I made  my  way  on  February  25  along  the 
broad  thoroughfare  which  leads  from  the  Imperial  Palace 
walls  to  the  curiously  makeshift  Houses  of  Parliament, 
to  attend  there  an  obviously  make-believe  debate  on  the 
question  of  universal  suffrage,  signs  of  Japan’s  modernity 
confronted  me  at  every  turn.  Bronze  statues  in  honour 
of  departed  warriors  and  word-spinners,  hideous  enough, 
in  all  conscience,  to  cure  most  men  of  any  ambition  to 
rival  their  fame;  a regiment  of  infantry  on  the  march, 
all  wearing  black  respirators,  supposed  to  be  an  effective 
protection  against  the  prevalent  influenza;  a crowd  of 
citizens,  mostly  of  the  student  class,  arrayed  in  a fearful 
and  wonderful  motley  of  native  and  foreign  garments; 
and  between  them  and  the  Diet,  forming  a close  cordon, 
several  hundred  policemen,  all  very  brisk  and  bristly. 
As  I watched  them  keeping  the  crowd  at  its  proper  and 
respectful  distance  from  the  approaches  to  the  Diet, 
some  imp  of  irony  whispered  in  my  ear  a modem  closet- 
philosopher’s  catchword  about  the  New  World  that  was 
to  be  made  free  for  Democracy,  and  my  mind  travelled 
swiftly  from  the  cloud-capped  towers  of  that  splendid 
Utopia  to  the  realities  of  the  scene  before  me.  For  here 
were  the  elected,  well-paid  servants  of  the  sovereign  people 
convened  in  the  name  of  Democracy  for  solemn  discus- 
sion of  a matter  vitally  affecting  the  people’s  liberties, 


MODERN  TOKYO 


223 


and  all  around  and  about  them,  another  body  of  public 
servants,  whose  duty  it  was  to  prevent  the  said  sovereign 
people  from  coming  anywhere  near  to  their  faithful 
representatives,  lest  perchance  they  might  do  them  an 
injury  ! 

Inside  the  Diet  the  scene  was  stately  and  impressive. 
If  only  all  the  members  (instead  of  about  half)  had  worn 
their  national  dress,  it  would  have  been  very  imposing. 
As  a body,  the  M.P.s  were  more  distinguished-looking 
and  dignified  than  I had  been  led  to  expect;  compared 
with  the  raw  youths  who  claim  to  represent  the  people 
in  China’s  or  Turkey’s  parliaments  pour  rire,  they  gave 
one  the  impression  of  being  grave  and  reverend  seigniors, 
for  their  average  age  appeared  to  be  rather  over  than 
under  forty.  All  those  who  held  official  positions  wore 
European  dress,  for  such  is  the  mot  d’ordre  of  the  bureau- 
cracy. Most  of  the  Government’s  contributions  to  the 
debate,  read  from  carefully-prepared  documents,  were 
received  by  the  House,  if  not  with  respectful  attention,  at 
least  without  unseemly  interruptions.  Even  when  the 
Prime  Minister  suddenly  produced  an  Imperial  Rescript 
whereby  the  House  found  itself  dissolved  without  further 
argument,  it  preserved  its  dignity  and  decorum.  But 
for  any  one  who  knew  the  inner  history  of  the  universal 
Suffrage  Bill  and  the  real  sentiments  of  the  Kenseikai 
Radicals  on  the  subject,  the  whole  debate  was  nothing 
more  than  a Barmecide  feat  of  political  flapdoodle,  " the 
stuff  that  fools  are  fed  with.”  The  proceedings  gave 
one,  in  fact,  much  the  same  impression  that  one  gets 
nowadays  in  the  House  by  the  river  at  Westminster, 
an  impression  of  cynical  make-believe,  of  an  elaborate 
farce,  well  played  by  highly  trained  professionals.  But 
the  entertainment  was  none  the  less  popular  as  a spectacle ; 
every  seat  in  the  several  divisions  of  the  gallery  was 
filled.  I had  a ticket  of  admission  to  the  place  which 
is  supposed  to  be  set  aside  for  the  Diplomatic  Body  and 
persons  introduced  by  the  Embassies,  but  found  all  its 
seats  occupied  by  Japanese,  an  arrangement  in  which 


224  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


the  policeman  in  charge  evidently  saw  nothing  to  com- 
plain of.  Having  squeezed  my  way  in  amongst  the 
spectators  standing  at  the  back  of  the  box,  I asked  my 
neighbour,  an  intelligent-looking  individual  in  a top 
hat,  whether  all  those  in  front  of  us  were  diplomats. 
“ Oh  no,”  he  replied,  “ they  are  only  trespassers.” 

Later  on,  as  I made  my  way  back  on  foot  in  the  dusk, 
along  the  broad  street  which  runs  past  the  Foreign  Office, 
and  thence  by  the  road  which  skirts  the  beautiful  old 
Palace  moat,  to  the  top  of  the  hill  where  the  British  Em- 
bassy stands,  I came  upon  a derelict  motor-bus,  broken- 
down  and  miserably  marooned  in  a morass  of  mud.  The 
sight  of  it  brought  forcibly  to  mind  the  fact  that  although 
Japan  has  become  one  of  the  Big  Five,  and  done  many 
other  great  things  since  last  I saw  the  streets  of  Tokyo, 
the  present  state  of  those  streets  and  of  the  public  services 
which  use  them  is  considerably  worse  than  it  was  then. 
It  is  unquestionably  true  that  the  roads  of  Peking  are 
now  better,  both  as  to  construction  and  maintenance, 
than  those  of  Tokyo ; ten  years  ago  the  comparison  was 
all  the  other  way.  Indeed,  the  problems  of  locomotion, 
transport,  and  communications  in  the  Japanese  capital 
have  become  acute.  Their  unpleasant  results  are  mani- 
fest in  many  directions  and  most  noticeably  in  the  restric- 
tion of  trade ; nevertheless,  neither  in  Parliament  nor  in 
the  Press  is  there  any  evidence  of  the  necessary  corrective 
in  the  shape  of  an  organised  public  opinion.  The  distances 
in  Tokyo  from  the  business  centres  to  the  residential 
suburbs  are  very  great.  The  tramway  services,  good 
enough  of  their  kind,  are  totally  inadequate  to  the  needs 
of  the  present  population,  and  the  cost  of  hiring  a jin- 
ricksha (the  poor  man’s  carriage  of  former  days)  has 
risen  to  such  a height  that  it  is  often  cheaper  for  two 
people  to  hire  a taxi  than  to  use  the  man-drawn  vehicle. 
But  as  there  are  practically  no  motors  for  hire  beyond 
the  radius  of  the  railway  stations  and  large  hotels, 
the  average  middle-class  citizen,  who  desires  to  avoid 
struggling  for  standing  room  in  a tram,  either  keeps  a 


MODERN  TOKYO 


225 


private  jinricksha  or  a bicycle.  For  these,  in  wet  weather, 
the  state  of  the  roads,  ankle  deep  in  mud,  is  a constant 
affliction.  The  women  of  the  working  classes,  unable  to 
afford  jinricksha  hire,  have  to  choose  between  the  chance 
of  an  overcrowded  tram  and  walking.  On  all  sides  one 
hears  grievous  complaints  of  the  high  cost  of  living, 
which  is  notably  higher  in  Tokyo  than  in  Yokohama, 
but  except  in  the  case  of  the  rice  riots  of  August  1918, 
there  has  been  but  little  sign  of  any  organised  expression 
of  public  dissatisfaction  with  the  inefficiency  of  the 
bureaucracy,  which  is  largely  responsible  for  the  unsatis- 
factory conditions  prevailing  in  the  great  industrial 
centres. 

And  the  state  of  the  roads  is  only  one  of  many  symp- 
toms. In  Japan,  as  in  other  countries,  the  demoralisa- 
tion of  the  postal,  telephone,  and  telegraph  services  may 
be  ascribed,  indirectly  at  least,  to  the  war,  because  large 
numbers  of  civil  servants  have  left  their  posts  to  seek 
more  lucrative  employment  in  factories  and  offices.  But 
after  all,  Japan  was  not  actually  at  war,  and  only  bureau- 
cratic inefficiency  and  dishonesty  can  account  for  the 
appalling  condition  of  the  public  services  as  they  are  at 
present  all  over  the  country.  And  nowhere  is  their 
disorganisation  more  conspicuous  than  in  and  about  the 
capital.  Even  within  the  city  limits  telephoning  is 
generally  a futile  waste  of  time  and  a weariness  of  the 
flesh,  and  if  the  community  has  not  given  it  up  entirely 
as  a bad  job,  the  fact  is  probably  due  to  the  equally 
chaotic  state  of  the  postal  administration.  To  get  a 
telephone  call  through  to  Yokohama,  nineteen  miles 
away,  is  generally  a matter  of  two  or  three  hours,  but  to 
get  a reply  by  post  may  take  days,  so  that  in  cases  where 
time  is  money,  it  is  best  to  send  a private  messenger 
by  train.  And  to  judge  by  the  opinions  of  business  men 
on  the  spot,  these  symptoms  of  official  incompetence 
are  by  no  means  local  or  transient,  but  chronic,  and  due 
to  the  apathy  and  ignorance  of  a bureaucracy  which 
can  imitate,  but  cannot  maintain,  Western  methods, 
Q 


226  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  to  the  prevalence  of  “ graft  ” of  super-Tammany 
rapacity. 

I have  mentioned  the  high  cost  of  living.  Generally 
speaking,  the  price  of  food  and  other  necessities  has 
risen  more  rapidly  in  Tokyo  than  in  most  of  the  world’s 
great  cities,  a fact  which  accounts  for  much  of  the  pre- 
valent social  and  political  unrest,  especially  as  the  pressure 
on  the  poorer  classes  has  been  accompanied  by  the 
emergence  of  a class  of  new  rich,  whose  ostentatious 
display  of  war-wealth  violates  all  the  national  traditions 
of  frugality  and  simplicity.  These  narikin,  with  their 
foreign-built  houses,  their  motor-cars,  their  over-dressed 
women  and  unseemly  manners,  have  figured  more  and 
more  conspicuously  in  the  life  of  the  capital  since  1917, 
and  the  rice  riots  of  August  1918  showed  how  greatly 
their  extravagances  had  contributed  to  create  popular 
discontent.  The  new  economic  conditions  resulting  from 
the  war  are  in  many  respects  similar  to  those  in  England, 
especially  in  the  case  of  the  unorganised  middle  class, 
which  finds  itself  impoverished  and  ignored  between  the 
profiteers  and  the  proletariat.  The  rapid  growth  of  the 
new  millionaire  class  may  be  gauged  by  the  fact  that, 
whereas  in  1914  there  were  only  twenty-two  persons  in 
Japan  paying  income  tax  on  fortunes  declared  at  over 
100,000  yen,  in  1918  there  were  336,  and  this  despite  the 
notorious  laxity  of  the  revenue  collectors  in  dealing  with 
big  incomes. 

Taking  the  year  1909  as  a basis,  with  the  index  figure 
100,  the  cost  of  living  for  bank  clerks  and  other  clerical 
workers  had  risen  in  1919  to  320,  and  is  now  considerably 
higher;  in  the  same  period  the  incomes  had  increased 
to  227.  In  the  case  of  manual  labourers,  while  the  cost 
of  living  had  increased  at  about  the  same  rate,  wages 
had  risen  to  494,  or  more  than  twice  as  much. 

Small  wonder  that  under  these  conditions  the  birth-rate 
of  the  middle  class  shows  a steady  decline.  The  Captain 
of  an  ocean-going  steamer,  with  whom  I travelled,  told 
me  that  in  the  cities,  throughout  the  whole  country, 


MODERN  TOKYO 


227 


small  families  are  becoming  the  rule,  whereas  they  used 
to  be  the  exception,  amongst  the  professional  and  educated 
classes,  a direct  result  of  the  high  cost  of  living.  He 
himself  as  a boy  cost  his  parents  5 yen  a month  for 
school  and  board;  his  own  two  children  cost  45  yen  a 
month  each. 

The  social  results  of  these  conditions  are  plainly  mani- 
fest in  many  directions.  In  Tokyo,  Osaka,  and  other 
industrial  centres  they  have  produced  a ferment  of  new 
ideas,  much  political  agitation,  and,  amongst  the  younger 
Intellectuals,  manifestations  of  a spirit  of  iconoclasm  and 
resistance  to  parental  authority  which,  in  the  opinion 
of  some  observers,  points  to  a weakening  of  the  family 
system,  upon  which  the  whole  social  fabric  is  founded. 
Those  who  look  chiefly  to  the  surface  phenomena  of  life, 
as  they  see  it  in  the  chief  cities  of  Japan,  can  find  evidence, 
no  doubt,  in  support  of  this  view.  They  can  point,  for 
example,  to  the  growth  of  the  movement  for  the  emanci- 
pation of  women,  to  the  rapid  increase  of  strikes,  and  the 
wave  of  sentiment  in  support  of  Labour  Unions,  to  the 
demand  for  Universal  Suffrage,  and  to  many  other  things 
that  would  have  been  impossible  twenty  years  ago.  But 
they  err,  I think,  in  concluding  from  these  premises  and 
from  the  rapid  development  of  industrialism  that  the 
whole  social  structure  of  the  nation  is  imperilled ; for 
they  overlook  the  important  truth  that  the  great  majority 
of  the  people  are  agricultural,  indifferent  to  politics,  and 
firmly  rooted  in  the  customs  and  beliefs  that  have  sprung 
from  the  family  system,  with  all  its  traditions  of  loyalty, 
simple  faith,  and  discipline.  More  than  half  the  families 
which  constitute  the  Japanese  nation  are  tillers  of  the 
soil ; it  is  they,  and  not  the  two  million  factory  workers, 
who  truly  represent  the  abiding  strength  of  the  race — 
silent  depths  unmoved  by  all  the  waves  of  words  that 
sound  so  loud  in  the  ears  of  the  city-dwellers.  I believe 
that  the  structure  of  society  in  Japan,  as  in  China,  broad- 
based  upon  the  family  system  and  all  that  it  implies  of 
veneration  for  the  past,  will  enable  the  nation  to  stand 


228  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  survive  the  economic  strain  of  competitive  indus- 
trialism. 

Even  in  Tokyo,  beneath  the  froth  and  foam  of  unrest 
on  the  surface,  there  is  evidence  that  the  solidarity  of 
the  family  system  is  producing  a reaction  against  the 
exotic  Westernism  and  Radicalism  of  the  Intellectuals 
and  other  restless  followers  after  new  and  strange  gods. 
To  any  one  who  has  not  visited  Japan  for  several  years, 
the  signs  of  this  reaction  are  unmistakable  and  significant. 
Throughout  all  classes  of  society,  even  amongst  the 
factory  workers,  there  are  symptoms  of  a healthy  revival 
of  conscious  and  confident  nationalism,  of  a tendency 
to  cultivate  the  indigenous  rather  than  the  exotic,  to  be 
naturally  and  frankly  Japanese,  rather  than  to  imitate 
the  European.  The  bureaucracy  in  office  hours  still 
exhibits  in  its  clothing,  equipment,  and  manners  its 
deference  to  an  alien  civilisation,  but  in  its  home  life, 
and  even  at  the  Tokyo  Club,  officialdom  displays  its 
preference  for  native  clothes  and  native  food.  I have 
seen  two  elderly  diplomats,  men  with  distinguished 
records  as  Ambassadors,  playing  billiards  at  the  Tokyo 
Club,  both  wearing  Japanese  dress ; and  at  the  crowded 
Christmas  reception  given  by  the  Imperial  Hotel,  very 
few  of  the  guests  wore  foreign  clothes.  Most  Japanese 
of  the  upper  classes,  especially  those  who  have  been 
educated  abroad,  will  tell  you  that  they  find  trousers 
more  convenient  for  office  use  and  exercise  than  the  native 
kimono,  but  at  home  they  prefer  the  latter.  They 
might  add  that,  in  addition  to  being  more  comfortable, 
it  is  infinitely  more  dignified  and  becoming,  especially 
as,  for  reasons  which  remain  mysterious,  even  the  richest 
of  the  ultra-modern  Japanese  in  foreign  clothes  always 
give  one  the  impression  that  they  have  bought  them 
ready-made  and  never  troubled  about  their  fit. 

But  the  most  significant  manifestation  of  the  reaction 
against  Western  influences  is  to  be  found  in  art  and 
religion,  in  the  restoration  of  many  ancient  customs 
and  ceremonials,  things  beautiful  and  venerable  by  virtue 


MODERN  TOKYO 


229 


of  immemorial  usage,  which  fell  for  a while  into  disrepute, 
observed  only  by  the  faithful,  when,  with  the  end  of  the 
Shogunate,  the  nation  became  seized  with  a craze  for 
foreign  ways  and  foreign  ideas.  In  those  days  the 
classical  drama  and  many  a national  shrine  were  neg- 
lected of  the  people,  native  arts  and  crafts  languished 
whilst  the  nation  struggled  to  fashion  its  mind  and  its 
manners  on  those  of  another  race,  sacrificing  in  the  pro- 
cess much  of  its  natural  distinction  and  dignity.  But 
the  flowing  tide  of  that  delusion  has  now  ebbed,  and 
to-day  the  ancient  rites  and  ceremonials  are  observed 
with  renewed  fervour,  and  the  Way  of  the  Gods  appeals 
to  the  race-mind  as  of  old.  Particularly  notable  is  the 
widespread  revival  of  the  ancient  classical  NO  dances, 
instinct  with  all  the  stateliness,  grace,  and  poetry  of 
Japanese  culture.  The  warmth  of  the  welcome  extended 
by  all  classes  to  this  revival  is  a very  remarkable  sign 
of  the  times.  It  would  seem  to  indicate  a genuine 
renaissance  rather  than  a spasmodic  reaction,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  afford  evidence  of  the  permanent 
stability  of  the  national  conception  of  life  which  has 
grown  with,  and  out  of,  the  family  system.  To  witness 
a performance  of  the  NO  dances  and  observe  the  almost 
religious  devotion  of  the  audience,  is  an  experience  which 
makes  one  feel  that  the  narikin  and  all  his  works  and 
ways  are  but  an  “ unsubstantial  pageant  ” which  will 
fade  with  all  his  gorgeous  palaces,  and  “ leave  not  a rack 
behind.”  Before  he  and  his  motor-cars  can  fit  into  the 
scheme  of  things  Japanese,  this  land  of  men  and  things 
harmoniously  adjusted  to  its  own  small  but  exquisite 
scale,  will  have  to  be  shattered  and  reconstructed, 
Tokyo’s  modern  thoroughfares,  lined  with  European 
buildings,  filled  with  the  clamour  of  tramways  and  the 
smell  of  bad  petrol,  are  a necessary  evil,  like  the  diplomat's 
top-hat — Dai  Nippon’s  price  of  Admiralty;  but  they 
are  not,  and  never  will  be,  the  real  Japan. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


AT  A JAPANESE  THEATRE 

A grey  afternoon  in  February,  with  a driving  rain 
and  a cold  wind  which  blows  in  sudden  gusts  from  the 
four  quarters  of  heaven.  A little  musume,  coming  down 
a side  lane,  is  making  heavy  weather  of  it,  her  kimono 
close  tucked  about  her  knees  and  her  body  bending 
shakily  to  the  squalls  behind  her  oiled-paper  umbrella. 
The  mud  lies  so  deep  in  the  narrow  thoroughfare  that 
it  comes  at  times  above  the  level  of  her  high-tilted  wooden 
clogs,  leaving  its  mark  upon  her  white  socks.  Tokyo  in 
winter  knows  many  such  days;  you  may  get  an  idea 
from  Hokusai’s  pictures  of  their  bleakness,  and  of  their 
effect  upon  the  human  atom.  In  this  street  of  the  Kabuki 
Theatre,  on  a day  like  this,  one’s  thoughts  go  wandering 
back  to  the  old  Japan,  that  one  knew  and  loved  thirty 
years  ago,  before  the  days  of  trams  and  trains,  because 
it  is  a quiet,  old-fashioned  street,  remote  from  the  bustling 
modernity  of  Tokyo’s  commercial  centres.  No  tramway 
lines  run  through  it,  and  motor-cars  are  scarce ; 'tis  a 
street  that  suggests  the  dignity  of  an  individuality  pre- 
served, and  worth  preserving,  wisely  aloof  from  the 
crowd  that  follows  the  cheapjack  vendor  of  novelties. 
As  our  rickshas  make  their  heavy  way  through  the  mud, 
with  hoods  and  side-flaps  battened  down,  and  swaying 
in  the  wind,  one  catches  glimpses  of  bamboos  and  cedars 
amidst  high  walls  and  latticed  balconies  : little  moving 
pictures,  all  framed  in  grey,  that  stir  the  mind  to  dreams 
of  adventure  and  romance.  For  behind  these  walls  are 
some  of  the  most  fashionable  tea-houses  of  Tokyo, 

230 


UTAYEMON  AND  FUKUSUKlJ  (FATHER  AND  SON). 


AT  A JAPANESE  THEATRE  231 


patronised  alike  by  patricians  and  by  profiteers,  and 
frequented  by  the  daintiest  damsels  of  the  Geisha  world. 

The  entrance  to  the  theatre  is  in  keeping  with  its 
surroundings — unobtrusive,  but  impressive  by  virtue 
of  its  native  simplicity  and  the  sense  of  fitness  displayed 
in  its  decoration.  Here  is  no  meretricious  display,  no 
glaring  effect  of  electric  lighting  or  gaudy  posters,  but 
a little  open  court  or  vestibule,  level  with  the  street,  where 
the  audience  leaves  its  clogs  or  boots,  all  neatly  ticketed 
in  rows;  and  behind  it,  decorated  with  painted  screens 
and  lanterns,  a narrow  corridor,  carpeted  with  white 
matting,  that  leads  directly  into  the  body  of  the  theatre, 
or,  as  we  should  call  it,  the  pit.  Inside,  the  house  is 
much  larger  than  its  exterior  would  have  led  one  to  expect, 
and  here,  again,  one  is  impressed  by  the  artistic  restraint 
and  harmony  of  the  decorative  scheme,  with  its  plain 
gilded  ceiling  and  graceful  carving.  All  around  the  gallery 
hang  ornamental  paper  lanterns  that  soften  the  glare  of 
the  electric  light ; if  the  hieroglyphics  painted  on  their 
sides  are  the  advertisement  of  a face-powder,  the  fact 
is  pleasantly  unobtrusive.  The  stage  is  long  and  wide, 
and  the  flies,  hung  low,  add  to  the  impression  of  its  depth  ; 
the  scenery  is  extremely  effective,  conforming  always 
to  the  classical  conventions,  rich  without  gaudiness, 
beautiful  in  its  ensemble  and  colouring,  and,  to  the 
initiated,  intensely  significant  in  its  details. 

In  the  body  of  the  house  are  the  boxes — little  squares 
partitioned  off  from  each  other,  where  four  or  five  persons 
can  squat  comfortably  in  the  Oriental  manner  and  leave 
room  in  their  midst  for  the  charcoal  brazier  and  a tray  with 
cups  for  tea  or  cake.  These  are  the  best  and  most  expen- 
sive seats  in  the  house ; here  you  may  see  Tokyo,  both 
en  famille  and  en  garfon,  enjoying  itself  thoroughly  and 
at  its  leisure.  For  the  performance  at  the  Kabuki, 
consisting  generally  of  three  or  four  plays,  begins  at  one 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  and  lasts  till  about  ten.  There 
are  intervals  of  twenty-five  minutes  between  each  play, 
during  which  the  audience  either  consumes  its  own 


232  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


miscellaneous  refreshments  or  repairs  to  the  restaurant 
on  the  upper  floor,  where  meals  are  served  both  in  the 
European  and  the  native  style.  • 

The  stage  is  more  popular  in  Japan  to-day,  and  takes 
itself  more  seriously,  than  at  any  time  in  the  past  fifty 
years.  Ten  years  ago  most  of  the  play-houses  of  Tokyo 
were  struggling  for  a bare  existence,  and  many  of  the  best 
actors  played  to  half-empty  houses.  To-day,  despite  the 
new  attraction  of  the  cinema,  every  theatre  is  crowded, 
and  enterprising  managers  are  planning  new  and  larger 
buildings  in  several  cities,  while  the  salaries  of  popular 
favourites  have  soared  to  figures  hitherto  unknown. 
The  change  is  due  partly  to  the  increased  earnings  of  the 
working  classes  and  the  general  prosperity  created  by  the 
war,  and  partly,  no  doubt,  to  a general  restlessness  and 
hunger  for  amusement,  signs  of  the  disjointed  times,  as 
conspicuous  in  Japan  as  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  In 
Tokyo  the  phenomenon  is  also  explained  by  the  rapid 
growth  of  the  city’s  population,  and  by  the  fact  that  a 
large  number  of  its  three  million  inhabitants  are  industrial 
workers,  for  whom  the  theatre  provides  a welcome  relief 
from  the  monotony  of  mechanical  labour. 

But  of  all  the  theatres  in  Japan  there  is  none  so  secure 
in  the  intelligent  appreciation  of  the  people  as  this  home 
of  the  classical  national  drama,  nor  have  any  of  the 
brilliant  young  players  of  the  younger  generation  achieved 
the  same  high  place  in  the  loyal  affection  of  the  public 
as  the  veteran  actors  of  the  Kabuki-za.  The  fact  speaks 
well,  I think,  both  for  the  public  and  the  players,  because 
all  the  aspirations  and  achievements  of  such  popular 
idols  as  Nakamura  Utayemon  and  Ichikawa  Chusha  are 
based  upon  an  unswerving  tradition  of  high  seriousness, 
upon  fidelity  to  national  ideals,  and  preservation  of  the 
classical  style,  the  great  inheritance  of  the  Yedo  school. 

On  the  day  of  my  visit  to  the  Kabuki,  the  usual  “ house 
full  ” notice  was  up,  in  spite  of  the  weather,  before  two 
o’clock ; not  even  in  the  gallery  was  there  standing  room. 
Of  the  three  plays  on  the  programme  one  was  a ghost 


AT  A JAPANESE  THEATRE  238 


tale,  the  second  a drama  based  on  the  well-worn  theme 
of  a retainer’s  loyalty  to  his  feudal  chief,  and  the  third 
a historical  play — “ Benke,”  the  tragic  love  story  of  a 
priest  who  became  a great  warrior.  Throughout  all 
three  the  note  of  high  seriousness  was  consistently  sus- 
tained, together  with  an  amazing  harmony  of  effect, 
down  to  the  minutest  details  of  stagecraft  and  a subtle 
sense  of  perfection  such  as  Art  can  only  give  at  its  highest 
pitch  of  intensive  culture.  As  I sat  absorbed  in  the  weird, 
insidious  beauty  of  the  ghost  play,  wondering  at  the  grace 
and  dignity  with  which  Utayemon  (now  over  sixty  years 
of  age)  played  the  young  woman’s  part,  and  the  delicate 
concordance  of  scenery  and  music  with  the  innermost 
spirit  of  the  drama,  my  mind  went  back  to  the  day,  more 
than  thirty  years  ago,  when  for  the  first  time  I saw  Danjuro 
the  ninth — when,  without  understanding  the  language, 
I learned  to  appreciate  the  fine  flower  of  dramatic  art, 
which  generations  of  great  players  have  brought  to  such 
perfection  in  Japan.  The  style  and  methods  of  the  great 
Danjuro  are  a tradition  and  a living  force  on  the  Tokyo 
stage  to-day,  jealously  preserved  by  his  two  famous  pupils, 
Ichikawra  Danshiro  and  Ichikawa  Chusha,  and  by  them 
faithfully  handed  down  to  the  rising  stars  of  the  next 
generation.  There  is  something  of  almost  religious  devo- 
tion in  the  attitude  of  these  great  actors  towards  the 
classical  traditions  of  their  profession  and  in  the  relations 
wrhich  exist  between  masters  and  pupils  of  the  craft. 
In  many  instances,  notably  those  of  Nakamura  Utayemon 
and  Ichikawa  Danshiro,  the  tradition  passes  direct  from 
father  to  son  in  an  atmosphere  of  discipline  and  filial  piety 
like  that  of  Chinese  scholars  of  the  golden  age  of  learning 
and  their  disciples. 

There  are  no  wTomen  on  the  boards  of  the  Kabuki 
Theatre,  for  mixed  companies  are  forbidden  by  the  laws 
of  the  classical  drama.  Of  the  great  women  impersonators 
(Onnagata) — each  marvellous  in  his  way — the  most  famous 
are  Nakamura  Utayemon,  above  mentioned,  his  son 
Fukusuke,  and  Onoe  Baiko,  wrho  specialises  in  the  weird 


234  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


at  the  Imperial.  To  see  Utayemon  and  his  son  playing 
the  parts  of  mother  and  daughter  in  a great  drama  like 
“ Benke  ” is  an  experience  well  worth  a month’s  journey. 
The  father  is  probably  the  most  idolised  actor  on  the 
Japanese  stage  to-day,  and  when  he  takes  the  part  of 
the  youthful  heroine  of  a popular  play  like  “ Nijushiko,” 
the  house  (undemonstrative,  as  a rule,  compared  to 
European  audiences)  resounds  with  cries  of  “ Nippon 
ichi  ” (first  in  Japan).  You  will  hear  the  same  at  Osaka, 
where  Ganjiro  is  playing — Ganjiro,  the  idol  of  the  great 
industrial  city  of  the  west — for  Japanese  playgoers  are 
fervent  partisans,  and  there  has  always  been  keen  rivalry 
between  the  two  cities. 

By  means  of  an  introduction  from  a personal  friend 
of  Utayemon,  and  by  the  courtesy  of  the  management, 
I was  privileged  to  visit  the  chief  performers  in  their 
dressing-rooms,  and  to  see  something  of  the  actors’  life 
and  business  behind  the  scenes.  The  most  striking  feature 
of  the  stage  and  all  its  appurtenances  was  the  scrupulous 
tidiness  and  cleanliness  of  everything  and  every  one 
connected  with  it.  No  sign  of  the  mild  disorder,  the 
genial  confusion  with  which  the  artistic  temperament 
is  wont  to  reveal  itself  in  and  about  the  green-rooms  of 
European  theatres ; on  the  contrary,  there  was  a place 
for  everything  and  everything  in  its  place,  from  the 
common  wardrobe  of  the  humble  supers  to  the  elaborate 
equipment  of  the  principals’  wigmaker’s  room.  And 
withal  an  amplitude  of  elbow-room  sufficient  to  allow 
a generous  measure  of  privacy.  As  I sat  in  Utayemon’s 
dressing-room,  I wondered  what  the  principal  villain 
or  the  leading  lady  at  Drury  Lane  would  think  of  this 
dainty  boudoir  a I’Orientale,  with  its  sliding  panels  and 
its  spotless  floor  of  white  matting,  its  classically  chaste 
decoration  of  flowers  and  kakemono  appropriate  to  the 
season,  and  its  beautiful  little  shrine  in  a secluded  alcove, 
where  father  and  son  invoke  their  kindly  gods  and  offer 
their  thanksgiving  for  success.  On  the  wall,  opposite 
the  shrine,  in  a long  row,  were  the  black  envelopes  in 


AT  A JAPANESE  THEATRE  235 


which  the  management  conveys  its  congratulations  and 
a little  gift  to  each  “ star  ” to  commemorate  a “ house 
full  ” performance.  (Every  member  of  the  company 
receives  one  of  these  graceful  mementos ; for  the  lesser 
lights  it  takes  the  form  of  a “ red  letter  ” enclosing 
a five  sen  piece.)  While  I sat  and  talked  to  Utayemon, 
Fukusuke  was  having  a new  wig  tried  on  by  one  of  the 
soft-footed  dressers ; very  pleasant  and  touching  it  was 
to  see  the  father’s  unaffected  pride  in  his  already-famous 
son,  and  the  latter’s  deferential  courtesy. 

An  exacting  business  is  the  profession  of  the  Onnagata, 
entailing,  as  it  does,  the  unceasing  effort  of  a voice  high- 
pitched  and  artificially  strained.  Utayemon,  like  many 
other  female  impersonators,  suffers  from  a mild  form  of 
paralysis  or  numbness  of  the  limbs,  brought  about  by 
the  use  of  arsenical  white  paint,  lavishly  applied  to  produce 
the  necessary  female  pallor.  But  considering  his  age,  he 
bears  his  years  of  strenuous  work  very  lightly,  preserv- 
ing a youthful  vivacity  of  mind  that  seems  to  defy  the 
hand  of  Time.  He  has  the  keen,  mobile  features,  the 
gracefully  eloquent  movements  of  the  unmistakable 
born  actor ; temperate  in  his  habits,  intensely  serious  in 
his  profession,  addicted  in  his  hours  of  leisure  to  painting 
and  music,  he  displays  in  conversation  a philosophic 
dignity,  combined  with  genial  humour,  which  reminded 
me  of  the  elder  Guitry. 

Most  of  the  leading  actors  in  Japan,  as  in  other  countries, 
are  lavish  with  their  money  and  given  to  extravagant 
display;  most  of  them,  by  common  report,  are  heavily 
in  debt.  By  the  same  report  Utayemon  is  the  one  excep- 
tion to  the  rule,  avoiding  the  notoriety  conferred  by 
the  fashionable  intelligence  columns  of  the  Tokyo  Press. 
The  etiquette  which  obtains  in  the  dramatic  profession 
all  over  the  world,  whereby  the  amount  of  a player’s 
remuneration  remains  a confidential  matter  between  him 
(or  her)  and  the  management,  prevails  also  in  Japan,  so 
that  it  is  difficult  to  speak  positively  as  to  the  salaries 
earned  by  the  stars  of  the  Tokyo  stage,  but  in  the  case 


236  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


of  Utayemon,  admittedly  the  best  paid,  it  appears  to  be 
generally  understood  that  he  receives  ten  thousand  yen 
(say  £1200)  a month.  As  a full  house  at  the  Kabuki, 
according  to  the  Manager,  means  about  five  thousand 
yen,  this  seems  a high  figure.  But  there  are  Chinese 
comedians  playing  in  the  big  native  theatres  at  Shanghai 
who  draw  higher  salaries  than  this. 

The  custom  of  Japanese  theatres  is  to  give  their  per- 
formances continuously  for  twenty-five  days  in  each 
month,  and  to  close  for  the  other  five  or  six  days.  When 
a company  has  done  its  nine  or  ten  hours  a day  (they 
also  serve  who  only  stand  and  wait)  for  twenty-five  days, 
it  has  well  earned  a rest.  It  is  in  this  holiday  season 
at  the  end  of  each  month  that  the  prodigals  of  the  pro- 
fession play  ducks  and  drakes  with  their  money,  repaying 
by  sumptuous  entertainments  the  generosity  of  their 
special  patrons  and  the  zealous  devotion  of  their  Geisha 
admirers.  It  is  often  a case  of  Do  ut  des.  Every  popular 
actor  has  his  own  following  of  faithful  admirers,  and  a 
Geisha  whose  society  is  much  sought  after  in  the  world 
of  “ big  business  ” or  high  politics  can  do  a great  deal 
for  the  object  of  her  affections  by  persuading  her 
“ narikin  ” friends  to  give  theatre  parties  in  his  honour. 
A Japanese  actor’s  pay  is  generally  dependent  upon  his 
popularity,  and  he  whose  Geisha  admirers  bring  most 
ticket-buyers  to  the  box  office  draws  salary  accordingly. 
When,  in  return,  the  popular  favourite  invites  his  patrons 
to  entertainments  at  fashionable  tea-houses,  his  Geisha 
friends  reap  their  harvest  of  golden  opportunity.  As  a 
native  journalist  put  it,  when  explaining  the  intricacies 
of  these  sentimental  business  relations,  a “ narikin  ” 
will  spend  fabulous  sums  to  van  from  a famous  Geisha 
even  that  “ semblance  of  affection  ” which  makes  him 
the  talk  of  the  town  and  a conspicuous  figure  in  Tokyo’s 
Vanity  Fair.  Many  stage-struck  Geishas  wear  the  crests 
of  their  favourite  actors  on  their  kimonos  and  handker- 
chiefs— a form  of  hero-worship  which  is  not  confined  to 
the-  professional  entertainers.  On  the  upper  floor  of  the 


/?.  T.  Pridc’aux ) 


THEATRE  STREET  IN  KYOTO. 


AT  A JAPANESE  THEATRE  237 


theatre,  near  the  restaurant,  there  are  a number  of  little 
shops  and  booths,  where  various  kinds  of  “ fairings  ” and 
souvenirs  are  to  be  bought — pouches,  photographs, 
handkerchiefs,  and  hair  ornaments — all  bearing  the  crest 
of  one  or  other  of  the  chief  actors;  these  do  a roaring 
trade  with  the  sentimental  and  susceptible  young  ladies 
of  the  bourgeoisie.  My  friend  the  native  journalist  afore- 
said, moralising  on  these  matters,  delivered  himself  of 
one  of  those  quaintly  platitudinous  truths  in  which  his 
class  delights.  “ An  actor’s  wife,”  he  said,  “ must  have 
much  social  cleverness.  She  must  be  broad-minded, 
of  equable  temper,  and  never  jealous.”  Even  so. 

As  compared  with  the  drama  in  other  lands,  a popular 
play  in  Japan  calls  for  a good  deal  of  bloodletting.  The 
public  insists  on  scenes  that  will  make  its  flesh  creep, 
and  as  it  does  not  creep  too  easily,  the  agony  has  to  be 
long-drawn-out  and  emphasised  with  much  gruesome 
and  highly  realistic  detail.  In  the  three  plays  which  we 
saw  at  the  Kabuki,  there  were  three  killings  and  two 
blood-curdling  cases  of  hara-kiri,  and  in  the  latter  the 
victims  took  an  unconscionable  time  in  dying.  Most 
of  these  popular  dramas  are  tales  of  old  Japan,  illustrating 
and  exalting  the  glories  of  the  ancient  Samurai,  the 
virtues  of  filial  piety,  of  Spartan  courage,  and  unquestion- 
ing loyalty  to  the  feudal  lord.  Others  are  founded  on 
some  of  the  innumerable  legends,  with  which  Japanese 
literature  abounds,  that  deal  with  the  supernatural  and 
the  weird — tales  of  ghosts  and  goblins,  of  fox-wives, 
witches,  and  other  ghostly  visitants.  In  the  production 
of  the  atmosphere  of  uncanny  illusion  necessary  to  make 
such  plays  effective,  Japanese  stagecraft  has  attained  to 
a wonderful  perfection ; music,  scenery,  and  acting  are 
all  so  artistically  combined  to  create  a subtly  convincing 
background,  that  the  weirdest  of  weird  tales  becomes 
easily  credible.  I do  not  remember  to  have  experienced 
in  any  European  theatre  anything  like  the  sense  of  con- 
vincing illusion  as  that  produced  by  the  presentation 
of  the  ghost  of  a murdered  wife  in  one  of  these  plays  at 


238  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


the  Kabuki.  It  was  illusion  of  the  elemental  yet  effective 
kind  devised  by  Bottom  the  Weaver  for  the  presentation 
of  Moonshine  and  Thisbe’s  wall,  produced  by  the  creation 
of  a receptive  state  of  mind  in  the  audience,  rather  than 
by  elaboration  of  stage  properties  and  effects.  It  requires 
illusion  of  no  ordinary  kind  to  induce  unconscious  accept- 
ance of  the  convention  that  an  able-bodied  super  is  in- 
visible because  he  is  dressed  in  black.  But  as  a matter  of 
fact  the  audience  does  overlook  his  presence  on  the  stage, 
or  accepts  it  as  part  of  the  natural  order  of  things  super- 
natural, even  when  one  of  these  sable-robed  mutes  comes 
on,  in  the  middle  of  a most  intensely  tragic  scene,  and 
helps  the  expiring  heroine  to  die  gracefully  by  putting 
a cushion  under  her  neck.  I remember  long  ago  a per- 
formance in  which  the  great  Danjuro  was  bidding  farewell 
to  his  native  shores  from  the  stern  of  a swift-sailing  boat. 
The  illusion  of  movement  was  produced  partly  by  a fast- 
revolving  back  cloth  and  partly  by  supers  rocking  the 
boat  fore  and  aft  from  the  depths  of  a canvas  sea.  In 
the  midst  of  Danjuro’s  most  impassioned  speech,  one  of 
the  waves  beneath  him  burst,  exposing  a coolie’s  head 
and  shoulders ; but  so  far  as  the  audience  was  concerned, 
the  thing  might  never  have  happened.  There  was 
certainly  no  laughter. 

On  the  Japanese  stage,  music  plays  a very  important 
part  in  leading  the  audience  to  that  state  of  mind  which 
dwells  willingly  in  the  haunted  house  of  Illusion.  As 
in  the  art  of  the  scene-painter,  many  of  its  results  are 
produced  by  the  help  of  time-honoured  conventions, 
with  which  every  Japanese  is  familiar  and  whose  very 
ancientry  makes  them  the  more  effective.  For  certain 
plays — notably  those  which  deal  with  the  weird  and  un- 
earthly— the  musicians  are  concealed  behind  a bamboo 
screen  in  the  box  on  the  left  front  of  the  stage ; for  others 
they  sit  on  a platform  at  the  front  of  the  box,  and  when 
thus  visible,  wear  their  old  costumes  of  Daimio  days. 
Their  part  in  a performance  often  resembles  that  of  the 
chorus  in  a Greek  play.  In  many  effective  scenes  of 


AT  A JAPANESE  THEATRE  239 


the  national  classical  drama,  part  of  the  tale  is  told  in  a 
high-pitched  recitative  (like  that  of  Europe’s  troubadours) 
by  one  of  the  musicians,  whilst  the  actor  illustrates  the 
story  in  dumb  show;  the  whole  is  punctuated  by  single 
notes  of  the  samisen,  strangely  appropriate  and  significant. 
Or  again,  the  actor  tells  the  story,  into  which  at  intervals 
the  samisen  interpolates  its  impressive  keynote.  All 
the  music  used  by  these  players  at  the  Kabuki  has  been 
handed  down,  unwritten,  from  one  generation  to  another, 
and  the  work  of  the  samisen  player  and  singers  is  occasion- 
ally supplemented  by  very  telling  effects  of  drums  and 
bells  off  stage.  Fully  to  appreciate  their  artistic  signifi- 
cance one  must  understand  something  of  the  inevitable 
association  of  ideas  which  they  evoke  in  the  mind  of  the 
audience.  One  must  know,  for  example,  that  just  as 
the  willow  design,  applied  to  a decorative  scheme,  is  con- 
ventionally associated  in  the  Japanese  mind  with  the 
coming  of  ghosts,  so  certain  solo  notes  on  the  flute  convey 
the  idea  of  impending  doom,  and  a single  note  of  a temple 
bell  implies  the  very  presence  of  Death. 

In  every  land  the  mind  of  the  masses  is  readily  hyp- 
notised by  suggestions  based  on  deep-rooted  conventions 
and  superstitions,  but  nowhere  has  knowledge  of  this 
truth  been  so  skilfully  adapted  to  the  purposes  of  stage- 
craft as  in  Japan. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


A DAY  IN  SEOUL 

Pre-eminently  amongst  the  cities  of  the  ancient  East, 
Seoul  is  a sermon  in  stones,  which  the  stranger  within 
its  gates  may  read,  mark,  learn,  and  inwardly  digest. 
I know  of  none  which  teaches  more  forcibly  the  old, 
old  lesson  of  the  sins  of  the  fathers,  or  which  suggests 
such  inevitable  reflections  concerning  the  mysterious 
forces  that  form  the  character  and  mould  the  destinies 
of  nations.  The  Imperial  City  at  Peking  tells  its  own 
impressive  tale  of  splendid  isolation  and  departed  great- 
ness, but  China  is  still  mistress  in  her  own  house,  and 
though  her  present  state  political  be  rotten,  it  does  not 
carry  the  same  conviction  of  utter  helplessness,  of  dignity 
pathetic  in  irretrievable  adversity,  as  that  which  impresses 
itself  upon  one  in  Korea.  There  is  something  in  the 
very  sadness  and  silence  of  this  white-robed  race  of 
passive  resisters,  something  in  the  stoic  dignity  of  their 
monuments  and  men,  which  compels  our  instinctive 
sympathy  and  respect ; and  yet,  when  all  is  said  and 
done,  the  problem  of  self-determination  for  Korea  remains, 
humanly  speaking,  as  far  removed  from  solution  as  the 
federation  of  the  world  and  the  brotherhood  of  man. 

Chaperoned  by  the  courteous  secretary  of  the  South 
Manchurian  Railway  (a  kindly  soul,  addicted  to  scholarly 
researches  in  orthodox  Buddhism),  I saw  the  sights  of 
modem  Seoul  and  compared  it  in  my  mind  with  the  city 
as  I knew  it  long  ago,  before  Japan  had  forced  China  to 
abandon  her  suzerainty  over  the  Hermit  Kingdom,  and 
again  later,  before  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  when  the 
Korean  King  assumed  the  title  of  Emperor,  and,  for  a 
breathing-space  of  ten  years,  the  country  was  free  to 
manage  its  own  affairs.  I remembered  how,  in  1898, 

240 


IN  THE  OLD  PALACE  ENCLOSURE,  SEOUL.  KOREAN  GIRLS  AT  A JAPANESE  SCHOOL  IN  SEOUL. 


A DAY  IN  SEOUL 


241 


the  people  had  demonstrated  their  discontent  with  their 
own  rulers,  sitting  silent  in  their  thousands  before  the 
Palace  day  and  night  for  fourteen  days.  I remembered, 
too,  that  when  Japan  fought,  first  China  and  then  Russia, 
for  supremacy  in  the  peninsula,  the  attitude  of  these 
dogged  conscientious  objectors  was  ever  that  of  uncon- 
cerned spectators.  Remembering  these  things,  one  under- 
stands something  of  the  nature  of  the  tragedy  of  Korea, 
the  pitiful  destiny  of  a people  too  proud  to  fight,  whose 
home  is  the  strategic  keyland  of  North-Eastern  Asia,  and 
a predestined  bone  of  contention  between  the  Powers 
that  struggle  for  the  mastery  of  the  Pacific. 

As  I stood  in  the  great  Audience  Hall  of  the  old 
Palace,  untenanted  now  and  open  to  the  winds  of  heaven, 
yet  splendid  in  decay,  and  called  to  mind  the  history  of 
this  people  since  those  far-off  days  when  Korea  aspired 
to  lead  the  East  in  art  and  learning;  as  I looked  out 
upon  the  triumphs  of  incongruous  modernity  with  which 
Japan  has  decked  the  hill-girt  city  (her  banks  and  bar- 
racks, her  hospitals  and  huge  hotels),  dominating,  like 
alien  giants,  the  clustering  hovels  of  the  native-born,  it 
seemed  to  me  that  this  empty  Audience  Hall  fittingly 
typified  the  last  scene  in  a drama  of  inevitable  destiny. 

They  showed  me  the  “ Government  General  Museum,” 
housed  in  the  ancient  and  venerable  precincts  of  the 
Palace ; also  the  delectable  pleasaunce  and  rustic  retreat 
which  has  been  set  apart  for  the  use  and  behoof  of 
Prince  Yi,  further  consoled  for  the  loss  of  his  Throne 
by  a lieutenancy  in  the  Japanese  Army  and  the  hand 
of  a beautiful  Japanese  Princess.  I saw  the  preparations 
for  His  Highness’s  wedding  (that  ill-omened  marriage  1 of 
which  the  people  speak  in  whispers) — furniture  and  em- 
broidery and  bowls  of  silver  being  made  by  native 
workers  under  the  direction  of  Japanese  craftsmen.  They 
showed  me  model  schools,  where  Korean  boys  and  girls 
are  being  taught  to  look  upon  Japan  as  their  spiritual 

1 It  has  since  taken  place,  “according  to  plan,”  and  judging  by 
Press  reports,  husband  and  wife  are  doing  well. 

R 


242  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


home,  and  many  other  cogwheels  in  the  ingeniously 
devised  machinery  of  assimilation.  But  in  all  the  high- 
ways and  byways  of  the  city  I saw  evidence  of  the 
dogged  conservatism  of  the  race,  and  proof  of  the 
fact,  which  the  Japanese  themselves  are  beginning  to 
appreciate,  that  this  very  policy  of  assimilation  has 
breathed  a new  spirit  of  life  into  the  passive  resistance 
of  the  Koreans  and  aroused  in  them  a strong,  though 
still  non-combatant,  ardour  of  nationalism.  They  may 
bow  to  the  presence  of  the  alien  invader,  they  may 
even  admit  that  his  progressive  administration  has  in- 
creased the  material  prosperity  of  their  country,  but  they 
firmly  decline  to  admit  the  superiority  of  Japan’s  intel- 
lectual and  moral  culture,  they  refuse  to  be  assimilated, 
and  their  refusal  has  assumed  the  force  of  a conscious 
national  movement.  The  problem  of  Korea,  you  perceive, 
is  very  similar  to  the  problem  of  Ireland. 

Despite  its  recent  trials  and  tribulations,  despite  the 
strong  hand  of  a ruler  that  respects  neither  topknots  nor 
tutelary  gods,  old  Seoul  still  preserves  the  philosophic 
dignity  which  is  the  birthright  of  the  Land  of  the  Morning 
Calm.  Here,  as  elsewhere  in  the  East,  one  may  note 
the  disastrous  results  of  putting  new  wine  into  old 
bottles ; uncouth  new  clothes  and  unpleasant  new  man- 
ners, imported  from  the  West,  strike  the  same  discordant 
note  in  Seoul  as  they  do  in  Tokyo  and  Peking.  But 
these  things  are  exotic  and  transient ; they  have  no 
roots  in  the  real  life  of  the  nation.  The  soul  of  the 
Korean  people,  like  that  of  the  Chinese,  stands  steadfast 
in  the  ancient  ways,  deep-rooted  in  its  own  ancestral 
beliefs,  and  contrives  withal  to  preserve  a certain  stoic 
kind  of  geniality.  It  is  a race  of  husbandmen  that 
has  eaten  too  often  of  the  bread  of  affliction  to  allow 
itself  to  be  provoked  to  desperation.  It  is,  no  doubt, 
often  slothful  in  business,  over -prone  to  politics  and 
plottings,  much  given  to  strong  drink;  but  you  have 
only  to  observe  the  placidly-determined  faces  of  these 
straight-backed  men — especially  the  elders  of  the  people — 


A DAY  IN  SEOUL 


243 


and  their  confident  gait,  to  realise  that  here  still  waters 
run  deep.  And  it  is  not  only  on  the  faces  of  the  men 
that  you  discern  something  of  the  difficulty  of  the 
problem  which  Japan  has  to  solve  in  Korea ; as  a passive 
resister,  the  female  of  the  species  is  more  deadly  than 
the  male.  I caught  a glimpse  of  this  truth,  subtle  and 
significant,  at  a private  performance  of  Korean  Geisha 
given  by  my  Japanese  hosts. 

It  was  after  an  informal  dinner  at  the  residence  of  the 
Civil  Governor,  Dr.  Midzuno,  that  one  of  his  secretaries 
(possibly  realising  that  the  thread  of  our  political  con- 
versation was  wearing  rather  thin)  suggested  a visit  to 
the  Taisho  Kemba,  a high-class  Geisha  entertainment 
under  Japanese  management  or  “ control.”  Never  having 
seen  Korean  Geishas  dance,  I welcomed  the  opportunity ; 
and  so  we  left  unsolved  the  problems  of  militarism  in 
high  places,  of  self-determination  and  the  League  of 
Nations,  and  speedily  found  ourselves  driving  in  His 
Excellency’s  comfortable  motor-car  through  the  silent 
streets  of  old  Seoul.  We  alighted  at  the  entrance  to  a 
narrow  alleyway,  running  darkly  between  mud  huts,  that 
brought  to  mind  the  purlieus  of  the  old  Chien  Men  quarter 
in  the  shadow  of  the  city  wall  at  Peking. 

There  was  something  furtive,  almost  sinister,  in  this 
approach  to  a reputed  shrine  of  Korean  musical  and 
dramatic  culture  : not  a light  shone,  not  a voice  sounded 
from  any  of  the  squalid  houses  past  which  we  groped 
our  way.  We,  too,  moved  silently,  for  the  snow  lay 
deep  between  these  close-built  walls.  Finally,  turning 
the  corner  of  a house  which,  in  the  darkness,  looked 
like  all  the  rest,  we  came  to  a door  over  which  a flickering 
lantern  hung ; here  our  guide  knocked,  a bolt  was  drawn, 
and  we  passed  from  the  bitterly  cold  night  into  a long, 
narrow  room,  furnished  at  one  end  with  charcoal  braziers 
and  chairs  for  the  audience,  and  as  to  the  rest,  fitted 
for  the  dance  with  soft,  clean  matting  and  si  ding  panels 
a la  Japonaise. 

The  honours  were  done  by  the  Japanese  manager  or 


244  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


impresario  of  the  Geisha  administration ; except  the  per- 
formers and  two  attendants,  no  Koreans  were  present. 
There  were  six  dancers,  girls  still  in  their  teens,  said  to 
be  the  fine  flower  of  Seoul  geishadom.  They  wore  the 
elaborate  headgear,  the  quaintly  stiff  but  comely  cos- 
tumes of  old  Korea — high -girdled  waists  and  voluminous, 
many-coloured  skirts — and  they  danced  slow  and  stately 
measures,  with  flawless  precision,  to  the  sound  of  samisen 
and  drum,  dances  intended  to  symbolise  either  the  poetry 
of  Nature  or  some  episode  of  legendary  romance.  Their 
conventionally  painted  faces,  like  those  of  all  Oriental 
dancers,  were  as  masks,  all  cast  in  the  same  mould  of 
sphinx-like  inscrutability,  but  as  women  they  lacked  the 
little  airs  and  graces,  the  butterfly  daintiness  and  spon- 
taneous gaiety  of  the  Japanese  singing-girl.  Indeed,  as 
entertainers,  they  were  distinctly  heavy,  and  when, 
between  the  dances,  they  came,  as  in  duty  bound,  to 
chat  with  their  guests  and  drink  a cup  of  sakt,  they 
did  it  perfunctorily  and  with  a courtesy  so  studied  that 
it  became  oppressive.  Not  theirs  the  bird-like  chatter 
and  light-hearted  laughter  with  which  the  geisha  of 
Tokyo  entertain  their  guests. 

Our  friend  the  secretary  ascribed  the  solemnity  of  the 
proceedings  to  the  reticent  stolidity  which  is  natural  to 
the  Koreans,  but  to  me  it  seemed — and  I saw  several 
incidents  and  gestures  to  confirm  the  impression — that 
these  daughters  of  the  Land  of  the  Morning  Calm  wrere 
not  so  much  on  their  dignity  as  on  the  defensive,  and 
that  behind  these  inscrutable  masks  there  lurked  the 
soul  of  a race  whose  patriotism  drinks  deep  at  the  well 
of  memories  and  dreams.  As  we  walked  back  to  the 
most  sumptuous  hotel  in  the  Far  East  (a  very  fine  piece 
of  window-dressing)  I asked  one  of  our  hosts  if  these 
women  never  smiled?  “Oh,  I think  so,”  he  replied, 
" but  not  so  much  with  strangers.” 

It  wall  take  some  time  and  tact,  methinks,  to  assimilate 
a people  whose  dancing-girls  decline  to  smile  for  the 
invader. 


CHAPTER  XV 


SHANGHAI 

He  who  returns  to  the  East  after  a long  absence  should 
find  something  of  the  freshness  and  keenness  of  his  first 
impressions,  enhanced  by  an  improved  sense  of  pro- 
portion and  relative  values.  Long  residence  in  China 
is  apt,  I think,  to  make  one  take  for  granted  many 
beautiful  and  satisfying  things.  Familiarity,  and  the 
cares  that  infest  the  day,  combine  to  dim  one’s  sense  of 
the  philosophic  dignity  inherent  in  all  the  East’s  con- 
ception of  life  and  death  and  in  its  time-defying  institu- 
tions. The  thorns  that  spring  up  conceal  from  us  the 
splendid  proportions,  the  enduring  strength,  of  that  which, 
say  what  we  will,  is  by  far  the  noblest  monument  of 
human  wisdom  that  has  come  down  to  us  from  the  wreck- 
strewn  past.  Amidst  the  clamour  of  the  money-changers 
and  the  nostrum  vendors  of  the  Treaty  Ports,  where 
East  and  West  alike  forget  the  things  that  matter  in  their 
swift  pursuit  of  gain,  one  often  loses  sight  of  the  profound 
significance  of  China’s  moral  civilisation.  Amidst  the 
froth  and  foam  of  the  breakers,  we  forget  the  deep,  un- 
ruffled spaces  of  the  sea.  And  because  of  our  restlessness 
and  the  haunting  memory  of  our  Western  birthright,  we 
often  depreciate,  when  we  live  amongst  them,  the 
thoughts  and  ways  of  these  old-world  children  of  the 
East.  But  when  one  has  left  China  behind  for  some 
years,  and  dwelt  in  the  market-places  of  the  West’s 
triumphant  civilisation,  when  one  has  seen  that  .civilisa- 
tion reduced  to  a welter  of  scientific  slaughter  and  red 
ruin,  one  begins  to  perceive  far  more  clearly  than  before, 
the  value  of  that  system  of  moral  philosophy  which  is 
the  very  breath  of  life  to  the  Chinese,  and  which  has 

245 


246  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


preserved  this  ancient  race,  if  not  from  attack,  at  least 
from  disruption.  One  is  then  perforce  compelled  to  face 
the  question  whether,  as  the  world  stands  to-day,  it  is 
not  an  impertinence  and  a waste  of  time  for  us  to  continue 
to  urge  the  Chinese  to  forsake  the  teachings  of  their  Sages 
and  to  believe  in  the  moral  superiority  of  a system  which 
ends  in  Armageddon  ? And  when  one  returns  to  China, 
and  finds  this  patient  people,  a quarter  of  the  earth’s 
inhabitants,  pursuing  its  steadfast  way  along  the  fines 
prescribed  by  centuries  of  experience  and  immemorial 
tradition,  and  achieving,  in  spite  of  new  perplexities  and 
perils,  a degree  of  stability  which  Europe  may  well  envy, 
one  comes  to  regard  the  East’s  non-militant  type  of 
civilisation  in  a new  fight  and  its  results  in  clearer 
perspective. 

There  can  be,  I think,  no  escape  from  the  conclusion 
that,  in  the  broad  conception  of  fife,  and  in  the  social 
and  political  systems  which  arise  out  of  that  conception, 
“ East  is  East  and  West  is  West,  and  never  the  twain 
shall  meet.”  Between  the  creative  ideas  of  East  and 
West  there  lies  a gulf  of  elemental  difference,  which 
neither  Time  nor  any  tide  in  the  affairs  of  men  can  bridge. 
Considering  Asia  and  its  philosophy  as  a whole,  dis- 
regarding its  intellectual  half-breeds  (those  brilliant 
dragon-flies  of  a brief  day,  that  flit  erratically  across  the 
depths  of  national  fife),  we  may  confidently  ascribe  this 
difference  to  the  hold  which  the  patriarchal  family 
system  of  morals  and  politics  has  acquired  over  the  race- 
mind  of  the  East,  and  to  the  peculiar  virtues  and  defects 
produced  in  the  masses  by  that  system.  But  let  the 
fundamental  causes  of  that  difference  be  what  they  may, 
deep-buried  in  the  past,  its  general  result  has  been  to 
produce  in  the  Asiatic  mind  a deep  reverence  for  the 
absolute  and  the  universal,  which  revolts  instinctively 
from  the  materialism  of  the  West.  Ex  Oriente  lux.  It  is 
not  for  nothing  that  from  the  East  has  come  every 
religion  which  has  elevated  and  comforted  the  hearts  of 
men,  for  the  East  has  always  held  firmly  to  the  belief 


SHANGHAI 


247 


that  the  means  of  existence  are  less  important  than  its 
ends.  The  masses  of  the  people  in  China  and  Japan  are 
unconsciously  nearer  to  the  spirit  of  the  Sermon  on  the 
Mount  than  many  of  the  Christian  communities  in 
Europe  and  America  which  subscribe  to  send  missionaries 
to  the  East.  Can  any  one  deny  that  the  forceful  in- 
dividualism, upon  which  are  based  the  social  progress 
and  material  prosperity  of  Europe  and  America,  is  morally 
inferior  to  the  family  system  of  Asia,  in  which  the  interests 
of  the  individual  are  sacrificed  to  those  of  the  community  ? 
It  is  the  birthright  and  the  instinct  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
to  respect  an  active,  self-helping  race  and  to  despise  the 
passive  non-resister ; but  from  the  Asiatic  point  of  view,  it 
is  not  only  a text,  but  an  absolute  truth,  that  the  meek 
shall  inherit  the  earth.  Your  Chinese  educated  in  Mission 
Schools  may  wear  a top-hat  and  profess  to  admire  our 
many  inventions,  but  the  attitude  of  the  East  as  a whole 
towards  our  material  civilisation  is  just  as  disdainful 
to-day  as  it  was  in  the  days  of  the  Great  Mogul.  As  for  me, 
returning  to  the  East  from  lands  wherein  all  our  triumphs 
of  mechanical  ingenuity  have  been  turned  to  purposes  of 
manslaughter,  I find  myself  more  than  ever  compelled 
to  accept  and  respect  the  Oriental  conception  of  life — that 
attitude,  founded  on  the  wisdom  of  the  ancients,  which 
has  given  to  their  form  of  civilisation  a stability  and 
harmony  such  as  our  modern  world  has  never  known. 
The  philosophy  of  the  Chinese  is  the  birthright,  not  of  an 
intellectual  elite  (as  with  us),  but  of  the  race;  it  has 
taught  them  that  even  wealth  is  only  a means  to  a rational 
end,  that  the  secret  of  human  happiness  lies  rather  in 
being  than  doing,  and  that,  in  this  unsubstantial  pageant 
of  illusions,  the  spirit  is  more  than  the  flesh.  Thus 
regarded,  all  the  fitful  fever  of  Europe’s  social  system, 
all  the  triumphs  of  our  industrial  organisation,  are  but 
the  dead  sea  fruits  of  purblind  error.  From  the  Eastern 
point  of  view, 

"The  world  is  too  much  with  us;  late  and  soon, 

Getting  and  spending,  we  lay  waste  our  powers,” 


248  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  a civilisation  which  leaves  neither  time  nor  place 
for  meditation,  stands,  by  that  very  fact,  condemned. 
Despite  the  burden  of  physical  suffering,  the  hunger 
and  the  squalor  imposed  upon  countless  millions  of 
Asiatics  by  their  passivity,  and  by  the  intensity  cf  the 
struggle  for  survival,  accentuated  by  their  procreative 
recklessness,  I hold  that  the  East  is  wiser  and  better 
than  the  West.  I believe  that  the  social  institutions 
which  have  grown  out  of  the  Chinese  philosophy  are 
nearer  to  the  truth,  and  therefore  morally  superior  to 
our  own ; and,  believing  this,  I ask  myself  upon  what 
grounds,  and  to  what  purpose,  do  we  persist  in  endeavour- 
ing to  impose  upon  them,  not  only  our  mechanical 
inventions,  but  our  political  panaceas  and  our  conflicting 
creeds  ? 

Shanghai  inevitably  suggests  some  such  train  of  thought, 
because  here,  within  the  narrow  boundaries  of  the  Treaty 
Port,  East  and  West  have  met  on  neutral  ground  and 
held  close  converse  together  for  seventy  years;  yet,  in 
all  things  that  are  essential  to  human  intercourse,  they 
remain  worlds  apart.  Some  800,000  Chinese  have  their 
being  within  the  borders  of  the  Model  Settlement,  living 
for  and  on  the  trade  which  has  brought  together  20,000 
white  men  and  Japanese  at  the  Yangtsze's  great  dis- 
tributing centre.  A large  proportion  of  these  Chinese  are 
humble  workers,  artisans  and  coolies  from  Kiangpei, 
who  come  in  their  thousands  to  eat  of  the  crumbs  that 
fall  from  the  rich  man’s  table.  All  around  and  about  the 
lordly  mansions  of  the  foreign  trader,  that  line  the  banks 
of  the  Whangpoo,  and  within  a stone’s-throw  of  the 
splendid  villas  of  the  suburbs,  the  tide  of  native  life  flows 
on,  practically  untouched  in  its  ancestral  ways  by  all  the 
words  and  works  of  the  stranger.  If,  by  some  miracle, 
every  foreigner  could  be  suddenly  transported  from  China 
to-morrow,  their  going  would  have  no  more  effect  upon 
the  inner  life  of  this  people  than  a tree  feels  when  the 
birds  leave  its  branches.  They  would  pass,  like  other 
unaccountable  phenomena,  and  leave  not  a trace  behind. 


SHANGHAI 


249 


Over  the  place  where  they  had  been,  the  tide  of  the 
nation’s  life  would  flow,  unchanging  and  unchanged,  and 
soon  their  very  memory  would  be  forgotten.  In  the 
back  streets  of  the  Settlements  at  Shanghai,  the  spiritual 
aloofness  of  the  Chinese  race  impresses  itself  just  as 
forcibly  as  in  the  remotest  city  of  the  interior. 

But  there  is  something  which  impresses  itself  even  more 
than  this  aloofness  of  the  mind  of  the  East,  upon  the 
traveller  who  returns  to  China  after  an  absence  of  years, 
and  that  is  the  charm  (almost  biblical  in  its  old-world 
quality)  which  lies  in  the  philosophic  serenity,  the  sterling 
faithfulness,  and  the  sober  efficiency  of  the  race.  Dynasties 
may  pass,  the  legions  thunder  by,  but  in  the  finely- 
tempered  soul  of  this  people  these  things  abide,  and  their 
savour  is  a fragrance  of  which  the  heirs  of  all  the  ages 
know  nothing.  Where,  in  all  our  bustling,  hustling 
market-places,  will  you  find  anything  to  compare  with 
the  equal-minded  fortitude,  the  kindliness,  the  almost 
dog-like  fidelity  of  the  Chinese,  those  simple  virtues, 
fruits  of  the  Sages’  ancient  tree  of  Knowledge,  which 
have  made  him  the  most  lovable,  and  perhaps  the  most 
admirable,  of  human  beings  ? Fully  to  appreciate  the 
character  of  humanity’s  primordial  elder  brother,  one 
must  have  left  the  East  awhile,  gone  back  to  the  restless 
sources  of  our  “ Western  learning,”  heard  Bolshevism 
howling  at  the  gates,  and  realised  the  cumulative  effects 
of  our  creed  of  individualism  upon  the  mind  of  the  masses. 
Thereafter,  China,  with  all  its  revolutions  and  economic 
distress,  seems  like  a weather-beaten  rock  of  sense  and 
stability  in  a world  of  unrest,  and  the  greetings  of  one’s 
old  friends  (teachers,  traders,  and  servants)  come  like 
some  strain  of  homely  music,  half-forgotten.  What  have 
we  to  offer  to  the  Chinese  that  shall  serve  them  better 
than  the  virtues  that  are  theirs  ? Shall  we  lure  them 
from  their  fields  to  our  factories  for  the  speeding  up  of 
trade?  With  Christian  Europe  in  the  melting-pot,  shall 
we  tell  them  that  Christianity  will  cure  the  thousand 
natural  ills  that  flesh  is  heir  to  ? No  doubt  but  that  we 


250  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


shall  do  these  things  and  continue  to  call  them  progress ; 
but  let  us  not  hope,  in  the  doing  of  them,  to  convince  the 
East  of  our  moral  or  intellectual  superiority. 

To  return  to  the  places  where  the  best  years  of  one’s 
life  have  been  spent,  to  be  a transient  spectator  where 
once  one  played  even  a small  part  upon  the  stage,  must 
always  be  a heart-stirring  adventure,  fraught  with  a 
gentle  melancholy  of  retrospection,  half  pleasure  and 
half  pain.  The  pain  predominates  when,  amidst  the 
whispering  ghosts  of  the  years  that  are  gone,  one  seeks  in 
vain  for  the  old  familiar  places,  where  only  a few  surviving 
landmarks  greet  one,  like  old  friends  in  a strange  land. 
The  changes  which  the  hand  of  man  has  wrought  in  and 
about  the  Foreign  Settlements  of  Shanghai  during  the 
past  ten  years,  have  been  as  many  and  as  great  as  those 
of  any  mushroom  Eldorado  of  the  new  world,  so  that  the 
revenant  in  search  of  old  haunts,  wanders  here  like  a 
pelican  in  the  wilderness.  On  all  sides  the  triumphs  of 
commerce-in-the-grand-manner  confront  him,  imposing 
manifestations  and  appliances  of  noise  and  haste  to  the 
business  of  barter,  more  suggestive  of  Chicago  than  of 
the  easy-going  Shanghai  of  bygone  days.  It  is  as  if 
Aladdin  had  persuaded  every  citizen  to  change  his  old 
lamps  for  new,  his  ricksha  for  a motor-car,  and  hence- 
forth to  live  in  a fever  of  trans- Atlantic  hustle  and  bustle. 
All  over  the  East,  the  traveller  of  to-day  will  find  portents 
and  proofs  of  a world  of  change,  but  nowhere  such  a trans- 
figuration, such  breathless  haste  and  hunger  for  new 
things,  such  a clean  sweep  of  old  signposts,  as  in  the 
foreign  community  of  Shanghai.  Tientsin  and  Canton, 
for  all  their  new  traffics  and  discoveries,  still  preserve  the 
essential  features  of  their  youth.  Yokohama,  by  com- 
parison, stands  unchanged  and  rooted  in  her  ancient 
ways.  From  the  purely  commercial  point  of  view,  there 
may  be  matter  for  regret  in  such  a state  of  suspended 
animation,  but  it  has  its  sentimental  and  aesthetic  com- 
pensations. True,  one  feels  in  the  Treaty  Ports  of  Japan 
that  the  alien  intruder  is  here  on  sufferance  only,  that  his 


SHANGHAI 


251 


tide  of  peaceful  penetration  is  on  the  ebb,  and  that  there 
is  a sense  of  suppressed  irritation  in  the  air ; nevertheless, 
I confess  to  a subtle  satisfaction  in  finding  so  many 
ancient  landmarks  standing  where  they  stood  of  old. 
Indeed,  the  Yokohama  Bund  and  the  approaches  to  the 
Bluff  give  one  at  first  sight  a queer  Rip  van  Winkle  feeling, 
so  little  changed  are  they  from  the  scene  which  greeted 
the  traveller  on  landing  here  thirty  years  ago.  And  men 
still  seem  to  move  here,  as  of  old,  with  the  leisurely 
dignity  that  marked  the  merchant  princes  of  the  'eighties, 
their  daily  lives  bounded  by  tranquil  offices,  the  race- 
course, and  the  restful  Club,  their  outer  world  limited 
to  Tokyo  and  Kobe,  Miyanoshita  and  Kamakura.  The 
unpainted  junks  that  move  upon  the  dancing  waters  of 
the  bay,  the  little  Japanese  shops  that  cling  and  cluster 
along  the  steep  road  which  winds  up  to  the  Bluff,  the  silk 
stores  and  curio  shops  of  the  Benten-dore — all  seem 
blissfully  unconscious  of  the  hand  of  Time,  unmoved  by 
the  clamour  that  reverberates  from  Tokyo  and  Osaka. 
And  over  them  all  Fujiyama,  the  peerless,  towers  in 
serenity  unshaken. 

The  causes  of  Yokohama’s  comparative  immutability 
and  of  Shanghai's  swift-moving  development  lie  so 
obviously  in  the  conditions  under  which  the  Western 
trader  exists  in  Japan  and  China  respectively,  that  they 
call  for  little  explanation.  Both  these  Treaty  Ports  are, 
of  their  origin,  exotic  growths,  excrescences  grafted  by 
force  of  arms  upon  the  native  tree  of  trade.  Japan, 
being  wise  in  her  generation,  and  having  diligently 
acquired  the  Western  science  of  man-killing  by  machinery, 
has  thrown  off  the  shackles  of  extra-territoriality ; and 
the  stranger  within  her  gates  has  never  been  quite  com- 
fortable since.  But  for  China,  with  her  patriarchial 
system  and  atavistic  resistance  to  change,  such  an  effort 
was  impossible,  and  with  the  passing  years,  as  her  weak- 
ness increased  with  the  crafts  and  assaults  of  the  earth- 
hungry  Powers,  Shanghai  has  become,  not  only  the 
stronghold  of  the  extra-territorialised  trader,  but  the 


252  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


favourite  residence  and  safety-vault  of  Chinese  officials 
en  retraite  and  a very  Cave  of  Adullam  for  political  refugees 
and  plotters  of  every  description.  Under  such  conditions, 
it  was  inevitable  that  the  city  should  wax  fat  and  kick ; 
that  the  little  self-governing  community  of  foreign 
merchants,  exempt  from  all  laws  and  taxation,  save 
those  of  their  own  making  and  their  Taiping-days  Charter, 
should  grow  into  a great  Free  Town,  richer  by  far  than 
any  of  the  Hanseatic  League.  The  Shanghai  of  to-day 
is,  in  fact,  a little  State,  an  imperium  in  imperio  adminis- 
tered by  its  Council  elected  by  the  foreign  Land-renters, 
in  which  close  upon  a million  Chinese  enjoy  the  benefits 
of  law  and  order  (but  no  votes)  in  return  for  a modest 
rate  of  taxation.  All  the  nations  and  kindreds  of  the 
earth  have  foregathered  here,  with  fifteen  Consuls  flying 
fifteen  flags,  and  each  takes  its  part,  tant  bien  que  mal, 
in  the  affairs  of  the  Settlement.  It  is  a League  of  Nations, 
in  parvo,  which  has  stood  the  test  of  time,  building  up 
its  administration  by  gradual  process  of  precedents,  and 
held  together  by  the  effective  bond  of  a common  interest 
in  the  development  and  protection  of  trade.  As  an 
object  lesson  of  the  federation  of  the  world  on  a small 
scale,  the  Model  Settlement  of  Shanghai  deserves  more 
attention  than  it  has  yet  received  from  political  econo- 
mists. When  that  object  lesson  is  studied,  it  will  be 
observed  that  the  foundations  upon  which  the  success  of 
the  experiment  has  rested,  differ  in  one  very  important 
respect  from  those  upon  which  Mr.  President  Wilson  and 
Lord  Robert  Cecil  have  proposed  to  build  their  League 
of  Nations.  The  success  of  international  co-operation 
at  Shanghai  has  been  brought  about  by  the  fact  that, 
because  the  British  Land-renters  have  always  been  in  a 
considerable  majority,  the  control  of  the  administration 
has  been  automatically  vested  in  British  hands;  the 
little  State  has  thus  enjoyed  the  benefits  of  a continuous 
policy  and  a recognised  directing  authority.  If  the  day 
ever  comes — and  the  Japanese  are  moving  heaven  and 
earth  to  attain  it — when  the  control  of  the  administration 


SHANGHAI 


253 


becomes  a bone  of  contention  between  seriously  divided 
national  factions,  the  doom  of  the  Model  Settlement  is 
sealed.  The  ideal  of  the  League  of  Nations,  based  on  a 
community  of  sentiment,  may  be  admirable  in  theory, 
but  its  successful  application  involves  the  necessity  of 
recognition  by  all  concerned  of  a common  interest  and 
an  authoritative  executive.  It  is  on  the  rock  of  imaginary 
equal  rights  that  the  good  ship  Utopia  goes  to  pieces. 

Meanwhile  Shanghai,  having  noo  British  voters  on 
its  Land-renters’  list,  as  against  300  Japanese,  230 
Americans,  and  150  Germans,  still  steers  its  prosperous 
course,  unperturbed  by  the  distant  thunder  of  a world 
distraught,  or  the  clouds  of  political  strife  that  gather  on 
the  near  horizon.  How  prosperous  that  course  has  been 
since  1913,  he  who  runs  may  see;  evidence  of  wealth, 
increasing  and  prolific,  abounds  on  every  side,  from  the 
teeming  activity  of  wharves,  warehouses,  and  factories, 
to  the  Capuan  villas  of  the  Bubbling  Well.  And  the 
ease  with  which  money  has  been  made,  both  by  merchants 
and  mandarins,  is  reflected  in  the  monstrous  cost  of 
living  and  in  a degree  of  luxury  in  some  respects  unequalled 
either  in  New  York  or  Buenos  Aires.  I have  seen  some- 
thing of  the  stupendous  wealth  of  both  these  cities  during 
and  since  the  war ; I have  walked  their  streets  and  dwelt 
in  their  hotels,  wondering,  like  a poor  relation,  at  the 
princeliness  of  their  pomps  and  vanities,  the  lavishness 
of  their  resplendent  lives;  but  in  the  matter  of  mellow 
creature  comforts,  of  savoury  fleshpots  deftly  served,  no 
Croesus  of  America,  North  or  South,  can  ever  hope  to 
attain  to  the  comfortable  heights  and  depths  that 
Shanghai  takes  for  granted,  because  not  all  his  wealth 
can  buy  the  swift,  soft-footed  service,  the  ubiquitous 
efficiency  of  the  Chinese  house-boy,  gardener,  or  cook. 
And  neither  Fifth  Avenue  nor  the  Calle  Florida  treat  the 
dollar  with  quite  the  same  splendid  insouciance  as  does 
Shanghai’s  Nanking  Road.  When,  last  year,  the  exchange 
of  the  Mexican  stood  at  about  six  shillings,  Shanghai  spent 
it  in  the  same  cheerful  spirit  as  when  it  was  worth  two. 


254  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Converted  into  sterling,  salaries  and  prices  in  the  gorgeous 
East  verged  on  the  ludicrous,  and  for  the  passing  stranger, 
the  disastrous.  To  pay  the  equivalent  of  £3  a day  for 
the  meagrest  of  hotel  accommodation ; 24s.  an  hour  for 
the  hire  of  a Ford  car ; 4 s.  6 d.  for  having  one’s  hair  cut, 
and  is.  2d.  for  the  daily  paper,  is  to  fill  one  with  something 
more  than  respect  for  the  Orient. 

It  was,  of  course,  to  be  expected  that  with  the  develop- 
ment of  railways  opening  up  the  interior,  strategic  trade 
centres  like  Shanghai  and  Hankow  would  grow  and 
flourish  exceedingly.  But  something  more  than  an 
ordinary  expansion  of  commerce  was  needed  to  produce 
the  exuberant  prosperity  and  modernity  of  present-day 
Shanghai.  The  vast  profits  of  five  years  of  war  trade, 
practically  untaxed,  accounted  for  a good  deal,  and  the 
hoarded  wealth  brought  into  the  safe  refuge  of  the  Settle- 
ment by  retired  Chinese  and  Manchu  officials  since  the 
upheaval  of  the  Revolution,  provided  much  new  grist 
for  the  local  mills  of  trade.  The  results,  in  any  case, 
are  astonishing,  and  not  the  least  remarkable  feature  of 
the  swiftly-changing  scene  is  the  American  air  of  get- 
rich-quick,  which  has  come  to  prevail  in  this  most  cos- 
mopolitan of  all  communities.  The  teeming  tide  of  life 
which  flowed  along  the  Maloo  ten  years  ago  was  a gently 
meandering  stream,  compared  with  the  turbulent  torrent 
of  to-day.  Looking  back  on  the  even  tenor  of  existence 
in  those  days,  the  present  kaleidoscopic  activities  of  the 
community  seem  incredibly  remote  from  their  serenity; 
it  is  the  difference  between  a vicar’s  garden-party  and  a 
race  meeting.  During  and  since  the  war,  there  has  been, 
naturally  enough,  a new,  and  by  no  means  inconsiderable, 
invasion  of  China  by  American  firms  and  American  ideas ; 
also  the  increasing  number  of  Chinese  students  educated 
in  the  States  was  bound  to  produce  its  first  and  most 
conspicuous  effects  in  the  Settlements,  which  have  ever 
been  Young  China’s  headquarters  and  chief  stamping- 
ground.  Nevertheless,  compared  to  the  whole  foreign 
community,  the  number  of  Americans  in  Shanghai, 


SHANGHAI 


255 


missionaries  included,  has  not  been  enough  to  leaven  the 
whole  lump.  Rather  it  would  seem  that  similar  economic 
conditions  have  produced  similar  results  in  Shanghai  and 
Chicago.  The  gods  have  dropped  the  bait  of  opportunity 
into  the  pool  of  enterprise,  and  the  fishes  dart  hither  and 
thither  in  a restless  commotion  of  competition. 

Here  and  there,  above  the  tumultuous  tide  of  change, 
a few  old  landmarks  stand  out  and  bring  to  mind  the 
easy-going  past — the  Cathedral  and  the  Custom  House, 
the  Lyceum  Theatre  and  Country  Club,  the  Joss-house 
at  the  Bubbling  Well,  the  goodly  messuage  of  the  British 
Consulate,  and  the  Race-course  (once  on  the  outskirts, 
now  at  the  very  heart  of  the  Settlement),  a perennial 
monument  to  the  foresight  of  the  first  City  Fathers. 
Even  on  the  Bund,  amidst  the  turmoil  of  tramcars, 
motors,  and  lorries,  there  are  sights  and  sounds  that  recall 
the  Shanghai  of  early  days  : the  mustering  of  brokers’ 
victorias  at  the  Bank — owners,  mafoos  and  ponies,  just 
as  they  were  years  and  years  ago,  and  all  serenely  un- 
conscious of  being  an  anachronism ; the  rhythmic  chant 
of  swift -moving  coolies,  unloading  cargo  at  the  jetties ; 
the  never-ceasing  song  of  native  labour;  wheelbarrow 
coolies  staggering  under  their  monstrous  burdens.  And 
on  the  river,  the  old  familiar  vision  of  junks  and  sampans 
innumerable,  blue  sails  and  brown,  and  twirling  yuloh 
blades,  the  moving  homes  of  men  whose  lives  are  as  the 
lives  of  their  forefathers  were  in  the  old  time  before  them, 
and  as  the  lives  of  their  sons  will  be,  when  we  are  all 
forgotten.  These  glimpses  and  voices  from  the  dense 
background  of  purely  native  life,  these  swift  intimations 
of  its  pitiless  struggle  for  sheer  survival,  seem  to  me  full 
of  a deeper  significance  than  all  the  glamour  and  glitter 
of  Shanghai’s  exotic  modernity.  As  I watch  the  human 
pageant,  the  social  activities  of  Mrs.  Compradore  Wang, 
driving  in  her  Rolls-Royce  to  her  villa  in  the  Western 
District,  or  those  of  Mrs.  Rosenkrantz,  who  takes  her  to 
the  play  at  the  Lyceum,  count  for  less  than  these  half- 
naked  coolies  singing  at  their  work.  For  these  ladies 


256  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


are  at  best  but  transient  phenomena,  froth  on  the  crest 
of  a wave ; but  the  humble  sons  of  Han  are  as  they  have 
been  since  the  days  of  Babylon,  and  as  they  will  be  when 
Europe’s  present  frontiers  are  wiped  out,  a great  tide  of 
the  ocean  of  human  life,  mysterious  and  profound. 

When  one  reflects  upon  the  present  state  and  probable 
future  of  industrialism  in  Europe  and  America,  the 
ant-like  capacity  of  the  Chinese  for  monotonous  labour 
assumes  a new  significance.  Not  only  does  it  explain 
most  of  the  rapid  growth  of  Shanghai,  but  it  brings  before 
us,  much  nearer  than  of  old,  the  vision  of  the  only  real 
Yellow  Peril,  the  competitive  results  of  this  mass  of 
unsophisticated  cheap  labour  upon  countless  workshops 
and  factories  overseas.  Here,  before  our  eyes,  are  the 
beginning  of  a new  phase  and  new  consequences  of 
economic  pressure,  unmistakable  evidences  of  the  fact 
that  Capital  is  beginning  to  perceive  the  value  of  this 
vast  reservoir  of  efficient,  easily-contented  workers,  and  is 
making  ready  to  use  it.  Already  Captains  of  industry — 
Americans,  British,  Germans,  and  Japanese  (especially 
Japanese) — are  hastening  to  map  out  the  ground,  selecting 
coigns  of  vantage  all  over  the  country,  for  the  organisation 
and  application  of  all  this  dynamic  energy  to  the  develop- 
ment of  manufactures;  and  this  assuredly  is  only  the 
thin  end  of  a wedge  which  must  eventually  move  the 
whole  fabric  of  international  trade.  Assuming  that 
industrial  enterprise  can  be  organised  in  China  under 
conditions  which  shall  secure  the  co-operation  of  Chinese 
capital  and  the  support  of  Chinese  officialdom,  it  will  be 
as  impossible  for  any  European  or  American  industry  to 
face  its  competition  in  any  open  market,  as  it  is  for  the 
white  countries  to  admit  Asiatic  immigration. 

It  is  not  only  the  foreigner  who  perceives  the  possi- 
bilities of  the  situation  brought  about  in  the  East  by  the 
war  of  Labour  against  Capital  in  the  West ; the  Chinese 
are  fully  alive  to  them.  They  are  also  well  aware  of  the 
fact  that,  so  long  as  the  foreigner’s  factories  are  confined 
within  the  narrow  limits  of  the  Treaty  Ports,  until  he  can 


SHANGHAI 


257 


secure  the  free  use  of  land  and  labour  in  close  proximity 
to  the  chief  sources  of  raw  materials,  there  can  be  no 
rapid  development  of  enterprise  on  the  grand  scale  of 
which  the  Americans  talk.  As  in  the  past,  they  will 
undoubtedly  resist,  with  all  the  effective  weight  of  their 
inertia  and  powers  of  obstruction,  any  attempt  by  the 
foreigner  to  exploit  China’s  raw  materials  and  cheap 
labour  for  his  own  exclusive  benefit.  But  there  appears 
to  be  a very  definite  disposition  in  their  high  places  to 
entertain  proposals  for  co-operative  enterprise,  of  a kind 
which  will  give  Chinese  officialdom  an  equal  share  of 
profits  and  a fair  share  of  “ face,”  in  return  for  the 
privilege  of  trading  and  manufacturing  rights  in  the 
interior.  Unless  the  present  omens  are  misleading,  we 
are  likely  to  hear  a good  deal  in  the  near  future  of 
Anglo-Chinese  joint  enterprises. 

There  exists  a certain  group  of  Cantonese  intransigeants, 
it  is  true,  who  proclaim  the  readiness  and  the  ability  of 
the  Chinese  to  handle  highly-organised  industrial  business 
without  the  help  of  foreign  capital  or  foreign  technical 
experts,  and  who  therefore  denounce  the  co-operative 
idea.  They  cite  the  success  of  purely  Chinese  companies, 
such  as  the  Nanyang  Tobacco  Company,  or  Wing  On’s  new 
department  stores,  as  evidence  in  support  of  their  con- 
tention, and  they  point  to  the  great  businesses  that 
have  been  built  up  by  Chinese  merchant  princes  in 
Hong  Kong  and  Java,  in  the  Straits  and  the  South  Seas. 
The  question  thus  raised  is  extremely  interesting  and  a 
little  delicate.  It  is  evident  that  if,  without  assistance, 
the  Chinese  can  provide  efficient  and  reliable  administra- 
tion for  the  development  of  native  industries,  they  can 
eat  up  their  competitors  at  their  leisure  and  be  perfectly 
justified  in  so  doing.  In  that  case,  the  raison  d’etre  of 
half  the  Europeans  in  China  would  cease  to  exist,  and  the 
Treaty  Ports  would  soon  become  the  diminished  homes 
of  petty  commission  agents  and  disgruntled  shippers. 
But  is  it  possible  ? Of  the  intelligence  and  business 
capacity  of  the  Chinese  merchant,  there  can  be  no  question ; 
s 


258  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


yet  the  fact  remains  that  there  has  never  been  a case 
in  China  of  a public  company  successfully  handled  by 
Chinese  for  Chinese.  There  is  all  the  difference  in  the 
world  between  a Chinese  merchant  conducting  his  personal 
or  family  business,  and  the  same  man  acting  as  director 
of  a railway  or  mining  company ; the  great  names  made 
by  Chinese  merchant-adventurers  in  the  South  have 
always  been  associated  with  family  concerns,  and  the 
same  is  generally  true  of  modem  enterprises,  such  as 
Wing  On’s,  where  the  initiative  comes  from  Chinese 
educated  abroad.  There  is  also  a wide  difference  between 
the  position  of  a Chinese  business  conducted  in  a British 
Colony,  or  even  in  the  No  Man’s  Land  of  a Treaty  Port, 
and  one  which  has  to  work  out  its  own  salvation  in  some 
inland  province  of  China,  exposed  to  the  rapacity  of  local 
officials  and  the  bigoted  conservatism  of  the  gentry. 
When  all  is  said  and  done,  the  fact  remains  that,  although 
there  is  probably  more  hoarded  wealth  in  China  to-day 
than  ever  before,  none  of  its  owners — be  they  merchants 
or  mandarins — display  any  inclination  to  invest  it  either 
in  Government  loans  or  in  purely  Chinese  companies 
under  official  auspices.  At  the  same  time,  many  of  the 
richest  and  ablest  men  in  the  country  are  prepared  to 
put  money  into  co-operative  enterprises,  with  financial 
control  vested  in  the  foreigner.  Money  talks. 


Any  one  who  is  trying  to  see  the  problems  of  the  Far 
East  as  a whole,  to  form  a just  estimate  of  the  various 
forces  at  work  beneath  the  surface,  and  the  probable 
resultant  of  their  actions  and  reactions,  can  hardly  fail 
to  be  impressed  by  the  intellectual  and  spiritual  detach- 
ment of  the  foreign  community  of  Shanghai  from  all 
things  Chinese,  except  those  which  directly  affect  the 
commercial  outlook.  Even  allowing  for  the  fact  that 
here  they  have  no  abiding  city,  there  is  something  passing 
strange  in  the  earnestness  of  their  concentration  on  purely 
local  affairs,  their  complete  absorption  in  trade  and  sport, 


YOUNG  china:  marriage  up  to  date,  shanghai.  a treaty-port  lady  of  fashion,  shanghai, 


SHANGHAI 


259 


their  cheerful  indifference  to  the  language,  literature,  and 
institutions  of  the  native-born.  And  even  more  remark- 
able than  this  aloofness  of  the  foreign  colony,  is  the  exotic 
quality  of  Young  China’s  political  and  intellectual 
activities,  always  manifested  to  the  sound  of  trumpets 
and  drums  in  the  Tom  Tiddler’s  ground  of  the  Model 
Settlement.  They  loom  very  large  in  the  world’s  Press, 
these  activities  of  the  semi-Europeanised  product  of  our 
Mission  schools  and  Universities  overseas,  and  their 
reverberating  rhetoric  evokes  many  weird  echoes  in 
distant  lands;  nevertheless,  their  voice  is  that  of  the 
intellectual  hybrid  of  a class  which  has  all  the  qualities 
and  all  the  defects  of  the  half-breed,  but  is  without  real 
roots  either  in  China  or  in  Europe.  It  is  a class  which, 
though  in  some  instances  its  intentions  have  been 
excellent,  has  proved  itself  to  be  utterly  incapable  of 
originating  or  directing  any  practical  policy  for  the  good 
of  China. 

The  foreign  merchant  at  Shanghai,  whose  contact  with 
Chinese  affairs  is  usually  limited  to  half  an  hour’s  chat 
with  his  semi-denationalised  compradore,  may  be  for- 
given for  mistaking  the  cackle  of  these  highly  vocal 
young  gentlemen  for  the  murmur  of  the  Chinese  world. 
It  is  also  probably  true  that  the  foreign  community’s 
collective  vanity  is  rather  tickled  by  appearing  before  the 
world  as  godfather  to  a movement  in  which  many  good, 
earnest  men  have  discerned  the  makings  of  a new  heaven 
and  a new  earth.  But  even  allowing  for  all  this,  and 
recognising  the  fact  that  a busy  commercial  outpost  has 
not  much  leisure  for  philosophy  or  political  economy,  I 
find  myself  unable  to  account  for  the  persistence,  at  this 
date,  of  fallacies  which  were  natural  enough  in  the  first 
enthusiasm  for  the  Revolution  that  overthrew  the  Manchu 
dynasty.  Generally  speaking,  it  would  seem  to  be  due 
to  lack  of  perspective  and  sense  of  proportion ; but  in  a 
good  many  instances  it  would  seem  that  belief  in  these 
fallacies  has  been  professed  as  part  of  a deliberate  policy, 
intended  to  provide  good  fishing  in  troubled  waters 


260  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


In  certain  quarters  this  policy  is  obviously  inspired  by 
a desire  to  undermine  British  preponderance  in  the  local 
executive  government.  There  are,  no  doubt,  sincere 
idealists  and  earnest  parlour  Bolsheviks  who  encourage  the 
extremists  of  Young  China  militant  in  such  matters  as 
the  immediate  abolition  of  extra-territoriality,  from 
perfectly  disinterested  motives;  but  as  a rule  the  in- 
spiration of  this  kind  of  sympathy  may  be  traced  either 
to  the  mud-fishers  aforesaid,  or  to  the  anxiety  of  some 
well-paid  “ adviser  ” to  do  something  to  justify  his 
position,  or  to  the  desire  of  well-meaning  busy-bodies  to 
loom  large  in  the  public  eye. 

Young  China’s  record,  having  reference  to  the  funda- 
mental question  of  the  nation’s  fitness  for  representative 
government,  has  been  discussed  elsewhere : for  the 

moment,  we  are  concerned  only  with  the  Model  Settle- 
ment. And  here,  despite  the  cumulative  evidence  of 
the  eight  years  which  have  passed  since  the  proclamation 
of  the  Republic,  the  delusion  still  seems  to  prevail,  even 
amongst  sober  business  men,  that,  with  the  passing  of 
the  Monarchy,  a sudden  and  miraculous  change  has 
taken  place  in  the  structural  character  of  the  Chinese 
people,  and  that  the  passive  non-resisting  type  is  a thing 
of  the  past.  In  spite  of  the  obvious  fact  that  the  so- 
called  " parliamentarians  ” have  reduced  the  country', 
politically  speaking,  to  the  level  of  Mexico  or  Venezuela, 
all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men  are  ready  to  assure  you, 
not  only  at  their  dinner-tables,  but  in  public  meetings 
assembled,  that  the  Chinese  of  to-day  are  a totally 
different  people  from  those  of  the  last  generation;  that 
“ things  are  moving  very  fast,  sir,  and  we  must  keep 
abreast  of  the  times."  They  will  ask  you  to  observe  the 
movement  for  the  emancipation  of  women,  the  number 
and  activity  of  political  associations  in  their  midst,  the 
increasing  signs  of  organisation  amongst  certain  sections 
of  Chinese  labour,  and  many  other  proofs  and  portents  of 
“ progress.”  It  is  true  that,  for  the  moment,  one  does 
not  hear  quite  so  much  as  one  did  in  1912  of  the 


SHANGHAI 


261 


regenerative  force  of  Parliamentary  procedure  at  Peking, 
or  the  moral  effect  of  the  abolition  of  opium,  because,  with 
three  rival  Parliaments  contesting  the  field,  and  opium 
more  plentiful  than  ever  before,  it  is  difficult  for  the  most 
earnest  of  visionaries  to  make  the  facts  of  the  situation 
square  with  the  theory  of  fundamental  change.  But 
the  vague  belief  in  the  increasing  political  consciousness 
of  the  Chinese  masses  persists,  nevertheless,  together  with 
a slipshod  profession  of  the  fashionable  faith  in  the 
miraculous  benefits  which  China  may  expect  to  derive 
from  “ democracy.” 

I find  it  hard  to  account  for  the  persistence  of  these 
delusions  amongst  any  but  vocational  idealists.  That 
the  missionaries  and  school-teachers  who  are  largely 
responsible  for  Young  China’s  political  activities  and 
aspirations,  should  still  hope  to  gather  rare  and  refreshing 
fruit  from  the  tree  of  their  own  planting,  is  natural 
enough.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  the  rhapsodist  to  place  his 
hopes  for  to-morrow  above  the  experience  of  a thousand 
yesterdays,  and  to  attach  more  importance  to  the  form 
of  a government  than  to  the  character  of  the  men  who 
claim  to  administer  it.  But  the  prevalence  of  this  kind 
of  plausible  optimism  in  a business  community  which, 
with  regard  to  its  own  affairs,  can  never  afford  to  ignore 
the  experience  of  yesterday,  is  chiefly  due,  I think,  to  the 
fact  that  blind  faith  in  “ democracy,”  as  a cure  for  all 
human  ills,  has  become  a fashionable  shibboleth  all  the 
world  over,  and  this  by  reason  of  intellectual  laziness, 
and  because  the  catchwords  of  our  later-day  demagogues, 
their  appeal  and  the  secret  of  their  success,  are  based  on 
sentiment  rather  than  on  sense,  and  on  hysteria  rather 
than  on  history.  At  Shanghai,  in  particular,  the  teachings 
of  history  have  carried  even  less  weight  than  elsewhere, 
because  the  eloquence  and  fervour  with  which  Young 
China  proclaimed  its  discovery  of  Utopia,  to  the  thumping 
of  innumerable  tubs,  created  a clamour  and  a series  of 
moving  pictures  sufficient  to  disturb  most  minds,  and  to 
prevent  them  from  inquiring  whether  this  Utopia  was  the 


262  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


sort  of  place  in  which  the  Chinese  people,  as  a whole, 
might  find  themselves  at  home.  And  yet,  for  those  who, 
amidst  the  tumult  and  the  shouting,  found  time  to 
reflect,  who  remembered  the  millions  of  patient,  politically- 
unconscious  toilers  that  made  the  real  China,  it  must 
always  have  been  apparent  that  these  “ Western-learning  ” 
Intellectuals  and  their  “ emancipated  ” women  were  no 
more  representative  of  China  than,  shall  we  say,  the 
Cantonese  communities  of  Singapore  or  California  ? And 
they  must  have  had  their  doubts  also  as  to  the  wisdom 
of  those  Catholic  liberties  of  the  Foreign  Settlements — 
especially  on  the  French  side — which  permit  conspirators, 
malcontents,  and  political  refugees  of  every  kind  to  hatch 
their  plots  and  load  their  bombs  with  impunity.  These 
gentry  use  the  safe  shelter  of  the  Municipality  for  their 
own  sordid  ends,  and  by  means  of  the  local  vernacular 
Press  attain  to  a degree  of  importance  which  otherwise 
they  could  never  have  achieved.  The  evil  results  of  this 
are  twofold : firstly,  that  the  profession  of  political 

agitator  has  been  made  attractively  safe ; and  secondly, 
that  throughout  the  Treaty  Ports  there  prevails  an 
exaggerated  estimate  of  Young  China’s  political  influence 
and  regenerative  ideas.  I do  not  mean  by  this  to  suggest 
that  new-school  politicians,  such  as  Sun  Yat-sen  or  Dr. 
C.  T.  Wang,  and  the  ferment  which  they  have  produced 
at  home  and  abroad,  are  wholly  unimportant.  The  point 
which  I desire  to  emphasise  is,  that  those  observers  who 
discern  in  this  ferment  the  re-birth  of  China,  and  the 
sudden  awakening  of  the  nation  to  a new  sense  of  political 
morality,  are  overlooking  not  only  the  instinctive  con- 
servatism of  the  race,  but  the  self-seeking  ambitions 
which  have  been  so  powerful  a factor  in  producing  this 
upheaval.  No  one  who  knows  anything  of  China  to-day 
can  possibly  maintain  that  all  the  professional  politicians’ 
talk  of  constitutions,  parliaments,  and  democracy  evokes 
any  interest,  or  indeed  any  response,  from  the  great 
masses  of  the  people. 

There  is  something  pathetically  suggestive  of  the 


SHANGHAI 


263 


intellectual  disorder  of  Young  China,  and  of  its  inability 
to  grasp  the  essential  spirit  of  Western  civilisation,  in  the 
fearful  and  wonderful  garments  worn  by  its  emancipated 
sisters,  cousins,  and  aunts,  not  to  mention  those  of  Delilah 
and  Aspasia,  with  whom  native  traditions  of  decorum 
naturally  count  for  less  than  the  desire  to  be  conspicuous. 
The  clothes  and  manners  affected  by  Chinese  women  of 
the  respectable  classes  in  Shanghai  to-day  are  enough  to 
justify  an  old-time  resident  in  the  belief  that  Confucius, 
filial  piety,  and  the  patriarchal  system  have  gone  with 
the  Monarchy  into  limbo ; that  the  days  of  the  polygamist, 
with  his  docile,  secluded  women,  are  done;  and  that 
female  suffrage  is  in  sight.  But,  as  a matter  of  fact,  the 
fantastically-apparelled  creatures  are  a purely  local  and 
transient  manifestation,  the  product  of  an  abnormal  and 
exotic  environment,  neither  flesh,  fish,  fowl,  nor  good  red 
herring.  Their  hybrid  garments  and  jaunty  assumption 
of  foreign  customs  and  manners  merely  typify  the  in- 
evitable confusion  and  unrest  of  this  No  Man’s  Land 
'twixt  East  and  West.  Take  one  of  these  quaint  little 
monsters,  with  her  tam-o’-shanter  cap,  her  woollen 
muffler,  short  silk  trousers,  spats,  and  high-heeled  boots, 
and  put  her  down  in  any  city  of  the  interior ; if  she  did 
not  speedily  run  for  cover,  she  would  most  assuredly  be 
mobbed.  Here  in  Shanghai  she  may  ignore  the  Sacred 
Edict  with  impunity;  she  can  indulge  in  courtship,  and 
even  in  marriage,  d l' Americaine ; she  may  join,  un- 
chaperoned, in  the  afternoon  parade  of  fashion  on  the 
Nanking  Road ; she  may  take  part  in  political  demonstra- 
tions, and  even  address  public  meetings ; but  she  does 
these  things  because  she  is  a product  of  Shanghai,  and 
Shanghai  is  not  China.  In  certain  ultra-modem  circles, 
led  by  ruffling  blades  fresh  from  American  Universities, 
Chinese  ladies  have  even  been  known  to  snatch  a fearful 
joy  from  turkey-trotting  to  the  sounds  of  jazz,  thereby 
violating  all  Oriental  ideas  of  female  propriety.  Greatly 
daring,  one  or  two  of  them  have  even  done  it  in  Peking, 
and  I observe  that  Sir  John  Jordan,  talking  to  a London 


264  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


reporter,  has  cited  the  fact  as  proof  of  China's  remarkable 
progress.  I note  also  that  the  same  genial  authority 
referred  to  their  newly-developed  interest  in  politics  and 
women's  rights,  all  of  which  merely  help  to  make  it  more 
and  more  difficult  for  the  uninitiated  to  determine  the 
real  significance  of  Shanghai’s  eccentric  shadow-play. 
As  for  that  enterprising  reporter,  he  must,  I think,  have 
caught  Sir  John  unawares,  for  none  knows  better  than 
that  wise  and  kindly  man  that  the  race-mind  of  the 
Chinese  hates  and  fears,  more  than  all  else,  those  en- 
croachments of  the  West  which  threaten  its  instinctive 
moralities  and  ancestral  proprieties.  Persicos  odi,  puer, 
apparatus. 

During  the  period  of  my  visit  to  Shanghai,  the  com- 
munity, native  and  foreign,  was  much  exercised  over  a 
question  which  has  frequently  vexed  it  in  recent  years, 
namely,  the  right  of  the  Chinese  taxpayers  to  representa- 
tion on  the  Municipal  Council ; in  other  words,  to  a share 
in  the  direct  government  of  the  Settlement.  Young 
China’s  fervour  of  excitement  and  eloquence,  and  its 
skilful  use  of  the  machinery  of  intimidation  in  dealing 
with  the  timid  shopkeeping  class,  presented  on  this 
occasion  no  new  features.  There  were  the  usual  telegrams 
in  all  directions,  the  usual  manifestoes  by  all  sorts  of 
associations,  real  and  imaginary,  the  usual  passionate 
assertion  of  China’s  sovereign  rights,  accompanied  by 
threats  of  strikes  and  personal  denunciations.  But,  as 
an  example  of  windy  agitation  on  a trackless  sea  of 
sentiment,  there  was  something  very  significant,  not 
only  in  Young  China’s  handling  of  the  matter,  but  in  the 
sympathetic,  not  to  say  respectful,  reception  accorded  to 
their  views  by  officials  and  influential  members  of  the 
foreign  community.  The  Chinese  claim  to  representation, 
based  on  elementary  justice,  is  morally  unanswerable; 
to  deny  it  is  morally  impossible,  since  nine-tenths  of  the 
Settlement’s  revenues  are  collected  from  Chinese  rate- 
payers. Unfortunately,  however,  the  existence  of  the 
Settlement  itself  is  equally  indefensible  on  broad  grounds 


B._T.  Prideaux ] 


MILITARISM  IN  THE  MAKING. 


B.  T.  Prideaux } 

THE  FEMALE  OF  THE  SPECIES. 

(These  pictures  were  taken  at  a Chinese  School  in  the  French 
Settlement,  Shanghai.) 


SHANGHAI 


265 


of  justice.  It  was  originally  established,  and  has  ever 
since  been  maintained,  by  the  law  of  the  stronger,  and 
because  Chinese  methods  of  administration  could  never 
provide  the  foreign  trader  with  anything  like  security  for 
life  and  property.  For  that  matter,  the  whole  principle 
of  extra-territoriality  can  only  be  defended  on  grounds 
of  political  expediency,  in  themselves  unjust.  But  if 
extra-territoriality  goes,  the  Foreign  Settlement  goes  also, 
not  only  as  an  object-lesson  in  efficient  administration, 
but  as  a sanctuary  for  Chinese  partisans  and  plotters  of 
the  losing  side,  and  a safe  hiding-place  for  the  wealth  of 
prudent  mandarins.  The  most  astonishing  thing  about 
this  particular  agitation  was,  that  the  excitable  students 
with  whom  it  originated  should  have  been  supported 
by  the  sober-headed  Guilds  and  Chambers  of  Commerce, 
for  these  would  be  the  very  first  to  suffer  from  the  intro- 
duction of  mandarin  methods  in  Municipal  affairs;  but 
moral  courage  in  the  face  of  noisy  intimidation  has  never 
been  a characteristic  of  the  Chinese  merchant.  Equally 
astonishing,  from  the  transient  spectator’s  point  of  view, 
was  the  failure  of  the  foreign  community’s  representatives 
to  put  Young  China  firmly  in  its  place;  for  it  should 
have  been  self-evident  that  a claim  to  give  the  Chinese 
seats  on  the  Council,  as  a matter  of  equity,  and  based  on 
their  numerical  strength,  would  give  them,  on  the  same 
grounds,  a perfect  right  to  absolute  control.  The  obvious 
course,  whereby  alone  the  just  claims  of  the  Chinese  could 
be  reconciled  with  the  facts  of  the  situation  (a  course 
which  should  have  been  adopted  when  the  Guilds  proposed 
it  in  1906),  is  for  the  foreign  community  to  recognise  and 
encourage  a Chinese  Consultative  Committee,  elected 
as  the  Chinese  ratepayers  may  think  fit,  to  take  its 
advice,  whenever  feasible,  in  matters  affecting  purely 
Chinese  interests,  and  to  give  all  possible  publicity  to 
its  representations.  The  essential  need  of  the  situation 
is  machinery  for  the  ventilation  of  the  bona-fide  grievances 
of  the  law-abiding  Chinese  community.  Such  grievances 
undoubtedly  exist,  but  the  professional  agitator  who 


266  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


plies  his  noisome  trade  under  the  protection  of  the 
Municipality  should  be  forcibly  reminded  that  these 
grievances  are  as  gossamer  on  the  summer  breeze  when 
compared  with  the  burdens  borne  by  those  who  dwell 
in  Chinese  cities — “ whose  children  are  far  from  safety, 
whose  harvest  the  hungry  eateth  up,  and  the  robber 
swalloweth  up  their  substance.” 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Chinese  Government  (if 
ever  it  reaches  a state  of  coherence  such  as  shall  enable 
it  to  maintain  one),  the  protection  which  the  self-governing 
Settlements  of  the  Treaty  Ports  afford  to  political  refugees 
and  conspirators,  is  likely  to  present  a much  more  serious 
problem.  The  asylum  found  by  the  " provisional  govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  of  Korea  ” in  the  French  Settlement 
at  Shanghai,  constitutes  a precedent  which  might  easily 
develop  along  lines  fraught  with  real  danger  to  the  destinies 
of  the  Model  Settlement.  The  path  of  wisdom  for  the 
City  Fathers,  looking  to  the  future,  must  he  in  barring 
all  but  purely  local  politics,  and  in  preventing  the  Settle- 
ment from  becoming  an  Alsatia  and  a stamping-ground 
for  wild  asses. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


NORTHWARD  THROUGH  SHANTUNG 

Twelve  years  ago,  the  highest  circles  of  foreign  finance 
and  diplomacy  at  Peking — following  the  German  lead — 
professed  their  genuine  belief  in  the  capacity  of  Chinese 
officialdom  to  provide  honest  and  efficient  management 
for  the  railways  then  being  built,  or  about  to  be  built, 
with  foreign  capital.  The  terms  under  which  the  railway 
loan  agreements  for  the  Tientsin-Pukou,  the  Hangchow- 
Ningpo,  and  other  railways  were  concluded,  gave  prac- 
tical effect  to  this  belief.  “ Pukou  terms,”  as  they  were 
called,  eliminated  from  the  foreign  loans  conditions  of 
effective  supervision  over  railway  construction  and 
finance,  which  had  hitherto  been  declared  indispensable 
safeguards  for  the  bondholder.  They  were,  in  effect,  a 
declaration  of  faith  in  the  mandarin,  extorted  from 
British  and  French  political  finance  by  the  pressure  of 
German  competition,  and  for  which  Germany  received 
prompt  reward  from  the  Viceroy  Chang  Chih-tung  and 
other  mandarins.  British  officialdom,  as  is  its  wont, 
made  a virtue  of  necessity  and  followed  the  line  of  least 
resistance  to  the  sound  of  its  own  trumpets.  “ We  must 
put  the  Chinese  on  their  mettle,”  wrote  an  eminent 
authority,  “ and  hope  for  the  best.”  But,  as  a matter 
of  fact,  the  Chinese  were  put  on  to  our  metal — good 
pounds  English — with  results  which  every  disinterested 
observer  knew  to  be  inevitable. 

If  I thus  refer  to  the  pre-war  past,  it  is  because, 
despite  the  parlous  results  of  these  experiments,  history 
seems  to  be  in  considerable  danger  of  repeating  itself, 
in  the  form  of  further  foreign  loans  for  the  immediate 
benefit  of  the  mandarin  and  the  ultimate  ruin  of  China. 
And  if  I refer  to  the  present  conditions  of  management 

267 


268  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  traffic  on  the  Tientsin-Pukou  line,  it  is  because  no 
one  can  travel  by  that  railway,  with  his  eyes  and  ears 
open,  and  remain  inclined  to  the  belief  that  Chinese 
officialdom,  either  of  the  young  or  the  old  school,  is 
capable  of  honest  administration  without  an  authoritative 
guiding  hand. 

To  pass  from  the  Shanghai-Nanking  railway,  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  Yangtsze,  to  the  Pukou  line  on  the 
north,  is  to  pass  from  comparative  efficiency  to  chaos. 
Even  on  the  Shanghai  line,  misplaced  sympathy  for  local 
ideas  of  self-determination  has  seriously  curtailed  the 
railway's  utility  and  earning  power;  with  proper  ware- 
housing accommodation  and  rolling  stock  the  carrying 
capacity  might  easily  be  doubled,  but  the  Chinese 
Managing  Directorate  prefers  the  system  of  small  profits 
and  quick  returns,  and  the  foreign  staff  have  learned  by 
painful  experience  that  it  is  foolish  to  kick  against  the 
pricks.  The  permanent  way  and  rolling  stock,  however, 
are  maintained  in  good  condition  and  the  passenger  traffic 
is  well  managed.1 

The  sight  which  greets  the  traveller’s  eye,  as  he  crosses 
the  river  to  the  Pukou  terminus  of  the  northern  line,  is 
perhaps  the  most  convincing  object-lesson  in  mandarin 
business  methods  to  be  met  with  in  all  China.  Stretching 
far  up  and  down  the  river-bank  are  vast  accumulations 
of  cargo,  mostly  perishable,  awaiting  transportation,  all 
unprotected  from  the  weather.  Piece  goods,  yam,  tobacco, 
and  grain  of  all  kinds  are  stacked  in  tumultuous  confusion, 
and  in  the  rainy  season,  when  import  and  export  cargo 
he  miserably  marooned  in  mud,  the  merchants’  losses, 
for  which  there  is  no  compensation,  are  enormous.  The 
profits  which  the  railway  has  earned  in  the  past  should 
have  amply  sufficed  to  build  the  necessary  warehouses 

1 During  the  year  1920,  7,200,000  passengers  travelled  on  the 
Shanghai-Nanking  Railway  and  5,500,000  on  the  Shanghai- 
Hangchow  line,  in  each  case  an  increase  of  about  10  per  cent,  on 
the  preceding  year.  Railway  officials  declare  that  the  systems 
have  practically  reached  the  maximum  development  possible 
with  their  present  rolling  stock. 


NORTHWARD  THROUGH  SHANTUNG  269 


and  to  provide  the  line  with  sufficient  rolling  stock;  but 
from  the  outset  the  railway  has  been  regarded  as  a milch 
cow  by  the  officials,  civil  and  military,  who  have  succes- 
sively controlled  it ; and  to-day  it  stands,  or  rather 
totters,  as  a melancholy  example  of  hopeless  inefficiency. 
As  in  the  case  of  the  Luhan  line,  every  dollar  has 
gone  to  satisfy  the  needs  or  greed  of  the  mandarin. 
Freight  charges  have  been  raised  to  the  scale  of  English 
railways,  the  third-class  passenger  rate  to  two  cents  a 
mile  for  the  most  primitive  kind  of  transportation.  The 
rolling  stock  is  in  a deplorable  condition  and  wholly 
inadequate  to  the  traffic  available.  One  of  the  most 
prominent  officials  at  the  capital,  long  connected  with 
the  Ministry  of  Communications,  admitted  to  me  frankly 
that,  under  proper  management,  the  earning  power  of 
this  railway  might  easily  be  quadrupled — and  the  same 
holds  good  of  other  lines — but,  he  added,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  raise  another  loan  to  put  things  right  ! It 
was  a henchman  of  this  same  official,  a highly  intelli- 
gent representative  of  Young  China  educated  abroad, 
who,  as  Managing  Director  of  the  railway,  became  so 
conspicuous  that  he  was  finally  impeached  and  removed 
from  office,  only  to  become  Manager  of  the  Bank  of 
Communications  at  Shanghai.  He  lately  held  an  in- 
fluential post  in  close  proximity  to  the  President  at 
Peking.  Ex  pedc  Herculem. 

During  the  period  of  acute  disorder  in  the  Central 
Provinces  which  followed  the  Revolution  of  1911,  the 
southern  section  of  the  line — the  section  built  with 
British  capital — was  for  a considerable  time  at  the  mercy 
of  General  Chang  Hsiin,  the  redoubtable  military  chieftain 
of  Shantung  who,  in  1917,  achieved  notoriety  by  his 
attempt  to  restore  the  Manchu  dynasty.  Chang  and  his 
subordinates  organised  and  controlled  the  business  of  the 
railway  for  their  own  convenience  and  profit ; they  did 
a thriving  trade  in  the  free  carriage  of  rice,  ostensibly 
for  the  troops,  but  actually  for  sale.  Chang  appointed 
his  own  Traffic  Manager  and,  though  nominally  a loyal 


270  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


servant  of  the  Government  at  Peking,  treated  the  railway 
as  his  own  preserve.  On  one  occasion,  when  he  had 
commandeered  and  held  in  reserve  twelve  locomotives, 
to  the  complete  dislocation  of  ordinary  traffic,  eleven  of 
them  were  recovered  by  the  lawful  railway  authorities 
in  exchange  for  Chang’s  favourite  wife,  who  had  been 
seized  and  held  as  hostage  by  the  revolutionaries  at 
Nanking.  Yet,  if  report  speaks  truly,  Chang  Hs fin’s 
swashbucklers  never  practised  the  gentle  art  of  “ squeez- 
ing ” the  railway  with  anything  like  the  deliberate 
rapacity  of  the  civil  mandarins  who  succeeded  them. 

At  Tsinanfu,  once  the  advanced  post  of  German 
influence  in  China,  one  finds  to-day  none  of  the  lawless- 
ness and  disorder  which  obtained  in  the  days  of  General 
Chang  Hsfin.  Thanks  to  the  firm  hand  and  clear  head 
of  the  Civil  Governor,  Chfieh  tajen,  the  capital  of  Shantung 
affords  an  excellent  object-lesson  of  the  benefits  of  bene- 
volent autocracy  in  China  and  of  the  progress  to  which 
the  country  might  attain  under  good  government.  The 
results  which  this  youthful  but  determined  official  has 
achieved  in  the  administration  of  local  and  provincial 
affairs — complicated  as  they  are  by  Japan’s  claims  to 
the  reversion  of  Germany’s  special  rights  and  interests — 
reveal  on  a small  scale  China’s  urgent  need  of  a strong 
man  who  shall  put  an  end  to  the  strife  of  predatory 
politicians  and  give  peace  in  his  time.  There  is  nothing 
of  the  fire-eater  about  the  Civil  Governor  of  Shantung. 
Like  his  famous  colleague,  Chang  Tso-lin,  whose  word 
is  law  throughout  Manchuria,  he  impresses  one  at  first 
sight  as  a scholarly  person  of  mild  and  modest  manners. 
But  beneath  the  velvet  glove  there  is  an  iron  hand ; 
his  suave  demeanour  conceals  an  inflexible  will,  great 
brain-power,  and  a shrewd  statecraft  remarkable  in 
a man  of  thirty-seven,  comparatively  inexperienced 
in  public  affairs.  It  is  not  only  in  progressive  local 
administration  and  public  works  that  the  Civil  Governor’s 
hand  has  made  itself  felt  at  Tsinanfu ; he  has  succeeded 
under  circumstances  of  peculiar  difficulty  in  maintaining 


NORTHWARD  THROUGH  SHANTUNG  271 


friendly,  and  at  the  same  time  dignified,  relations,  not 
only  with  the  Japanese  authorities  at  Kiaochao,  but 
with  the  faction  in  power  at  Peking  and  with  his  own 
Provincial  Assembly.  And  he  is  one  of  the  few  high 
officials  who  have  had  the  sense  and  the  courage  to 
rebuke  publicly  the  pernicious  ignorance  and  indiscipline 
of  the  student  movement. 

It  was  at  the  bleak  dawn  of  a January  morning  that 
our  train  brought  us  to  Tsinanfu,  through  the  wintry 
desolation  of  the  northern  loess  lands,  a treeless  vista  of 
monotonous,  dust-coloured  country,  frost-bound  and 
dismal.  It  was  only  just  daylight  as  we  passed  from  the 
clean  and  well-kept  railway  station  to  the  hotel — both 
buildings  are  melancholy  monuments  to  the  glory  that 
once  was  Deutschdum  in  these  parts — but  already  the 
broad  macadamised  roads  of  the  Settlement  were  swarm- 
ing with  Shantung’s  human  beasts  of  burden — coolies 
doggedly  pushing  single-wheeled  barrows,  all  laden  with 
incredible  mountains  of  cargo.  And  from  these  barrows 
there  arose  a lamentable  clamour  of  creaking  wheels, 
shrill  and  incessant  as  the  song  of  gigantic  cicadas,  the 
labour  lied  of  all  North  China.  Threading  its  way 
through  this  ant-like  procession  of  untiring  toilers,  the 
Civil  Governor's  motor-car  (it  is  the  only  one  in  Tsinanfu) 
seemed  an  anachronism — almost  an  impertinence.  In  the 
Governor’s  car  was  one  of  the  Governor’s  Secretaries, 
Mr.  Tsen  Shan-wang,  B.S.,  A.M.,  Ph.D.,  educated  in 
America,  a highly  intelligent  and  amiable  specimen  of 
Young  China,  who,  by  sheer  agility  of  body  and  mind, 
was  apparently  able  to  combine  the  duties  of  Secretary 
in  Charge  of  Public  Works  and  Industries  at  Tsinanfu 
with  those  of  an  expert  geologist  under  the  Ministry  of 
Commerce  and  Agriculture  at  Peking,  besides  being 
technical  adviser  to  one  or  two  Chinese  mining  companies 
elsewhere.  Mr.  Tsen’s  opinions  of  men  and  affairs, 
characteristically  American,  were  based  on  the  fixed 
idea  that  noise  and  bustle  are  symptoms  of  a superior 
civilisation,  that  progress  is  a product  of  machinery,  and 


272  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


that  ballot-boxes  are  the  only  reliable  signposts  to  Utopia. 
In  the  old  rock-garden  of  the  Civil  Governor’s  garden, 
with  its  stone  barge  of  state,  its  fan-shaped  pavilion,  its 
poet’s  comers  and  classical  inscriptions,  this  new-school 
mandarin  gave  one  the  same  feeling  of  incongruity  as 
the  linoleum  on  the  floor  of  His  Excellency’s  library  or 
the  electric  lights  that  wink  at  you  from  venerable 
trees,  where  the  city's  scavenger  kites  have  roosted  for 
centuries. 

The  Governor’s  second  private  secretary,  Mr.  Hsu,  a 
young  graduate  from  Chekiang,  combined  a limited 
English  vocabulary  and  American  ideas  about  “ progress  ” 
with  an  instinctive  reverence  for  Chinese  scholarship  and 
all  that  it  stands  for.  His  mind  was  therefore  in  a 
parlous  state,  eternally  wandering  in  a wilderness  of 
strange  doctrines,  while  drawn  to  its  own  spiritual  home. 
Something  of  its  tumultuous  state  may  be  gathered  from 
the  fact  that  his  hybrid  clothing  ended  in  a bowler  hat 
at  one  end  and  carpet  slippers  at  the  other.  For  that 
matter,  all  over  the  East  to-day,  the  mark  of  the  West 
displays  itself  in  this  sort  of  hideous  incongruity.  The 
Governor’s  reception-room  was  typical  of  a state  of  mind 
that  produces  neither  flesh,  fish,  fowl,  nor  good  red 
herring : an  American  stove,  backed  by  Soochow  cur- 
tains, leopard-skin  rugs  on  a linoleum-covered  floor, 
Chinese  book-boxes  and  ancient  scrolls,  cheek  by  jowl 
with  a cheap  tapestry  sofa  and  a bedroom  dressing-table 
that  did  duty  as  a curio  stand. 

There  were  many  other  sights  and  sounds  beside  the 
Governor's  car  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  railway 
station  significant  of  the  impact  of  the  West  upon  the 
East.  Rickshas  of  fearful  and  wonderful  construction, 
a local  species  provided  with  huge  horns  and  lamps, 
have  superseded  the  old  cumbrous  cart  as  the  vehicle 
of  the  upper  and  middle  classes.  Most  of  their  owners 
and  patrons — a stout  and  sturdy  lot  of  citizens — wrere 
wearing,  over  their  silk  robes,  fur-collared  European  over- 
coats of  the  nondescript  kind  that  now  confronts  one  all 


NORTHWARD  THROUGH  SHANTUNG  273 


over  the  East ; unseemly  garments  which  have  reduced 
the  outer  man  in  China,  Manchuria,  and  Japan  to  a 
common  level  of  dull  hideousness.  In  addition  to  the 
usual  crowd  of  passengers,  the  train  had  brought  a large 
batch  of  coolies  repatriated  from  France;  wiry  fellows 
these,  easily  distinguishable  from  the  unsophisticated 
native  by  a certain  alertness  in  their  gait  and  a general 
air  of  self-reliance,  yet  civil-spoken  and  displaying  none 
of  that  turbulence  which  one  had  been  led  to  expect. 
And  everywhere  in  the  thronged  streets,  amidst  the 
goodly  trees  and  solid  buildings  that  remind  us  of  Teutons 
departed,  were  the  sons  of  Dai  Nippon,  civilian  agents 
and  harbingers  of  “ peaceful  penetration,”  more  easily 
to  be  recognised  here  by  their  short  stature  than  farther 
south.  They  held  themselves  discreetly,  yet  with  dignity, 
as  if  conscious  alike  of  their  isolation  and  of  the  greatness 
of  the  Island  Empire  behind  them.  And  as  a reminder 
of  that  greatness,  to  gladden  their  hearts,  there  were 
brisk-stepping  companies  of  Japanese  soldiers,  detach- 
ments of  the  troops  whose  vanguard  duty  it  is  to 
“ protect  ” a Chinese  railway  on  Chinese  soil. 

Driving  to  the  Civil  Governor’s  yamen  through  the 
native  city,  one  realises,  as  in  many  other  cities  of 
Cathay,  how  wide  is  the  gulf  that  lies  between  the  exotic 
modernism  of  Young  China — as  displayed  in  the  area  of 
the  Railway  Settlement — and  the  immutable  conditions 
imposed  upon  the  masses  of  the  population  by  their 
economic  necessities  and  deep-rooted  conservatism. 
Nowhere  is  this  contrast  more  conspicuous  than  at 
Shanghai,  where,  in  spite  of  the  Foreign  Settlement’s 
splendid  object-lesson  in  efficient  self-government,  the 
native  city  remains  practically  as  it  was  in  the  days  of 
the  Taiping  rebellion — neglected,  insanitary,  unkempt ; 
to  the  traveller’s  eye  unpleasant  and  to  his  nose  an 
offence.  At  Canton,  Soochow,  Wuchang,  and  other 
provincial  capitals  it  is  much  the  same.  Wherever  native 
officialdom  has  demonstrated  its  capacity  to  develop 
municipal  administration  on  modern  lines,  the  experiment 
T 


274  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


always  has  the  appearance  of  elaborate  window-dressing, 
because  of  the  medieval  squalor  all  around  and  about 
it.  Here  at  Tsinanfu  there  are  many  schemes  for  widen- 
ing and  metalling  the  narrow  streets,  for  public  lighting 
and  sanitation,  and  given  twenty  years  of  an  energetic 
Governor  like  Chiieh  tajen,  no  doubt  something  might 
be  done;  but  generally  speaking,  it  will  need  an  earth- 
quake or  a conflagration  like  the  Fire  of  London  to 
prepare  the  ground  for  effective  modernisation  of  the 
great  cities  of  China. 

At  dinner  with  the  Governor  at  his  yamen,  after  a 
day  spent  in  visiting  the  city  and  inspecting  the  corps 
d’ elite  of  General  Ma  Liang  (of  which  more  anon),  there 
was  talk  of  many  things  : of  the  Japanese,  their  flagrant 
trade  in  opium,  and  their  claims  to  “ special  rights  and 
interests  ” in  Shantung ; of  the  strife  of  party  factions 
at  Peking,  and  the  need  for  national  unity;  of  the 
student  movement,  and  His  Excellency’s  recent  homily 
to  its  leaders ; of  missionaries  and  Bolsheviks,  of  Manchus 
and  of  Mings.  His  Excellency  held  strong  views  on 
the  necessity  of  curbing  the  arbitrary  power  of  the  pro- 
vincial Tuchuns  and  centralising  effective  government  at 
Peking;  pending  that  happy  consummation,  however, 
he  was  satisfied  to  maintain  law  and  order  in  Shantung 
and  to  sit  tight.  He  saw  no  immediate  prospect  of 
reconciliation  and  unity  between  the  northern  and 
southern  factions,  and  deplored  the  ascendancy  of 
Japanese  influence  at  the  capital,  but  hoped  that 
England  and  the  United  States  might  intervene  to 
relieve  the  situation. 

The  only  other  guests  were  two  of  His  Excellency’s 
secretaries — one  my  friend  Mr.  Hsu,  the  young  man  from 
Chekiang,  and  the  other  a middle-aged  scholar  of  the 
orthodox  school,  in  native  dress.  Mr.  Hsu,  while  studi- 
ously deferential  to  his  chief,  took  an  active  part  in  the 
conversation,  but  the  literary  secretary’s  utterances  were 
limited  to  those  whereby,  according  to  polite  usage  in 
China,  the  thankful  guest  signifies  his  appreciation  of  a 


NORTHWARD  THROUGH  SHANTUNG  275 


hearty  meal.  Only  once  did  he  interpolate  a remark, 
and  that  was  to  express  his  admiration  for  the  military 
genius  of  General  Ma  Liang. 

The  worthy  General  is  something  more  than  a local 
celebrity.  His  wide  reputation  is  based  on  the  fact  that, 
in  a crumbling  world  of  chance  and  change,  he  has  held 
fast  in  his  profession  to  the  venerable  traditions  of  the 
mighty  past,  and,  to  use  an  expressive  Americanism,  has 
“ got  away  with  it.”  His  ideas  on  the  subject  of  military 
training  and  the  art  of  war  are  those  of  China’s  ancient 
sages,  of  the  scholar  strategists  of  antiquity  (very  similar 
to  those  solemnly  propounded  by  the  Viceroy  Chang 
Chih-tung  at  the  time  of  the  Japanese  War),  and  he  has 
applied  them  with  laborious  minuteness  to  the  training 
of  his  local  army  of  20,000  men.  What  is  more,  he  has 
written  an  elaborate  treatise  on  the  subject  in  seven 
volumes,  of  which  he  gave  me  a copy — a learned  work, 
much  praised  by  the  literati.  He  is  a firm  believer  in 
physical,  not  to  say  acrobatic,  training,  as  the  founda- 
tion of  military  efficiency.  Of  the  prowess  of  the  sturdy 
Shantung  men  of  his  command  he  is  inordinately  proud, 
and  an  exhibition  of  their  skill  forms  part  of  every 
official  entertainment  at  Tsinanfu.  The  performance  is 
well  worth  seeing,  for  it  includes  physical  drill,  jiu-jitsu, 
wrestling  matches,  fencing  with  pikes,  javelins,  and  staves, 
weight-lifting,  acrobatic  turns,  and  many  other  feats  very 
deftly  performed  by  men  in  the  pink  of  condition;  but 
of  the  things  pertaining  to  modem  warfare,  not  a sign. 
“ If  every  province  had  an  army  like  mine,”  said  the 
General,  after  the  concluding  tour  de  force  (in  which  a 
brick  placed  on  a man’s  head  was  smashed  with  a sledge- 
hammer), “ China  could  defy  the  world.”  Tentatively  I 
ventured  to  speak  of  modern  artillery  (which,  I observed, 
might  slay  even  the  finest  athletes  at  twenty  miles' 
range),  of  aeroplanes  and  poison  gas.  The  General 
expressed  his  frank  contempt  for  artillery.  “ How  can  they 
see  to  fire  by  night  ? ” he  asked.  “ In  the  dark,  these 
fellows  of  mine  would  creep  upon  them  and  capture  them 


276  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


all.”  As  we  drove  back  from  the  review  to  the  Civil 
Governor’s  yamen,  my  host  observed,  “ The  General  is 
a very  conservative  man;  all  the  students  hate  him.” 
And  I wondered  whether,  in  his  heart,  the  Governor’s 
sympathies  were  with  the  scholar-strategist  or  with  the 
students. 

On  the  journey  from  Tsinanfu  by  rail  to  Peking,  via 
Tientsin,  I (who  had  not  been  in  these  parts  since  1910) 
could  discern  but  little  outward  evidence  of  the  stupen- 
dous changes  of  which  one  hears  so  much  in  the  English 
and  American  Press.  All  along  the  railway,  and  espe- 
cially on  the  line  between  Tientsin  and  Peking,  it  seemed 
to  me  that  the  allowance  of  railway  officials,  military 
police,  and  casual  loafers  was  even  more  generous  than 
in  the  past.  The  various  classes  of  passengers  were  much 
the  same.  Amongst  the  foreigners,  more  Japanese,  per- 
haps, and  fewer  Germans;  amongst  the  natives  of  the 
wealthier  sort,  a wider  distribution  of  the  hideous  hybrid 
garments  which  are  the  outward  and  visible  signs  of 
" Western  learning  ” ; but  the  bulk  of  the  traffic,  as  of 
old,  consisted  of  officials — conspicuous  by  their  multi- 
tudinous baggage — sober,  solid  citizens,  of  the  small- 
trader  class,  and  crowds  of  coolies  and  peasants,  in  blue- 
grey,  cotton-padded  garments,  close-huddling  like  cattle 
in  the  biting  north  wind.  In  the  reserved  coupes  of  the 
first-class  corridor  carriage,  one  perceived,  as  of  old,  the 
intangible,  impassable  barrier  between  East  and  West 
which  no  League  of  Nations  can  ever  overcome;  one 
realised,  as  of  old,  how  artificial  is  the  atmosphere  of 
their  demonstrative  social  relations.  One  felt  also,  with 
a recurrence  of  discomfort  and  distaste,  the  old  vague 
sense  of  something  furtive — a suspicion  of  undignified 
intrigues — in  certain  strange  foregatherings  of  one’s  fellow- 
passengers,  in  whispered  conferences  of  foreign  Conces- 
sionaires and  Chinese  officials,  and  in  the  latter’s  inability 
or  reluctance  to  distinguish  between  a Chevalier  de  la 
Legion  d’honneur  and  a Chevalier  d’ Industrie. 

One  fellow-traveller  I met  on  this  journey  of  a type 


NORTHWARD  THROUGH  SHANTUNG  277 


new  to  me,  a type  that  has  emerged  from  the  throes  of 
the  Revolution  of  1911,  to  wit,  a Chinese  Member  of 
Parliament.  He  was  a native  of  Honan,  and  supporter 
of  the  Anfu  faction,  a big,  burly  specimen  of  the  gentry 
class,  thick  of  neck  and  loud  of  voice,  but  a shrewd 
fellow  and  affable  withal.  Seeing  that  he  had  no  seat, 
I invited  him  to  share  my  coupe,  which  he  did  with 
alacrity.  For  an  hour  or  more  he  talked  freely  of  men 
and  affairs  at  the  capital,  and  from  his  conversation  I 
learned  many  things  of  the  art  of  government,  as  prac- 
tised by  Tuan  Chi-jui  and  his  friends.  Of  the  outside 
world  and  of  the  meaning  of  representative  government, 
he  had  no  clearer  idea  than  had  his  forefathers  of  the 
Han  dynasty,  and  his  description  of  the  position  and 
duties  of  a Member  of  Parliament  was  such  as  to  make 
one  sympathise  with  Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s  Cromwellian  method 
of  dealing  with  that  amorphous  assembly.  After  a while, 
wearying  of  academic  talk,  he  put  his  feet  up,  covered 
himself  with  a plush  rug,  and  promptly  went  to  sleep; 
and  as  he  slept,  he  snored,  and  his  snoring  was  even  as 
the  bull  of  Bashan,  an  incredible  uproar  of  snorts  and 
gasps  and  grunts,  which  speedily  compelled  me  to  leave 
him  in  undisturbed  possession  of  the  coupe  for  the  rest 
of  the  journey.  At  the  Chien  Men  terminus  we  wished 
each  other  a cordial  farewell,  with  expressions  of  mutual 
esteem. 

Say  what  you  will,  East  is  East. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

PEKING  IN  I92O 

At  the  railway  terminus,  where  the  Tientsin  evening 
express  comes  to  rest  in  the  shadow  of  the  grim  old  wall 
by  the  Chien  Men,  and  you  feel  your  way  out,  as  of  old, 
by  the  narrow  path  that  leads  through  the  water-gate 
to  the  Wagons-lits  Hotel,  the  times  and  tides  of  revolution 
have  wrought  but  little  visible  change  in  the  familiar 
scene.  Indeed,  one’s  first  feeling  here,  as  in  other  Chinese 
cities  (as  distinct  from  the  Treaty  Ports),  is  a grateful 
and  comfortable  sense  of  the  sound  and  sane  stability 
of  this  people  and  a renewed  appreciation  of  its  abiding 
virtue  in  a world  of  change.  And  this  feeling  grows  upon 
you  the  longer  you  stay  in  Peking,  in  spite  of  all  the 
surface  indications  of  modernism  and  undercurrents  of 
unrest.  Many  things  have  happened,  it  is  true,  in  the 
years  that  have  gone  since  last  we  passed  out  by  this 
same  water-gate.  The  Dragon  Throne  no  longer  “ sways 
the  wide  world  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  has  been  gathered  to 
his  fathers  and  a strange  new  flag  floats  over  the  Presi- 
dential Mansion  in  the  Forbidden  City.  In  the  brand- 
new  highways  that  lead  to  the  modern-style  Government 
offices,  and  in  the  Legation  quarter,  you  will  see  dignitaries 
of  State  in  motor-cars,  wearing  hideous  shapeless 
foreign  overcoats,  who  in  bygone  days  used  to  ride  in 
green  palanquins  with  eight  bearers.  And  in  the  even- 
ing, at  a Waichiaopu  dance,  you  may  meet  these  same 
worthies,  wearing  dress  clothes,  all  covered  with  stars 
and  ribbons,  and  looking  as  if  they  had  sold  their  birth- 
right of  Oriental  dignity  for  a mess  of  alien  pottage. 
You  may  even  see  some  of  their  wives,  in  fearful  and 

278 


PEKING  IN  1920 


279 


wonderful  garments,  apeing  the  manners  and  customs  of 
the  barbarian,  and  you  may  hear  much  windy  talk  of  the 
awakening  of  China  and  the  dawn  of  the  New  Era.  You 
may  hire  a motor-car  which  will  drive  you,  over  a well- 
metalled  road,  even  unto  the  western  hills;  and  they 
will  show  you  aeroplanes  and  wireless  telephones,  and 
many  other  stalled  white  elephants  of  recent  importa- 
tion, to  prove  that  the  Republic  is  keeping  up  to  date 
and  that  the  old  business  of  Government  contracts  is  as 
lucrative  as  ever.  And  you  may  see  an  imposing  Marconi 
mast,  rising  from  the  grounds  of  the  Japanese  Legation 
(a  new  landmark  which  tells  its  own  tale,  for  him  that 
hath  ears  to  hear),  and  many  other  signs  and  portents 
of  change,  political  and  administrative. 

And  yet,  despite  all  these  things,  the  impression  which 
grows  upon  one  and  persists  is  that  of  the  deep-rooted 
immutability  of  this  wise  old  centre  of  the  Chinese 
system.  What,  after  all,  are  these  straws  on  the  shifting 
winds  of  change,  compared  with  the  abiding  testimony 
which  confronts  you  here  on  every  side,  in  the  monu- 
ments of  the  past  and  in  the  minds  of  men  ? Look 
down,  over  the  Legation  quarter,  beyond  the  yellow  roofs 
of  the  Imperial  City,  to  the  distant  gates  and  guard- 
houses that  mark  the  circumference  of  the  city  walls  : 
except  in  the  near  foreground,  where  new  buildings  have 
replaced  the  devastations  of  the  Boxers,  all  the  old  feng- 
shui,  the  haunts  of  countless  tutelary  gods,  are  undis- 
turbed. And  even  in  the  Legation  quarter,  with  all  its 
display  of  defensive  battlements  and  glacis,  there  are 
many  familiar  sights  and  sounds  to  recall  the  days  of 
Parkes  and  Wade,  when  the  glamour  of  mystery  and  the 
tradition  of  vast  power  still  lingered  about  the  Dragon 
Throne  and  made  it  something  of  an  adventure  for  a white 
man  to  live  in  the  shadow  of  the  Forbidden  City.  In 
the  spacious  grounds  and  beautiful  old  buildings  of  the 
British  and  French  Legations,  in  the  garden  of  the 
great  “ I.G.,”  in  the  general  features  of  Legation  Street, 
aye,  even  in  the  aspect  of  the  deserted  German  “ Fu,” 


280  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


the  passing  years  have  left  but  little  trace.  At  the 
British  Legation  the  ting-chai,  who  takes  your  card  with 
a broad  smile  of  welcome,  is  the  same  man  who  took  it, 
at  the  same  door,  thirty  years  ago.  The  old  kan-men-ti 
at  the  Customs  Inspectorate  was  guardian  of  this  same 
gateway  when  to-day’s  Commissioners  were  students. 
The  placid-faced  old  Shantung  man,  with  his  heavy 
bundle  of  silks  and  embroideries,  is  the  same  who  sat 
patiently  at  your  doorstep  a generation  ago.  His  goods, 
alas,  are  not  what  they  used  to  be  in  pre-Boxer  days, 
and  before  the  silk-dyers  learned  the  insidious  uses  of 
German  anilines,  but  age  has  not  withered  nor  custom 
staled  this  kindly  soul’s  philosophy.  As  you  wander 
through  the  narrower  streets  of  the  Tartar  City  and 
listen  to  the  street  vendors’  clamour  of  bells,  gongs,  and 
cymbals,  and  their  long-drawn  melodious  cries,  rising, 
far  and  near,  like  an  incense  of  homely  lives;  as  you 
watch  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  humble  workers  doing 
the  same  thing,  in  the  same  place  and  the  same  way, 
that  their  forefathers  did,  you  realise  how  meaningless, 
how  far  from  the  real  life  of  this  ancient  people,  are  the 
things  of  which  the  politicians  speak,  how  strong  the 
ties  that  bind  it  to  the  past.  You  get  an  inkling  of  its 
quiet  tenacity  of  purpose  from  the  way  in  which  it  has 
steadily  ignored  the  modernists’  attempt  to  abolish  the 
Chinese  New  Year  festival  and  to  adopt  the  Western 
calendar.  Most  of  the  poorer  classes  of  Peking’s  inhabi- 
tants have  " eaten  bitterness  ” more  than  once  since 
1900 ; their  houses  have  been  plundered,  and  their  queues 
cut  off,  in  the  name  of  new  and  strange  gods;  but 
neither  revolutions  nor  Presidential  Mandates  can  ever 
make  them  follow  after  these  gods,  or  lead  them  to  doubt 
the  wisdom  of  their  own  ancestral  ways. 

Higher  up  the  scale  also,  amongst  the  literati  and  the 
new-style  mandarins  of  the  Parliament,  if  you  look 
beneath  the  transparent  surface  of  make-believe  Re- 
publicanism, you  find  continual  evidence  of  the  same 
“ unbroken  continuity  of  ancient  traditions  ” in  the 


PEKING  IN  1920 


281 


grim  struggle  for  place  and  pelf  and  patronage  that  goes 
on  eternally  about  and  around  the  seat  of  government. 
The  outward  and  visible  forms  of  authority  are  changed, 
but  the  character  of  the  men  who  wield  it  and  many  of 
the  men  themselves  remain  the  same  as  in  the  days  of 
the  great  Tzu  Hsi.  Plus  f a change,  plus  c’est  la  memo 
chose,  or,  to  put  it  in  the  words  of  an  English  philosopher, 
“ from  the  upheaval  of  a revolution  the  old  shibboleths 
emerge,  with  new  men  to  utter  them.”  The  Dragon 
Throne  has  disappeared  in  the  turmoil,  even  as  dynasties 
have  gone  down  in  the  past,  but  all  the  essential  features 
of  the  inveterate  struggle  are  even  as  the  laws  of  the 
Medes  and  Persians.  The  names  and  war-cries  of  the 
partisans  are  altered,  but  their  methods  remain  the  same 
as  they  were  in  the  days  of  the  Hans  and  the  Mings. 
The  uncertainty  and  unrest  which  have  disturbed  the 
seats  of  the  mighty  ever  since  Young  China  grasped  its 
chance  at  the  time  of  the  Manchu  debacle,  the  atmosphere 
of  treasons,  stratagems,  and  spoils  that  has  since  pervaded 
the  headquarters  of  government  at  Peking  and  in  the 
provinces,  all  these  are  nothing  new  in  the  history  of 
China;  they  are  merely  symptomatic  of  the  periodical 
paroxysms  which  occur  whenever  the  strong  hand  of 
authority  is  relaxed,  for  lack  of  the  right  kind  of  ruler. 
To-day,  because  the  people  are  as  sheep  without  a shep- 
herd, the  struggle  for  supremacy  between  ambitious 
chieftains  and  their  rival  factions  goes  on,  just  as  it 
did  in  the  days  of  the  Three  Kingdoms ; but  its  leaders 
have  acquired  a new  sort  of  “ world  sense  ” and  a very 
shrewd  idea  of  the  value  of  modern  catchwords,  which 
have  provided  new  and  effective  war-cries  for  their 
essentially  sordid  strife.  For  the  benefit  of  the  gallery 
overseas,  they  shout  lustily  about  Constitutions,  Parlia- 
ments, and  militarism.  But  whether  the  leading  figures 
be  Sun  Yat-sen  and  Tang  Shao-yi,  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  and 
Liang  Shih-yi,  Chang  Hsiin  and  the  old  brigade,  Tuan 
Chi-jui  and  the  Anfu  Club,  or  Chang  Tso-lin  and  the 
Chihli  faction,  the  causes  and  results  of  the  strife  are 


282  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


ever  the  same,  and  must  remain  so  until,  by  process  of 
exhaustion,  a new  ruler  shall  emerge  strong  enough  and 
wise  enough  to  govern  the  country  as  it  needs  and  asks 
to  be  governed,  that  is  to  say,  by  a benevolent  form  of 
despotism  which  shall  conform  to  the  Confucian  tradi- 
tions, and  by  virtue  of  institutions  adapted  to  the  struc- 
tural character  and  genius  of  the  race.  It  is  surely 
significant  to  note  that  all  the  “ elder  statesmen,"  whose 
names  command  a measure  of  respect  amidst  the  tumult 
of  the  swashbucklers  and  the  word-spinners,  are  men 
whose  sympathies  have  been  unmistakably  identified 
with  the  maintenance  of  the  Confucian  system  and 
the  patriarchal  order  of  government.  The  deep-rooted 
prestige  of  the  orthodox  literati  is  sufficiently  indicated 
by  Hsii  Shih-chang’s  occupancy  of  the  Presidential 
Mansion,  for  this  venerable  ex- Viceroy  is  not  only  an 
avowed  Monarchist,  but,  like  Yuan  Shih-k’ai,  he  believes 
implicitly  in  the  moral  superiority  of  China’s  political 
system  over  that  of  the  West.  Like  the  great  Empress- 
Dowager,  he  cannot  conceive  of  any  sound  statesmanship 
professing  to  ignore  the  “ three  fundamental  bonds  and 
the  five  moral  obligations,”  which  are  the  permanent 
foundations  of  the  Chinese  social  edifice,  “ as  the  sun  and 
moon,  for  ever  enlightening  the  world."  And  this  same 
faith  is  held,  deep  down  in  their  hearts,  by  those  who 
lead  their  factions  to  fight  in  the  name  of  a still-born 
Constitution  or  a lawless  Parliament,  by  the  hungry 
office-seekers  of  the  capital  and  the  satraps  of  the  pro- 
vinces. Even  amongst  the  younger  men  there  are  signs 
of  a reaction  in  favour  of  the  classical  tradition. 

Another  feature  wherein  the  present-day  mandarins 
conform  to  the  old-established  type  is  their  individual 
and  collective  timidity  in  the  face  of  any  public  agitation 
or  partisan  attack.  Nothing  has  emphasised  this  char- 
acteristic of  the  ruling  class  more  forcibly  than  the 
pitiful  collapse  of  the  Government,  when  the  students 
of  the  capital  and  of  Shanghai  raised  their  clamour 
for  the  dismissal  of  Tsao  Ju-lin  and  his  pro-Japanese 


A CAMEL  TRAIN  FROM  THE  WESTERN  HILLS,  PEKING. 


PEKING  IN  1920 


283 


colleagues  in  the  Cabinet.  The  fear  which  overtook  the 
tajen  of  the  Ministries  when  the  students  vented  their 
feelings  by  burning  Tsao's  house  was  obviously  panic, 
due  to  atavistic  causes  that  are  bred  in  the  very  bones 
of  the  East,  the  rich  man’s  fear  for  the  loss  of  his  hoarded 
wealth.  Let  there  fall  but  a shadow  of  sudden  tumult 
or  alarm,  and  the  mandarin’s  first  instinct  is  to  conciliate 
and  to  temporise,  whilst  he  seeks  a place  of  safety  for 
his  family  and  his  portable  possessions.  The  students’ 
strike  and  demonstrations  were  quelled,  and  the  turbulent 
youths  placated,  by  a make-believe  dismissal  of  the 
offending  Ministers,  with  the  immediate  result  that,  all 
over  the  country,  the  babes  and  sucklings  of  the  Mission 
schools  were  led  to  consider  themselves  as  a power  in  the 
land.  But  before  a serious  crisis  of  political  disturbance, 
such  as  General  Chang  Hsiin’s  brief  restoration  of  the 
Manchu  dynasty  in  July  1917,  or  the  Anfu  Club’s  fight 
for  supremacy  last  August,  when  the  issues  at  stake  are 
likely  to  lead  to  armed  conflict  and  promiscuous  looting, 
the  ruling  passion  of  the  mandarin  expresses  itself,  rapidly 
and  by  common  consent,  in  movement  of  heavy-laden 
carts  from  all  parts  of  the  city  to  the  shelter  of  the  Lega- 
tion quarter.  How  many  times,  I wonder,  have  Na 
Tung's  gold  bars  and  Hu  Wei-te’s  curios  found  refuge  in 
the  sanctuary  which  the  Boxer  colleagues  of  these  worthies 
did  their  best  to  destroy  in  1900?  At  such  times  of 
tumult,  the  foreign  Banks  and  the  Wagons-lits  Hotel 
became  literally  safety- vaults  for  the  officials’  wealth. 
It  is  a strange  commentary  on  the  chaotic  condition  of 
China  under  the  Republic,  that  the  very  same  officials 
who  profess  to  share  Young  China’s  enthusiasm  for  the 
recovery  of  “ sovereign  rights  ” and  the  abolition  of 
extra-territoriality  are  the  first  to  fly  for  safety  to  the 
protection  of  the  Legation  guards.  As  a place  of  residence 
for  Chinese  millionaires  en  retraite,  Peking,  in  spite  of 
these  guards  and  of  its  social  and  lucrative  opportunities, 
is  not  as  fashionable  as  Shanghai  or  Tientsin;  and  it  is 
safe  to  say  that  if  it  were  not  for  the  sanctuary  available 


284  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


in  the  Legation  quarter,  a good  many  of  those  who  now 
labour  for  (or  against)  the  State  would  not  face  the  risks 
of  official  life  at  the  capital. 

As  regards  the  political  activities  of  the  student  class, 
I found  amongst  foreigners  in  close  touch  with  them 
(notably  the  American  Y.M.C.A.)  a general  tendency  to 
regard  the  movement  as  genuinely  spontaneous  and 
proof  of  the  increasing  national  consciousness  and  patriot- 
ism of  the  rising  generation  as  a whole  and  of  the  " Western 
learning  " contingent  in  particular.  One  earnest  Y.M.C.A. 
worker,  with  whom  I witnessed  and  discussed  the  great 
procession  of  boy  and  girl  politicians  last  January  at 
Peking,  to  protest  against  the  proceedings  of  Japan  in 
Shantung,  was  of  opinion  that  the  final  result  of  these 
demonstrations  would  be  good,  inasmuch  as  they  would 
tend  to  increase  the  officials’  and  parliamentarians'  sense 
of  direct  responsibility  to  the  people.  There  were 
several  thousands  of  youths  and  girls  in  this  procession, 
carrying  cloth  bannerets,  distributing  handbills,  and 
shouting  their  war-cries  in  unison  to  the  word  of  com- 
mand of  their  leaders.  It  was  a very  docile  and  decorous 
crowd,  even  though  one  of  its  war-cries  called  for  the 
blood  of  Yang  I-te,  the  Chief  of  Police  at  Tientsin;  and 
the  girls  seemed  to  display  a more  lively  enthusiasm  than 
the  boys.  With  a sincere  desire  to  be  persuaded,  I could 
find  nothing  in  this  pathetic  demonstration  to  differentiate 
it  from  many  other  manifestations  of  Young  China's 
fitful  fever  : the  undisciplined,  emotional  quality  which 
is  so  characteristic  of  the  Western-educated  youth  of 
the  Orient  has  always  sought  and  found  expression  in 
these  solemn  processions  and  long-winded  protests.  It 
was  true  ten  years  ago,  and  it  remains  true  to-day,  that, 
given  the  stimulus  of  the  sense  of  movement  en  masse, 
with  waving  of  flags  and  beating  of  drums,  the  moral 
support  of  foreign  teachers  and  sympathisers,  and  the 
applause  of  the  native  Press,  the  Chinese  student  class  is 
capable  of  developing  a swift-spreading  contagion  of 
semi-hysterical  excitement  and  violent  activity.  But 


PEKING  IN  1920 


285 


never  in  all  these  years  has  any  movement  of  this  kind 
revealed  the  existence  of  deep-rooted  political  convictions 
or  any  serious  purpose  of  constructive  effort.  The  student 
agitation  of  last  year,  on  the  subject  of  the  Japanese 
question  in  Shantung,  merely  served  to  frighten  the 
mandarins  at  Peking,  without  in  any  way  advancing 
China’s  position  in  regard  to  that  question ; and  it  failed, 
as  usual,  to  denounce  the  official  corruption,  which 
obviously  constitutes  the  chief  obstacle  to  the  satis- 
factory solution  of  this,  or  any  other,  national  problem. 
It  is  all  a shadow-play  of  words  against  a background 
of  delusive  dreams,  and  for  the  persistence  of  these 
dreams  the  West  is  chiefly  responsible. 

Later  on,  in  Tientsin,  a new  and  sordid  complexion  was 
cast  upon  certain  of  the  activities  of  the  student  agitators, 
or  at  all  events  of  the  organisers  of  these  demonstrations 
in  the  north.  Documentary  evidence  was  secured  by 
the  police  which  showed  that  the  movement  had  been 
organised  and  financed  by  the  political  opponents  of  Tuan 
Chi-jui  and  the  Anfu  Club.  The  Chief  of  Police  informed 
me  that,  according  to  the  evidence  in  his  possession,  a 
sum  of  $200,000  had  been  subscribed  out  of  the  funds 
of  the  late  Vice-President  (Feng  Kuo-chang)  for  the 
purpose  of  stirring  up  agitation  against  the  Government, 
and  the  North  China  Daily  Mail  declared  that  even 
foreigners  had  received  payment  from  this  fund  to  assist 
in  these  “ spontaneous  ” manifestations  of  political 
consciousness  ! 

In  its  main  thoroughfares  of  trade  and  traffic  Peking 
presents  an  appearance  of  animation  and  prosperity, 
combined  with  a very  marked  improvement  in  civic 
administration.  Considering  the  general  state  of  unrest 
that  has  prevailed  since  the  Revolution,  and  all  the 
alarms  and  excursions  that  the  capital  has  experienced ; 
remembering  the  condition  of  listless  destitution  in  which 
its  citizens  lived  and  moved  in  the  years  following  the 
havoc  of  the  Boxers,  one  is  agreeably  surprised  at  the 


286  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


city’s  air  of  cheerful  well-being,  at  the  excellence  of  its 
roads,  the  smart  appearance  of  the  police,  the  liveliness 
of  trade  in  its  marts  and  markets,  and  the  generally 
comfortable  appearance  of  the  man  in  the  street.  Indeed, 
in  the  main  artery  of  traffic,  that  runs  from  the  railway 
terminus  at  the  Chien  M6n  to  the  heart  of  the  city,  it  is 
only  the  broad  outlines  that  remind  one  of  the  Peking 
of  pre-Boxer  days.  The  old-time  scavengers  are  gone — 
the  gaunt  pigs,  famished  dogs,  and  human  gatherers  of 
offal  that  used  to  scour  the  noisome  streets  and  garbage 
heaps  of  old;  gone  are  the  human  scarecrows  that  used 
to  lay  the  dust  with  the  overflow  of  the  sewers ; and  gone, 
or  almost  gone,  the  sorrowful  army  of  maimed  and  leprous 
beggars  that  cried  for  alms  in  the  gates  of  the  city  and 
on  the  outskirts  of  the  temples.  The  old,  springless  cart, 
with  its  powerful  Szechuan  mule  and  the  high,  narrow 
wheels  that  cut  the  roads  to  ribbons,  is  vanishing  fast, 
ousted  by  the  automobiles  of  the  great  and  by  jinrickshas 
of  innumerable  types.  I do  not  mean  to  suggest  that, 
in  the  matter  of  smells  and  squalor,  Peking  is  not  still 
a very  medieval  spot,  but  there  have  been  some  very 
energetic  new  brooms  at  work  in  the  past  ten  years, 
and  some  very  effective  spring-cleaning  has  been  done. 
The  improvements  that  have  been  made  in  the  matter 
of  roads  alone  prove  that,  given  sufficient  incentive  and 
money,  the  Chinese  are  quite  capable  of  collective  effort 
and  successful  organisation  in  the  public  service.  At 
Tsinanfu  and  Tainanfu  you  may  see  the  same  lesson  writ 
large  across  two  very  ancient  cities;  in  these  matters, 
China’s  trouble  lies  not  in  discovering  new  sources  of 
useful  energy,  but  only  in  maintaining  their  output. 
Thus,  for  example,  the  Peking  police  have  been  w'ell 
disciplined  and  kept  up  to  the  mark,  by  common  consent 
of  a very  nervous  bureaucracy,  ever  since  Yuan  Shih-k’ai’s 
troops  looted  the  houses  of  the  parliamentary  delegates 
in  February  1912,  and  the  machinery  for  checking  crimes 
against  property  is  at  present  a great  deal  swifter  and 
more  drastic  than  in  the  old  days  of  the  Board  of  Punish- 


PEKING  IN  1920 


287 


ments.  The  police  have  a Chief  whose  methods  for 
discouraging  lawlessness  and  looting  are  quiet  but  very 
effective.  On  the  29th  of  January,  1920,  for  instance, 
it  came  to  my  knowledge  accidentally  that  eleven  men 
had  been  shot  that  morning,  without  other  formality 
than  orders  from  headquarters,  having  been  taken  red- 
handed  in  some  bandit  or  burglary  business. 

But  good  roads  and  a “ loyal  ” police  force  mean 
public  funds,  and  prosperous  shopkeepers  mean  buyers 
with  money  in  their  purses,  and  one  wonders  at  first  sight 
from  whence  has  come  all  this  money  to  the  capital,  in 
these  days  of  truculent  provincial  Tuchuns,  who  decline 
to  render  unto  Caesar  that  which  used  to  be  his.  But 
the  explanation  is  simple  enough.  The  money  which  has 
given  to  Peking  this  unexpected  air  of  well-being  and 
vivacity  has  been  raised  chiefly  by  politicians  for  politi- 
cians, and  much  of  it  is  lavishly  spent  by  the  parliamentary 
supporters  of  the  faction  which  happens  to  be  in  control 
of  the  Boards  of  Revenue  and  Communication — the  two 
milch  cows  of  national  finance.  The  five  years  of  the 
Great  War  were  very  fat  years  for  China,  years  in  which 
the  value  of  her  silver  currency  was  trebled  and  her 
indemnity  payments  remitted,  whilst  ,the  balance  of 
profitable  trade  brought  a vast  amount  of  money  into 
the  country.  The  Government’s  immediate  liabilities 
were  greatly  reduced  and  its  revenues  increased.  These 
were  years,  in  fact,  when,  had  there  been  anything  of 
genuine  patriotism  or  statesmanship  in  Cabinet  or  Parlia- 
ment, China  might  well  have  put  her  financial  house  in 
order.  But  not  all  the  treasures  of  Golconda  could  have 
satisfied  the  rapacity  of  the  military  freebooters  and 
carpet-bag  politicians  who  gathered  in  their  thousands  to 
batten  on  the  public  purse.  The  Customs  and  salt  sur- 
pluses, railway  revenues  and  other  sources  of  normal 
income  were  merely  appetisers  to  this  hungry  horde. 
From  Japan,  in  return  for  promissory  notes  and  conces- 
sions (that  are  likely  to  cost  the  nation  dear)  came  a 
steady  stream  of  loans  and  subsidies  which  went,  for  the 


288  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


most  part,  to  fatten  the  henchmen  of  the  Anfu  Club,  who 
formed  the  majority  of  Parliament,  and  all  the  locust 
swarm  of  the  fast-swelling  bureaucracy.  These  were  days 
of  easy  money,  when,  amidst  the  clash  of  factions,  the 
price  of  a vote  in  the  House  of  Representatives  soared 
from  the  hundreds  to  the  thousands  (as  when  Tsao 
Kun  was  an  aspirant  for  the  Vice- Presidency),  and,  if 
report  speaks  truly,  a great  deal  of  this  money  has  been 
spent  in  the  fashionable  shops  and  tea-houses  of  the 
Chien  Men  quarter,  to  the  enriching  of  thrifty  citizens. 
Even  so  the  whirligig  of  Time  brings  in  his  revenges,  and 
the  locusts  give  back  the  years  that  the  locust  has  eaten. 

In  these  days,  when  Young  China  and  many  of  its 
well-meaning  friends  talk  volubly  of  “ sovereign  rights,” 
it  is  worth  remembering  that  very  few  cities  in  the  land 
have  escaped  outbreaks  of  lawlessness  and  looting  since 
the  Revolution,  except  those  in  which  the  foreigner  and 
his  vested  interests  are  protected  by  the  display  of  force. 
Had  it  not  been  for  the  presence  of  the  Legations  and  the 
forces  at  their  command,  Peking  would  hardly  have 
escaped  rough  treatment  at  the  hands  of  the  rabble  armies 
of  the  contending  factions  in  one  or  other  of  the  several 
crises  that  have  occurred  since  1912.  And  even  with  the 
protection  which  the  city  derives  from  the  prestige  and 
potential  power  of  the  Legations,  the  presence  of  these 
hordes  of  undisciplined  troops,  whose  pay  is  always  in 
arrears,  is  a constant  cause  of  unrest,  which  readily  takes 
the  form  of  sudden  panics.  When  rumours  and  alarm 
signals  are  flying,  the  thought  of  these  unruly  masses  of 
marauders,  loosely  held  in  leash,  is  ever  in  the  minds  of 
peace-loving  householders,  and  at  the  first  whisper  of 
armies  on  the  move,  the  trains  for  Tientsin  are  filled  with 
crowds  of  timid  citizens  and  there  is  much  burying  of 
treasure  by  night.  The  amount  of  gold  and  silver  and 
valuables  which  lies  “ cached  ” around  and  about  Peking 
to-day  is  said  by  the  Chinese  themselves  to  be  much  larger 
than  the  secret  hoards  of  pre-Boxer  days. 

Discussing  this  matter  of  hoarding,  a banker  of  wide 


PEKING  IN  1920 


289 


experience  informed  me  that  the  marked  growth  of  this 
tendency  is  directly  traceable  to  the  slim  financial  methods 
of  the  bureaucracy,  and  particularly  to  the  banking  opera- 
tions of  the  Chiaotung  clique.  The  old-fashioned  trust- 
worthy native  banks  in  private  hands  have  been  almost 
completely  frozen  out  by  the  new-style  Government 
Banks,  of  whose  methods  it  need  only  be  said  that  most 
of  their  notes  are  quoted  at  heavy  discounts  (50  per  cent, 
and  over),  and  that  the  average  prudent  citizen  is  not 
disposed  to  entrust  his  sycee  to  their  safe  keeping.  There- 
fore the  hoarding  habit  has  steadily  grown,  and  a vast 
quantity  of  silver  has  thus  been  withdrawn  from  circula- 
tion. During  the  War,  this  helped  to  send  up  the 
market  price  of  silver  (in  January  1920  the  Tientsin 
tael  touched  ten  shillings),  and  this,  in  turn,  seriously 
handicapped  China’s  export  trade. 

As  illustrating  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  Tuchuns’ 
armies,  and  how  the  fear  of  them  is  carried  and  spread 
by  swift-footed  rumour,  a certain  visit  paid  to  Peking  by 
the  Tuchun  of  Jehol  in  January  was  instructive.  A fine 
specimen  of  the  old-style  Chinese  military  commander 
is  Tuchun  Chiang,  of  the  northern  marches,  a veteran 
standing  six  feet  in  his  socks,  who  fought  with  Gordon 
against  the  Taipings,  and  a genial  warrior  withal.  He 
attended  a reception  at  the  British  Legation,  and  brought 
with  him  not  only  the  flavour  of  picturesque  old  days  and 
ways,  which  is  becoming  sadly  rare  under  the  Republic, 
but  also  a suggestion  of  something  premonitory,  a whisper- 
ing wind  of  warning.  His  troops,  he  declared,  had  had 
no  pay  for  seven  months,  and  he  had  come  to  Peking  to 
get  money  for  them  from  the  Ministry  of  War,  or  know 
the  reason  why.  If  it  were  not  forthcoming,  there  was 
“ big  trouble  ” ahead.  When  I spoke  of  this  distinguished 
visitor  to  a Chinese  merchant  who  prides  himself  on 
knowing  a good  deal  about  wheels  within  wheels  in  the 
north,  he  smiled  and  said  it  was  quite  true  that  the  Jehol 
troops  had  not  been  paid  for  a long  time,  and  were  becom- 
ing mutinous,  but  common  report  had  it  that  for  months 
u 


290  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 

past  the  Tuchun  had  been  burying  a large  amount  of 
sycee.  It  is  probably  safe  to  say  that  the  twenty-two 
Tuchuns  between  them  have  squeezed  enough  in  the  last 
five  years  to  balance  the  national  budget  for  the  next  ten, 
and  that,  among  all  these  self-determined  satraps,  only  one 
or  two  (notably  the  Tuchun  of  Shansi)  have  shown  them- 
selves just  and  patriotic  rulers  of  the  “ stupid  people.” 

Another  manifestation  of  the  lawless  activities  of  the 
“ licentious  soldiery  ” is  their  barefaced  trade  in  contra- 
band opium,  conducted  under  the  protection  of  their 
chiefs.  There  are  many  curious  features  about  the  opium 
traffic  in  China  to-day,  from  Canton  to  Kirin,  but  none 
more  curious  than  the  brisk  business  in  the  drug  openly 
conducted  at  the  capital,  not  by  the  opium-shops  (for 
these  were  suppressed  long  ago  to  the  sound  of  moral 
drums  and  virtuous  trumpets),  but  by  officials,  civil  and 
military.  As  I ventured  to  predict  in  1912,  to  the  great 
scandal  of  all  true  believers,  the  “ opium-abolition  ” 
movement  has  put  an  end  to  the  bona  fide  importation  of 
the  Indian  drug  and  checked  the  transit  trade  in  all  its 
former  channels,  merely  to  divert  it  into  new  ways,  more 
directly  profitable  to  the  mandarin.  In  January  of  last 
year  you  could  buy  as  much  native  opium  as  you  wished 
in  Peking  for  $7  an  ounce,  and  Indian  opium  at  $12, 
and  it  was  commonly  reported  in  the  city  that  the  bulk 
of  the  supply  came  from  Moukden,  brought  in  by  the 
soldier  emissaries  of  the  great  Tuchun,  Chang  Tso-lin, 
and  regularly  controlled  from  his  agents’  offices. 

Calling  one  day  at  a curio-shop  in  the  Soochow  hutung 
to  ask  after  the  proprietor,  an  old  friend  of  former  days, 
I learned  that  he  had  died  the  year  before,  and  from  his 
eldest  son  I gathered  that  excessive  opium-smoking,  after 
seven  years  of  abstinence,  was  chiefly  responsible  for  his 
death.  I also  learned  that  the  anti-opium  movement  had 
become  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a dead  letter.  When  I 
inquired  how  the  father  had  been  able  to  procure  the  drug, 
his  son  replied  that  any  one  who  had  the  money  could 
purchase  it  from  the  officials  at  any  time.  It  came  from 


H.  T.  Prideaux ] 

MILLET  (KAO  LIANG)  IN  OCTOBER. 


ON  THE  FROZEN  PEIHO,  TIENTSIN OLD-STYLE  LOCOMOTION  AND  NEW, 


PEKING  IN  1920 


291 


the  north  ( k’ou  wai),  he  said,  brought  over  the  border  by 
Russians  and  Japanese,  most  of  the  drug  being  grown  in 
Manchuria  and  Kansuh.  Later  on,  at  Moukden,  I saw 
something  of  the  machinery  of  this  traffic  in  working — 
a dozen  evil-looking  Russian  women  of  the  Polish- Jew 
type,  breakfasting  at  the  Yamato  Hotel,  on  their  way 
through  from  Harbin  to  Dalny,  opium  and  morphia 
smugglers  all.  And  Japan’s  “ self-determined  ” parcel 
post  is  another  important  factor  in  the  situation. 

Ignoring  the  fact  that  opium  is  grown  in  many  parts  of 
the  country  with  the  obvious  connivance  of  officials,  and 
that  the  trade  is  conducted  at  many  centres  under  official 
auspices,  a section  of  Young  China’s  mandarins  has 
recently  drawn  the  usual  red  herring  across  the  opium 
trail  and  endeavoured  to  make  the  corrupt  traffic  serve 
the  purposes  of  its  campaign  for  the  abolition  of  extra- 
territoriality. In  former  days,  when  its  first  object  was 
to  get  rid  of  the  competition  of  the  Indian  opium  trade, 
Young  China  and  the  foreign  Anti-Opium  Societies  used 
to  declare  that  China  could  and  would  abolish  opium 
completely,  when  once  the  Indian  importation  had  been 
stopped.  Thanks  chiefly  to  the  fervent  propaganda  of 
the  sentimentalists  and  “ uplifters  ” in  England  and 
America,  the  Indian  trade  was  abolished,  and  forthwith 
opium-growing  and  smuggling  became  one  of  the  man- 
darins’ most  lucrative  sources  of  income.  The  fact  is 
notorious  and  undeniable;  at  missionary  meetings  to- 
day it  is  either  passed  over  in  sad  silence  or  treated  as  a 
lamentable  case  of  backsliding.  But  the  section  of  Young 
China  to  which  I refer  sees  nothing  lamentable  in  the 
situation.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  now  urging  the  senti- 
mentalists and  the  uplifters  to  believe  and  to  preach  that 
the  opium  traffic  will  be  finally  abolished  if  once  the 
foreigners’  rights  of  extra-territoriality  are  given  up; 
and  already  there  are  indications  of  a widespread  propa- 
ganda developing  along  these  fines.  At  a banquet  follow- 
ing the  meeting  of  the  Anti-Narcotic  Society  in  Tientsin 
in  January  of  last  year,  Mr.  Huang  (educated  in  America), 


292  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Foreign  Affairs,  made  a typical 
speech,  in  which  he  declared  that  China  could  not  be 
expected  to  deal  properly  with  the  opium  and  morphia 
trades  until  she  had  recovered  her  political  autonomy. 
Thanks  to  the  loose  thinking,  bred  of  facile  catchwords 
which  prevails  in  England  and  America,  the  “ sovereign 
rights  recovery  ” movement  is  now  making  considerable 
progress,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  not  in  the  nature  of  the 
earnest  idealist  to  allow  the  melancholy  experience  of 
yesterday  to  check  his  enthusiasm  for  the  Utopia  of  to- 
morrow. To  any  one  who  knows  anything  about  China, 
the  idea  of  putting  an  end  to  opium  by  abolishing  the 
foreigners’  extra-territorial  rights  is  grimly  humorous, 
but,  unfortunately,  many  of  the  good  people  who  share 
Mr.  President  Wilson’s  illusions  about  the  world  of  men 
have  no  knowledge  of  the  East  and  but  little  sense  of 
humour.  And  Mr.  Huang,  despite  his  dress-clothes,  has 
both. 

There  were  many  new  features  of  interest  in  the  pictur- 
esque pageant  of  life  at  Peking  as  I saw  it  last  year, 
many  lights  and  shadows  suggestive  of  coming  events, 
but  few  more  significant,  as  straws  on  the  wind,  than  the 
pillar-boxes  of  the  Imperial  (and  quite  independent) 
Japanese  Post,  dotted  about  all  over  the  capital.  Japan’s 
“ conquest  by  post  ” throughout  all  the  regions  of  the 
North  is  a very  real  and  a very  insidious  business,  more 
seriously  injurious  to  China’s  revenues  and  sovereign 
rights  than,  shall  we  say,  her  hold  on  Kiaochao  : yet  the 
Chinese  authorities  and  Press  patriots  seem  to  see  nothing 
particularly  derogatory  to  their  dignity  in  a proceeding 
which  asserts  “ concession  ” privileges  at  the  very  heart 
of  government.  When  I spoke  on  the  subject  to  Mr. 
Liang  Shih-yi,  the  great  wirepuller  in  chief,  he  said  that 
the  Government  had  protested  against  these  sign-posts  of 
the  Rising  Sun’s  ascendancy,  but  the  Japanese  Minister 
had  paid  no  attention,  and  what  more  could  they  do  ? 
The  boycott  was  evidently  foredoomed  to  failure. 


PEKING  IN  1920 


293 


At  the  Wagons-lits  Hotel,  such  signs  of  change  as  one 
observes  are  suggestive  of  Europe  in  the  melting-pot 
rather  than  of  China  in  transition.  At  the  Saturday- 
night  dances,  where  diplomacy  unbends,  one  sees  a 
sprinkling  of  Chinese,  and  now  and  then  some  spirit,  bolder 
than  the  rest,  will  defy  his  ancestral  gods  by  “posturing 
with  a female  to  the  sound  of  horns  ” ; but  the  crowd  of 
jazzers  (far  more  numerous  than  in  pre-war  days)  seems 
to  be  chiefly  composed  of  Americans,  most  of  them  good, 
healthy-looking  youngsters  of  the  clean-run  breed  that 
one  finds  now  in  many  an  outpost  of  the  Standard  Oil, 
the  British-American  Tobacco  Co.,  and  the  Y.M.C.A.  It 
was,  of  course,  to  be  expected  that  American  interests  in 
China  would  rapidly  expand  during  the  first  four  years 
of  the  war,  and  before  the  States  came  into  the  struggle ; 
nevertheless,  some  of  the  manifestations  of  this  expansion 
are  surprising,  and  one  does  not  get  used  to  them  very 
readily,  because  all  one's  memories  of  Peking  are  some- 
how opposed  to  the  idea  that  haste  and  hustle  can  ever 
be  possible  within  these  old  grey  walls.  In  the  same  way 
one  cannot  get  quite  accustomed  to  the  silent  places  that 
used  to  be  humming  hives  of  German  activity  in  these 
parts ; there  is  something  almost  ominous  in  the  solitudes 
that  were  the  Legation  and  the  Deutsch-Asiatische 
Bank. 

The  stretch  of  the  city  wall  which  lies  between  the 
Chien  Men  and  the  Hata  Gate,  ever  memorable  for  the 
Legations’  grim  struggle  with  the  Boxers,  remains,  as  of 
old,  the  spot  where  the  foreigner  takes  his  constitutional 
in  dignified  seclusion,  no  Chinese  being  allowed  to  intrude 
thereon.  Here,  of  an  afternoon,  you  may  see  the  pillars 
of  many  States  discussing  the  destinies  of  nations  and  the 
latest  gossip  of  the  diplomatic  world.  Beneath,  the 
distant  aspect  of  the  city,  with  its  wide  expanse  of  low 
buildings  screened  by  trees,  where  the  yellow  roofs  of  the 
Palace  and  the  great  towers  of  the  main  gates  glisten  and 
glow  in  the  setting  sun,  is  much  the  same  scene  as  the 
European  gazed  upon  when  first  the  armies  of  the  Western 


294  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


barbarian  camped  yonder  on  the  Anting  plain.  Close 
under  the  wall,  to  the  southward,  the  canal  runs,  as  of 
yore,  still  flanked  by  garbage  heaps,  stinking  to  heaven ; 
beyond  the  railway  line  you  may  catch  a glimpse  of 
camel-trains,  slowly  wending  their  wonted  way  towards 
the  western  hills.  From  the  marts  and  markets  of  the 
Chien  M3n  quarter  rises  the  vague  murmur  of  innumerable 
buyers  and  sellers,  and  in  the  distance,  to  the  north-west, 
a little  yellow  cloud  tells  of  the  coming  of  a sand-laden 
wind.  Everything  in  the  distance  is  unchanged ; it  is 
only  here,  beside  us  on  the  wall,  that  one  is  reminded  of 
time  and  the  hour,  and  of  all  the  things  that  have  hap- 
pened to  China  since  first  we  trod  these  ancient  weather- 
beaten bricks.  Here  you  see  a group  of  Italian  airmen, 
beautiful  creatures  all  covered  with  medals,  pleasantly 
engaged  for  some  weeks  past  in  killing  time  (not  to  speak 
of  ladies)  while  they  wait  for  the  much-advertised  coming 
of  d’Annunzio.  And  here  are  two  interesting  specimens 
of  the  youngest  of  Young  China,  recently  returned  from 
an  American  University  with  nice  young  American  wives. 
There  is  nothing  particularly  new  or  strange  in  this 
particular  manifestation  of  the  results  of  Western  learn- 
ing, and  the  pathos  of  it  is  an  old  story  : 

Alas,  regardless  of  their  doom,  the  little  victims  play  ! 

To-day,  arm  in  arm,  they  walk  upon  the  wall,  with  eyes 
that  see  not,  strangers  to  both  the  worlds  in  which  they 
move,  but  dimly  feeling  already  their  inevitable  destiny 
of  tragic  isolation.  Ten  years  hence,  no  doubt,  she  will  be 
back  in  God’s  Own  Country,  with  a working  knowledge 
of  the  East,  and  he  will  be  the  centre  of  an  Oriental  menage 
on  the  patriarchal  system.  For  East  is  East  and  West 
is  West,  and  if,  in  the  false  dawn,  they  seem  to  meet, 
before  the  sun  sets  each  must  go  his  destined  way.  For 
such  is  the  law,  pre-ordained. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


AN  EMPEROR  IN  WAITING 

To  the  north  of  the  Tartar  City  in  Peking,  not  far  from 
the  old  Drum  Tower,  there  lies  a little  quartier  of  quiet 
streets  where,  despite  all  the  alarms  and  upheavals  of 
the  past  twenty  years.  Time  seems  to  have  stood  still. 
The  placid  stream  of  life  that  flows  through  this  secluded 
backwater  reminds  one  very  vividly  of  the  Peking  of 
bygone  days,  the  city  of  dreadful  dust  and  splendid  dreams, 
whose  mysterious  charm  lingers  with  such  imperishable 
fragrance  in  the  treasure-house  of  memory.  A few  children 
flying  kites  or  playing  in  the  shade  of  ancient  trees,  a 
few  timid-faced  women  bargaining  with  the  vegetable- 
sellers  at  their  doors;  little  groups  of  gatemen  and  ser- 
vants gathered  about  the  entrance  of  a tajen’s  residence ; 
and  here  and  there  an  old-fashioned  springless  mule 
cart,  with  its  driver  slumbering  contentedly  on  the  shaft. 
Strangely  quiet,  these  old  streets;  there  are  no  shops 
to  break  the  grey  line  of  high,  windowless  walls,  that 
enclose  invisible  courtyards  and  gardens,  and  the  deep- 
eaved,  sloping  roofs  of  houses,  all  built  to  one  design. 
Only  from  time  to  time  the  long-drawn  cry  of  some  hawker 
on  his  rounds,  the  tinkling  cymbals  of  the  beancurd  seller, 
or  the  reedy  flute  of  an  itinerant  chiropodist,  breaks  on 
the  unfrequented  silence,  and  lures  the  children  from  their 
noiseless  games.  Time  was,  when  these  streets  were  the 
abode  of  wealth  and  fashion,  when  many  of  the  men 
who  own  these  houses  were  snug  and  prosperous  digni- 
taries, battening  on  the  bounty  that  flowed  from  the 
Dragon  Throne,  for  this  was,  and  still  is,  essentially 
a Manchu  quarter,  as  you  may  know  by  the  curious  head- 

295 


296  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


gear  of  the  women  at  their  doors.  But  to-day  the  glory 
of  the  Great  Inheritance  has  faded,  and  with  it,  in  many 
cases,  has  gone  the  livelihood  of  men  who,  bred  to  a birth- 
right of  sheltered  ease,  are  quite  incapable  of  earning  one. 

Faded,  but  not  utterly  departed,  the  glory  that  once 
was  the  Manchu  dynasty.  For,  as  all  the  world  knows, 
the  “ Lord  of  Ten  Thousand  Years,”  though  shorn  of 
much  pomp  of  majesty  and  power,  still  sits  upon  the 
Dragon  Throne;  and,  as  all  the  world  knows  also,  only 
the  hour  and  the  Man  are  needed  to  restore  to  the  allegiance 
of  the  Son  of  Heaven  most  of  the  men  who  now  prudently 
profess  and  call  themselves  Republicans.  They  know, 
the  dwellers  in  these  quiet  streets,  that  in  every  house 
throughout  the  city,  a Dragon  flag  lies  folded  away — 
were  they  not  all  unfolded  to  the  breeze,  for  one  brief 
week,  only  three  years  ago?  They  know  that  the 
President  of  the  Republic  was  a Grand  Secretary  by  the 
grace  of  Her  Majesty  the  “ Old  Buddha,”  and  that, 
since  her  passing,  he  has  ever  been  a very  faithful  Guardian 
of  the  Heir-Apparent ; they  know  that  every  high  official 
in  Peking,  having  been  a party  to  the  restoration  scheme 
of  1917,  may  be  so  again  at  any  moment.  Is  it  not  freely 
rumoured  that  the  Son  of  Heaven  is  to  be  married  to 
President  Hsu’s  daughter,  the  Imperial  Clan  consenting, 
and  that,  by  this  “ harmonious  fusion,”  the  way  wall  be 
prepared  for  the  re-establishment  of  the  Throne,  as  a 
limited,  constitutional,  and  truly  national  Monarchy? 

To  the  European  mind,  such  a solution  of  China’s 
political  problems  may  seem  fantastic ; nevertheless, 
seriously  considered,  it  is  no  more  fantastic  than  the  fact 
that  the  Emperor  still  remains  part  of  the  recognised 
order  of  things,  in  the  vicinity  of,  and  in  close  touch 
with,  the  Presidential  Mansion ; and  that,  within  the 
narrow  limits  of  the  Forbidden  City,  the  daily  life  of  his 
court,  with  all  its  wonted  privileges,  dignities,  and  cere- 
monies, pursues  the  even  tenor  of  immemorial  usage. 
A Republic,  with  an  Emperor  held  in  reserve  as  part  of 
the  established  order  of  things,  and  treated  with  all  due 


AN  EMPEROR  IN  WAITING  297 


deference  by  the  powers  that  be,  may  strike  the  European 
as  an  impossible  arrangement ; yet  it  is  eminently  char- 
acteristic of  that  instinct  of  the  Chinese  race-mind  which 
is  always  opposed  to  finality,  either  in  politics  or  business. 
It  is  a fundamental  principle  in  Chinese  statecraft  (which 
Young  China  obeys  just  as  implicitly  as  its  forefathers) 
never  to  bum  its  boats,  to  leave  loopholes  for  compromise 
and  adjustment,  and  to  allow  for  the  contingencies  of 
inevitable  reaction. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  Manchu  Dynasty  has 
never  definitely  abdicated  1 and  that  the  Imperial  Decree 
establishing  the  Republic  was  the  work  of  two  famous 
Chinese  officials,  both  of  whom  were  convinced  that  the 
institution  of  a Republic  in  China  could  only  mean  “ the 
instability  of  a rampant  democracy,  of  dissension  and 
partition.”  The  subsequent  maintenance  of  the  Emperor 
as  the  acknowledged  head  of  the  subsidised  Imperial  Clan 
is  therefore  not  only  explicable,  but  thoroughly  consistent 
with  every  principle  of  mandarin  statecraft.  Consistent 
also  with  the  workings  of  the  race-mind,  which  clings 
instinctively  to  the  unbroken  continuity  of  ancient 
traditions,  have  been  the  arrangements  made  by  the 
“ Republican  ” authorities  for  the  dignity  and  comfort  of 
the  Manchu  Emperor  and  his  Court,  and  the  respectful 
attitude  maintained  towards  His  Majesty  by  all  concerned, 
from  the  President  downwards.  In  the  seclusion  of  his 
Palace,  surrounded  by  his  Manchu  and  Chinese  tutors,  his 
Ministers  and  Chamberlains,  His  Majesty  maintains  all  the 
time-honoured  ceremonial  of  the  Imperial  Court,  enjoying 
“ due  courtesy,  not  fealty  and  obedience  ” (as  a Presi- 
dential Mandate  puts  it),  from  his  former  subjects. 

This  “ due  courtesy  ” and  the  attitude  of  metropolitan 
officialdom  towards  the  Throne,  were  very  significantly 
displayed  after  General  Chang  Hsiin’s  serio-comic  attempt 
to  restore  the  Throne,  for  his  own  ends,  by  a coup  d’etat 
in  July  1917.  Those  who  follow  events  in  China  will 
remember  that,  without  warning,  and  certainly  without 

1 Vide  Recent  Events  and  Present  Policies  in  China,  pp.  170,  178. 


298  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


connivance  on  his  part,  the  Emperor  was  compelled  by 
Chang  Hsiin  to  resume  the  Throne,  that  for  a week  Edicts 
were  issued  in  his  name  and  the  Dragon  Flag  waved  once 
more  over  the  Forbidden  City.  But  when  the  little  plot 
had  come  to  its  inglorious  end,  and  Chang  Hsiin’s  forces 
had  been  sent  home  (with  full  pay  and  the  honours  of 
war),  no  word  was  heard  against  the  Emperor,  either  at 
Peking  or  in  the  provinces.  On  the  contrary,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  went  out  of  its  way  to  express  its 
respectful  regrets  to  His  Majesty  that  his  seclusion  should 
have  been  invaded  and  his  peace  disturbed,  by  the 
reprehensible  proceedings  of  an  ambitious  schemer.  No 
monarch  could  ask  for  a more  deferential  expression  of 
sympathy  from  his  loyal  subjects,  and  His  Majesty’s 
reply  was  couched  in  terms  equally  appropriate  to  the 
delicate  situation.  Delicate  it  certainly  was,  for  all 
North  China  was  aware  that  nearly  every  high  official  in 
Peking  was  a party  to  the  scheme  for  the  restoration  of 
the  Throne,  and  that  the  miscarriage  of  General  Chang’s 
plot  was  not  due  to  any  difference  of  opinion  on  this 
point,  but  only  to  his  unwillingness  to  agree  to  a fair 
division  of  the  spoils  of  office. 

When,  by  Decree  of  the  Throne,  the  Chinese  Republic 
was  first  proclaimed,  the  boy-Emperor  was  six  years  of 
age.  To-day  he  is  in  his  sixteenth  year,  and  the  question 
of  his  future  is  therefore  becoming  a matter  of  increasing 
concern,  not  only  to  his  family,  but  to  the  venerable 
guardians  of  the  Heir-Apparent,  of  whom  Hsu  Shih- 
Chang,  President  of  the  Republic,  is  one.  Especially 
interesting  and  important  is  the  problem  of  his  marriage, 
which,  if  Imperial  traditions  be  observed,  must  be  decided 
before  long.  As  already  stated,  the  opinion  is  strongly 
held,  and  freely  expressed  in  high  official  circles  at  Peking, 
that  the  best  solution  of  China’s  political  difficulties  would 
be  for  the  Imperial  Clan  to  consent  to  His  Majesty’s 
marriage  with  the  daughter  of  President  Hsu.  The 
underlying  idea  is,  that  if  this  were  done,  and  the  exclusive 
Houselaws  of  the  Manchu  dynasty  thus  abrogated  by  the 


AN  EMPEROR  IN  WAITING  299 


marriage  of  the  Emperor  to  a Chinese  lady,  the  anti- 
dynastic  movement  in  the  South  must  lose  such  moral 
force  as  it  now  claims  and  the  way  be  prepared  for  the 
re-establishment  of  the  Monarchy  Constitutional,  limited, 
and  shorn  of  all  the  exclusive  Manchu  privileges. 

The  reader  will  observe  that  I am  speaking  now  of 
the  opinion  which  prevails  amongst  the  educated  class  of 
Chinese,  and  especially  the  literati  of  the  old  regime,  in 
North  China.  So  far  as  my  observation  goes,  the 
“ Western-learning  ” section  of  Young  China  which  holds 
official  positions  at  Peking,  displays  no  violent  opposition 
to  this  way  of  thinking.  In  the  South,  and  especially 
amongst  the  vociferous  section  of  students  and  journalists, 
which  lives  by  and  for  political  agitation  in  the  shelter 
of  the  Treaty  Ports,  they  will  tell  you  that  the  restoration 
of  the  Throne  is  impossible,  and  that  the  Republic  repre- 
sents a genuine  expression  of  the  people’s  fixed  will. 
Times  being  as  they  are,  theirs  are  the  opinions  which 
reach  and  impress  England  and  America;  nevertheless, 
I have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  they  are  wrong, 
and  that  the  movement  for  the  restoration  of  the  Throne 
will  eventually  have  the  hearty  approval  of  the  vast 
majority  of  the  people.  They  will  welcome  it,  not  only 
because  the  Dragon  Throne  has  been  for  ages  an  essential 
part  of  the  Confucian  system,  inseparable  from  the  ideas 
of  an  agricultural  race  born  and  bred  on  patriarchal 
Theism,  but  also  because  of  the  callous  corruption  and 
disorder  with  which  the  present  administration  has  become 
identified  all  over  the  country.  And  this  approval  will 
be  strengthened  as  public  opinion  gradually  comes  to  learn 
that  the  young  Emperor  is  not  only  gifted  with  a very 
high  order  of  intelligence,  but  that  his  education  has  been 
such  as  to  lead  him  to  break  completely  with  the  pre- 
judices and  delusions  of  the  past.  Those  who  know  him 
best  speak  enthusiastically  of  his  abilities,  of  his  lofty 
conception  of  duty,  and  of  his  desire  to  play  a man’s  part 
in  life.  Like  the  late  unfortunate  Emperor  Kuang  Hsu, 
it  is  his  earnest  wish  to  be  active  in  the  work  of  constitu- 


300  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


tional  reform  and  to  identify  himself  with  the  true  welfare 
and  progress  of  the  Chinese  people.  It  is  also  his  keen 
ambition  to  be  allowed  to  complete  his  education  by  travel 
in  Europe  and  America,  and  to  be  released  from  the 
fettering  traditions  of  the  past  which  confine  him  in  the 
Forbidden  City. 

During  my  recent  visit  to  Peking,  I was  fortunate  in 
making  the  acquaintance  of  Mr.  R.  F.  Johnston,  English 
tutor  to  His  Majesty,  and  of  learning  from  him  much  about 
the  young  Emperor’s  education  and  of  life  at  the  Imperial 
Court.  Mr.  Johnston  is  a distinguished  scholar,  an  emi- 
nent authority  on  Buddhism  and  Chinese  poetry,  the 
author  of  From  Peking  to  Mandalay,  Buddhist  China,  and 
other  well-known  works.  To  visit  him  in  his  Chinese 
house,  in  that  quiet  little  street  near  the  Drum  Tower 
which  I have  described,  to  hear  him  talk  of  his  daily 
work  and  that  of  the  Emperor’s  three  other  tutors,  to 
get  an  intimate  and  vivid  picture  of  present-day  conditions 
in  the  Forbidden  City — this  was  an  experience  well  worth 
a long  journey.  There  are  people  who  declare  that  the 
romance  of  the  East  is  dead  and  its  glamour  a delusion, 
that  its  high  places  have  been  invaded  and  desecrated 
by  modern  materialism ; but  the  tale  which  Mr.  Johnston 
told  me,  in  the  peaceful  seclusion  of  an  inner  courtyard, 
amidst  the  miniature  shrines  and  grottos  of  a little  rock 
garden  in  the  classical  style,  was,  to  my  mind,  as  romantic 
in  its  way  as  anything  in  Marco  Polo’s  adventures  or 
the  memoirs  of  the  Jesuit  Fathers  at  the  Court  of  Kanghsi. 
Indeed,  there  is  something  which  appeals  most  powerfully 
to  the  imagination,  in  the  presence  of  this  English  tutor 
in  the  Forbidden  City,  planting  seeds  of  modem  worldly 
wisdom  in  the  mind  of  the  Son  of  Heaven,  whilst  all  about 
him  the  ancient  ceremonial  of  the  Court  continues, 
mindful  only  of  the  venerated  past. 

The  reader  may  well  wonder  how  and  why  Mr.  Johnston 
ever  came  to  become  an  Imperial  Tutor  in  Peking,  seeing 
that  by  profession  he  is  a District  Officer  and  Magistrate 
of  the  British  “ Leased  Territory  ” of  Weihaiwei.  The 


«$■ 


UNDER  THE  WALLS  OF  PEKING. 


AN  EMPEROR  IN  WAITING  301 


story  is  interesting,  because  it  aptly  illustrates  the 
curiously  intimate  relations  which  exist  between  the 
mandarins  who  govern  China  (even  when  they  agree  to 
manifest  irreconcilable  differences  in  public)  and  that 
“ bias  of  class  ” which  is  stronger  than  any  of  their  political 
opinions.  At  the  time  of  the  anti-dynastic  movement 
(which  became  republican  by  accident),  in  1911,  a number 
of  officials  who  had  acquired  wealth  under  the  old  regime, 
and  who  had  no  love  for  the  Cantonese  clique,  sought 
security  for  themselves  and  their  portable  property  in 
one  or  other  of  the  Foreign  Settlements.  Several  of 
those  who  belonged  to  the  powerful  Anhui  faction,  and 
had  held  high  office  under  the  Manchus,  found  a safe 
refuge,  near  to  the  capital,  in  Tientsin ; others  established 
themselves  in  the  German  colony  at  Kiaochao  or  on  British 
territory  at  Weihaiwei.  Amongst  the  latter  was  Li 
Ching-mai,  a younger  son  of  the  Viceroy  Li  Hung-chang, 
who  resembles  his  famous  father  in  combining  progressive 
ideas  with  staunch  adherence  to  the  Imperialism  of  the 
orthodox  literati',  as  Minister  to  Austria,  and  in  other 
diplomatic  missions  under  the  monarchy,  he  had  acquired 
a reputation  for  perspicacity  and  knowledge  of  foreign 
affairs.  At  Weihaiwei  he  made  Mr.  Johnston’s  acquaint- 
ance, and  it  was  at  his  suggestion,  evidently  made  with 
a shrewd  eye  for  the  probable  course  of  events  at  Peking 
hereafter,  that  the  present  President  of  the  Republic 
approved  of  the  engagement  of  Mr.  Johnston’s  services 
as  tutor  to  His  Majesty  Hsiian  Tung.  The  arrangement 
was  sanctioned  in  due  course  by  Sir  John  Jordan,  on 
behalf  of  the  British  Government ; and  Mr.  Johnston, 
detached  from  duty  at  Weihaiwei,  took  up  his  duties  at 
the  Palace  in  1918. 

The  education  of  the  young  Emperor  conforms  strictly 
to  the  principles  and  precedents  of  the  Confucian  ethics 
and  immemorial  usage,  every  hour  of  his  day  being  filled 
with  its  prescribed  study,  exercise,  or  recreation.  Besides 
his  English  teacher,  three  other  tutors  are  in  regular 
attendance  on  His  Majesty.  His  first  lesson  begins  at 


302  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


6 a.m.,  when  he  studies  the  Chinese  classics  under  the 
direction  of  Chen  Pao-chen,  a distinguished  scholar  and 
poet,  who  was  an  ardent  supporter  of  the  Emperor  Kuang 
Hsu’s  programme  of  constitutional  reform  in  1898.  The 
Emperor  takes  more  kindly  to  his  Chinese  lessons  than 
to  those  of  his  Manchu  tutor,  the  inclination  of  his  mind 
and  sympathies  being  essentially  Chinese,  and  at  the  same 
time  progressive.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  old  Manchu  Shih 
Hsu,  as  guardian  of  the  Heir- Apparent,  to  instruct  His 
Majesty  in  the  language  and  literature  of  his  forefathers. 
Shih  Hsu  achieved  distinction  in  1900  as  a fanatical  leader 
of  the  Boxer  movement  and  a stiff-necked  conservative. 
Since  then  his  spirit  has  been  chastened  by  the  crowding 
misfortunes  of  the  Imperial  Clan ; in  his  old  age  he  lives 
and  moves,  unconvinced  but  unprotesting,  a picturesque 
and  pathetic  survival,  in  the  diminished  shadow  of  the 
Dragon  Throne,  doing  his  best  to  maintain  its  ceremonies 
and  dignities.  His  feelings  concerning  the  young  Emperor 
amidst  the  wrack  of  the  Republic  are  displayed  by  an 
attitude  wherein  courtesy  struggles  hard  with  conser- 
vatism, and  wins  a cheerless  victory.  He  was  strongly 
opposed  to  the  idea  of  His  Majesty  learning  English  and 
to  the  intrusion  of  a barbarian  into  the  sacred  precincts ; 
but  the  fact  being  accomplished,  he  has  accepted  it  with 
courteous  resignation,  as  one  more  buffet  of  outrageous 
fortune.  Towards  his  fellow-tutors — even  towards  the 
foreigner — he  displays  the  dignified  courtesy  which  good 
manners  demand ; for  the  rest,  there  are  enough  derelicts 
of  the  old  Imperial  Clan  in  and  about  the  Palace  to  provide 
him  with  the  consolations  of  congenial  society. 

The  third  Imperial  tutor  is  Chu  I-fan,  far-famed 
amongst  the  literati  as  a master  of  the  science  and  art  of 
caligraphy;  from  him  the  Emperor  has  acquired,  with 
infinite  diligence,  a style  of  penmanship  which  scholar 
experts  sincerely  praise  for  its  distinction  and  classic 
elegance.  Following  the  time-honoured  custom  of  his 
ancestors.  His  Majesty  takes  pleasure  in  making  ceremonial 
scrolls  of  characters  penned  and  sealed  with  his  own 


AN  EMPEROR  IN  WAITING  303 


hand,  which  he  bestows  as  birthday  or  New  Year  gifts 
upon  his  tutors  and  guardians  and  other  meritorious 
persons.  Amongst  the  treasures  of  Mr.  Johnston’s  library 
are  several  of  these  marks  of  Imperial  favour,  together 
with  a jade  Ju-Yi  (Chinese  sceptre  or  baton)  of  exquisite 
workmanship. 

Towards  all  his  tutors  the  young  Emperor  observes 
the  respectful  demeanour  prescribed  by  the  Confucian 
code — standing  up  whenever  they  enter  or  leave  his 
presence,  and  addressing  them  with  punctilious  deference. 
On  their  birthdays,  and  at  certain  festivals,  he  sends 
congratulatory  gifts  to  their  homes,  with  all  the  ceremony 
prescribed  by  Imperial  etiquette  on  such  occasions.  The 
arrival  of  a gift  of  melons  from  the  Lord  of  Ten  Thousand 
Years  (“  Wan  Sui-Yeh,”  as  the  citizens  of  Peking  still 
call  him)  creates  a commotion,  and  much  talk  of  bygone 
days,  in  the  quiet  neighbourhood  of  Mr.  Johnston’s  house. 
At  the  four  seasonal  festivals,  each  tutor  receives  a sub- 
stantial present  in  money,  a custom  which  dates  back 
to  very  ancient  times. 

All  the  Imperial  tutors  have  the  right  (also  prescribed 
by  ancient  usage)  to  ride  in  palanquins  through  the 
Imperial  precincts,  which,  for  the  sake  of  “face”  pre- 
servation, they  do.  Mr.  Johnston  is  the  healthy  kind 
of  man  who  would  far  rather  walk  than  be  carried  by 
human  beasts  of  burden  in  a sedan-chair,  but  he  sub- 
ordinates his  personal  inclinations  in  this  matter  to  the 
necessity  for  conforming  to  Oriental  ideas  of  the  dignity 
of  an  Imperial  Tutor  and  the  importance  of  maintaining 
that  dignity  intact  in  the  eyes  of  the  eunuchs  and  myr- 
midons of  the  Palace.  The  Emperor  himself,  after  his 
lessons,  returns  to  his  private  apartments  in  a yellow 
chair,  borne  by  twenty  attendants. 

Mr.  Johnston  gives  the  Emperor  his  lessons  in  the  same 
apartment  of  the  Chien  Ching  Rung  (Palace  of  Heavenly 
Purity)  where  the  ill-fated  Kuang  Hsu  first  learned  and 
discussed  the  principles  of  constitutional  government 
with  the  Cantonese  scholar  and  iconoclast,  Kong  Yu-wei, 


304  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


and  where  he  plotted  with  that  visionary  reformer  to 
overthrow  the  power  of  the  Empress-Dowager.  A place 
of  many  memories  and  many  vicissitudes  is  this  stately 
Chien  Ching  Kung,  where  the  grandson  of  Jung  Lu,  in 
company  with  Prince  Tsai  Tao’s  eleven-year -old  son, 
now  listens  respectfully  to  a foreigner  expounding  the 
elements  of  Western  learning.  It  was  in  this  Palace, 
curiously  decorated  with  a profusion  of  foreign  clocks, 
that,  for  the  first  time,  the  old  Buddha  penitent  received 
the  Diplomatic  Body  after  her  return  to  Peking  in  1901. 
If  her  august  shade  should  be  permitted  to  revisit  the 
glimpses  of  the  moon,  to  frequent  the  scenes  which 
witnessed  so  many  triumphs  of  her  crowded  life,  to  what 
depths  of  despond  must  that  proud  spirit  be  brought  by 
the  present  humiliation  of  her  Imperial  House  ! 

Mr.  Johnston  describes  the  young  Emperor  as  a lad  of 
unusual  intelligence  and  pleasant  disposition,  keenly 
interested  in  his  studies  and  particularly  in  geography 
and  foreign  politics.  He  followed  the  negotiations  of 
the  Versailles  Conference  from  day  to  day  with  critical 
attention,  studying  the  course  of  events  as  described  in 
the  Chinese  Press,  by  the  aid  of  the  best  maps  procurable, 
and  asking  questions  which  showed  a remarkable  grasp 
of  the  general  situation.  On  one  occasion,  for  example, 
he  complained  to  Mr.  Johnston  that  the  boundaries  of 
Luxembourg  were  not  clearly  shown  on  his  map  of 
Europe.  His  reading  and  talks  with  his  English  tutor 
have  filled  him  with  a keen  desire  to  travel  abroad,  to 
see  with  his  own  eyes  the  wide  world  and  all  its  wonders ; 
and  the  idea  is  being  seriously  and  favourably  discussed 
by  those  whose  business  it  is  to  determine  what  things 
are  lawful  and  expedient  for  His  Majesty.  The  President 
of  the  Republic,  Hsu  Shih-chang  (who,  as  guardian  of 
the  Heir-Apparent  and  a Monarchist  by  conviction, 
maintains  cordial  and  intimate  relations  with  His  youth- 
ful Majesty),  favours  the  proposal  that  he  should  proceed 
before  long  on  a tour  of  Europe  and  America,  incognito, 
and  escorted  by  Mr.  Johnston,  Li  Ching-Mai,  and  a small 


AN  EMPEROR  IN  WAITING  305 


suite  of  personal  attendants.  This,  and  the  question  of 
the  Emperor’s  marriage,  are  subjects  of  continual  and 
serious  discussion  in  the  Palace.  According  to  all 
dynastic  precedents,  the  time  is  close  at  hand  when 
his  betrothal  must  be  decided,  so  that  if  his  wish  to 
travel  is  to  be  fulfilled  it  cannot  be  much  longer  delayed. 
It  is  said  that  Prince  Tsai  Tao  and  other  leaders  of  the 
Imperial  Clan  support  the  idea  of  the  “ harmonious 
fusion  ” marriage,  and  that  it  even  meets  with  the 
resigned  approval  of  the  four  old  ladies  of  Kuang  Hsu’s 
Court  and  the  aged  Consort  of  Tung  Chih,  who,  from 
their  privacy  " behind  the  screen,”  still  play  at  Palace 
politics.  If  China  were  truly  mistress  in  her  own  house, 
if  the  men  who  profess  to  guide  the  destinies  of  the 
Republic  were  not  actually  in  bondage  to  their  Japanese 
paymasters,  it  might,  I think,  be  taken  for  granted  that 
the  young  Emperor  would  before  long  be  betrothed  to 
the  President’s  daughter,  and  that  before  his  marriage 
he  would  be  permitted  to  complete  his  education  by 
travel  abroad.  But  as  matters  stand,  the  nominal 
rulers  of  China  can  no  more  decide  such  matters  for 
themselves  than  could  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  when  he  was 
virtually  Dictator.  The  ultimate  destiny  of  His  Majesty 
Hsiian  Tung  depends  neither  on  the  old  gentlemen  of 
the  Presidential  Mansion,  nor  on  the  old  ladies  of  the 
Imperial  Household,  but  on  winged  words  spoken  in 
the  Secret  Council  Chamber  of  the  Elder  Statesmen  of 
Japan. 

Meanwhile,  maintained  by  the  four-million-dollar 
allowance  granted  to  the  Imperial  family  by  the  makers 
of  the  Republic  in  1912,  the  daily  life  of  the  Court  within 
the  narrow  limits  of  the  Forbidden  City  pursues  the  even 
tenor  of  its  ancient  ways.  No  longer  may  the  Emperor 
leave  the  inner  precincts  to  make  stately  progress  through 
the  Imperial  and  Chinese  enclosures  of  the  capital,  and 
perform  the  solemn  sacrifices  of  the  summer  and  winter 
solstices  at  the  Temple  of  Heaven.  No  longer  may  he 
invoke,  on  behalf  of  his  people,  the  favour  of  the  Divine 
x 


306  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Husbandman  at  the  Temple  of  Agriculture,  or  receive 
the  homage-bearing  envoys  of  tributary  tribes.  But 
within  the  precincts  of  the  Forbidden  City  the  elaborate 
ceremonial  of  his  Court,  with  all  its  ordinances,  ritual, 
and  high-sounding  titles,  continues  as  of  old.  All  about 
him,  splendidly  steadfast  and  unchanged,  are  the  temples 
and  palaces  of  his  forefathers,  monuments  to  the  departed 
glories  of  Kang  Hsi  and  Ch’ien  Lung.  All  about  him  also 
are  the  Iron-capped  Princes  and  the  hereditary  chieftains 
of  the  Eight  Banners,  picturesque  but  parasite  survivals 
of  a once  warlike  race.  A considerable  portion  of  the 
Republic’s  money-grant  goes  to  the  maintenance  in 
listless  idleness  of  three  or  four  thousand  of  these  Manchu 
pensioners,  living  either  in  the  Tartar  City  or  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Imperial  tombs.  Last,  but  not 
least,  the  Chinese  eunuchs  of  the  old  regime  still  infest 
the  Palace  to  the  number  of  a thousand  or  more,  by  all 
accounts  worthy  successors  of  the  “ rats  and  foxes  ” 
whose  evil  influence  contributed  so  largely  to  the  de- 
moralisation of  Hsiian  Tung’s  ancestors  after  the  reign 
of  Chia  Ch’ing. 

The  young  Emperor’s  disposition  and  physique  are 
healthy  and  normal,  but  even  without  the  assistance  of 
scheming  Dowagers  or  treacherous  Regents,  danger  must 
lurk  in  wait  for  him,  danger  of  demoralisation  and 
effeminacy,  so  long  as  these  sleek  rogues  remain  to 
practise  their  intrigues  and  insidious  arts  from  the  gate- 
keeper’s lodge  even  unto  the  King’s  bedchamber.  Mr. 
Johnston,  indeed,  regards  the  continued  presence  of  these 
eunuchs  in  the  Palace  as  the  greatest  of  all  the  dangers 
to  which  the  young  Emperor  is  exposed,  and  the  history 
of  the  dynasty  fully  justifies  this  5opinion.  For,  as  all 
these  crafty  creatures  know  that  their  opportunities 
of  acquiring  wealth  and  power  depend  upon  the  de- 
moralisation and  weakness  of  their  sovereign,  they  will 
lay  their  snares  for  him,  even  as  their  predecessors  laid 
them  for  Hsien  Feng  and  Tung  Chih. 

On  the  occasion  of  Mr.  Johnston’s  first  appearance  at 


PEKING  : A LLAMA  RITUAL. 


IN  THE  MANCHU  QUARTER,  PEKING. 


AN  EMPEROR  IN  WAITING  307 


the  Palace,  the  eunuchs,  on  the  plea  of  “ lao  kuei-chii,” 
or  time-honoured  custom,  politely  but  firmly  requested 
that  he  should  pay  his  footing,  to  the  tune  of  $150.  But 
Mr.  Johnston  was  equally  firm  in  his  determination  to 
prove  that  the  new  Imperial  Tutor  represented  new 
ideas,  and  that  the  gentle  art  of  “ squeezing  ” had  no 
place  in  his  curriculum.  Knowing  too  much  of  Oriental 
ways  to  make  them  ‘‘lose  face”  and  generate  wrath- 
matter  by  a blunt  refusal,  he  temporised  and  promised  to 
bring  the  money  on  the  following  day.  He  brought  it 
accordingly,  but  with  it  he  tendered  them  for  signature 
a receipt  in  duplicate,  one  copy  for  the  President  of  the 
Republic  and  one  for  the  British  Minister.  Chagrined 
by  this  departure  from  all  classical  precedent,  the  eunuchs 
withdrew  their  request ; but  before  they  departed  the 
new  tutor  gave  them  in  forcible  vernacular  a stern  lecture 
on  the  evil  of  their  ways. 

His  Majesty  Hsiian  Tung  is  fond  of  exercise,  but  the 
restricted  area  of  the  Palace  enclosure  affords  but  little 
opportunity  for  gratifying  his  healthy  inclinations.  He 
rides  occasionally,  although  there  is  but  little  joy  in  this 
form  of  exercise,  as  prescribed  for  him  by  the  rigid  con- 
servatism of  the  Court ; for  an  attendant  leads  his  pony 
at  a sedate  pace  round  and  round  a stone-paved  court- 
yard. Mr.  Johnston  hopes  that  His  Majesty’s  guardians 
and  advisers  may  be  persuaded  before  long  to  allow  him 
to  take  up  his  residence  at  the  Summer  Palace,  where  he 
would  be  less  exposed  to  the  demoralising  influence  of 
the  eunuchs,  and  where  he  might  learn  to  play  tennis 
and  get  regular  rowing  exercise  on  the  lake.  The  boy- 
Emperor  himself  longs  for  the  freedom  of  wider  space 
with  all  the  eagerness  of  youth,  gazing  wistfully  through 
the  bars  of  his  gilded  cage  upon  the  wide  world,  of  which 
he  has  heard  so  much  and  seen  nothing. 

He  takes  a boy’s  keen  interest  in  all  the  mechanical 
inventions  of  the  West,  and  shows  serious  application 
in  endeavouring  to  learn  their  principles  and  uses.  When, 
in  December,  President  Hsu  Shih-chang  asked  Mr. 


308  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Johnston  to  suggest  suitable  presents  for  him  to  send 
with  his  congratulations  on  the  Emperor’s  birthday  in 
February,  Mr.  Johnston  asked  his  pupil  for  a list  of  the 
things  that  he  would  like  to  have.  The  first  thing  on 
His  Majesty’s  fist  was  a Corona  typewriter,  the  use  of 
which  he  proposed  to  learn.  The  Son  of  Heaven,  tapping 
dutiful  messages  on  a typewriter  to  the  Dowager  Consort 
of  Tung  Chih,  is  a picture  calculated  to  disturb  one’s 
sense  of  the  fitness  of  things,  like  the  motor-cars  which 
hoot  and  hustle  through  the  once-sacred  enclosure  of  the 
Tung  Hua  Men.  But  the  East  of  the  “ Arabian  Nights  ” 
is  gone  for  ever  and  the  note  of  a Corona  in  the  For- 
bidden City  is  but  one  of  many  whisperings  of  the  winds 
of  change.  May  the  gods  send  them  fortunate  for  His 
Majesty  Hsiian  Tung  ! 


CHAPTER  XIX 


THREE  PALACES  1 

Revisiting  the  East  after  an  absence  of  years,  it 
seems  to  me  as  if  all  its  splendid  past  and  all  its  present 
discontents  were  recorded  and  symbolised  in  the  Imperial 
Palaces  of  Peking,  Seoul,  and  Tokyo.  Of  one  race  are 
they,  these  three,  but  each  is  beautiful  with  a distinctive 
beauty  of  its  own.  Stately  and  splendid,  with  the 
dignity  of  great  simple  things,  each  tells  its  own  tale, 
that  he  who  runs  may  read,  of  creeds  and  civilisations 
that  have  passed,  like  shadows  on  a wall.  Silent  and 
secluded,  wrapped  in  their  garments  of  departed  great- 
ness, they  stand,  to  the  outward  eye  steadfast  and  un- 
changed, looking  out  on  a troubled  world  of  unfamiliar 
things  and  alien  ways.  Ten  years  ago,  all  three  were 
the  habitations  of  Emperors,  sacred  spots  from  whose 
mysterious  depths  issued  the  Edicts,  whereat  men 
trembled  and  obeyed.  To-day,  the  Son  of  Heaven  and 
the  Lord  of  the  Morning  Calm  have  gone  their  ways,  to 
join  the  mournful  company  of  Kings  in  exile.  Only 
His  Majesty  of  Tokyo  remains,  a dim,  mysterious  figure 
in  the  medieval  seclusion  of  Chiyoda,  a picturesque 
survival  of  old  Japan,  like  an  idol  in  a shrine,  a living 
Buddha,  in  the  great  new  city  throbbing  with  machinery. 

As  I think  of  these  three  Palaces,  and  of  what  each  has 
stood  for  in  the  mighty  past,  it  seems  to  me  that,  in  their 
recent  history  and  their  present  fate,  we  have  an  epitome 
of  the  whole  tragedy  (for  tragedy  it  is)  of  the  violation 
by  the  West  of  the  East’s  immemorial  seclusion.  Also 
these  grim  sermons  in  stone  speak  of  the  wisdom  of  Dai 
Nippon,  the  nation  that  put  oil  into  its  lamp  and  learned 
in  time  the  Western  way  of  man-killing  by  machinery. 

1 Originally  published  in  Asia  (New  York). 

3°9 


310  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


For  if  the  Forbidden  Cities  of  Peking  and  Seoul  are  now 
open  to  the  public  (on  presentation  of  a card),  is  it  not 
because  their  rulers  and  wise  men  honestly  believed  (like 
Mr.  Wilson)  that  reason  is  superior  to  force  and  that 
violence  is  an  argument  fit  only  for  malefactors  ? Even 
after  the  wars  of  1842  and  i860,  when  the  citizens  of 
Peking  had  seen  the  hosts  of  the  invaders  encamped  on 
the  Anting  plain  and  watched  the  smoke  of  the  looted 
Summer  Palace  rising  to  Heaven,  Japan  alone  of  all  the 
Eastern  nations  took  the  lesson  to  heart  and  proceeded 
to  put  on  the  whole  armour  of  materialism.  China, 
panoplied  in  the  invincible  superiority  of  her  ancient 
reverences  and  beliefs,  heard  the  legions  thunder  by  and 
turned  again  to  sleep.  And  to-day,  when  the  Manchus’ 
little  day  is  done  and  the  kingdom  has  been  taken  from 
them  by  reason  of  their  impotence,  the  Dragon  Throne 
at  Peking  remains  empty  because  Japan  has  willed  it 
so — to  this  the  shade  of  Yuan  Shih-k’ai  bears  witness  at 
the  Seven  Springs.  This  Palace  of  Peking  which,  within 
the  memory  of  man,  has  held  the  vassal  East  in  fee, 
levying  homage  and  tribute  from  Annam,  Tibet,  and 
Korea,  and  all  the  “ lesser  breeds  without  the  law,”  is 
now  little  better  than  an  appanage  of  Tokyo — Tokyo  the 
once  despised,  whose  worldly-wise  rulers  have  stooped 
for  years  to  conquer.  Had  there  been  no  coming  of  the 
West,  with  its  missionaries,  modern  artillery,  and  money 
to  lend,  the  passing  of  the  Manchus  would  have  meant  no 
more  to  the  Middle  Kingdom  than  a summer  day’s 
shower.  But  where,  in  all  this  wind-fed  Republic,  is  the 
Man  of  Destiny  who  shall  restore  the  glory  that  was 
once  Cathay,  who  shall  save  the  Great  Inheritance  from 
the  hands  of  alien  mortgagees  ? 

It  was  all,  of  course,  inevitable.  In  the  bustling 
workaday  world-of-things-as-they-are,  there  is  no  place  for 
meditation,  no  room  for  the  Canons  of  the  Sages,  or  the 
dreamers  of  ancient  dreams.  Say  what  you  will,  the 
be-all  and  the  end-all  of  the  West  in  the  East  is  trade, 
all-devouring  trade,  which  has  no  traffic  with  philosophy. 


THREE  PALACES 


311 


For  what  more  do  they  amount  to,  all  our  boasts  of 
progress,  all  our  labours  for  the  advancement  of  Western 
civilisation,  than  a claim  to  disturb  the  lives  of  a simple- 
hearted  people  with  ideas  which,  being  Oriental,  they 
distrust,  and  with  machinery  which,  being  elemental, 
they  dislike?  It  is  our  pleasure  and  our  pride  to  move 
through  life  much  faster  and  with  far  more  noise  than 
the  Chinese  have  ever  done  or  desired  to  do ; we  have 
perfected  mechanical  devices  by  which,  if  we  so  choose, 
we  can  reduce  them  to  slavery  or  the  cemetery ; but  do 
these  things  justify  the  West  in  claiming  for  its  civilisa- 
tion, as  compared  with  that  of  the  East,  any  real 
superiority — any  superiority,  in  fact,  other  than  that 
which  a soulless  machine  has  over  a man  ? I think  not. 
I believe  that  the  feelings  with  which  every  one  of  us 
regards  these  splendid  monuments  of  earth’s  most  vener- 
able civilisation  are  evidence  of  the  instinctive  reverence 
which  our  triumphant  materialism  pays  to  the  intellectual 
and  moral  superiority  of  the  East.  For  what  shall  it 
profit  a man  if  he  gain  the  whole  world  and  lose  his  own 
soul?  And  the  soul  of  the  East,  deep-rooted  in  the 
philosophy  of  the  Sages,  keeps  its  own  wise  counsel, 
undismayed,  though  its  high  places  be  filled  with  the 
clamour  of  the  barbarian.  They  have  survived  many 
invasions  of  barbarism,  these  passive  sons  of  Han,  but 
no  alien  rule  has  ever  changed  their  unperturbed  attitude 
toward  life  and  death,  their  valuation  of  the  things  that 
matter.  And  so,  though  a gaudy  five-coloured  flag  floats 
above  the  yellow  roof  where  the  Empress-Dowager 
reigned,  majestic  to  the  end,  and  though  the  rulers  of 
the  Republic  are  busy  selling  the  remainder  of  their  birth- 
right for  whatever  it  may  fetch,  there  is  comfort  of  a 
kind  to  be  found  in  these  time-mellowed  roofs  and  in 
the  steadfast  walls  of  Kublai  Khan  that  gird  the  For- 
bidden City. 

Yes,  there  is  comfort  in  the  sight  and  thought  of  them, 
because  they  stand  for  the  very  soul  of  the  East,  for  many 
beautiful  and  venerable  things  which  wither  and  wane 


312  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


in  our  machine-made  world;  the  dignity  and  grace  of 
splendid  ceremonial,  of  solemn  rites  conceived  and  carried 
out,  through  countless  years,  in  a spirit  of  simple  reverence 
which  touches  the  sublime.  I like  to  believe  that  the 
memory  of  these  things,  and  the  love  of  them,  will  remain 
as  deep-rooted  in  the  life  of  the  Chinese  people  as  ancestor- 
worship  itself ; for  is  not  the  Throne,  with  all  its  stately 
ritual,  the  essential  crown  and  climax  of  the  Confucian 
philosophy?  For  a little  while  these  men,  who  call 
themselves  Republicans,  may  be  lured  from  the  Way  of 
wisdom  by  fear,  favour,  or  greed ; for  a little  while  they 
may  be  content  to  see  earth’s  most  beautiful  song  without 
words,  the  Temple  of  Heaven,  abandoned  to  sordid  uses 
or  neglect ; they  may  see  fit  to  wear  frock-coats  and  top 
hats,  instead  of  the  most  dignified  and  decorative  gar- 
ments ever  devised  by  man ; but  surely  before  long  they 
— or  others  in  their  place — will  be  compelled  to  restore 
the  ancient  faith,  the  ancient  ways.  Is  it  not  known  to 
every  tea-house  in  the  North,  that  all  the  “ big  men  ” 
of  the  Republic,  including  the  President  himself,  pledged 
themselves  three  years  ago  to  restore  the  Dragon  Throne 
and  to  set  the  boy  Hsuan  Tung  upon  it  ? It  is  not 
possible  that  China’s  Older  Statesmen,  men  like  Hsii 
Shih-chang,  Wu  Ting-fang,  and  Liang  Shih-yi,  should  be 
content  for  long  to  see  the  imperishable  traditions  of 
Cathay  replaced  by  the  antics  and  indignities  of  a horde 
of  carpet-baggers  and  intellectual  half-breeds. 

If  they  now  suffer  these  indignities,  it  is  because  the 
present-day  mandarins,  like  the  Manchus,  are  an  effemin- 
ate and  timid  breed ; one  seeks  in  vain  amongst  them  for 
one  stout-hearted  leader  of  the  type  of  Tso  Tsung-tang 
or  Admiral  Ting.  They  are  afraid  of  the  students, 
afraid  of  the  soldiers,  afraid  of  their  own  shadow's ; above 
all,  afraid  of  sudden  tumults  and  alarms,  which  might 
mean  the  loss  of  their  close-hoarded  wealth.  But  the 
man  and  the  hour  will  surely  come ; and  the  world  will 
then  remember  that  it  was  by  the  will  of  the  Emperor 
of  China  that  the  Republic  came  into  being,  and  that 


IN  THE  ONCE-FORBIDDEN  CITY,  PEKING. 


THREE  PALACES 


313 


he  who  gives  may  take  away.  His  Majesty  Hsiian 
Tung,  as  a matter  of  historical  fact,  is  still  the  Son 
of  Heaven.  As  Emperor,  he  has  decreed  that  the  form 
of  government  in  China  shall  be  a “ Constitutional 
Republic,  to  comfort  the  longing  of  all  within  the  Empire 
and  to  act  in  harmony  with  the  ancient  Sages,  who 
regarded  the  Throne  as  a public  heritage.” 

Go  where  you  will  in  China,  speak  with  all  sorts  and 
conditions  of  men,  and  everywhere  they  will  tell  you 
that  under  the  sham  Republic  things  have  been  much 
worse  for  the  common  people  than  ever  they  were  under  the 
Manchus.  Even  the  hireling  journalists,  who  have  helped 
to  nourish  Young  China’s  fantastic  delusions  and  to  en- 
courage their  self-seeking  ambitions,  are  beginning  to 
admit  that  only  the  restoration  of  a strong  Central 
Government,  under  such  a constitutional  monarchy  as  was 
proposed  in  1898  by  his  unfortunate  Majesty  Kuang 
Hsii,  can  bring  back  order  and  prosperity  to  China. 

Wise  men,  like  Sir  Robert  Hart,  Prince  Ito,  and  Yuan 
Shih-k’ai,  knew  this  and  predicted  the  anarchy  that  must 
follow  the  attempt  to  establish  a Republic.  And  it  was 
Yuan,  past-master  of  Oriental  statecraft,  who,  when  the 
game  was  up  in  1912,  arranged  for  an  " abdication  ” of 
the  Emperor,  under  conditions  that  left  him  the  Imperial 
title  and  his  residence  in  the  Imperial  City,  with  a liberal 
pension  and  all  the  ceremonial  and  religious  observances 
of  his  dynasty.  In  the  profound  seclusion  of  his  palace, 
in  sight  of  the  Presidential  Mansion,  Hsiian  Tung  main- 
tains the  unbroken  continuity  of  ancient  traditions  and 
all  the  elaborate  etiquette  of  his  diminished  court,  at 
the  same  time  keeping  up  dignified  (and,  in  certain 
quarters,  intimate)  relations  with  the  Republican  author- 
ities. Every  Chinese  official  fully  appreciates  the  state- 
craft which  has  prompted  this  maintenance  of  the  Throne 
behind  the  power,  and  of  the  deferential  attitude  which 
even  the  parliamentarians  pay  to  His  Majesty  en  retraite. 
And  every  shopkeeper  of  the  capital  keeps  his  Dragon 
flag  carefully  folded  away,  against  the  day  when  the 


314  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


Son  of  Heaven  shall  return  in  splendour  to  his  Great 
Inheritance. 

Meanwhile,  for  good  or  evil,  the  West  has  left  its  mark 
upon  and  around  the  Forbidden  City.  They  have  cut 
great  holes  in  the  Chien  Men  wall  and  the  “ stupid 
people  ” make  free  of  the  Via  Sacra,  the  straight  and 
royal  road  which  runs  from  the  heart  of  the  Imperial 
enclosure  to  the  Temple  of  Heaven.  Cook’s  tourists,  in 
motor-cars,  now  raise  the  dust  in  places  where  in  former 
days  no  foreigner  might  pass.  The  picturesque  old 
Peking  cart  and  the  palanquin  have  almost  disappeared 
from  the  main  streets;  to-day,  ministers  of  State  and 
wealthy  men  drive  in  their  limousines,  where  twenty 
years  ago  they  sat  behind  fat  Szechuan  mules,  protected 
from  the  mud  in  covered  carts.  You  can  even  motor 
on  a good  metalled  road  to  the  Western  Hills,  by  way  of 
the  Summer  Palace;  if  rumour  lie  not,  more  than  one 
dignitary  of  the  new  regime  repairs  thither  for  week-end 
joy-rides  with  Dulcinea-up-to-date.  Thousands  of  jin- 
rickshas, public  and  private,  crowd  the  new  thorough- 
fares; these,  and  Chu  Chi-chien’s  stolid  police,  are 
conspicuous  amongst  the  outward  and  visible  signs  of 
change.  But  the  camel  and  the  donkey  still  bear  their 
modest  share  of  the  traffic,  and  the  general  appearance 
of  the  city,  beyond  the  small  area  in  which  foreign-style 
houses  have  been  built,  is  much  the  same  as  it  was  in  the 
days  of  the  Manchus.  At  dusk,  in  all  the  smaller  hu- 
tung  off  the  main  streets,  the  shrill  cries  and  pipings  of 
innumerable  hawkers  and  pedlars  blend  in  an  old-time 
evensong  that  seems  to  speak  of  fives  deep-rooted  in 
ancestral  ways — a sort  of  vocal  incense  to  the  past. 

• ••••• 

There  are  motor-cars  also  in  Seoul,  and  if  you  are  a 
distinguished  visitor,  you  will  be  personally  conducted 
and  admitted  to  the  precincts  of  that  which,  ten  years 
ago,  was  the  Palace  of  the  Emperor  of  Korea,  and  most 
of  which  is  now  the  area  of  the  Government  General 
Museum.  They  will  show  you,  also,  the  present  palace 


THREE  PALACES 


315 


of  Prince  Yi,  with  its  audience-room  marvellously  furnished 
with  priceless  embroidered  screens  and  German  gas- 
stoves,  Prince  Yi,  whose  helpless  Hermit  Kingdom  has 
been  taken  away  from  him,  and  replaced  by  a lieutenancy 
in  the  Japanese  Army.  But  they  have  left  him  his 
beautiful  palace  pleasaunce,  a very  delectable  retreat  for 
any  king  in  exile,  with  its  classic  pavilions  and  dainty 
summer-houses  nestling  in  the  heart  of  the  wood,  a 
spot  most  suitable  either  for  meditating  on  the  vanity 
of  human  ambitions  or  for  sporting  with  Amaryllis  in 
the  shade.  Sad  but  stately,  very  dignified  in  adversity, 
is  this  old  Imperial  city  of  Seoul,  which  its  Japanese 
masters  call  Keijo.  Its  ancient  palaces  are  very  cousins 
to  those  of  Peking,  with  their  massive  curved  roofs  and 
the  huge  lacquered  pillars  that  remind  one  of  the  great 
cedars  of  Lebanon,  with  which  Solomon  budded  the 
Temple.  The  large  central  Audience  Hall,  with  the 
decaying  water-garden  behind  it,  stands  open  to  the 
winds  of  heaven ; the  dust  lies  thick  upon  its  pillared 
terraces  and  painted  ceilings.  It  looks  out  upon  all  the 
brand-new  trappings  with  which  Japan  has  decked  the 
hill-girt  city — the  wide,  paved  roads,  banks,  hospitals 
and  barracks,  the  railway  and  hotels.  It  looks  out,  too, 
upon  the  winding  mountain  way,  by  which  for  centuries 
the  tribute-bearing  envoys  and  their  caravans  started  on 
the  journey  to  Peking.  And  all  about  the  Imperial 
enclosure  are  little  clusters  and  alley-ways  of  mean  mud 
huts,  the  homes  of  old  Korea,  abjectly  ineffective,  yet 
possessed  of  that  quality  of  philosophic  dignity  which 
distinguishes  the  humblest  of  these  hewers  of  wood  and 
drawers  of  water.  It  must  look  far  back  into  the  past, 
this  palace  of  the  Hermit  Kingdom,  to  catch  a glimpse 
of  the  days  of  Korea’s  pride  of  art  and  learning ; all  its 
living  memories  are  those  of  a people  that  has  been  con- 
tent with  vassaldom,  willing  to  pay  tribute  as  the  price 
of  protection.  The  Land  of  the  Morning  Calm  has  paid 
for  centuries  the  price  of  listless  lotus-eating ; its  empty, 
silent  Audience  Hall  represents  the  last  scene  in  a drama 


316  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


of  inevitable  destiny.  But  how  many  scenes  of  battle, 
murder,  and  sudden  death  have  been  enacted  around  and 
within  these  grim  old  walls,  before  “ the  shuttlecock 
among  the  nations  ” came  to  its  pitiful  end  ? 

Because  of  the  far-sighted  statecraft  of  Prince  Ito — 
who  took  the  young  Prince  Yi  as  a boy  of  nine  to  be 
educated  in  Japan — the  present  rulers  of  Korea  have 
gilded  the  pill  of  “ assimilation  ” for  him  whose  father 
was  an  Emperor.  They  have  left  him  the  outward  and 
visible  signs  of  semi-royal  state  and  have  given  “ face  " 
to  many  of  the  old  Korean  nobility — as  useless  a lot  of 
hereditary  wasters  as  ever  battened  on  a miserable 
peasantry.  They  are  marrying  His  Royal  Highness  to 
a daughter  of  the  Japanese  Prince  Nashimoto,  the  idea 
being  to  set  an  example  of  harmonious  fusion,  and  thus 
to  counteract  the  agitation  of  the  mission-taught  students 
and  other  exponents  of  the  principle  of  “ self-determina- 
tion.” One  hears  all  sorts  of  stories  about  this  strategic 
marriage.  Very  different  is  the  tale  they  tell  you  in 
Seoul  from  that  which  you  get  at  Tokyo. 

Most  Japanese  wall  tell  you  that,  in  giving  Prince  Yi 
one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  high-born  ladies  of  Japan 
to  wed,  the  Japanese  Government  is  doing  its  best  to 
atone  for  the  errors  and  offences  committed  by  the 
Military  Party  in  Korea;  that  the  marriage  is,  in  fact, 
part  and  parcel  of  the  policy  of  conciliatory  Liberalism, 
which  aims  at  making  the  Koreans  capable  and  con- 
tented citizens  of  the  Empire,  with  equal  rights  and 
representation.  They  point  to  the  fact  that  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  country  is  now  in  the  hands  of  pro- 
gressive and  broad-minded  civilians  and  that  the  condition 
of  the  people,  infinitely  better  than  ever  it  was  under  the 
old  regime,  is  steadily  improving;  both  of  which  facts 
are  undeniable.  When  the  Koreans  get  the  measures  of 
local  self-government  which  have  been  promised  them 
and  full  representation  in  the  Imperial  Diet,  the  cry  of 
“ self-determination  ” will  have  nothing  behind  it  but  the 
professional  agitator  and  the  mushy  sentimentalist,  who  is 
always  for  the  under-dog,  no  matter  howr  he  got  there. 


THREE  PALACES 


317 


There  are  some  very  sympathetic  sentimentalists  in 
Seoul — missionaries,  for  the  most  part,  who  were  un- 
official advisers  of  royalty  in  the  old  days,  and  elderly 
ladies,  who  regret  the  dead  old  Emperor  and  his  comic- 
opera  Court,  “ where  every  one  was  somebody,  and  no 
one  anybody.”  These  dear  people  wax  very  eloquent 
over  Korea’s  lost  independence,  and  pray  for  American 
intervention,  but  they  forget  that  when  Japan  drove 
first  China  and  then  Russia  from  Korea,  by  force  of 
arms,  the  whole  business  might  have  been  in  another 
planet,  so  far  as  the  Koreans  were  concerned.  Also, 
that  America  was  all  in  sympathy  with  Japan  at  the 
time  of  her  war  with  Russia,  and  President  Roosevelt 
a strong  supporter  of  her  claim  to  paramount  influence 
in  Korea. 

But  to  return  to  the  Prince’s  marriage.  They  will 
tell  you  in  Seoul  that  he  was  betrothed  in  childhood  to 
a Korean  girl  of  noble  family,  and  that  to  force  him  into 
another  marriage  was  an  act  of  barbarous  tyranny.  Also 
that  his  wedding  to  the  Japanese  Princess  was  to  have 
taken  place  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  January,  1919, 
but  that  it  had  to  be  postponed  because,  a few  days 
before  the  event,  his  father,  the  ex-Emperor,  committed 
suicide,  and  the  father  of  his  native-born  betrothed  did 
the  same.  It  is  quite  possible  that  these  stories  are  true ; 
but  as  the  young  Prince  himself  has  been  brought  up  in 
Japan  since  he  was  nine,  and  cannot  possibly  have  any 
deep  attachment  for  any  Korean  lady,  it  seems  absurd 
to  attempt  to  justify  political  agitation  in  this  matter 
on  sentimental  grounds.  Politically  speaking,  the  best, 
in  fact  the  only,  solution  of  the  Korean  question  lies  in 
peaceful  assimilation ; and  thus  regarded,  the  marriage 
of  Prince  Yi  to  the  Princess  Nashimoto  is  evidently 
justifiable  on  grounds  of  expediency.  If  the  ex-Emperor 
of  Korea  were  of  the  type  which  commits  suicide  on  a 
point  of  dignity  or  honour  (which  I doubt),  the  time  for 
him  to  have  done  it,  with  real  effect,  was  when  the 
Japanese  compelled  him  to  sign  the  Treaty  of  Annexation 
in  August  1910.  What  sense  could  there  be  in  his 


318  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


objecting  to  the  marriage  of  his  son  to  a Japanese  princess, 
after  he  had  signed  such  a clause  as  this  : “ H.M.  the 
Emperor  of  Japan  and  H.M.  the  Emperor  of  Korea, 
having  in  view  the  special  and  close  relations  between 
their  respective  countries,  desiring  to  promote  the  com- 
mon weal  of  the  two  nations,  and  to  assure  permanent 
peace  in  the  extreme  East,  and  being  convinced  that  these 
objects  can  best  be  attained  by  the  annexation  of  Korea 
to  the  Empire  of  Japan,  have  resolved  to  conclude  a treaty 
of  such  annexation  ” ? 

The  pity  'tis,  but  true,  that  the  Palace  of  the  Kings  of 
Korea  is  not  likely  ever  again  to  be  anything  but  a 
melancholy  monument  to  the  departed  greatness,  the 
splendid  isolation,  of  the  East ; a spot  where  tourists  may 
moralise,  very  comfortably,  on  the  destinies  of  nations 
and  the  presence  of  flies  in  the  ointment  of  self-determina- 
tion. The  doom  of  its  independent  Throne  was  sealed 
when  the  restless  Powers  of  the  West,  seeking  new  worlds 
to  conquer,  sent  their  first  heralds,  with  battleships  and 
Bibles,  to  bid  the  East  awake  and  gird  itself  to  trade. 
And  if  it  be  true  that  a live  dog  is  better  than  a dead  lion, 
then  the  destiny  of  His  Highness  Prince  Yi  is  more  for- 
tunate than  that  of  most  of  his  ancestors ; for  history 
shows  that  the  Koreans,  like  the  Japanese,  have  shown 
but  little  respect  for  their  monarchs  and  suffered  very  few 
of  them  to  die  covered  with  years  and  honour. 

Now,  from  the  palaces  of  monarchs  dethroned,  let  us 
turn  to  that  which  to  me  is  more  beautiful,  and  in  some 
ways  more  interesting  than  either,  the  Palace  of  his 
Sacrosanct  Majesty,  the  Mikado  of  Japan.  Indeed,  I 
know  of  no  spot  on  earth  which  carries  the  same  appeal  to 
the  imagination  and  the  historic  sense,  as  this  medieval 
enclosure  of  the  Chiyoda  Palace,  with  its  triple  moats  and 
majestic,  cedar-crowned  walls,  at  the  very  heart  of  the 
modernised  city  of  Tokyo.  It  is  as  if  the  spirit  of  the 
ancient  East  werehere  invulnerably  entrenched,  a treasure- 
house  and  stronghold  of  Asian  mystery,  protected  by 


THREE  PALACES 


319 


invisible  hands  against  a world  of  impious  change.  Far 
more  profound  than  the  aloofness  of  Peking’s  Forbidden 
City  under  the  Manchus,  is  the  mystic  seclusion  with 
which  the  makers  of  modern  Japan  have  surrounded  “ the 
descendant  of  Jimmu  Tenno,  who  was  the  grandson  of  the 
Sun  Goddess,  who  can  do  no  wrong.” 

These  moats  and  walls  tell  their  own  story  of  the  old 
feudal  days  and  of  the  Tokugawa  Shogunate,  that  held  the 
Dragon  Throne  in  custody.  To  the  passer-by,  the  voice  of 
the  wind  in  these  cedars  sings  brave  tales  of  old  Japan, 
of  chivalry  and  beauty  and  romance,  like  to  the  tales  of 
the  minstrels  at  the  Kabuki  Theatre,  beloved  of  the 
people.  But  to  him  who  understands,  they  sing  also  of 
Elder  Statesmen  and  of  the  craft  of  king-making.  For 
this  semi-divinity,  with  which  the  Clansmen,  who  rule 
Japan,  have  seen  fit  to  invest  their  Sovereign  since  the 
Restoration  of  1868,  this  Emperor-worship,  which  in  fifty 
years  has  taken  so  firm  a hold  upon  the  masses,  is  un- 
doubtedly part  and  parcel  of  a skilful  official  propaganda 
of  Imperialism.  Prince  Ito  and  the  Elder  Statesmen, 
who  brought  their  country  safely  through  many  perils, 
realised  that  they  must  devise  a new  rallying-point  for 
loyalty  and  patriotism,  and  they  found  it  in  Mikadoism, 
Emperor  worship,  the  dominating  force  of  modern  Japan. 
The  bureaucracy  of  the  Clans  has  exalted  Mikadoism  and 
made  it  a popular  religion,  with  very  definite  political 
ends  in  view,  chief  of  which  is,  that  the  mystic  oracle 
shall  always  express  itself  as  the  Clans  think  fit.  When 
a Minister  of  State  proclaims  “ that  the  majesty  of  our 
Imperial  House  towers  high  above  everything  to  be  found 
in  the  world,  as  durable  as  heaven  and  earth,”  he  pro- 
claims also,  for  all  who  have  ears  to  hear,  the  fact  that 
those  who,  as  delegates  of  the  Throne,  represent  its 
omniscience,  can  do  no  wrong.  And  so  this  Chiyoda 
Palace,  this  lovely  dream  enshrined  in  rough-hewn  stone, 
stands  firm  amidst  a world  of  change,  a splendid  casket 
for  the  mystic  Throne,  worshipped  from  afar.  In  its 
precincts  inviolate  dwells  the  Sacred  Presence  which  sits 


320  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


upon  that  Throne,  he  who  reigns  but  does  not  rule,  the 
consecrated  puppet  of  Mikadoism;  and  all  about  these 
grim  old  walls,  close  to  the  moat  and  glacis  slopes,  where 
the  wild  duck  sleep  in  the  sun,  the  life  of  modern  Tokyo 
storms  and  frets,  with  its  noisy  hooting  of  motor-horns 
and  rumbling  of  heavy-laden  trams.  Within  sight  of 
its  guard-towers  and  bastions  are  the  Western-style  build- 
ings of  the  Diet,  all  the  Government  offices,  hotels,  and 
banks  of  the  new  dispensation,  and  the  pretentious 
villas  of  the  new  plutocracy.  But  from  its  silent  and 
mysterious  depths,  as  from  a Delphic  oracle,  still  issue  the 
Imperial  Rescripts  before  which  the  Diet  bows  its  head 
and  the  voice  of  the  people  is  stilled,  those  ordinances 
in  which  the  will  of  the  Elder  Statesmen  cloaks  itself 
in  the  sanctity  of  the  Imperial  Ancestors.  To  make  and 
to  keep  these  Edicts  majestically  impressive,  to  maintain 
their  authority  as  a power  above  that  of  the  law,  the 
Clansmen  in  their  wisdom  have  always  surrounded  this 
shrine  of  the  national  Deity  with  an  atmosphere  of  impene- 
trable mystery,  and  kept  its  sanctuary  inviolate.  They 
know  that,  shorn  of  its  mysteries,  Mikadoism  as  a religion 
and  an  incentive  to  patriotism  would  lose  most  of  its 
appeal  to  the  masses. 

Therefore,  in  spite  of  the  enterprising  activity  of  the 
Japanese  Press  and  the  natural  curiosity  of  the  diplomatic 
world  in  Tokyo,  very  little  is  knowm  of  the  daily  life  of 
the  Inner  Court  at  the  Chiyoda  Palace.  A small  book 
published  in  1912,  The  Memoirs  of  a Lady-in-Waiting, 
gave  an  interesting  description  of  the  rigid  etiquette 
imposed  on  all  who  live,  move,  and  have  their  being  near 
the  Presence;  but  it  was  promptly  suppressed  as  lese 
majeste  by  the  ever-vigilant  authorities.  Since  then 
several  newspapers  have  been  punished  by  the  police  for 
attempting  to  throw  light  on  the  manners  and  customs 
of  the  Court. 

But  enough  has  been  told,  by  the  “ Lady-in-Waiting  ” 
and  by  others,  to  show  that  life  in  the  Inner  Court  of 
the  Chiyoda  Palace  bears  a remarkable  resemblance  to 


THREE  PALACES 


321 


that  of  the  old  Court  of  China.  The  amusements,  accom- 
plishments, and  religious  observances  of  the  Court  ladies 
are  in  many  ways  curiously  like  those  of  the  Forbidden 
City  in  Peking  under  the  Empress- Dowager,  as  described 
by  the  Princess  Derling.  All  these  ladies  are  the 
daughters  of  the  old  Kuge,  or  court  nobles,  of  Kyoto, 
and  they  maintain  in  the  life  of  the  Palace  not  only  the 
Kyoto  dialect,  but  all  the  old-world,  dreamy  atmosphere 
of  that  ancient  centre  of  Japanese  culture  and  religion, 
as  impervious  to  the  influence  of  Western  civilisation  as 
the  Dalai  Lama  or  the  Grand  Mogul.  With  the  exception 
of  a few  youths,  who  act  as  pages  and  messengers  between 
the  Outer  and  the  Inner  Courts,  society  within  the  sacred 
precincts  consists  entirely  of  women.  In  former  days 
His  Majesty  was  entitled  to  twelve  lawful  wives  and  con- 
cubines, a discretion,  but  since  the  passing  of  the  Imperial 
House  Law  in  1889,  the  Empress  is  his  only  lawful  spouse. 
The  political  influence  wielded  by  many  of  the  Court 
ladies,  and  especially  by  the  first  lady-in-waiting  (mother 
of  the  present  Emperor),  bears  a certain  resemblance 
to  that  which  the  eunuchs  wielded  under  the  later 
Manchus  at  the  Court  of  Peking.  As  in  the  case  of  the 
eunuchs,  their  hot -house  fives  have  always  been  closely 
confined  within  the  Palace  walls,  their  knowledge  of  the 
outside  world  has  been  practically  nil,  and  their  minds, 
therefore,  naturally  prone  to  constant  intriguing  for 
power  and  rights  of  patronage  against  the  Chamberlains 
and  Ministers  of  the  Household.  And  behind  the  thirty 
ladies-in-waiting,  there  are  the  rank  and  file  of  female 
Palace  attendants,  some  three  hundred,  all  of  Kyoto 
stock — quite  sufficient  to  keep  any  conscientious  Chamber- 
lain  on  the  qui  vive. 

The  education  of  the  present  Emperor  was  taken  out 
of  the  hands  of  the  Palace  Ladies  by  his  father,  when  he 
was  eight  years  old  and  entrusted  to  Count  Hijikata, 
a Minister  who  had  long  been  the  avowed  enemy  of  petti- 
coat influence  and  who  had  fought  several  losing  battles 
with  the  veteran  Lady  Takahira,  far  famed  for  her  ready 

Y 


322  CHINA,  JAPAN,  AND  KOREA 


tongue.  The  present  Emperor  and  his  consort  are  thus, 
by  education,  much  less  rigidly  conservative  in  many 
ways  than  His  Late  Majesty  Mutsuhito.  Nevertheless, 
the  Inner  Court  remains  strictly  native  in  its  architecture, 
equipment,  and  ways  of  life,  a little  oasis  of  old  Japan, 
serenely  undisturbed  by  the  bustle  of  Western  civilisa- 
tion, faithful  to  the  teachings  and  traditions  of  the  past. 

I like  to  think  that  this  kernel  of  conservatism  at  the 
very  heart  of  Japan’s  national  life,  this  little  stronghold  of 
stability  amidst  tempestuous  seas  of  modem  materialism, 
represents  something  of  instinctive  wisdom,  something 
more  than  political  expediency,  on  the  part  of  the  Elder 
Statesmen.  I like  to  think  of  this  moated  Palace  as  the 
outward  and  visible  sign  of  an  inward  and  spiritual  grace, 
as  a symbol  of  the  steadfast  soul  of  the  East,  a sign  that 
it  is  destined  to  endure,  untarnished  and  unchanged,  long 
after  Europe  has  forgotten  most  of  its  present-day  inven- 
tions. From  the  noisy  tram-cars,  and  crowds  uncouthly 
clad  in  hideous  alien  clothes,  I look  gratefully  towards 
those  cedar-crowned  walls,  and,  with  the  eye  of  faith, 
I see  the  Soul  of  the  East  emerging  once  again,  trium- 
phantly serene,  as  it  has  so  often  done  before,  from 
perils  of  change.  In  this  vision,  the  Three  Palaces  speak 
with  one  voice,  but  that  of  Tokyo  strikes  a more  hopeful 
note  than  either  Peking  or  Seoul,  because  of  the  virile 
energy  of  the  Japanese  people,  which  has  enabled  them  to 
wrest  from  the  armouries  and  laboratories  of  the  West  the 
secrets  of  its  material  strength,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
preserve  their  reverence  for  the  deep-rooted  wisdom,  the 
immemorial  usage,  of  the  East.  In  this,  my  vision,  the 
East  comes  once  more  into  its  own,  and  I descry,  ages 
hence,  a Confucianist  Sage  pondering,  like  Macaulay's 
New  Zealander  amidst  the  ruins  of  London,  on  the  rise 
and  fall  of  a material  civilisation  in  which  there  was  no 
place  for  philosophy. 


INDEX 


Addis,  Sir  Charles,  127 
Agriculture,  150,  204,  227 
Ahn  Chang-ho,  201 
American  opinion,  1,  4,  5,  6,  10, 
20,  78,  89,  272,  284,  299 
Americanised  Chinese,  70,  81 
Ancestor-worship,  42,  82,  312 
Anfu  clique,  22,  62,  92,  97,  100, 
108,  112,  285 

Anglo-American  interests,  12 1, 
134.  155,  158,  165,  168,  169,  189, 
256 

Anglo- Japanese  Alliance,  133, 156, 
160,  162,  163,  169,  175,  180,  191 
Anti-British  Press,  172 
Anti-Opium  Association,  10G 
Asian  Review,  69,  164,  188 
Australia,  142,  154,  156 

Balance  of  power,  135,  154 
Banks,  15,  26,  52,  66,  76,  87,  105, 
121,  140,  148,  164,  188,  241, 
269,  283,  289 
Bean  trade,  106 
Bell,  E.  P.,  192 
Benevolent  despotism,  107 
Black  Dragon,  165,  190 
Borrowing,  by  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, 66,  83,  86,  94,  106,  121, 
125 

Boxer  indemnity,  54,  64,  87,  279, 
283,  293,  302 

Brigandage,  15,  16,  39,  55,  71, 
106,  120 

Buddhist  doctrine,  33,  85 
Burma,  168 

California,  210,  21 1,  213,  262 
Canada,  154 

Cantonese,  17,  22,  52,  68,  70,  89, 
91,  92,  98,  108,  212,  257,  301 
Cecil,  Lord  Robert,  252 
Central  Government,  22,  29,  32, 
52,  66,  80,  95,  109,  119,  121,  129 
Chang  Chih-Tung,  275 
Chang  Hsiin,  13,  57,  59,  76,  109, 
120,  269,  297,  298 
Y 2 


Chang  Tso-lin,  97,  102,  107,  109, 
1x0,  270,  290 
Chen  Chin-tao,  72 
Cheng,  S.  G.,  25,  78,  92 
Chihli  Viceroyalty,  52,  61,  97, 
107,  108,  119,  163,  287 
Chinese  bonds,  91,  132 
Chinese  character  : fidelity,  249 ; 
greed  for  money,  74,  81 ; 

illiterate  masses,  81 ; lovable, 
68;  moral  philosophy,  245; 
race-mind,  41,  104,  294; 

timidity,  76,  122,  264,  282 
Chinese  Labour,  137,  256 
Chinese  Republic : attitude  to 

Emperor,  298;  established,  1, 
30;  Press  enthusiasm,  7;  Pro- 
visional Constitution,  52 ; Young 
China’s  leaders,  74 
Chiyoda  Palace,  318 
Choshiu  Clan,  161,  i8r,  190 
Chou-An-hui  Society,  44 
Christianity,  194,  213,  219,  247 
Chu  Chi-chien,  122 
Chueh  lajeti,  270,  274 
Civil  War  in  China,  17,  22,  28,  80, 
88,  89,  1 12,  1 18 
Coleman,  Frederick,  162,  199 
Confucianism,  30,  34,  49,  77,  81, 
84,  91,  108,  282,  299,  301,  312 
Consortium,  66,  87,  106,  108,  113, 
117,  125,  128,  160,  168 
Cost  of  living,  139,  142,  177,  226 
Coup  d'etat , Old  Buddha's,  33 
Cromer,  Earl,  8,  9 
Currency  reform,  128,  132 
Customs’  revenues  (China),  54,  64, 
75,  86,  9i,  98,  129,  170 

Dai  Nippon,  132,  143,  214,  229 
Democratic  ideals,  10,  11,  17,  18, 
27,  73,  180,  261 
Dewey,  Professor,  19 
Disbandment  of  Chinese  troops, 
11 7,  123,  127 

Dragon  Throne,  34,  43,  60,  73,  82, 
91,  no,  279,  295,  299,  310,  312 


323 


324 


INDEX 


East  and  West,  85,  210,  246,  276, 
294»  309 

Emigration,  141,  152,  158 
Emperor  Hsiian  Tung  : in  wait- 
ing, 295 ; Dragon  Throne,  299 ; 
deference,  303 ; exercise,  307 ; 
guardians,  299 ; his  English 
tutor,  300 ; maintenance,  305, 
marriage  question,  296,  305 
Empress  Dowager  Tzu-Hsi,  61, 
104,  282,  304,  311,  321 
European  War,  47,  53,  55,  60,  68, 
160,  169,  179 

Family  system,  83,  176,  182,  184 
Famines,  Chinese,  14,  15,  18,  20, 
2 7,  83,  94,  109,  no,  263 
Feng  Kuo-chang,  49,  57,  62,  63, 

79,  285 
Fengtien,  163 

Foreign  financial  control  in  China, 
necessity  for,  10,  27,  28,  69,  76, 

80,  83,  85,  98,  107,  117,  121, 
169,  230 

Frontier  Defence  Corps,  109 

“ Geisha,"  147,  236,  243 
Germany  : activities  of  agents, 

66;  declaration  of  war  by 
China,  64,  65;  expulsion  from 
Kiao-chao,  44;  German  club, 
102;  intrigues,  44,  53,  130; 
Japan’s  claims,  270;  Liaotung, 
203;  Old  Consortium,  126; 
privileges  in  Shantung,  173; 
propagandists,  188,  206;  sub- 
sidised Press,  54 

Hanihara,  166 

Hara,  Prime  Minister,  174 

Hart,  Sir  Robert,  107,  313 

Hayashi,  Baron,  152,  164,  170,  180 

Hijikata,  Count,  321 

Hong  Kong,  150,  257 

Hsiian  Tung,  61.  See  Emperor. 

Hsu  Shih-chang,  57,  109,  304,  312 

Hua  Chuen-mei,  5 

Huang  Hsing,  4 

Ijuin,  173 

Inouye,  178,  188,  218 
Ishii,  Baron,  152,  164,  168,  188 
Ito,  Prince,  115,  146,  178,  190, 
3i3,  316,  319 

Japan  : Anglo- Japanese  Entente, 
175;  anti-Japanese  demonstra- 
tion, 79 ; ascendancy  at  Peking, 


25,  80,  97,  no;  Asian  Review, 
164;  Black  Dragons,  166,  190; 
claims  to  racial  equality,  143; 
clothes,  218, 223, 228 ; conflicting 
instincts,  180;  Consortium,  134, 
135;  conviction  that  Germany 
would  win  the  War,  160,  169, 
179;  cost  of  living,  139,  142, 
177;  dream  of  Pan- Asian 
Empire,  190;  emigration,  14 1, 
144,  210;  family  system,  176, 
182,  184;  fear  of  moral  isola- 
tion, 189;  food  supply  and 
population,  137,  141,  146,  169; 
future  development,  1 54 ; 

"Geisha,”  147,  236,  243; 

honesty  in  commerce,  188; 
increasing  dislike  to  foreigners, 
186;  Jingo  element,  113,  144, 
164,  168;  Kiaochao,  171 ; 

Liberalism,  113,  179;  liners, 
209,  216,  219 ; military  prestige, 
181 ; music,  215,  238;  naval 
programme,  191 ; not  a colon- 
ising race,  147;  "Old  Japan," 
218,  231,  237,  319;  present 
policy,  1x3,  152;  "peaceful 
penetration”  in  Korea,  149, 
197;  profiteering,  139,  177,  216; 
progress  in  Manchuria  and 
Mongolia,  149,  150;  raw 

materials,  sources  of,  154,  161, 
168;  ricefields  and  labour,  138, 
140;  secret  agreements  with 
China,  133,  160,  162,  174,  180; 
social  and  political  unrest,  177; 
suffrage  and  Labour  Unions, 
183;  suicides,  214;  theatre, 
230 ; ultimatum  to  China,  45 ; 
Yangtsze  Valley,  172 
Johnson,  R.  F.,  Emperor’s  tutor, 
288 

Jordan,  Sir  John,  263 

Kang  Yu-wei,  303 
Kato,  Viscount,  152,  162,  166 
Kawakami,  145,  171,  212 
Kenseikai,  180,  182 
Kiangsu  Tuchun,  Li  Shun,  no 
Kiaochao,  170,  271 
Komura,  Viscount,  166 
Korea : alternative  to  Japanese 
rule,  207;  character,  242;  com- 
pared to  Ireland,  242  ; Declara- 
tion of  Independence,  194; 
“ geographical  gravitation," 
142;  II  Chin  Hoi,  198;  in- 
capacity for  self-government, 


INDEX 


325 


199;  influence  of  missionaries; 
193;  Japan’s  position,  204; 
President  Roosevelt’s  view,  1 77 ; 
self-determination,  170,  186, 

Seoul,  240 ; spirit  of  nation- 
alism, 200;  standard  of  living, 
207 ; sufferings  and  humiliations, 
195 ; United  States’  attitude,  193 
Kuang  Hsu,  Emperor,  303 
Kuangtung,  108 

Kuo-Min  tang,  32,  33,  36,  43,  52, 
58,  59,  65 

Labour,  Chinese,  137,  256 
Lafcadio  Hearn,  177 
Lamont,  T.  W.,  126,  193 
Lansing,  152 

League  of  Nations,  136,  179,  192, 
193,  197,  198,  199,  202,  252 
Liang  Ch’i-ch’ao,  47,  60 
Liang  Shih-yi,  292,  312 
Liaotung,  164,  203 
Li  Ching-hsi,  59,  61 
Li  Ching-mai,  301 
Li  Hung  Chang,  32,  46,  58,  97, 
104,  301 
Li  Shun,  no 
Li  Ting-hsin,  52 
Li  Yuan-hung,  50,  57,  63 
Little  Hsii,  102,  107,  108,  119 
Lu  Tsung-ju,  108 
Lu  Yung-ting,  72,  108 

Ma  Liang,  274,  275 
Manchu  dynasty  : abdication,  1 ; 
abortive  restoration,  n,  43,  56, 
269 ; Chang  Hsun's  mediation, 
60 ; collapse,  3,281;  Hsuan  Tung, 
61 ; maintenance  of  Emperor, 
297 ; never  definitely  abdicated, 
29  7,  313;  pensioners,  306; 

“ Worship  of  Heaven,”  38 
Manchuria,  46,  80,  101,  105,  106, 

126,  133;  141,  143,  147,  149,  154, 
158,  167,  173,  270,  291 

Mandarin  class,  12,  18,  25,  34, 
45,  5L  83,  87,  95,  no,  116,  t22, 
I3°,  17 3,  268,  282,  301,  312 
Mandarin  wealth  restricted,  94 
McKenzie,  F.  A.,  194 
Midzuno,  Dr.,  198 
Mikado,  318 

Missionaries,  14,  15,  20,  30,  78, 

127,  132,  193,  247,  255,  291,  317 
Mitsu-bishi,  184 

Monarchy  in  China,  32,  33,  47 
Mongolia,  105,  126,  133,  "141,  150, 
158,  167 


Morrison,  Dr.,  6,  7,  8 
Mu  Yung-hsien,  72 

Nashimoto,  Prince,  316 
National  Assembly  (Chinese),  31, 
37 

National  Convention,  13,  108, 

in 

“ New  Parliament,”  22 
Nieh,  General,  57 
Northern  Militarists,  24 

Obata,  173 

Okuma  Government,  44,  144,  188 
“ Old  Japan,”  231,  237,  319 
“ Old  Parliament,”  China,  22,  23 
Opium,  16,  17,  78,  105,  106,  131, 
261,  274,  290 
Ozaki,  152,  164,  180 

Pan- Asian  Empire,  190 
Pan-Pacific  Association,  21 
Parliament,  n,  17,  22,  23,  26,  37 
41,  50,  52,  56,  261 
Peace  Conference,  45,  102,  105, 
hi,  123,  144 

Peking : Confucian  tradition,  282 ; 
hoarding  habit,  289 ; immuta- 
bility and  modernity,  279 ; isola- 
tion, 240 ; Japanese  ascendancy, 
25,  80,  97,  no;  Obata,  173; 
official  clique,  79;  opium,  290; 
palace,  309,  318;  sanctuary  for 
millionaires,  284,  288;  students' 
strike,  283;  trade  and  traffic, 
285;  Y.M.C.A.,284 
Police,  286 
Population,  19,  220 
Postal  service,  75,  170,  292 
Presidential  election  law,  41 
“ Procreative  recklessness,"  19, 
27,  82,  248 

Provisional  Constitution,  52 

Race-mind,  41,  104 
“ Racial  discrimination,"  170,  188 
Racial  equality,  210 
Railways,  87,  105,  120,  126,  128, 
13°,  155.  161,  169,  172,  254, 
268,  274 

Reconstruction,  28,  75,  85,  113 
Reinsch,  Dr.  Paul,  8,  21,  22 
Religious  beliefs,  27,  30,  55,  85 
Revolution,  Chinese,  of  1911,1,2, 
107,  112,  115,  277 
Rice  trade,  106,  137 
Roosevelt,  President,  193,  197, 
3i7 


326 


INDEX 


Russia,  12,  46,  64,  75,  97,  135, 
M3,  153, 155. 167, 169, 186, 191, 
193,  198,  203,  21 1,  240,  317 

Saionji,  Marquis,  145,  188 
Salt  Gabelle,  53,  66,  75,  87,  98, 
125,  131,  287 

Satsuma  and  Choshiu  Clans,  161, 
181,  190 

Seiyukai  Party,  175 
Self-determination,  192,  240 
Self-government,  1,  31,  71 
Seoul,  240,  3x0,  314 
Shanghai,  90,  173,  245,  250,  252, 
253,  255,  258,  259,  263,  264, 
272,  273 

Shantung,  79,  81,  100,  119,  135, 
151,  169,  173,  267,  275,  2S5 
Sherrill,  C.  H.,  194 
Shibusawa,  Baron,  166 
Shih  Hsu,  302 
Siam,  168 

Siberia,  141,  157,  162,  194 
Silver  currency,  86,  287 
" Son  of  Heaven,"  60,  82,  96,  296, 
300 

Southern  constitutionalists,  24 
Soyeda,  166 

Students’  Movement  in  China,  26, 

30,  69,  76,  78,  79,  82,  108,  hi, 
1 14,  177.  184,  254,  282,  284 

Suffrage,  31,  227,  263 

Sun  Yat-sen,  4,  5,  8,  10,  11,  14,  21, 

31,  32,  43,  48,  57,  59,  65,  70, 
72,  73,  78,  116,  204,  262 

Sung  Chiao-jen,  35 

Tainanfu,  286 

Taiping  Rebellion,  85,  129,  252, 
273 

Tanaka,  164,  181 
Tang  Shao-yi,  52,  57,  70,  77,  80, 
90,  94,  99,  100,  103,  150 
*'  Temple  of  Heaven,"  40,  60,  305, 
312 

Terauchi,  Count,  159 
Terrorism  in  Korea,  195 
Theatre,  Japanese,  230 
Thibet,  168 
Ting,  Admiral,  312 
Tokonami,  166 

Tokyo:  art  and  religion,  228; 
democracy,  222;  high  cost  of 
living,  225;  Houses  of  Parlia- 
ment, 222 ; Imperial  Palace, 
306 ; Kabuki  Theatre,  230 ; 
population,  220 ; postal  service, 
225;  revolutionary  ideas,  227; 


Rice  Riots,  225 ; state  of  streets, 
224 

Tsai  Ao,  49 

Tsao  Ju-lin,  76,  108,  282 
Tsao  Kun,  97,  102,  107,  109,  no 
Tsen  Chun-hsuan,  72,  90 
Tsinanfu,  270,  275,  286 
Tsingtao,  171 
Tso  Tsung-tang,  312 
Tuan  Chi-jui,  13,  50,  51,  52,  54, 
56,  58,  59,  61,  79,  92,  96,  97, 
99,  108,  1 10,  xii,  1 19,  163, 
277 

Tuchuns  : amassing  of  fortunes, 
74,  93 1 appeal  to  patriotism 
useless,  94 ; Chang  Tso-lin, 
super-Tuchun,  104 ; descen- 
dants of  mandarin  Viceroys, 
91 ; diminished  power  of 
smaller  Tuchuns,  109;  dis- 
bandment of  troops,  117,  123, 
127;  hopeless  misrule,  106; 
law  unto  themselves,  87,  96, 
1 14;  Li  Shun's  bequest,  110; 
matrimonial  alliance  between 
Chang  Tso-lin  and  Tsao  Kun, 
no;  methods  in  Manchuria, 
105 ; payment  of  troops,  103 
Tung  Chih,  302 

“ Twenty-One  Demands,"  the, 
172,  173 
Tyau,  Dr.,  25 

Tzu-Hsi,  Empress-Dowager,  61, 
xo4,  282,  304,  311,  321 

Uchida,  Viscount,  157,  159,  168 

Versailles  Treaty,  76,  142,  143, 
170,  186,  197,  304 

Wang,  C.  T.,  25,  74,  77,  n6,  262, 
271 

Wang  Huai-ching,  109 
Wang  I-tang,  99,  102 
War  Participation  Loan,  100 
Weale,  Putnam,  1 1 
Wellington  Koo,  25,  70,  77,  116 
Wen  Tsung-yao,  72 
Western  learning,  24,  26,  28,  36, 
69,  73,  77,  81,  115,  201,  249, 
262,  284,  294,  299,  304 
Wilson,  President,  143,  170,  179, 
196,  252,  292 

Winter  Solstice  sacrifice,  40 
" Worship  of  Heaven,"  38 
Wu  Pei-fu,  13,  107,  108 
Wu  Ting-fang,  70,  77,  80,  90, 
312 


INDEX 


327 


Yamagata,  Prince,  161,  174,  181 
Yang  I-te,  284 

Yellow  Peril,  10,  136,  21 1,  256 
Yi,  Prince,  241,  315 
Yokohama,  251 
Yoshiwara,  171 
Yoshizawa,  166 

Yonng  China  : activities  in  the 
Press,  39,  88,  91,  107,  259; 
delusions,  313;  intimidation, 
264 ; missionary  encourage- 
ment, 78;  new  generation,  73; 
Utopianism,  261 ; vision  of 
millennium,  31 ; Western  con- 
ceptions, 115;  Yuan  Shih-k’ai 
and,  33 


Young  Turks,  29 

Yuan  Shih-k’ai  : accepts  Presi- 
dency, 29;  American  view  of, 
4,  5,  11 ; attempt  to  restore 
monarchy,  43 ; attitude  towards 
Japanese  claims,  45,  46;  char- 
acter, 34;  Cromwellian  methods, 
277;  compared  to  Diaz,  19; 
denounced  as  traitor,  50;  dicta- 
torial powers,  42,  1 19;  forsaken 
by  Tang  Shao-yi,  95;  Imperial 
aspirations,  49;  last  of  super- 
mandarins, 51 ; paternal  despot- 
ism, 27;  policy,  37,  39,  4°: 
recalled  by  Manchus,  29 ; signing 
of  mandates,  39 


Printed  in  Great  Britain  by 
Richard  Clay  & Sons,  Limited, 

PARIS  GARDEN,  STAMFORD  ST.,  S.E.  I, 
AND  BUNGAY,  SUFFOLK. 


